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Abstract 
This thesis aims to illuminate how paediatricians in the United Kingdom (UK) make difficult 
medical decisions when treating severely disabled children with complex health conditions.  In 
particular, it examines the part played, if any, by law, rights, and ethics in those decisions.  After 
drawing on jurisprudence of the English and European Human Rights Court, together with 
existing scholarship, to analyse the doctors’ decision making, this thesis adopts a legal 
consciousness theoretical approach. Using this it looks at how the paediatricians make sense of 
and conceptualise law when making these decisions. It examines how decisions are, by the 
paediatricians’ own accounts, commonly made at present and what the paediatricians say about 
how they and their colleagues make such decisions. 
 
This thesis addresses the following research questions: 
i) Which decisions do UK paediatricians find particularly difficult when working with 
disabled children and what makes those decisions particularly difficult?  
ii) What factors do UK paediatricians take into consideration when making difficult 
decisions for disabled children and what weight do they put on those factors? 
iii) What formal education in law, rights, and ethics have the doctors received and to 
what extent, if any, can we discern how this education impacts on their difficult 
decisions for disabled children? 
iv) How do UK paediatricians construct and understand the law, rights, and ethics 
when making their difficult decisions? 
 
This thesis makes an original contribution, being the first in-depth socio-legal study examining 
UK paediatricians’ medical decision-making for severely disabled children, by identifying two 
distinct styles paediatricians adopt when approaching best interest decisions, and by 
recommending a new category of legal consciousness.  It concludes by recommending 
research and changes both in doctors’ training and approach to best interest decision-making to 
address the current challenges paediatricians describe facing when deciding for severely 
disabled children. 
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Lay Abstract 
This study is interested in how doctors who work with severely disabled children in the UK 
decide when they should treat a child who is very sick and when the doctors think it is kinder, 
(referred to in law as in a child’s best interests), not to treat the child, but allow him or her to die. 
 
The author surveyed thirty-three senior doctors from around the UK, who work with disabled 
children, making these types of decisions in their day-to-day work. The author asked the doctors 
in detail about how they decide for a child. The doctors were asked who he or she involved in 
the decision-making, what the doctor considered, and how the doctor decided what things were 
most important when making the decision. 
 
Nine of the doctors also gave in-depth interviews to the researcher, talking about how they and 
their doctor colleagues make these types of decisions. 
 
This research was particularly interested in how aware the doctors are of the law and the 
guidance they receive from their professional organisations, telling them how these decisions 
should ideally be made.  The researcher was also particularly interested to know how important 
the doctors thought the law was to their decisions. Also, what did the doctors think about the 
law? Did the doctors think it helped them make the decisions or did it get in the way of making 
good decisions? Is the law something the doctors embraced or feared? 
 
The research found that doctors divide into two groups when making these decisions. One 
group, who tend to be doctors who already know the children, tend to involve a lot of other 
people including other health staff who know the child, the child’s parents and if the child is able 
to be part of the discussions, also the child. These doctors also think about the child’s welfare 
widely, not just about medical things.  The second group of doctors tend to be doctors who don’t 
already know the child and tend to be called in because they are experts in caring for very sick 
children.  They tend to have rules they have created for themselves to help them make their 
decisions about severely disabled children.  For example, lots of the doctors talked about 
doctors having a rule that they would not give intensive care to a child who has learning 
difficulties. 
 
There was a lot of discontent from the doctors in both groups about the way decisions are often 
made for severely disabled children, so this thesis ends with making some recommendations for 
further research and also changes in how doctors are trained and how they make their difficult 
decisions for severely disabled children.  The aim of these recommendations is to address the 
problems the doctors had highlighted. 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
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PART ONE      




1.  Statement of Research    
 
This thesis will examine how paediatric consultants in the United Kingdom 
(‘UK’) make difficult medical decisions when treating children with severe 
disability and complex health problems. In particular, it will examine the part 
played, if any, by the law, rights, and ethics in these decisions.  This thesis, as 
will be seen in chapter two, takes as its starting points (i) Kennedy’s question 
‘what is a medical decision?’1 and (ii) best interest decisions for children as they 
have been defined by the English High Court. These existing lenses are used to 
explore how, by their own accounts, UK paediatricians make difficult medical 
decisions for disabled children.  A legal consciousness conceptual framework is 
then adopted to fill in the gaps left by the existing lenses, by examining how the 
paediatricians make sense off and conceptualise law when making these 
decisions.  
 
Paediatric consultants are chosen as the focus of this study because of the 
dominant influence they have on the lives of disabled children.  Basnett 
summed up the impact doctors have on the lives of disabled people generally: 
‘For disabled people, the training, attitudes and behaviour of 
health professionals towards them are all vital because of the 
important role health professionals play in many disabled people’s 
lives (often with physicians dominant). These roles include 
                                                 
1 Kennedy, I, (1979) What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, Published in an amended form Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
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providing health or social care, acting as gatekeepers to 
treatment, influencing health policy and society and training future 
health professionals.’2 
 
The dominant influence medical professionals have on the lives of disabled 
children and their families was also recognised by McLaughlin in her study of 
the impact of caring on the parents of young disabled children.3 
As will be seen, the empirical research conducted for this thesis demonstrates 
the extent or otherwise to which paediatricians act as gatekeepers to treatment 
for disabled children. 
  
This chapter starts with some preliminary definitions of key terms used in this 
thesis, before going on to set out the research questions.  The structure of this 
thesis is then outlined, followed by an account of the entry points that led the 
researcher to embark on this study. 
 
2. Some Preliminary Definitions 
 
2.1   Paediatrician 
Paediatricians are medical doctors who specialise in the medical treatment and 
care of children.4  Since the focus of this thesis is the treatment of children the 




                                                 
2 Basnett, I, (2001) ‘Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Towards and Decisions Affecting 
Disabled People’,  in G.L. Albrecht, K.D. Seelman and M. Bury (eds), Handbook of Disability Studies, Sage 
Publications, London, pp.450-467, p.452 
3  McLauglin, J, (2006)  ‘Conceptualising Intensive Caring Activities: the Changing Lives of Families with 
Young Disabled Children’ 11(1) Sociological Research Online, 
<http://www.socresonline.org.uk/11/1/mclaughlin.html> accessed 4 July 2018 
4 Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, 2016, What is Paediatrics?, accessed  20 January 2017, 
https://www.rcpch.ac.uk/training-examinations-professional-development/paediatric-careers-and-
recruitment/careers/what-paedi 
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2.2    Children 
This study examines the treatment and care of disabled children.   
There is no single legal definition of a child across the United Kingdom. Article 1 
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was ratified 
by the United Kingdom in 1991, however, defines ‘child’ as  
‘every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the 
law applicable to the child, majority is obtained earlier.’5   
 
This thesis will, however, make a distinction between children under the age of 
two, who will be referred to as ‘infants’ and children from the age of two to the 
age of 18 years, who will be referred to as ‘children’.  It is acknowledged that it 
is more usual for the term ‘infant’ to be used for children up to the age of one. 
However, it will be argued that there are important differences between children 
above and below two years of age, which make the determination of the child’s 
best interests potentially a different exercise.  This distinction is also made 
because of the lack of focus on best interest decisions for disabled children 
(over two) by the English High Court up to the time of the empirical research for 
this thesis6 and by commentators.  Young people, including those over the age 
of 16, are included within the definition of children in this study.7 
 
 
                                                 
5 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, Article 1 
6 More recently the English High Court has turned its focus to children over the age of two years old in 
cases such as Re AA [2014] EWHC 4861 (not a dispute, but concerned with the withdrawal of treatment 
from a disabled child aged 12; King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v MH [2015] EWHC 1920 
and King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Y ND MH [2015] EWHC 1966 (7 year old with spinal 
muscular atrophy); County Durham and Darlington NHS Foundation Trust v SS, FS and MS [2016] EWHC 
535 (7 year old); A Local Authority and An NHS Trust v MC & FC & C [2017] EWHC 370 (13 year old) 
7 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 applies to children from the age of 16; see s.2 (5) (b) in England and 
Wales s.64 (4). This requires all decisions for those who lack capacity to be made in their best interests 
s.4.  Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 applies to children from the age of 16 in Scotland see s.1 
(6). Any intervention must benefit the individual concerned s.1 (2) 
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2.3     Disabled 
 
The doctors in this study were asked about their treatment and care of ‘disabled 
children’.  For reasons explained in chapter three, the doctors in this study were 
told that the children of interest for this study were ‘children with chronic health 
conditions and sometimes sensory and cognitive impairments.  These children 
will sometimes have some level of neurological impairment, will often be 
described as having life-limiting conditions, although they will not necessarily be 
terminally ill.  It is important, however, that disability is not conflated with illness.  
There are clearly many disabled adults and children who have no significant 
health problems.  The focus of this study was however, disabled children with 
complex health problems. Their health problems may be severe and chronic, or 
they may be acute, or indeed both.  
 
The children have lived beyond infancy, some into their teens.  They would be 
described by health professionals as having ‘a life limiting illness’, one that is 
incurable, will shorten the child’s natural lifespan, although the length of that life 
can vary from months to decades.8 Many of the children will have severe 
cerebral palsy, the most common cause of permanent disability in children.9 
The children can experience: 
‘frequent illness due to their increased risk of epilepsy, gastrointestinal 
and nutritional problems and respiratory disorders compared with the 
general childhood population with those children who are most severely 
motor impaired at the greatest risk’.10 
 
                                                 
8 Fraser, LK, Miller, M, Hain, R, Norman, P, Aldridge, J, McKinney, PA & Parslow, RC, (2012)‘Rising 
national prevalence of life-limiting conditions in England’,  Pediatrics, vol. 129, no. 40, pp. 923-929 
9 Meehan E, Freed Gl, Reid SM, Williams K, Sewell JR, Rawicki B & Reddihough DS,( 2015) ‘Tertiary 
paediatric admissions in children and young people with cerebral palsy’, Child: care, health and 
development, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 928-937 
10 Ibid 
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They may be dependant in their everyday lives on medical technology, ‘with 
one in ten reliant on a gastronomy feeding tube’.11 Despite the complexity of 
their impairments and health problems, the children will live mostly at home, 
attend nursery or school, and have wide and varied life experiences.   
 
They are children who twenty to twenty-five years ago, would probably have not 
have survived infancy.12  As such, these children present new challenges for 
both medicine and law; not only in terms of how to care for the children; they 
raise ethically and legally challenging questions about when is it in a child’s best 
interests to continue treatment and when treatment should be withheld or 
withdrawn.   
 
This thesis shall use the term ‘disabled children’ being the term used in the UK 
by government and public bodies.  UK public bodies use the term to reflect the 
social model of disability13 and the fact that the children have been disabled by 
their circumstances.  It can be contrasted with the phrase ‘living with disabilities’ 
favoured by the United Nations (‘UN’) as putting the emphasis on the person or 
child first rather than on their impairment.  While there is merit in both these 
formulations, the first is used because it is the most commonly used in the UK. 
  
                                                 
11 Ibid 
12 McFarlane A, Mugford M (2012) ‘Epidemiology’ in Janet M. Rennie (ed), Rennie & Robertson’s 
Textbook of Neonatology’, Churchill, London 
13 ‘the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social organisation which takes 
little or no account of people who have physical impairments and thus excludes them from participation 
from mainstream or social activities’, source: Shakespeare, T, 2016, ‘The Social Model of Disability’, in 
David LJ, (Ed), The Disabilities Studies Reader, chapter 13, Taylor & Francis, Abington, p. 196 
 
P a g e  | 6 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
2.4     Difficult Decisions 
The doctors in this study were asked about their ‘difficult decisions’ for disabled 
children.  As will be seen in chapter three, this term was used rather than asking 
doctors about their ‘best interest’ decisions, so as not to  
pre-empt the types of decisions doctors would choose and to avoid anticipating 
how they would frame and speak about the decision-making process.  However, 
as will be seen, all but two doctors did choose to talk about end-of-life, best 
interest decisions.  Once this finding has been discussed in chapter four,14 the 
terms ‘difficult decisions’, ‘end-of-life decisions’ and ‘best interest decisions’ are 
used interchangeably in this thesis. 
 
2.5     Ethics 
The term ethics is not, within this thesis, conceived within a traditional academic 
or medico-legal disciplinary understanding, but rather through the lens of the 
doctors’ professional practice and guidance from the paediatrician’s 
professional bodies most notably the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child 
Health (‘RCPCH’) and the General Medical Council (‘GMC’).  
 
2.6     Law 
The term law is defined widely to include, but not limited to, domestic legislation, 
international treaties, case law of the UK courts and the European Court of 
Human Rights (‘ECtHR’), and soft law, such as the doctors’ professional ethical 
guidance. 
 
Having established these basic definitions, this chapter now turns to the 
research questions of this thesis and indicates in brief, where each research 
question will primarily be addressed within this thesis. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Chapter four, para 5.1, p.168 
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3. Research Questions 
 
This thesis will address the following research questions: 
i) Which decisions do UK paediatricians find particularly difficult when 
working with disabled children and what makes those decisions 
particularly difficult?  
ii) What factors do UK paediatricians take into consideration when 
making difficult decisions for disabled children and what weight do 
they put on those factors? 
iii) What formal education in law, rights and ethics have the doctors 
received and to what extent, if any, can we discern how this 
education impacts on their difficult decisions for disabled children? 
iv) How do UK paediatricians construct and understand the law, rights, 
and ethics when making their difficult decisions? 
 
The findings for research question (i) are presented in chapter four of this 
thesis; the findings from research question (ii) are presented in chapters four, 
five, and six; the findings from research question (iii) are presented in chapters 
eight and nine, and the findings from research question (iv) are also presented 
in chapters eight and nine. 
 
4. Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis is formed of three parts. Part one starts with this introductory 
chapter, which continues by setting out key influences that led to this study.  A 
brief explanation is given as to why certain key texts and cases were formative.  
The rest of this chapter then sets out information about the author’s personal 
and professional background that strongly influenced the start of this study, 
while also outlining steps taken to guard against that same background biasing 
this study. 
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Part one of this thesis continues with chapter two, surveying the key milestones 
in law and paediatricians’ ethical guidance dealing with best interests and end-
of-life decision-making that preceded this study. It starts with the seminal 1979 
Astor Lecture given by Ian Kennedy.15  Chapter two16 also provides an overview 
of earlier studies that have considered doctors’ attitudes towards disabled 
patients. 
 
Chapter three concludes part one, by describing the methodology used for the 
empirical research in this study.  It also addresses the research ethics issues 
this thesis raised in more detail.  
 
In part two17 the findings from the empirical research in this study are 
presented. In chapter four18 the questions (i) who are the doctors in this study; 
(ii) which decisions do they find difficult; (iii) what makes those decisions difficult 
and (iv) what factors do they consider when making difficult decisions for 
disabled children, are answered. In chapter five,19 particular focus is given to 
what doctors said in their survey responses about the importance of prognosis, 
futility, a child’s quality of life, and a child’s cognitive ability to their difficult 
decisions.  Part two concludes with chapter six20 which turns to what the 
doctors said about disagreements and uncertainty in their interview. 
 
                                                 
15 Kennedy, I, (1979) What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, published in an amended form Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
16 Chapter two, para 10, pp. 82-91 
17 Chapters four -six, pp.137-284 
18 Chapter four, pp.137-179 
19 Chapter five, pp.181-236 
20 Chapter six, pp.237-284 
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Part three of this thesis deals with the doctors’ reflections on the law.  It starts in 
chapter seven21 with a discussion of legal consciousness, the theoretical 
framework used to analyse how the doctors conceptualise law in relation to their 
decisions. It is acknowledged that a conceptual framework is more commonly 
presented earlier in a thesis.  However, while the questions what and how 
doctors make their decisions can be answered in part two of this thesis through 
the existing lenses of law and ethics,22 these lenses seemed unable to answer 
the question why doctors make decisions in the ways they do.  A legal 
consciousness framework was therefore adopted to try to explore the question 
why, with an analysis of the doctors’ reflections on the law in part three of this 
thesis. 
 
Consideration is also given in chapter seven to how the paediatricians are 
situated, both in terms of how they are placed or otherwise, within legal and 
ethical frameworks and how they are situated within a culture of healthcare, the 
NHS, their hospital, department and wider culture. Chapters eight23 and nine24 
then explore what the doctors wrote and said about law, rights and ethics in 
their survey and interviews respectively. In chapter ten,25 the final chapter of 
part three and of this thesis, conclusions are drawn and consideration is given 
to the place, if any, of law in doctors’ difficult decisions for disabled children. 
Consideration is also given as to whether changes are needed in how best 
interest decisions are made for disabled children in the UK, including whether 
changes are needed in the legal process and, if so, what these might be.  
 
 
                                                 
21 Chapter seven, pp. 285-321 
22 see para 1, p.1, ante 
23 Chapter eight, pp.323-346 
24 Chapter nine, pp.347-380 
25 Chapter ten, pp. 381-403 
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5. How this thesis came about 
 
This section presents the various entry points for the commencement of this 
thesis, to situate the researcher and explain the key influences that motivated 
and guided the thesis. 
 
5.1  Doctrinal developments 
This study uses mixed methods approach to research. One initial starting point 
was desk-based research, which was used to review relevant academic papers, 
statutes, international human rights conventions, professional guidance, and the 
case law of the English High Court and the ECtHR. 
 
Kennedy’s 1979 Astor Lecture,26 in which he posed the question, ‘what is a 
medical decision?’ has already been mentioned as one of the key academic 
papers that guided the development of the thesis.  The lecture, and the debate 
it inspired, are discussed in detail in chapter two.27  Many of the questions 
Kennedy poses, such as what types of decisions are legitimate ones for doctors 
to make and whether doctors have the education and training to make them, 
are particularly pertinent to disabled children.  This pertinence arises in part 
because of the lack of autonomy disabled children experience and, as Basnett’s 
earlier28 quotation29 suggests, the dominant influence doctors can have on 
disabled people’s lives generally and, as will be argued in chapter two, disabled 
children’s in particular. 
 
                                                 
26 Kennedy, I, (1979) What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, published in an amended form Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
27 chapter two, para 2,  pp.25-34 
28 See page one ante 
 
29 Basnett, I, (2001) ’Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Towards and Decisions Affecting 
Disabled People’, in G.L. Albrecht, K.D. Seelman and M. Bury (eds), Handbook of Disability Studies, Sage 
Publications, London, pp.450-467 
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The question as to whether doctors have the training and education to make 
certain decisions was also raised at the admissibility hearing before the ECtHR 
in litigation concerning David Glass.30 The case considered whether doctors 
were acting within their powers by treating a child in clear contravention of the 
child’s mother’s wishes without first seeking authority from the court.  At its 
centre was 12-year-old David, a boy with significant physical and cognitive 
impairment.  His lawyers argued: 
‘it is inappropriate and unreasonable to leave the task of balancing 
fundamental rights to the doctors.  They have no training in such a task, 
which is pre-eminently a judicial function.31   
 
The Glass litigation32 and the academic debate that followed are discussed in 
detail in the next chapter.33 They were influential in the development of the 
research questions in this thesis, being the only contemporary case34 to cover 
the issues this thesis explores head on. 
 
Conflict between the medical team and David’s family, and uncertainty as to 
David’s prognosis, featured strongly in the events that led to the Glass litigation.  
 
The impact Glass and the debate it provoked in guiding the argument 
herein can be seen explicitly in research question three, which draws 
directly on Kennedy’s argument, and the assertion made in Glass, that 
doctors do not have training to make what can be seen as legal and 
ethical rather than medical decisions.  The paediatricians in this study 
                                                 
30 Glass v UK [2003] ECHR Admissibility Decision no. 61827/00 
31 Ibid 
32 Glass, R (On the application of) v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust [1999] EWCA Civ 1914; Glass, R (On 
the application of) v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust [1999] EWHC Admin 343; Glass v UK [2003] ECHR 
Admissibility Decision no. 61827/00 
33 Chapter two, para 7, pp. 61-75 
34 see FN 6 ante 
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were directly asked about their training and education in law, rights, and 
ethics.  In chapters eight and nine35 what the doctors say about making 
best interest decisions for disabled children is also mapped against how 
much legal and ethical education individual doctors have received.  
 
It is perhaps worthy of comment that David Glass and Charlotte Wyatt, a 
disabled infant at the centre of repeated best interest applications to court,36 
were both treated in the same hospital, St Mary’s, Portsmouth.  This does beg 
the question as to whether there was something about the culture of that 
hospital which led to disputes between families of disabled children and medical 
staff becoming particularly antagonistic.  The impact of the culture of different 
medical schools, hospitals, departments, and paediatric sub-specialisms is 
another theme that emerges in this thesis and is explored in chapters two,37 
six38 and seven.39  
 
 5.2  Personal Influences 
Although this thesis is not written in the first person, for reasons that will 
become obvious the following sections of this chapter are written in the first 
person. 
 
My personal background as the mother to my son Adam was a profound 
influence on my embarking on this thesis.  Adam, who lived with severe 
physical impairment, multiple, and very complex health problems was largely 
                                                 
35 Chapter eight pp. 323-346, chapter nine, pp.347-380 
36 Wyatt (a child) (medical treatment: parents' consent) Re [2004] EWHC 2247 (Fam), [2005] 1 FLR 21; 
Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust v Wyatt [2005] EWHC 117 (Fam), [2005] All ER (D) 294 (Jan); Wyatt v 
Portsmouth NHS Trust and another, [2005] EWHC 693 (Fam); Wyatt (a child) (medical treatment: 
continuation of order) Re, [2005] EWCA Civ 1181, [2005] 1 WLR 3995; Wyatt Re, [2005] EWHC 2293 
(Fam), [2005] 4 All ER 1325; Wyatt v Portsmouth Hospital NHS, [2006] EWCA Civ 529 
37 Chapter two, para 8, pp. 75-79 & para. 10, pp. 82-91 
38 Chapter six, para 4.2, p. 249 
39 Chapter seven, para 10, pp. 315-318 
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typical of the children who are the focus of this study.  He was perhaps atypical 
in being educationally bright, with no cognitive impairment.   Adam spent over 
eight years of his life in hospital, which in turn meant that I have spent over 
eight years of my life in children’s hospitals, engaging with medical and nursing 
staff and for much of the time sitting observing.  Adam was born in 2000 and 
acquired severe cerebral palsy shortly after his birth.  He later acquired 
significant complex health problems.  Adam died, (while I was researching this 
thesis), from sepsis in 2015. 
 
Adam received care in seven different hospitals in the United Kingdom, a 
combination of district, tertiary and specialist children’s hospitals.  Moreover, 
because he had several serious health problems he was seen by specialists 
from several paediatric sub-specialties, including general paediatrics, 
neurology, respiratory medicine, endocrinology, metabolic medicine,  
gastroenterology, ear nose and throat, intensive care, and emergency 
medicine.   
 
Over the years, it intrigued me that paediatric consultants could see the same 
child presenting with the same symptoms at the same moment very differently.  
I began wondering why this was and what influenced the doctors in their 
decisions and attitudes towards Adam. I perceived cultural differences not just 
within different hospitals, but also between departments within the same 
hospital. Different consultants often had completely disparate views of Adam 
and his state of health despite at times reviewing him within minutes of each 
other.  At times the contrasts was extreme, with, for example, two consultants 
viewing Adam within minutes of each other, one declaring him fit for home and 
the other saying he needed admission to Paediatric Intensive Care (‘PICU’).  
Doctors who regularly saw him also ranged in their assessment of his cognitive 
ability from being educationally gifted with no cognitive impairment at all, to 
having no awareness at all and being totally unable to communicate.   
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This should be read in the context of Adam’s life more generally and, for 
example, his attendance at mainstream school. He was always at the top end of 
the ability range educationally for his age.  His was in the top stream at 
secondary school.  He blogged and wrote poetry and as a teenager was 
regularly commissioned to write by the NHS nationally and by charities.  It 
seemed that paediatricians’ totally contradictory assessments of Adam, whether 
of his medical or cognitive state, could not all be simultaneously correct.  This 
led me to ponder what were doctors basing their judgments upon if not on 
Adam?  This in turn led to research question two in this thesis, an inquiry 
into what factors paediatricians take into consideration when deciding for 
disabled children. 
 
As Adam’s mother, with a legal background and researching a PhD in best 
interest decisions, I was also invited over time to serve on numerous 
committees with health professionals. For example, I was a member of various 
committees of the Scottish National Clinical Network for Children with 
Exceptional Health Care Needs,40 a member of Child Health UK Epilepsy Death 
review,41 a member of NICE’s ‘End of Life Care for Children and Young People’ 
Expert Guidelines Committee42 and a specialist member of the NICE Quality 
Assurance Committee43 for the same guideline.  I was also co-opted on to 
various RCPCH committees including its Council44 and Ethics and Law 
                                                 
40  Scottish National Clinical Network for Children with Exceptional Health Care Needs, 
<https://www.cen.scot.nhs.uk>, accessed 25 January 2018 
41Child Health Reviews UK, (2013)  ‘Themed case reviews of mortality and morbidity in children and 
young people with epilepsy’, <https://www.rcpch.ac.uk/child-health-reviews-uk/programme-
findings/programme-findings-chr-uk>, accessed 25 January 2018 
42 NICE, ‘End of life care for infants, children and young people with life-limiting conditions: planning and 
management,’ (2016) NG61, <https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ng61>, accessed 25 January 2018 
43 NICE, ‘End of life care for infants, children and young people, Quality Standard,’ (2017) 
<https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/qs160>, accessed 25 January 201 
44 RCPCH <https://www.rcpch.ac.uk/council/rcpch-council>, accessed 26 January 2018 
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Advisory Committee.45  I also served on steering committees dealing with 
human rights and equality for NHS Lothian. I am currently a co-lead author with 
two consultant paediatricians of new guidance on child death for NHS England 
and the Department of Health and on the advisory committee for the National 
Confidential Inquiry into Patient Outcome and Death (NCEPOD) child neuro-
disability study.46   
 
These appointments and roles have given me the opportunity to work closely 
with doctors and other health professionals not involved with my son’s 
healthcare and to engage with them in a different dynamic and environment 
than that of ‘parent of sick child’ and paediatrician.   Both children’s rights and 
best interests have been discussed frequently so I have had the opportunity to 
hear doctors discuss rights and best interests and gain insights into doctors’ 
understanding of these concepts as they discussed them amongst themselves. 
This has given me greater insight into doctors’ understanding of and attitudes 
towards the law and the role, or otherwise, they see it playing in their decisions.  
 
From the very beginning of my research I was conscious that my personal 
experiences would have a significant impact on my research.  The ethical 
issues this raised are discussed in greater detail in chapter three.47  I was 
coming to my research with years of experience of having observed literally 
hundreds of doctors making difficult decisions about a disabled child with very 
complex health problems.  I had seen many doctors provide my son with what I 
regarded as first class medical care, but I had also seen a small but significant 
minority treat my child in ways that distressed and horrified me.  I was aware 
                                                 
45 RCPCH, <https://www.rcpch.ac.uk/what-we-do/ethics/ethics-and-law-resources/ethics-and-law-
resource>, accessed 26 January 2018 
46 NCEPOD <http://www.ncepod.org.uk/cn.html>, accessed 26 January 2018 
47 Chapter three, para 2, pp.96-105 
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that I was bringing to this research strong opinions on the matters being 
researched and with considerable experience of at times observing and at other 
times being involved in the type of difficult medical decisions which are the 
subject of my study. 
 
I was also very conscious from the start that it was not a subject I could 
approach with total emotional detachment.  As I discuss in chapter three, the 
question as to whether I should tell doctors I interviewed of my parental status, 
raised significant ethical issues.  My status as Adam’s mother prepared me I 
believe, for any potentially distressing comments doctors may make about 
disabled children and enabled me to remain detached.  
 
Having to consider the impact of one’s own personal experiences and having 
close links with the subject being researched, is not an unusual one for a 
researcher.  Indeed, it seems unlikely that anyone would choose to embark on 
years of study of a topic they knew little or nothing about.  I would suggest that 
most people choose to research subjects they have strong feelings about.  As 
Bell identifies, there are definite advantages to being an ‘inside’ researcher as 
she terms it: - 
‘For example, he [the researcher] had an intimate knowledge of the 
context of the research and of the micro politics of the institution…He 
found that colleagues welcomed the opportunity to air problems and to 
have their situation analysed by someone who understood the practical 
day-to-day realities of their task’.48    
 
Bell is describing a researcher who is interviewing his colleagues, but while the 
doctors I interviewed were not aware I was a parent, they often expressed their 
pleasure at having the opportunity to discuss the relevant issues with me; 
indeed, several expressly thanked me for researching the issues.  Bell also 
highlights that her researcher found it uncomfortable interviewing colleagues.  
                                                 
48 Bell, J, (2010) Doing Your Research Project, fifth edition, Open University Press, Maidenhead, pp. 54-
55 
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As a parent, the situation could be even more problematic if I were to interview 
doctors who treated my son.  I would have felt restrained in some of the 
questions I asked them.  I suspect, at least some of the doctors would not have 
felt comfortable giving me full and frank answers to my questions.  As will be 
explained in chapter three,49 I ask doctors personal and probing questions, not 
just about their background and family status, but also their religious faith.  
Doctors are asked to reflect on very intimate aspects of their professional 
practice, indeed, even the lawfulness of their or their colleagues’ actions.  It is 
likely that addressing such questions with doctors who treated my son would 
have inevitably changed the dynamic of our relationship and could have been 
very difficult for both parties.  As I explain in more depth in chapter three,50 I 
therefore did not include any doctor who treated my son in my research.  I also 
did not include any doctors at all from Edinburgh’s Royal Hospital for Sick 
Children because Adam spent a large part of his life there.  
 
As I also explain in chapter three,51 I did discuss my survey and interview 
questions with doctors I knew, but only with ones who had very brief 
involvement in Adam’s care.  Just as Bell reports, the doctors with whom I 
discussed my research questions welcomed the opportunity to discuss the 
issues raised. They welcomed my research.  I was fascinated by this, 
particularly as two of the doctors were very senior practitioners in positions of 
some influence locally and nationally.  I was interested to find that once I 
embarked on my interviews, nearly every doctor interviewed expressed a 
similar view; namely, their thanks to me for researching the topic and on some 
occasions expressed almost relief at having the opportunity to discuss the 
issues; welcoming the fact these issues were being researched and addressed.  
                                                 
49 Chapter three, para 3, pp.105-108 
50 Chapter three, para 2.3, p.103-104 
51 Chapter three, para 4, p.108-109 
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I was struck by a sense from several of the consultants, despite their senior 
positions, that they felt helpless to address what they saw were failings in the 
healthcare of disabled children.  This sense of helplessness is explored in more 
depth in chapter six.52 
 
There has also been an additional impact on my research due to my status as 
Adam’s mum.  I have worked on my PhD part-time.  Additionally, Adam’s health 
problems meant that the time I had to work on my PhD has been very restricted.  
While Adam was alive I was only able to work on it while Adam was in school, 
which due to his health problems, was limited.  Moreover, there have been long 
spells when I had to abandon my research when Adam was critically ill or 
because his school nursing support had not been forthcoming.   I was unable to 
work on my PhD for several months following Adam’s unexpected death and 
the circumstances of Adam’s death meant analysing and writing about the data 
from the doctors’ surveys and interviews was very traumatic.  This meant writing 
data chapters took considerably longer than they would have done in more 
normal circumstances.  
 
On the flip side of this, when Adam was critically ill, I observed first hand 
doctors grappling with best interest decisions in real life and death situations. I 
have since reflected on these observations.  The time I have spent with my son 
when he was critically ill has been important in helping to crystallise the key 
themes of my PhD: how do doctors make difficult decisions when treating 
disabled children with complex health problems and what part can the law, 
rights, ethics and professional guidance play, if any, in improving how those 
decisions are made and fundamentally the care such children receive? 
 
I fully recognise that my closeness to the subject matter of my PhD legitimately 
calls into question my objectivity as a researcher.  Academia has no doubt 
                                                 
52 Chapter six, para 5, pp. 251-256 
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moved on from the view expressed by Myrdal in 1969 that ‘the ethos of social 
science is the search for objective truth’.53 Indeed, as Philips54 and Rossman & 
Rallis55 point out: what is meant by objectivity is itself subjective and will depend 
on the perception of the researcher or the observer.  I suggest that it is more 
important and I am more likely to succeed, if rather than searching for research 
objectivity, which, in any event I and others argue is not possible, I am self-
aware and reflexive about my subjective opinions, values and the influences 
which have brought me to my research; that I acknowledge these - which is 
what this chapter is aiming to do - and take steps to avoid my subjective views 
harming my research.  The steps I have taken to do this are discussed in 
greater detail in chapter three,56 but include detailed discussion of my survey 
and interview questions with my supervisors; discussing the same with 
paediatricians; and with the interviewee’s consent, making sound recordings of 
interviews and transcribing them in full to help ensure the doctors’ words are 
accurately recorded.  I have attempted a mindful approach to the research, 
where biased selection of subjects and the data they provide is very 
consciously recognised as a real risk and actively avoided as far as this is ever 
possible.   
 
For this thesis, it is all the more important that my personal and professional 
background is acknowledged, because a key question for my study is the 
influence the doctors’ personal, professional and academic background have on 
their difficult medical decisions for disabled children.  It seems to me that if I am 
examining, in essence, the extent to which doctors are subjective in their 
                                                 
53 Myrdal, G, (1969) Objectivity in social research, Pantheon, New York, p.40 
54 Phillips, DC, (1990) ‘Subjectivity and Objectivity: An Objective Inquiry’, in Eisner, EW, & Peshkin, A, 
(Eds), Education: Qualitative Inquiry In The Continuing Debate, Teachers College Press, New York 
55 Rossman, GB, (2011) Learning in the Field: An Introduction to Qualitative Research, Third Edition, Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks 
56 Chapter three, para 2.3, pp.103-104 
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professional decisions, I must be upfront about my own subjectivity or risk 
extreme hypocrisy.   
 
5.3   Professional Influences 
I also bring my professional training and experience as an English qualified 
solicitor to my research.  Not only have I spent years observing the care a 
severely disabled child received through the eyes of a mother, but also through 
the eyes of a solicitor and one with particular interest in child and human rights.  
My observations of doctors have been coloured by my training and experience 
as a solicitor, a profession where respect for the law, ethics and professional 
conduct is paramount.   
 
My identity as a solicitor has also impacted on the perception doctors treating 
my son had of me, sometimes to Adam’s advantage and sometimes to his 
disadvantage.  Some consultants expressly stated that they identify with me 
because of my professional status and hence felt a close bond with Adam.  For 
other doctors my professional status has clearly been a cause for concern.  
There were occasions when my professional status was the first thing a doctor 
mentioned when called to see Adam.  Indeed, I was often told by nurses and 
doctors I knew well, that my professional status was the first thing shared by 
certain staff when discussing Adam. 
 
My status as a solicitor also meant that my son grew up in a particular social 
and economic environment. This enabled him, up to a point, to maximise his 
potential, both in terms of his health and education.  This of course, is an 
influence that my professional status had on my son’s care, rather than on my 
research.  However, I suggest that the two are interlinked.  My status as a 
solicitor gave me a very particular experience of parenting a disabled child with 
complex health problems, in many ways different, in some respects more 
positive and in some respects more negative, than other parents in a similar 
position.  It is my very particular experience that led me to this thesis. 
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I would also suggest that my status as a solicitor has helped me to be cognisant 
of being overly subjective and to maintain a more professional detachment 
when interviewing doctors.  My professional training and practice has taught 
and educated me to weigh up the evidence; to come to a judgment on the 
merits of an issue, not by ignoring the emotional impact of the decision, but by 
detaching myself from the emotional impact on me and others.   
 
My awareness of the impact of my own personal and professional 
background on how I conceptualised best interest decisions, was 
influential in me asking, with research question two, what factors 
paediatricians consider when they make best interest decisions for 
disabled children. 
 
Having established what led me to the start of this thesis, the next chapter 
surveys the key milestones in law and ethics that preceded it and the part they 
played on the development of the research questions in this thesis.  It also 
addresses briefly the first of two overarching contributions this thesis makes to 
current literature, namely a better understanding of how paediatricians make 
difficult decisions for disabled children and the part, if any played by the law in 
those decisions.  The second contribution this thesis makes is to suggest a new 
category of legal consciousness.  This is addressed in chapter seven and 
nine.57  Both contributions will be further unpacked throughout this thesis. 
  
                                                 
57 Chapter seven, para 11.2, p.320, chapter nine, para 3.1, pp. 361-365 
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Chapter Two 
 
A survey of key milestones in the development of this thesis 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
This chapter surveys key academic and legal milestones in the development of 
law and ethics relevant to paediatricians’ difficult decision-making for disabled 
children, from Kennedy’s 1979 seminal Astor Lecture ‘What is a medical 
decision?’58 to April 2010 when the first surveys in this study were sent to 
doctors. 
 
The aim of this chapter is not just to critically evaluate key milestones but also 
to illustrate the contextual timeline that led to the research questions in this 
thesis. This chapter presents the lens through which what the doctors in this 
study say about their decision-making is evaluated and highlights the questions 
the literature leaves unanswered that this thesis aims to address.  It will be 
recalled from chapter one, that this thesis addresses the following research 
questions: 
 
i) Which decisions do UK paediatricians find particularly difficult when 
working with disabled children and what makes those decisions 
particularly difficult?  
ii) What factors do UK paediatricians take into consideration when 
making difficult decisions for disabled children and what weight do 
they put on those factors? 
                                                 
58 Kennedy, I, (1979). What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, published in an amended form in Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
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iii) What formal education in law, rights and ethics have the doctors 
received and does this education impact on their difficult decisions for 
disabled children? 
iv) How do UK paediatricians construct and understand the law, rights 
and ethics when making their difficult decisions? 
 
The review of the case law in this chapter is not intended to be a 
comprehensive account of all relevant cases, but rather to highlight key cases 
that illustrate how courts construct the concept of best interest decision-making 
for severely disabled children. This will provide a benchmark to compare how 
the doctors in this study say best interest decisions are actually made in 
hospitals around the UK.   
 
This chapter starts by considering Kennedy’s Astor Lecture, it then goes on to 
evaluate the breakthrough cases of Re B (A Minor) (1981)59 and R v Arthur 
(1981).60 The focus then turns to national and international child, disability and 
human rights legislation and the introduction of professional ethical guidance on 
end-of-care decision-making for children. The chapter then considers 
investigations into the healthcare of disabled people before reviewing research 
that considers the impact of doctors’ attitudes on the treatment disabled people 
receive.  It ends by summarising the findings of this review and the contribution 
this thesis makes. This exercise is important for the rest of the thesis because it 
sets the scene, showing what is already known about the impact of law, rights 
and ethics on difficult decisions for disabled children and what contribution this 
thesis makes to this debate. 
  
                                                 
59 Re B (A Minor) (Wardship, Medical Treatment) [1981] WLR 1421, CA, August 1981, 
60 R v Arthur [1981] 12 BMLR 1, heard before Farquharson J, 3-5th November, 1981 
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2.  Starting Points: Kennedy ‘What is a Medical Decision?’ 
 
Kennedy’s paper delivered as the Astor Lecture at Middlesex Hospital Medical 
School on 3rd July 1979 ‘What is a Medical Decision?’61 is chosen as the 
starting point for this timeline because the late 1970s and early 1980s are seen 
by commentators, among them Clements and Read,62 as when the paradigm in 
attitudes towards both doctors and disabled children and perhaps most 
importantly, doctors’ attitudes to disabled children, began to shift from one of 
unquestioning deference to doctors and an attitude towards disabled children 
where: 
‘it was common practice to bring about deaths of some children with 
learning disabilities or physical impairments, particularly if their parents’ 
social or personal situation was ‘unfavourable’.63 
 
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the coming together of several factors;64 
early challenges to unquestioning deference to doctors by Kennedy and 
others;65 advances in medical technologies resulting in the survival of babies 
with severe impairments who would have previously died;66 a criminal 
prosecution of a senior paediatrician;67 the start of lobbying by pressure 
                                                 
61 Kennedy, I, (1979). What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, published in an amended form Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
62 Clements L & Read J, (2008), ‘Demonstrably Awful- The right to life and the selective non-treatment of 
disabled babies and young children’, chapter 8 in Clements L & Read J, (Eds), Disabled People and the 
Right to Life, Routledge, Abington, pp.148-175 
63Ibid, p.149 
64 Ibid, p.158 
65 Ibid, see also Illich, I, (1977) Limits to Medicine, Penguin, London 
66 Mcfarlane, A, Mugford, M, (2012) ‘Epidemilogy’ in J Rennie (ed), Rennie & Robertson’s Textbook of 
Neonatology, Churchill, London 
67 R v Arthur [1981] 12 BMLR 1, heard before Farquharson J, 3-5th November, 1981 
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groups;68changes in policy leading to disabled people moving from institutions 
into the community69 and access to education for children with cognitive 
impairments.70 All of these played a role in the evolution of attitudes towards 
both doctors and disabled people. 
 
Clements and Read summarise the lot of disabled children (and indeed adults) 
before the start of this shift in very grim terms: 
‘Taken together, the overwhelmingly negative and burdensome images 
of living with disability, the barriers which prevented disabled people 
living ordinary lives, the segregated and frequently dehumanising service 
provision, the tendency to characterise disabled children and adults as 
falling outside majority definitions of personhood, and the exclusion of 
disabled people and disability issues from political and policy agendas 
may be seen as significant factors in a context where practices to curtail 
disabled children’s lives were legitimated.’71 
 
McIntosh, now a retired neonatologist, describes his own and his colleagues’ 
attitudes in the 1970s as ‘arrogant’.72 He describes turning off infants’ 
ventilators overnight and then telling their mothers in the morning so mothers 
‘would not have a disturbed night’s sleep’.73 
 
                                                 
68 Campbell, J, Oliver, M, (2013) Disability Politics, Routledge, Abington  
69 Department of Health and Social Security, (1971) Better services for the mentally handicapped, Cm 
4683  
70 Education (Handicapped Children) Act 1970 
71 Clements L & Read J, (2008) ‘Demonstrably Awful- The right to life and the selective non-treatment of 
disabled babies and young children’, chapter 8 in Clements L & Read J, (Eds), Disabled People and the 
Right to Life, Routledge, Abington, p. 160 
72 McIntosh, N, (2017) ‘Ethics’, chapter 14 in Craft A & Dodd K (Eds), From An Association to A Royal 
College: The History of the British Paediatric Association and Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Heath 
1988-20016, Springer, New York, p.110 
73 Ibid 
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This thesis explores paediatricians’ best interest decisions and is strongly 
influenced, as was discussed in the last chapter, by Kennedy’s argument that 
some decisions made by doctors are not medical or wholly medical ‘which may 
not properly be within the unique or special competence of a doctor qua doctor 
to make’.74 It develops Kennedy’s argument, in the context of decisions for 
severely disabled children.  However, while Kennedy hypothesizes that doctors 
are not competent to make decisions which are essentially legal or ethical in 
nature, research questions two, three and four of this thesis test 
Kennedy’s hypothesis by asking paediatricians directly about their 
training and education in law and ethics and the impact of law on their 
difficult decisions.  This thesis also maps individual doctor’s education 
and training in law and ethics75 with a view to ascertaining whether 
doctors who have had significant education and training in law and ethics 
construct and conceive their decisions for disabled children the same or 
differently from doctors who have not. 
 
It is noteworthy that Kennedy starts his paper by explaining why his own status 
as a lawyer is significant: ‘I may say things which are rarely heard in the hurly-
burly of medical life.’76 Kennedy is making the point that he is bringing a non-
medical perspective to an audience of medics. In doing so he is acknowledging 
that his perspective is coloured by his own professional training and 
background, but he is also planting the idea early in his talk that professionals -
including by implication health professionals - are influenced in their opinions by 
their backgrounds; they are not making objective scientific decisions. This 
concept was one that is also important in this thesis.  Doctors were asked 
about their professional and personal backgrounds and their responses 
                                                 
74 Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and Ethics, OUP, Oxford,  p.20. 
75 See chapter eight, pp.323-346 and nine, pp. 347-380 
76 Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and Ethics, OUP, Oxford, p.19. 
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were mapped to what the doctors said about the factors they include 
when making difficult decisions for disabled children and the weight 
individual doctors say they put on those factors.  Moreover, as was seen in 
chapter one,77 the author’s professional and personal background are 
acknowledged and steps taken as far as it is ever possible78 to avoid these from 
influencing this study.  However, like Kennedy, this thesis employs a legal, 
professional and personal lens, to examine what doctors say about difficult 
decision-making for disabled children. 
 
Kennedy’s lecture starts by citing decisions chosen to illustrate that some 
decisions are clearly not within the realm of the doctor.  He implies the 
examples given are so exaggerated that nobody would see them as legitimate 
decisions for doctors.  However, one of Kennedy’s examples is striking here, 
namely, ‘how should children be raised?’79 While presented for the apparent 
self-evident absurdity of a doctor being involved in such a decision, it should 
perhaps not be overlooked that doctors do have a huge amount of influence on 
how many disabled children are raised.  At times doctors will be the prime 
decisions maker for disabled children, in circumstances where a doctor would 
not be involved at all for non-disabled children. For example, paediatricians 
often have significant influence over which school a disabled child attends, 
indeed even whether the child attends school at all; over what food the child 
eats; whether a child can attend social groups or activities; even in some 
circumstances what a child can wear.80  As Martin et al identify: 
                                                 
77 Chapter one, paras. 5.2-5.3, pp.12-21 
78 Chapter three, para. 2.3, pp. 103-104  
79 Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and Ethics, OUP, Oxford, p. 20 
80 For example, some shoe shops ask parents to provide a letter from a doctor confirming a non-mobile 
child is allowed to wear shoes; families are asked to provided doctors letters before disabled children 
are allowed to attend social groups such as Scouts or be an airline passenger.  
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‘The attitudes of health professionals also play a significant role in 
shaping the life-style opportunities generated for disabled people in 
addition to being the gatekeepers of information and services.’81  
 
The examples of decisions given, as Kennedy identifies, are clearly not 
‘medical’ decisions, but disability has arguably become so closely linked to 
medicine and every aspect of disabled children’s lives seen as within the 
domain of doctors, that doctors are seen by health, education, other authorities 
and even wider society, as the experts on all aspects of a disabled child’s life; 
including access to schools; social activities and services. Kennedy recognised, 
however, that decisions self-evidently not within the realm of medicine had 
become viewed as within doctors’ expertise, but perhaps not to the extent 
families of disabled children experience, even close on forty years later: 
‘the conviction exists in my mind that failure to examine the question has 
resulted in decisions being taken by doctors which may not properly be 
within the unique or special competence of a doctor qua doctor to 
make.’82 
 
Kennedy tries to further define what constitutes a medical decision, stating: ‘I 
suppose the notion of ill health is most manageable if defined in purely physical 
terms, in terms of abnormality or impairment of function. He rightly recognises 
that this definition and the World Health Organisation’s definition of health83 are 
far too broad.  Indeed, a broad definition can be particularly problematic for 
disabled people as physical or cogitative impairment can be conflated with 
illness and thus seen legitimately within the realm of a doctor, as the examples 
given above illustrate, can commonly happen for disabled children.  
Alternatively, if doctors become the definers of ‘illness’, this risks everything to 
                                                 
81 Martin Hl, Rowell MM, Reid SM, Marks MK, Reddihough, DS, (2005) Cerebral palsy :What do medical 
students know and believe?, J. Paediatr. Child Health 41, 43-47, p. 43 
82 Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and Ethics, OUP, Oxford, p. 20 
83 ‘not the mere absence of disease, but the total physical, mental and social well-being’ Quoted 
Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and Ethics, OUP, Oxford, p.21 
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do with impairment becoming defined as ‘medical’.  Moreover, it also risks life 
threatening but treatable conditions experienced by people with severe 
impairments, being overlooked and the symptoms seen by health professionals 
as ‘normal’ for someone with severe impairment.84 
 
Decision-making for severely disabled infants is something Kennedy briefly 
addresses.85  He cites Campbell and Duff’s paper ‘Deciding the care of severely 
malformed or dying infants’,86 which outlines the authors’ views as to how 
decisions should be made.  For their era, Campbell and Duff are arguably 
ahead of their time, advocating as they do, joint decision-making between 
clinicians and parents, with the clinician focusing ‘primarily on the needs and 
rights of the individual infant’ while taking wider welfare considerations into 
account.  However, while recognising the difficulty of separating an individual 
child’s needs from those of the child’s family, there is an implication that the 
needs and rights of the family should outweigh those of the infant. There is also 
the suggestion that the life of an infant from an economically comfortable family 
may be saved, while the life of an infant from an economically deprived family 
would not be.  Kennedy critiques Campbell and Duff, however, for their attack 
on non-medics threatening doctors’ dominance in these types of decisions.   
 
Campbell and Duff seem to place great faith in parents and doctors’ abilities 
to limit the impact of their own values, interests and prejudices on their 
decisions.  They say ‘many safeguards against bad choices are already in 
                                                 
84 Martin G, (2014) ‘Caring for patients with intellectual disabilities’, chapter 9 in Gill, P, Wright N, Brew I 
(Eds), Working with vulnerable groups: A clinical handbook for GPs; Royal College of General 
Practitioners, RCGP, London 
85 Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 25-26 
86 Campbell, AGM, Duff, RS (1979) ‘Deciding the case of severely malformed or dying infants’, Journal of 
Medical Ethics, 5(2), 65-67 
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existence’87 but give no examples.  As shall be seen in chapters four 88 and 
six,89 disagreements between parents and doctors were raised by the doctors in 
this study, but perhaps surprisingly, the doctors talked a lot more about 
disagreements amongst doctors as to an individual disabled child’s best 
interests.90  
 
Like Kennedy, Campbell and Duff were among the first to question not just who 
should make decisions for severely disabled infants, but also how these 
decisions should be made.  However, they only addressed the question for 
infants.91  This may be because at that time disabled children with complex 
health problems tended not to survive infancy.   However, a search of both 
medical and legal literature shows that little is written, even more recently about 
withdrawing or withholding treatment from severely disabled children beyond 
infancy.  In part, this is because death in infancy is more prevalent than death 
during the rest of childhood.92  However, children with neurological conditions 
clearly do die between the ages of 2-18 years following the withholding or 
withdrawing of care.  Indeed, the RCPCH 2015 guidance on end-of-life 
decision-making for children states that most child deaths in intensive care 
                                                 
87 Ibid, p.66 
88 Chapter four, para 5.4, p.172  
89 Chapter six, para 7.3, pp. 276-282 
 
90 See chapter six, para 7, pp.261-275 
91 Defined for the purposes of this thesis as children under the age of two years, see chapter one, para 
2.2, p. 2  
92 Figures from the Office of National Statistics and the National Records of Scotland indicated that 
between 1980 and 2010 102,119 children between 1-18 years died and 106,558 neonates (babies up to 
their first birthday) died in England, Wales and Scotland. Source, Royal College of Paediatrics and Child 
Health & University College London (2013) Child Health Reviews- UK – Overview of child death in the 
four UK countries, RCPCH, London 
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result from decisions with withdraw or withhold treatment.93  Moreover, the Child 
Health Review UK94 epidemiological overview into the deaths of children over 
the age of one, published in 2013, shows that while two thirds of the children 
who died in Great Britain95 had a chronic condition, between 30%-40% of them 
had a predominate neurological condition.  This thesis therefore moves on 
from the majority of the literature, which even recently tends to address 
just the situation for infants.96 Rather, this study looks at doctors,’ 
particularly UK paediatric consultants,’ decision-making for severely 
disabled children defined, in chapter one, to include young people up to 
the age of 18 years old.97 
 
In a second paper also published in 1979,98 Campbell and Duff considered the 
factors they believe doctors should include in their best interest decisions. They 
suggest treatment should be withheld or withdrawn if a child does not have 
sufficient cognitive ability ‘to allow a personal life of meaning or quality and no 
potential for development in harmony with ‘Fletcher’s indicators of 
                                                 
93 Larcher V, Craig F, Bhogal K, Wilkinson D, Brierley J, (2015) ‘Making decisions to limit treatment in life-
limiting and life-threatening conditions in children: a framework for practice’, Archives of Disease in 
Childhood, 100, s1-s23, para 2 
94 RCPCH, (2013), Child Health Reviews – UK, Clinical Outcome Review Programme, Overview of child 
deaths in the four UK countries, RCPCH, London, 
https://www.rcpch.ac.uk/system/files/protected/page/CHRUK_Module%20A%20low%20res%20(2).pdf 
accessed 26 January 2018 
95 England, Scotland and Wales 
96 See for example Warwick, C, Perera, L, Murdoch, E, Nicholl, R, (2011) Guidance for withdrawal and 
withholding of intensive care as part of neonatal end-of –life care, British Medical Bulletin, vol 98(1) 
pp.99-113; Cuttini, M, Casotto, V, de Vonderweid, U, Garel, M, Kollee, LA, Saracci R, (2009) Neonatal 
end-of-life decisions and bioethical perspectives; Early Human development, vol. 85(10) pp. 521-525 and 
Rennie, JM, Leigh B (2008) The legal framework for end-of-life decisions in the UK, Seminars in Fetal & 
Neonatal Medicine, 13, 296-300 
97 Chapter one, para, 2.2, p. 3 
98 Campbell, AG, Duff, RS, (1979) Authors’ response to Richard Sherlock’s commentary, J Med Ethics 5, 
141-142 
 
P a g e  | 33 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
humanhood’.99 These are listed by Fletcher as: (i) minimum intelligence; (ii) self-
awareness; (iii) self-control; and (iv) a sense of time, including a sense of the 
past and future.100  Quite apart from the question, addressed later in this 
chapter and later in this thesis,101 as to how accurately doctors can assess 
cognitive ability, Campbell and Duff here seem to have gone far beyond what 
Kennedy would see as a medical decision.  They seem to suggest that doctors 
in effect decide what it means to be human.  Likewise, while the logic of their 
argument, that the capacity and resources of a parent should be taken into 
consideration, may make sense to some, moral, ethical and indeed legal 
questions are raised if whether a disabled child lives or dies is decided, even in 
part, based on a parents’ economic status. 
 
The notion that ‘quality of life’ decisions are within the competence of a doctor is 
firmly rejected by Kennedy: 
 
‘a decision as to what quality of life is worth living is not, in my view, a 
medical decision, and thus not for doctors alone to make. It is a decision 
of great moral weight which cannot and should not be left to the 
discretion of the particular doctor or teams of doctors.  There is nothing in 
the training of a doctor which makes him specially or uniquely competent 
to make such a decision.’102   
 
Almost forty years on from when Kennedy, Duff and Campbell were writing, the 
question as to whether doctors should make quality of life judgments remains 
unresolved, not just between doctors and non-medics but between doctors 
                                                 
99 Ibid, p.141 
100 Fletcher J,(1972), Indicators of Humanhood – A tentative profile of man, The Hastings Centre Report, 
2(5) pp. 1-4 
101 Chapter five, para six, pp. 226-234 
102 Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and Ethics, OUP, Oxford, p.25 
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themselves.103  Indeed the findings of this thesis suggest that it is something 
which causes some doctors considerable moral struggle.104 This thesis 
therefore builds on the existing normative debate as to whether doctors 
should evaluate a child’s quality of life, by asking doctors, in answer to 
research question two, whether doctors do in practice make quality of life 
decisions for severely disabled children, if so how, and whether doctors 
think they should be making quality of life judgments. 
 
Very soon after Kennedy’s seminal lecture the questions he asked were 
explored in real life situations with the breakthrough civil cases of Re B105 and 
the criminal trial of a paediatrician Dr Arthur,106 as will now be discussed. 
 
3. Breakthrough Cases: Re B and the trial of Dr Arthur 
 
Just two years after Kennedy, Campbell and Duff were writing some of these 
questions moved from academic debate into the law courts, when two 
significant legal cases, both concerning infants were considered.  The cases, 
one civil and one criminal, arguably left more questions than they answered, but 
both cases subjected doctors’ decision-making for disabled children to legal 
scrutiny for the first time and into the public domain and media spotlight. The 
first case, the civil one, Re B (A Minor) (1981)107 concerned Alexandra, a baby 
girl born with Down’s syndrome and an intestinal blockage.  Alexandra’s parents 
had refused consent for her to have an operation to remove the blockage. In 
their view, it was in her best interests to die rather than to live with Down’s 
                                                 
103 Cohn A, (2016) Measuring quality of life, BMJ, 354:i3816 
104 Chapter six, para 5, pp. 251-256 
105 Re B (A Minor) (Wardship, Medical Treatment) [1981]  WLR 1421, CA, August 1981 
106 R v Arthur [1981] 12 BMLR 1, heard before Farquharson J, 3-5th November, 1981 
107 Re B (A Minor) (Wardship, Medical Treatment) [1981]  WLR 1421, CA, August 
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syndrome.  Alexandra’s doctors disagreed, so referred the case to their local 
authority.  When the parents continued to refuse consent the local authority 
successfully applied for Alexandra to be made a ward of court and the Director 
of Social Services consented to the operation.  The matter came before the 
High Court after a surgeon refused to carry out the operation without the 
parents’ consent.  The High Court rescinded the order making Alexandra a 
ward. The local authority immediately appealed to the Court of Appeal. 
Templeman LJ summed up the child’s predicament: 
‘The position now is stark…if this little girl does not have this operation 
she will die within a matter of days. If she has the operation there is a 
possibility that she will suffer heart trouble as a result and that she may 
die within two or three months. But if she has the operation and it is 
successful she has Down’s syndrome, she is mongoloid, but the present 
evidence is that her life expectancy is short, but 20 to 30 years.’108 
 
The Court of Appeal unanimously agreed that it was in Alexandra’s best 
interests to have the operation, upholding the appeal, once again empowering 
the Director of Social Services to consent to the operation.  The case was said 
to be a watershed one as, in the words of Clements and Read:  
‘Templeman in his extraordinary judgment simply came down in favour of 
life at a time when many respected physicians and large swathes of the 
public…were not prepared to accord parentally rejected disabled babies 
that right’.109   
 
As Clements and Read identify in his short judgment, Templeman LJ ‘recast the 
legal landscape,’110 putting value on the life of a disabled infant, accepting the 
argument that Alexandra could have a ‘happy life’ and holding that it was for the 
Court and not the child’s parents to decide the child’s fate.111 The case firmly 
                                                 
108 Re B (A Minor) (Wardship, Medical Treatment) [1981]  WLR 1421, CA, August, per Templeman LJ 
109 Clements, L, Read, J (2008) Disabled People and the Right to Life, Routledge, Abington, p. 152 
110 Ibid p.151 
111 Re B (A Minor) (Wardship, Medical Treatment) [1981]  WLR 1421, CA, August 1421, per Templemann 
LJ 
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established the principle that the court is the ultimate decider of an infant or 
child’s best interests, not the parents nor the doctors. 
 
The criminal trial of Dr Leonard Arthur112 took place later the same year and 
also concerned an infant with Down’s syndrome.  Dr Arthur was a senior 
consultant paediatrician. Following baby John’s birth in June 1980, his parents 
rejected him due to his condition.  Dr Arthur noted in John’s medical notes: 
‘Parents do not wish it to survive. Nursing care only’.  He also wrote a 
prescription for baby John to receive a morphine-type drug to alleviate the 
infant’s distress.113 John died three days later. The cause of death was given as 
‘broncho-pneumonia due to consequences of Down’s syndrome.’114  A Pro-Life 
group reported the death to the police after a member of the hospital staff 
alerted them to the situation.  Dr Arthur was charged with John’s murder.  By 
the time of the trial John’s post-mortem revealed that he had additional medical 
conditions, so the charge was changed to attempted murder.  Dr Arthur pleaded 
not guilty.115  The prosecution argued that the John’s death was caused by the 
medication and that Dr Arthur had intended it.  It was also alleged that John had 
been denied both food and medical treatment.  The prosecution case collapsed 
because of concerns about the pathologist’s evidence and the judge directed 
the jury to acquit Dr Arthur.116 While conceding that Dr Arthur had acted in 
John’s best interests, the prosecution declared: 
‘the time has not yet come in this country when a doctor could say: 
‘because you are mentally-handicapped [sic] and your parents do not 
                                                 
112 R v Arthur [1981] 12 BMLR 1, heard before Farquharson J, 3-5th November, 1981 
113 Brahams, D, Brahams, M (1983) The Arthur case – a proposal for legislation, Journal of Medical 
Ethics, 9, 12-15 
114 Ibid 
115 Ibid 
116 R v Arthur [1981] 12 BMLR 1, heard before Farquharson J, 3-5th November, 1981 
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want you to survive, I am going to take such steps as to ensure that you 
do not survive’.117 
 
Dr Arthur did not give evidence at his trial, but several eminent paediatricians 
did give evidence to support him, claiming his practice was in keeping with 
paediatric practice at the time.  Braham and Braham summarised the evidence 
of one of those paediatricians in their discussion of the case;  
 
 ‘Some children are born with such frightful handicaps [sic] that we think 
it is reasonable to accept the parents’ decision that in the interest of their 
own child, prolonging or long life is not that interest’ 118 
 
The conflict between this view and that expressed by Templeman LJ in the 
earlier civil case is clear.  The judge’s summing up to the jury was also striking 
for its deference to medical professionals: 
‘Whatever ethics a profession might evolve they could not stand on their 
own or survive if they were in conflict with the law…I imagine you will 
think long and hard before concluding that doctors of the eminence we 
have heard here have evolved standards that amounts to committing a 
crime’119 
 
The trial of Dr Arthur prompted much comment in the media,120 professional and 
academic journals,121 which continues even today.122 Gillon used the case as 
the basis of a series of papers in the British Medical Journal introducing medical 
                                                 
117 Ibid 
118 Ibid 
119 Quoted in Brahams, D, Brahams, M, (1983) The Arthur case – a proposal for legislation, Journal of 
Medical Ethics, 9, 12-15 
120 For example, nightly coverage on national news bulletins such as ITN: 
http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist/ITN/1981/10/21/AS211081005/?v=0 accessed 20 September 2015 
121 For example, Kuhse, A, (1984) Modern Myth. That letting die is not the intentional causation of 
death: some reflections on the trail and acquittal of Dr. Leonard Arthur, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 
1.1, 21-38; Gee, DJ, Green, MA, (1982) The secret defence: a case for changing the law, British Medical 
Journal, (Clinical research ed), 284.6313 415 
122 Field, D, Deeming, J, Smith, LK, (2016) Moral distress: an inevitable part of neonatal and paediatric 
intensive care?  archdischild 310268 
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ethics,123 and Brahams and Brahams used the case to propose new 
legislation.124 Although Dr Arthur was acquitted it seems to be a case which has 
cast a long shadow over paediatricians, with two of the doctors interviewed for 
this study mentioning the case.125  Dr Arthur received significant support from 
the medical profession and the public. In November 1981, The Times 
newspaper reported the results of a poll for BBC’s Panaroma programme.126  
The question ‘Should a doctor be found guilty of murder if, with the parents’ 
agreement he sees to it that a severely handicapped baby dies?’ can be 
criticised for its implicit bias, but 86% of those surveyed replied ‘No’; 7% ‘Don’t 
know’ and 7% ‘Yes’.  McIntosh also reports that following Dr Arthur’s 
suspension ‘a petition with 19,000 signatures, including three MPs called for his 
reinstatement’.127 
 
While the poll and petition undoubtedly showed public support for Dr Arthur, as 
Clement and Read argue, this was no doubt, like the judge’s summing up, in 
large part a reflection of both the ‘largely unchallenged position and authority of 
doctors’128 and the segregated lives of disabled people, which meant the 
general public knew little or nothing of their lives.129   
 
                                                 
123 Gillon, R (1985) An Introduction to philosophical medical ethics: the Arthur Case, British Medical 
Journal (clinical research ed), 290.6475 1117 
124 Brahams, D, Brahams,M, (1983) Symposium 1: The Arthur case – a proposal for legislation, Journal of 
Medical Ethics, 9.1 pp.12-15 
125 Chapter nine, paras 3.2-3.3, pp. 372-373 
126 Ferriman, A, (1981), Wide Support for Down’s doctor, The Times, 10 November, The Times Digital 
Archive, accessed 26 January 2018 
127 McIntosh, N, (2017) ‘Ethics’, chapter 14 in Craft A & Dodd K (Eds), From An Association to A Royal 
College: The History of the British Paediatric Association and Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Heath 
1988-20016, Springer, New York, p.110 
128 Clements, L, Read, J (2008) Disabled People and the Right to Life, Routledge, Abington, p.158 
129 Ibid 
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At first sight Re B and R v Arthur appear to be two sides of a coin.  In the first, 
doctors were acting to save the life of an infant with Down’s syndrome rejected 
by her parents. In the second, the parents of another infant with Down’s 
syndrome also did not believe their disabled infant’s life should be saved, but Dr 
Arthur withheld treatment and allowed that infant to die. However, on closer 
consideration the two cases are not so far apart. In Re B the surgeon also 
originally refused to operate on Alexandra without her parents’ consent, despite 
knowing that not doing so would inevitably lead to her death; arguably taking a 
stance similar to that taken by Dr Arthur.  At first instance, the judge in Re B 
also supported this stance, reinstating the parents’ parental power to consent or 
decline, suggesting despite the final outcomes for the two infants, the cases 
were not at two extremes.  Moreover, it is noteworthy that in both cases the 
legal judgments were in keeping with the majority of doctors’ clinical judgments.  
 
Farquarson J showed considerable deference to medical professionals in 
general and Dr Arthur in particular, in his direction to the jury quoted above. 
This was perhaps a reflection of the deference shown generally to medical 
professionals at the time.  Templeman LJ’s Court of Appeal judgment in Re B 
while being a ground-breaking endorsement for the rights of disabled infants 
also as it happened, supported the clinical judgment of the majority of 
Alexandra’s doctors.  Of course, the case only came to court because the 
doctors referred it to social services.  What is not known is what judgment the 
Court of Appeal would have made if, say, it had been a nurse rather than the 
doctors who had alerted social services and had the doctors also thought, like 
Alexandra’s parents, that it was in her best interests to allow her die.  This is not 
known, but Re J (1991)130 heard by the Court of Appeal some ten years later 
did address the question in another case concerning a severely disabled infant. 
                                                 
130 Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] [1991] Fam. 33; [1991] 2 W.L.R. 140 
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Lord Donaldson in that case made clear that the court could not order a doctor 
to treat a patient contrary to the doctors’ clinical judgment: 
 
‘No one can dictate the treatment to be given to the child – neither the 
court, parents nor doctors. There are checks and balances. The doctors 
can recommend treatment A in preference to B. They can also refuse to 
adopt treatment C, on the grounds that it is medically contraindicated or 
for some other reason which they could not conscientiously administer. 
The court or the parents, for their part, can refuse to consent treatment A 
or B or both, but cannot insist upon treatment C. The inevitable and 
desirable result is that choice of treatment is, in some measure, a joint 
decision of the doctors and the courts or parents.’ 131 
 
The Court of Appeal here is clearly reinforcing the sanctity of an individual 
doctor’s clinical judgment, something the courts have continued to do over the 
decades as autonomy (at least for competent adults) has become a dominant 
influence in medical law.132  However, as was seen, even in Re B, doctors can 
and do disagree as to what is in a particular child’s best interests.  Indeed, 
although all the doctors who gave evidence in Dr Arthur’s trial said they would 
have acted as he did, the case was later criticised by Kennedy,133 among 
others, for only hearing evidence from doctors who testified that they would 
have acted as Dr Arthur did.  Arguably this gave the jury the mistaken 
impression that most, if not all, doctors would have done the same and that Dr 
Arthur’s conduct was in no-way controversial.  Kennedy explains that this was 
far from the case. He cites another poll conducted by the BBC Panorama team 
of UK consultant paediatricians and surgeons the same year as Dr Arthur’s 
trial.134  That poll suggests that none of the 340 consultant paediatricians who 
responded would have acted as Dr Arthur did. It suggested that the doctors 
                                                 
131 Ibid, per Lord Donaldson 
132 Mason, JK, Laurie, GT (2013) Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, (9th Edition) para 
1.20, p8 
133 Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and Ethics, OUP, Oxford, p. 157 
134 Ibid pp. 157-58 
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took a much more child-centred approach and Dr Arthur’s conduct was more 
unusual than the defence evidence suggested. However, as Kennedy 
acknowledges, doctors may report acting differently in a survey, especially one 
conducted by an organisation outside the medical realm, from how they really 
act.135  Indeed, in the survey in this study while 91% of the doctors, as will be 
seen in chapters nine,136 report the child’s rights as a factor they actively 
consider when making difficult decisions for disabled children, there is little 
evidence of the doctors expressly doing this in the rest of their survey 
responses or subsequent interviews.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
The trial of Dr Arthur and the case of Re B may not then have changed how 
most paediatricians treat disabled children quite much as some commentators 
such as Kennedy137 and Clement and Read138 suggest, but the cases certainly 
opened the treatment of severely disabled children by doctors up to legal, 
media and public scrutiny, as well as wider professional and academic debate, 
for the first time.  The aim of this thesis is, therefore not just to move the 
debate from infants to children, but also to bring this debate up to date, by 
asking senior paediatric consultants in the second decade of the 
millennium how they and their colleagues make difficult decisions for 
disabled children. 
 
These early cases and the discussion which surrounded them, also illustrate 
that presented with the same child at the same time, different doctors can and 
do decide very differently as to a child’s best interests. In the case of a severely 
disabled child, as these cases vividly illustrate, this can mean the difference 
between life or death.  As the child and everything about the child is the same, 
                                                 
135 Ibid p. 158 
136 Chapter nine, para 4, p.378 
137 Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and Ethics, OUP, Oxford, p.157 
138 Clements, L, Read, J, (2008) Disabled People and the Right to Life, Routledge, Abington 
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this tends to suggest that the doctors’ decisions are based, or at least 
influenced, by something other than the child.  At the very least it appears that 
doctors are considering different factors; or putting different weight on factors; 
or assessing factors differently; or a combination of all three.  Several later 
studies support this in the context of infants or disabled adults.139 Kennedy’s 
argument that society not doctors should not be deciding what quality of life is 
one worth saving, is clearly very relevant here. 
 
It is here perhaps that the doctrine, stated so clearly by Lord Donaldson in Re J 
(1991)140 that the Court will not ‘dictate the treatment to be given’ can be 
criticised.  It is perhaps, (subject to all the caveats well-rehearsed by Kennedy 
as to what is meant by the term ‘clinical judgment,’) acceptable to argue that a 
court should not interfere with a doctor’s clinical judgment. It is however, more 
difficult to justify the non-interference where a doctor is declining treatment ‘for 
some other reason which they could not conscientiously administer.’141  The 
court should, as a minimum, consider, for example, what is motivating the 
doctor. Studies have shown that doctors can, for example, be motivated by their 
religious faith142 or by misinformed attitudes about disabled people’s lives.143  
                                                 
139 see for example in relation to infants: Cuttini, M, Nadai, M, Kaminski, M, Hansen, G, de Leeuw, 
Lenoir, S, Persson, J, et al (2000) End-of-life decisions in neonatal intensive care: physicians' self-
reported practices in seven European countries, The Lancet 355.9221: 2112-2118 and in relation to 
adults: Basnett, I, (2001)’ Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Towards and Decisions Affecting 
Disabled People’, in G.L. Albrecht, K.D. Seelman and M. Bury (eds), Handbook of Disability Studies, Sage 
Publications, London, pp.450-467. Basnett’s paper is discussed later in this chapter, being influential in 
the development of this thesis.  
140 Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] [1991] Fam. 33; [1991] 2 W.L.R. 140; per Lord 
Donaldson 
141 Ibid 
142 Cuttini, M, Nadai, M, Kaminski, M, Hansen, G, de Leeuw, Lenoir, S, Persson, J, et al (2000) End-of-life 
decisions in neonatal intensive care: physicians' self-reported practices in seven European countries, The 
Lancet 355.9221: 2112-2118 
143 See for example: Basnett, I, (2001)’ Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Towards and 
Decisions Affecting Disabled People’, in G.L. Albrecht, K.D. Seelman and M. Bury (eds), Handbook of 
Disability Studies, Sage Publications, London, pp.450-467; Maclean, AR, (2000) ‘The Human Rights Act 
1998 and the Individual’s Right to Treatment’, Medical Law International, 4 (3-4),  p. 268; Gething, L, 
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Arguably by showing such deference to doctors, the courts are failing in their 
duty to protect some of society’s most vulnerable citizens.  This thesis does not 
address the courts attitudes to doctors but this is a subject recommended for 
further research.144  The cases discussed preceded what can be termed the era 
of children’s rights that followed in the subsequent decade.  This chapter now 
considers the key national and international reforms introduced during that 
decade and their impact, if any, on normative best interest decision-making.   
 
4. An Era of Children’s Rights? The Children Act 1989; The United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Disability 
Discrimination Act 
 
The late 1980s and early to mid-1990s, a decade after Kennedy’s lecture, Re B 
and the trial of Dr Arthur, saw children and their rights come centre stage 
nationally and internationally.  In England and Wales, the Children Act gained 
Royal Assent in1989 (‘the CA’); the UK ratified the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (‘UNCRC’) in 1991;145 and the Children (Scotland) Act 
(‘the CSA’) was passed in 1995.  Both section 1(1) of the CA146 and section16 
(1) the CSA147 put the paramountcy of a child’s welfare, a term arguably 
                                                 
(1992) ‘Judgements by health professionals of personal characteristics of people with a visible physical 
disability’, Social Science and Medicine, 34(7), pp. 809-815, at p. 812; Paris, M.J, (1993)‘Attitudes of 
medical students & healthcare professionals towards people with disabilities’, Archives of Physical 
Medicine and Rehabilitation,  74 (8), pp. 818-825; Michael, J, Richardson, A, et al, (2008), ‘Healthcarefor 
all: The Independent Inquiry into Access for Healthcare for People with Learning Disabilities’, Tizard 
Learning Disability Review, 13 (4), pp.28-34; Ross, T (2012)‘Disabled patients dying due to 
institutionalised discrimination in NHS’, The Telegraph, 3rd January 2012 
144 Chapter ten, para 5.1.4, p.399 
145 Office of the High Commissioner United Nations Human Rights, Status of Ratification Interactive 
Dashboard, http://indicators.ohchr.org, accessed 7th October 2017 
146 ‘When a court determines any question with respect to: (a) the upbringing of a child, or (b) the 
administration of a child’s property or the application of any income arising from it, the child’s welfare 
shall be the court’s paramount consideration’ s.1(1) Children Act 1989 
147 Where under or virtue of this Part of this Act, a children’s hearing decide, or a court determines, any 
matter with respect to a child the welfare of that child throughout his childhood shall be their or its 
paramount consideration.’ s.16 (1) Children (Scotland) Act 1995 
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synonymous with best interests, onto a statutory footing.  While the outcome in 
the trial of Dr Arthur and Re B at first instance, suggested the welfare of the 
child was not the prime or paramount consideration in those cases, the principle 
of paramountcy, at least when the welfare of a non-disabled child was being 
considered, was not new law.  More than a decade before those cases, Lord 
MacDermott speaking in the House of Lords case of J v C [1969] considered 
similar wording to that in the CA in the 1925 Guardianship of Infants Act, said:  
‘…the child’s welfare is to be treated as the top item in a list of items 
relevant to the matter in question…That is the first consideration because 
it is of first importance and the paramount consideration because it rules 
upon or determines the course to be followed’.148  
 
In the much later 2007 House of Lords debate on child adoption, Lord St. John 
of Fawsley described best interests of the child as the ‘golden thread of English 
law.149   
 
Like domestic legislation, the UNCRC also emphasises the primacy of the 
child’s interests. Article 3 (1) states: 
‘In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or 
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities 
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration.’150    
 
                                                 
148 J v C (An Infant), [1970] AC 668, [1969] UKHL 4, [1969 3 WLR 868, [1969] 3 All ER 1140 AC 668, per 
Lord MacDermott 
149 Lord St John of Fawsley (2007), House of Lords Debate on Child Adoption, Hansard, Column 236; 21st 
January 2007 
150 United Nations (1989) Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 3 (1) 
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The Scottish government claim in their guidance151 on the CSA that the CSA 
and the CA, together with the Northern Irish equivalent,152 have been ‘held up 
by the UK Government as putting the UNCRC into UK legislation’.153 This is 
perhaps an exaggeration, as there is no parallel to most of the forty-two 
UNCRC rights in the domestic legislation.  The guidance also claims that 
domestic legislation goes further than the UNCRC as the CSA and CA both 
make the welfare of the child paramount, whereas in the UNCRC it is only ‘a 
primary consideration’.154  While this is true, a strength of the UNCRC over the 
domestic equivalents is that it applies to all the rights included in the UNCRC, 
whereas s.1(1) CA and s.16(1) CSA only apply to deliberations in courts or child 
hearings.  The domestic legislation would clearly have been stronger if, similar 
to duties in the later Human Rights Act 1998, the paramountcy duty applied to 
all public authorities.  That having been said, the phrase ‘best interests’ is 
repeatedly mentioned in some 208 pieces of UK legislation.155 
 
Also, of particular relevance to this thesis, ss.17(1) and (10) the CA and s.22 
CSA imposed a duty on a local authority to safeguard and promote the interests 
of disabled children.  Perhaps because the duty is imposed on the local 
authority rather than public authorities generally, a review of the literature 
                                                 
151 Scottish Government; ‘Voice of the Child' Under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995’,  Mapping Paper, 
Concluding thoughts - Issues and questions, chapter seven, vol. 1, 
Scottish Government, Edinburgh http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2002/09/14905/6740  accessed 12 
August 2014 
152 Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 
153Scottish Government; ‘Voice of the Child' Under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995’,  Mapping Paper, 
Concluding thoughts - Issues and questions, chapter seven, vol. 1, 
Scottish Government, Edinburgh http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2002/09/14905/6740  accessed 12 
August 2014, para 7.1.1 
154United Nations (1989) Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 3 (1) 
155 208 pieces of legislation from the UK are listed in the British and Irish Legal Information Institute’s 
database of UK legislation, available at http://www.bailii.org  accessed 30th January 2017 
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relating to children’s rights and healthcare in the UK, suggests that the NHS 
largely saw, and continues to see, the CA essentially as legislation relating to 
safeguarding.156 However, as Clement and Read note, this appears to be 
interpreted as a concern to protect children from harm from those outside the 
NHS:  
‘it would have been highly unusual for a connection to be made between 
widespread professional concerns over infant deaths generally and those 
medical practices which brought about the deaths of disabled babies. 
They were quite simply regarded as entirely separate matters’.157   
 
Article 23 UNCRC158 also gives disabled children a right to the special care and 
support they need to live a full, and where possible, independent life. Article 
24159 gives all children a right to the highest attainable standard of health and 
access to healthcare. Despite the Scottish government’s claim that UK 
legislation puts the UNCRC into law in the UK160 the UNCRC is not incorporated 
into domestic law.  This means breaches of its articles cannot be pleaded as a 
primary course of action before a domestic court.  As a result, enforcement of 
UNCRC rights is extremely difficult. Indeed, it can often mean that the UNCRC 
is not even seen to be ‘law’.161  However, as the United Nations explain: 
‘The human rights treaties are legal instruments which set international 
standards for promoting and protecting human rights worldwide. By 
                                                 
156 see for example: NHS Commissioning Board (2015) Safeguarding Policy NHS England, London;  
157Clements, L, Read, J, (2008) Disabled People and the Right to Life, Routledge, Abington, p. 159 
158 United Nations (1989) Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 23 
159 United Nations (1989) Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 24 
160 Scottish Government; ‘Voice of the Child' Under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995’,  Mapping Paper, 
Concluding thoughts - Issues and questions, chapter seven, vol. 1, 
Scottish Government, Edinburgh http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2002/09/14905/6740  accessed 12 
August 2014, 
161 For example, 91% doctors in this survey reported a child’s rights as important to their end-of-life 
decisions (chapter 9, para 4, p.378), but this included 15% of doctors who said law had no relevance at 
all to these decisions (chapter 8, para 4,p.342)   
P a g e  | 47 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
ratifying the treaties, States subscribe to these standards and commit 
themselves to implementing the rights at the national level’.162 
 
The UNCRC is enforced largely through the UN Committee reporting 
process,163 the effectiveness of which is subject to debate.  Haydon and 
Scruton, for example, talk of the UNCRC committee as ‘powerless to enforce 
recommendations or act on egregious breaches.’164  According to the UNCRC 
Committee 2008 Concluding Observations on the UK these breaches include: 
  
(a) no comprehensive national strategy for the inclusion of children 
with disabilities into society; 
(b) Children with disabilities continue to face barriers in the enjoyment 
of their rights guaranteed by the Convention, including in the right 
to access to health services, leisure and play.’165 
 
In 2007 UK government reported to the UCRC committee that 
professionals in the UK working with children receive training in the 
Convention. 166 This thesis drew on this claim and tested it, asking 
paediatricians with research question three, whether they had 
                                                 
162 Office for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2005) The United Nations Human 
Rights Treaty System: An Introduction to the core human rights treaties and the treaty bodies, Fact Sheet 
Number 30, United Nations; Geneva 
163 Office for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2005) The United Nations Human 
Rights Treaty System: An Introduction to the core human rights treaties and the treaty bodies, Fact Sheet 
Number 30, United Nations, Geneva 
164 Haydon,D, Scraton, P, (2009) Children's rights: rhetoric and reality: Deena Haydon and Phil Scraton 
explore the deficit in effective implementation of children’s rights in the UK, Criminal Justice Matters 
76.1, pp.16-18, at p. 16 
165 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (2008) Forthy-ninth session; Consideration of 
reports submitted by states partes under Article 44 of the Convention; Concluding Observations: United 
Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern Ireland, CRC/C/GBR/CO/4, United Nations, Geneva, para 52 
166 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (2008) Committee on the Rights of the Child; 
Consideration of reports submitted by state parties under Article 44 of the Convention; third and fourth 
periodic reports of States parties due in 2007 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
CRC/GBR/4, United Nations, Geneva, paras 64-68 
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received training in the UNCRC or child rights.167 
 
A third law introduced in this era, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995168 
(‘the DDA’) may from its title have been expected to shift the paradigm in 
favour of greater protection of the rights of disabled children.  However, the 
DDA provided at best a very half-hearted regime of statutory protection for 
disabled people’s civil rights.169  Its focus, moreover, was largely, and before 
significant amendment in 2005170 exclusively, an adult one, focusing as it did, 
on protection of disabled people’s employment, renting or housing and 
related rights and even these were within prescribed limits. Later 
amendments did impose a public-sector duty171 to actively promote equality 
of opportunity for disabled people, including within the NHS,172 but as the 
much later Court of Appeal judicial review case of R (Mencap) v 
Parliamentary & Health Service Ombudsman [2009]173 showed, the DDA was 
unable to protect vulnerable individuals from poor healthcare. In that case, 
the DDA failed to protect adults with learning difficulties from sub-standard 
healthcare, even when the health was so poor as to result in the individual’s 




                                                 
167 Chapter eight, para 2, pp. 328-332 
168 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 c.50 
169 Pearson, C, Watson, N, (2007) Tackling Disability Discrimination in the United Kingdom: the British 
Disability Discrimination Act, Journal of Law and Policy, 23: 95-120, p. 98 
170 Disability Discrimination Act 2005 c.13 
171 Ibid s.3 
172 Ibid s.21B 
173 R (Mencap) v Parliamentary & Health Service Ombudsman [2009] EWHC 3559 Admin, [2010] EWCA 
Civ 875 
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The DDA was also criticised for requiring the claimant (as opposed to the 
state) to bring claims for breaches.174  The UNCRC Committee’s General 
Comment No.2175 recognises the challenges children generally face in 
enforcing their rights, citing as it does both their developmental state and 
significant barriers children face in accessing the judicial system.176  These 
barriers can be seen to be all the more challenging for severely disabled 
children with serious health conditions. Moreover, their parents may be 
unaware of their child’s rights, unable to enforce them or unwilling to do so, 
especially if their child is dependant long term on services from the public 
body in question. 
 
Irrespective of the weaknesses in the DDA described, this thesis 
explores the impact, if any, of a child’s impairment on paediatrician’s 
difficult decisions.  Research question two,177 asks the paediatricians 
which factors paediatricians they take into consideration when making 
difficult decisions for disabled children and the weight they put on 
those factors.  In chapter five,178 comparisons are made between 
doctors with different professional and personal characteristics as to 
the weight they put on the four factors including child’s cognitive 




                                                 
174 Pearson, C, Watson, N, (2007) Tackling Disability Discrimination in the United Kingdom: the British 
Disability Discrimination Act, Journal of Law and Policy, 23: 95-120 
175 UNCRC (2002) General Comment No.2, The role of independent human rights institutions in the 
promotion and protection of the rights of the child, CRC/GC/2002, United Nations, Geneva, p. 2 para. 5 
176 Ibid 
177 Chapter one, para 3, p. 7 
178 Chapter five, pp.181-236 
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5. Impact of early rights legislation on the courts 
 
One way to assess the impact of legislation and international human rights 
treaties is to look at their impact, if any, on case law.  The aforementioned Re J 
(A Minor) [1991]179 is a leading case on an infant’s best interests from the same 
era. However, it was heard in October 1990 at a time when the UK had signed 
the UNCRC, but had yet to ratify it and before it came into force within the 
UK.180  Likewise, although the CA had received Royal assent, it had not come 
into force.  Moreover, J was a ward of court so the Court’s duty was to 
determine J’s best interests, rather than his rights. It is perhaps then 
unsurprising that the judgment makes no reference to J’s rights.  
While the CA had no influence on his Lordships’ judgment, the arguments 
raised more than a decade earlier by Kennedy and others do appear to have 
reached the Court of Appeal, with Balcombe LJ judging: 
‘This co-operation is reinforced by another consideration. Doctors 
nowadays recognise that their function is not a limited technical one of 
repairing or servicing a body. They are treating people in a real-life 
context. This at once enhances the contribution which the court -or 
parents can make towards reaching the best possible decision in all the 
circumstances.’181 
 
Balcombe LJ also made clear that J’s best interests should be considered from 
J’s point of view, making clear that this is the point of view of a severely 
disabled child, not that of a non-disabled child.182   The difficulties inherent in 
doing this are obvious. The decision-makers, be they Court of Appeal judges, 
paediatricians or parents, will have no experience at all of what life is like for a 
                                                 
179 Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] [1991] Fam. 33; [1991] 2 W.L.R. 140 
180 UK government, ‘United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC): how legislation 
underpins implementation in England, UK Gov 2010) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/united-nations-convention-on-the-rights-of-the-child-
uncrc-how-legislation-underpins-implementation-in-england accessed 9 July 2018 
181 Ibid 
182 Ibid 
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child born with a severe impairment. Added to this, very often the children in 
question will be too young and/or have physical and often cogitative 
impairment. This makes expressing their thoughts and feelings difficult or 
impossible. There will be the additional problem that if care is routinely withheld 
from infants with certain conditions health professionals will have no or little 
knowledge of the lives of children with those conditions, as few if any, will 
survive beyond infancy.   
 
As previously mentioned, this thesis, with research question two, addressed 
the weight and indeed confidence the doctors attribute to quality of life 
and other factors in their assessments for disabled children183.  
 
A contrast can be drawn with the earlier judgment in Re B where Templeman LJ 
cited uncertainty as to Alexandra’s future as reason not to withhold treatment 
and Balcombe LJ’s judgment here where recognition of the doctors’ uncertainty 
as to J’s future was rejected as a reason to treat him.  The doctors in this study 
cited uncertainty as a significant factor in their best interest decisions for 
disabled children, most commonly seeming to suggest that uncertainty is a 
reason to continue treatment, as is discussed in chapter six.184 
 
Later cases concerning children’s best interests did touch upon the impact of 
both the CA and UNCRC.  For example, Re W (A Minor) [1993]185, a case 
concerning whether it was in the best interests of a 16-year-old girl with 
anorexia nervosa to have medical treatment against her consent, held that the 
CA did not change the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to decide for the child, 
irrespective of whether the child was a ward of court.  In Re S (A Minor) [1993] 
the Court again confirmed its inherent jurisdiction and that the test to be applied 
                                                 
183 Chapter five, pp.181-236 
184 Chapter six, para 3-6, pp.241-261 
185 Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) [1993] Fam 64, [1992] 4 All ER 627. [1992 3WLR 758, [1993] 1 
FLR 1 
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is that the welfare of the child remains the paramount consideration.186  The 
weight to be put on the UNCRC was considered in Re C (A Child) [2000],187 a 
case arising from the parents of a child where the mother was HIV-positive to 
allow their new born baby to be tested for HIV.  The rights in national and 
international law of the child, independent of the rights of her parents were 
stressed.  Wilson J holding ‘The Convention does not have the force of law but 
assists in out interpretation and development of the law’.188 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from these earlier cases is that early rights 
legislation seems to have led to a greater recognition of the child’s rights by the 
Court but also a suggestion that this in the judges’ view did not significantly 
change the status quo. The second half of the same decade, however, did see 
guidance published by the RCPCH on withdrawing and withholding care for 
children, perhaps an indication of a shift from the attitude described by 
Clements and Reid and quoted earlier in this chapter, of a disregard for the 
lives if disabled infants.189 This chapter now goes on to critically examine this 
guidance and its impact.  
 
6. Professional Guidance Introduced 
 
The growing public interest in doctors’ decision-making, at least for infants if not 
for older children, was evident in 1994 when the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Medical Ethics heard evidence on the withdrawal of medical 
treatment from infants.  The British Paediatric Association’s (‘BPA’) (the 
forerunner of the RCPCH) Ethics Committee, which had been formed in 1979, 
gave evidence.  It told the Select Committee that up to 30% of neonatal deaths 
                                                 
186 Re S (a Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 376, at p. 380 
187 Re C (A Child) (HIV Testing) [2000] 2 WLR 270 
188 Ibid at p. 283, para C 
189 Clements, L, Read, J, (2008) Disabled People and the Right to Life, Routledge, Abington, p.149 
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might result from the withdrawal of life saving medical treatment.190  McIntosh 
tells how the Select Committee’s report (‘House of Lords 1994’), then led to a 
conference in 1996 on withdrawing and withholding care. Hosted by the BPA, it 
was attended by, in addition to health professionals, representatives from faith 
communities; disabled young adults; lawyers and ethicists.191 McHaffie & 
Fowlie192criticised this multi-disciplinary conference approach in their analysis of 
the 1997 professional guidance which followed.  While they saw this as a 
‘useful way to further thinking on the subject’ they saw the conference as 
lacking ‘the rigour of empirical data collected by scientific research.’193  This 
criticism is arguably misplaced as it suggests best interest decisions are purely 
scientific, evidence based clinical decisions, rather than wide ranging decisions 
that include clinical matters, but also the child’s wider welfare, law, rights and 
ethics.  Once again, Kennedy’s question as to what is a medical decision is key 
to the debate. 
 
The newly established RCPCH published its guidance ‘Withholding and 
Withdrawing Life Saving Treatment, a Framework for Practice’194 in 1997 
(‘RCPCH 1997’).  The guidance was drafted by the College’s Ethics Advisory 
Committee, membership of which is listed at the start of the document and itself 
merits some comment.  Even by the time of second edition, (‘RCPCH 2004’)195 
the edition of most relevance to this thesis, being current at the time of the 
                                                 
190 McIntosh, N, (2017) Ethics, chapter 14 in Craft, A, Dodd, K, (Eds), From An Association to A Royal 
College: The History of the British Paediatric Association and Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Heath 
1988-20016, Springer, New York, p.110 
191 Ibid, p.111 
192 McHaffie, H, Fowlie,PW, (1998) Withdrawing and withholding treatment: Comments on new 
guidelines, Archives of Disease of Childhood, vol.79, Issue 1, pp. 1-5 
193 Ibid, p.1 
194 RCPCH, (1997) Withholding and Withdrawing Life Saving Treatment, a Framework for Practice 1997, 
RCPCH, London 
195 RCPCH (2004) Withholding Life Sustaining Treatment in Children, A Framework for Practice, second 
edition, RCPCH, London 
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empirical research with paediatricians, eleven of the fourteen members of the 
guidelines committee were doctors and one was a nurse.  The remaining three 
were a law lecturer,196 a lay member and a Church of England minister.  The 
names of the members suggest that only one committee member was from an 
ethnic minority.197  Nine were male and six were female.  The medic-dominated 
membership of the committee suggests the RCPCH saw the withdrawing and 
withholding of treatment as a decision made by doctors. The list of former 
committee members suggests there had been no greater diversity in the make-
up of the committee when the guidance had been originally drafted.198   
 
The apparent scarcity of diverse viewpoints on the RCPCH drafting committee 
contrasts with the guidance itself.  RCPCH 2004 talks about the importance of 
including disabled people’s views and an understanding of cultural diversity.199 
A comparison can be made with the Nuffield Council on Bioethics Working 
Party, which considered ethical issues in critical care decisions for neonates,200 
two years after RCPCH 2004. That Working Party was much more diverse, 
with, for example, equal numbers of men and women.  Medics also did not 
dominate the committee, being only four of the fifteen members.  The 
committee also included lawyers and ethicists with recognised relevant 
expertise and a range of non-medical specialists.  However, like the RCPCH 
committee, the Nuffield 2006 Working Party did not appear to have any obvious 
                                                 
196 However, the lawyer seemed to have expertise in child protection, rather than best interest decisions 
at the end of a child’s life: http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/staff/phil-bates accessed 20 June 2017 
197 It is recognised that an individual’s name is only, at best, a guide to his or her ethic origin. 
198 RCPCH, (1997) Withholding and Withdrawing Life Saving Treatment, a Framework for Practice 1997, 
RCPCH, London 
199 RCPCH (2004) Withholding Life Sustaining Treatment in Children, A Framework for Practice, second 
edition, RCPCH, London, Para 5.3, page 38 
200 Nuffield Council (2006) Critical Care Decisions in fetal and neonatal medicine: ethical issues. Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, London 
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ethnic or cultural diversity, which may have meant that some important diverse 
viewpoints were not considered.201 
 
RCPCH 2004, starts with a statement that ‘The background to all treatments, 
now and in the future, must be that they should be in the child’s best 
interests.’202  The high possibility of differences of opinions between health 
professional, patients and families is acknowledged, perhaps a move away from 
the paternalism of the 1970s and 1980s, with the guidance literally highlighting 
‘It is unrealistic to expect complete consensus therefore the aim is to seek 
as much common ground as possible while acknowledging sincerely held 
differences of opinion.’203 
 
The original RCPCH 1997 received both praise and criticism from medics.  
McHaffie and Fowlie while reviewing it, reported on their own empirical research 
into the views on end-of-life decision-making of fifty-seven medics and 119 
nurses working in six neonatal units in Scotland.204  Their main criticism of 
RCPCH 1997 was that the guidance, in some respects, reflected an ideal rather 
than reality.  For example, despite references to ‘open and timely 
communication’ and ‘reasoning together’205 they report that nurses in five out of 
six of the units felt insufficiently involved in discussions.206  They also expressed 
concern that the guidance did not address the issue of withholding feeding from 
                                                 
201 Ibid, p.ix 
202 RCPCH (2004) Withholding Life Sustaining Treatment in Children, A Framework for Practice, second 
edition, RCPCH, London, Introduction, p. 12 
203 Ibid 
204 McHaffie, H, Fowlie,PW, (1998) Withdrawing and withholding treatment: Comments on new 
guidelines, Archives of Disease of Childhood, vol.79, Issue 1, pp. 1-5 
205 RCPCH, (1997) Withholding and Withdrawing Life Saving Treatment, a Framework for Practice 1997, 
RCPCH, London 
206 McHaffie, H, Fowlie,PW, (1998) Withdrawing and withholding treatment: Comments on new 
guidelines, Archives of Disease of Childhood, vol.79, Issue 1, pp. 1-5 
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a dying infant.  McHaffie and Fowlie report that nurses found doing this 
particularly distressing commenting ‘implementing this can feel very different 
from giving this’207 [the instruction not to feed].  They also report that many of 
the clinicians they interviewed were unaware that the practice of withholding 
feeds from infants still continued and speculate that this ‘could account for the 
scant attention in the RCPCH framework’,208 highlighting a gap between the 
guidance and grassroots practice.  This thesis goes further than McHaffie 
and Fowlie’s study by asking doctors, across the UK not just in Scotland, 
as part of research question four, if and how they use guidance when 
making decisions for disabled children, rather than, as literature does just 
looking at decisions for infants.  
 
It is noteworthy that McHaffie and Fowlie comment: ‘The RCPCH does address 
the concerns of clinicians.’  It is perhaps no surprise that the concern of a 
medical royal college is to address the concerns of its members. McHaffie and 
Fowlie also clearly state that the purpose of their paper was to look ‘at the 
RCPCH document in relation to the express concerns and stresses of staff  who 
work in neonatal intensive care units.’209  It was seen earlier that the 1997 
edition of the RCPCH guidance arose in response to House of Lords 1994.210 
The Select Committee had considered end-of-life care broadly, embracing ‘a 
wide range of legal, theological, medical, nursing and political opinions’.211 Most 
relevant here, however, is that they expressly considered only the withdrawing 
and withholding of treatment from infants not older children.  The committee 
also stated that the withdrawal or withholding of treatment should only be lawful 
                                                 
207 Ibid, para 8 
208 Ibid 
209 Ibid, para 3 
210 RCPCH (2004) Withholding Life Sustaining Treatment in Children, A Framework for Practice, second 
edition, RCPCH, London, Preface 
211 Lord Walton of Detchant (1994) ‘Medical Ethics Select Committee Report’, House of Lords Debate, 
Hansard, vol 554 cc1344-412, House of Lords, London 
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when in the infant’s best interests.212 It is clear from the House of Lords debate 
that their Lordships’ concern was the protection of vulnerable infants, rather 
than the protection or concerns of doctors. There is a strong argument that this 
should also be the purpose of professional guidance, rather than as McHaffie 
and Fowlie suggest, ‘the concerns of clinicians’213 which may or may not 
correspond with a child’s best interests.  When the doctors were asked as 
part of research question four about their use of professional guidance, 
particular consideration was given to if and how the doctors used RCPCH 
2004.  What doctors said in this regard will be seen in chapter nine.214 
 
By RCPCH 2004 specific reference was made to disabled children; the 
importance of society not devaluing disabled people; that impairment is not 
incompatible with a life of quality; and that disabled children should be provided 
with high quality health care.215 Paediatricians were also guided ‘to avoid over 
pessimistic views about life with disability’ and the guidance acknowledges that 
a disabled person’s view of their quality of their life can be different from a non-
disabled person’s view of life with impairment.216  The guidance also ends with 
the statement that ‘All who relate to those with disability should offer them the 
best personal and professional care’.217 There is, however, arguably a 
contradiction in these positive messages with the guidance’s ‘No Purpose 
Situation’218 listed as one of five potential reasons given as examples of when 
                                                 
212 Ibid 
213 McHaffie, H, Fowlie,PW, (1998) Withdrawing and withholding treatment: Comments on new 
guidelines, Archives of Disease of Childhood, vol.79, Issue 1, pp. 1-5 
214 Chapter nine, para 3.4. p.377 
215  RCPCH (2004) Withholding Life Sustaining Treatment in Children, A Framework for Practice, second 
edition, RCPCH, London, Para 2.7.1, page 24 
216 Ibid, Para 2.7.2, p.24 
217 Ibid, Para 6 p.40 
218 ‘4. The No Purpose Situation. Although the patient may be able to survive with treatment, the degree 
of physical or mental impairment will be so great that it is unreasonable to expect them to bear it’. 
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paediatricians may consider withholding or withdrawing treatment.   
Unfortunately, the guidance says little about the five scenarios. There are clear 
parallels between the ‘No Purpose’ situation and the ‘demonstrably awful’ life 
rejected in Re B219 and Re J 220 as a standard for assessing whether treatment 
should be given.  It can, it seems, be seen as no more than a description of 
severe impairment.  As such, it seems to be questionable grounds for the 
withdrawal of treatment, especially in light of the positive statements made 
elsewhere in the guidance. Indeed, the greatest problem with RCPCH 2004 is 
its lack of detail. It makes highly complex issues appear deceptively 
straightforward. 
 
A contrast can once again be made with the Nuffield 2006 report, which 
although only dealing with neonates,221 succeeds much better at conveying and 
considering the complexity of the issues involved. Many of the issues it raises 
can be applied to critical care decisions for disabled children generally.  It 
emphasises differences of opinions;222 it recognises the limits to a doctor’s 
knowledge223 and uncertainties,224 and it includes a thoughtful analysis of the 
social and economic impact of the decisions.225  It is perhaps, however, worthy 
of note that House of Lords 1994 had expressed an unanimous opinion twelve 
years earlier that: 
‘…healthcare teams should not be required to make decisions relating to 
                                                 
Source: RCPCH (2004) Withholding Life Sustaining Treatment in Children, A Framework for Practice, 
second edition, RCPCH, London, p.11 
219 Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1981], 1 W.L.R. 1421, 1424 
220 Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] [1991] Fam. 33; [1991] 2 W.L.R. 140 
221 Infants up to the age of 28 days 
222 Nuffield Council (2006) Critical Care Decisions in fetal and neonatal medicine: ethical issues. Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, London, para 3, Executive Summary 
223 Ibid, para 4 Executive Summary 
224 Ibid, Chapter 1, para 1.2 
225 Ibid, chapter 2 
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resources in the course of day-to-day clinical care of individual patients. 
Their concern should be for that individual's welfare. Decisions about 
treatments which society can or cannot afford should be made elsewhere 
than in the hospital ward or the doctor's consulting room..’226 
 
This made clear that in their view resource considerations had no place at the 
bedside. 
 
While mostly praising the RCPCH 2004, Gillis,227 an Australian paediatrician 
writing in the British Medical Journal, also expressed reservations. His concern 
was what he saw as the ‘glib response’228 of the guidelines committee to 
situations where medics and parents did not agree as to a child’s best interests, 
a situation he suggested was not uncommon and which is ‘a particularly difficult 
problem’229 Gillis is correct that the guidance even by 2004 said very little about 
how such disputes should be resolved; just two brief sentences.230  Indeed, the 
guidance can be said to be very paternalistic in this regard, as the assumption 
seems to be that the doctors’ opinion will be the correct one and the doctor’s 
role is to convince the parents of this, rather than balance the parents’ views of 
the child’s best interests with those of the doctors.  RCPCH 2004 does state: 
‘Parents may ethically and legally decide on behalf of their children’231 and ‘the 
parents will always be participants in the care and decision-making.’232 It talks of 
the need to support parents, in this task,233 but the emphasis is on helping 
                                                 
226 Lord Walton of Detchant (1994) ‘Medical Ethics Select Committee Report’, House of Lords Debate, 
Hansard, vol 554 cc1344-412, House of Lords, London 
227 Gillis, J, (1997) When lifesaving treatment in children is not the answer, BMJ 315, pp. 1246-1247 
228 Ibid, p.1247 
229 Ibid 
230 RCPCH (2004) Withholding Life Sustaining Treatment in Children, A Framework for Practice, second 
edition, RCPCH, London, para 2.3.2.6 & 2.3.2.13 
231 Ibid para 2.3.2.3 p.18 
232 Ibid para 2.2 p. 22 
233 Ibid. 
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parents to understanding the doctors’ clinical decision, which while a vital part of 
the decision, should not be the whole of it. There is little to suggest that there 
could be any merit in exploring a parent’s viewpoint.  Moreover, it seems 
doctors are tasked with deciding whether a parent is acting in a child’s best 
interests,234 a task it will be argued, see for example chapter five235 is more 
akin to that of a judge than a medical professional.  This once again returns 
to Kennedy’s 1979 argument236 and the crucial question of the nature of 
medical decisions.  It also mirrors what was said by the lawyers acting for David 
Glass at the admissibility hearing before the ECtHR, as was seen in chapter 
one.237  It is worthy of note that the RCPCH guidance published in March 2015 
(‘RCPCH 2015’) 238 replacing RCPCH 2004, does address disagreements with 
parents in more depth. It makes clear that the courts, not doctors, should decide 
unresolved disagreement.239   
 
In addressing research question one and the question what makes 
decisions difficult, this thesis will address what doctors said not just 
about disagreements between doctors and a child’s parents, but also, a 
                                                 
234 Ibid para 2.3.2.3 p.18 
235 Chapter five, para 5.8, p.225 
236 Kennedy, I, (1979). What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, published in an amended form in Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
237 Chapter one, para 5.1, p.11 
238 Neither this document nor NICE guidance published in December 2016 (NICE, 2016, End of life care 
for infants , children and young people with life-limiting conditions: planning and management, NG61, 
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ng61 accessed 25 January 2018) are critically analysed in this 
chapter as they were published after the timeline of this surveyed in this chapter and completion of the 
empirical research for this thesis was completed. 
239 Larcher V, Craig F, Bhogal K, Wilkinson D, Brierley J, (2015) ‘Making decisions to limit treatment in 
life-limiting and life-threatening conditions in children: a framework for practice’, Archives of Disease in 
Childhood, 100, s1-s23 
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subject the doctors spoke much more about, disagreements amongst 
doctors as to an individual child’s best interests.240 
 
It does seem from RCPCH 2004 and the commentaries on it discussed, that the 
focus of the guidance was perhaps more about making difficult decisions easier 
for doctors than protecting the best interests of the child.  While protection of 
health professionals is clearly important, this does seem to overlook the 
paramountcy of best interest decisions required by law.  Between the first and 
second edition of the RCPCH guidance the Human Rights Act 1998 (‘the 
HRA’)241 had been enacted.  The HRA seemed to have little impact on the 
guidance, but consideration is now given as to whether the HRA did seem to 
impact more widely on best interest decision-making for disabled children. 
 
7. Rights become ‘mainstream’: Human Rights Act 1998 
 
The passing of the HRA was accompanied by significant government and 
media fanfare.  On the day it came into force, BBC news described it as an act 
‘changing the face of the UK’.242 Perhaps reflecting how significant they thought 
the HRA to be to healthcare, the BMJ also described it as ‘a momentous 
development in the constitutional history of the United Kingdom’.243 The HRA 
incorporated the European Convention of Human Rights, (‘ECHR’)244 which the 
UK had ratified in 1951, into domestic law.  Individuals had been able to take 
cases directly to the ECtHR since 1966 (after the full exhaustion of all local 
                                                 
240 Chapter six, para 7, pp.261-275 
241 Human Rights Act 1998 c 42 
242 BBC News, (2000), Landmark human rights law enforced, BBC, 2nd October 2000, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/951753.stm, accessed 7th October 2017 
243 Hewson, B (2000) Why the human rights act matters to doctors, BMJ, 30;321(7264):780-1,p. 780. 
accessed 26 Apr. 2017 
244 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention of Human Rights0, as amended, 1950 
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remedies), but from October 2000 the ECHR became directly enforceable in UK 
courts.  While the s.6 HRA245 duty imposed on all public authorities to ensure 
compliance with the ECHR saw some NHS trusts246 drafting rights policies with 
the aim of imbedding a culture of rights,247 the impact of the HRA for all its 
prominence, especially on best interest decisions for disabled children is 
questionable.  Indeed, for all the fanfare, a study funded by the Nuffield Trust 
found ‘little visible impact on the field of health care provision,’248 resulting from 
its passing.  Likewise, a 2003 Audit Commission report on the human rights 
strategies of public bodies in England and Wales found ‘In health, 73 per cent of 
Trusts are not taking action.’249 The Audit Commission report suggested that 
rights were seen by NHS staff, especially managers, as something raised by 
trouble makers and making information about rights available was seen as ‘only 
raising the opportunity for further litigation’.250 
 
This lack of impact of the HRA seemed to extend to the jurisprudence of the 
English High Court on best interest decisions for children.  Hedley J’s reference 
to the ECHR in Portsmouth NHS Trust v Charlotte Wyatt [2005] 251 is, perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, one of the most detailed examinations of the impact of 
the HRA and the ECHR in such cases by the UK courts. It makes clear, at least 
in that case, that the HRA and ECHR changed nothing: 
                                                 
245 S.6 Human Rights Act 1998 c. 42 
246 In Scotland, NHS boards 
247 see for example NHS Lothians (2011) Equality and Diversity Policy, NHS Lothian, Edinburgh 
http://www.nhslothian.scot.nhs.uk/YourRights/EqualityDiversity/Pages/default.aspx, accessed 7 
November 2017 
248 Haggett, E, (2001) The Human Rights Act 1998 and Access to NHS Treatments and Services: A 
Practical Guide, the Constitution Unit, School of Public Policy, UCL, London,  p. 6 
249 Audit Commission (2003) Human Rights, Improving Public Service Delivery, Audit Commission, 
London, para 12 
250 Ibid, para 14 
251 Portsmouth NHS Trust v Charlotte Wyatt [2005] EWHC 117 (Fam) 
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‘In the course of argument, the European Convention of Human Rights 
was referred to but no separate submissions were developed even 
though key rights were undoubtedly engaged.  This is because although 
English domestic law has undoubtedly been significantly affected by the 
concept of Convention rights, it is recognised in this case at least, the 
Convention adds nothing to domestic law’.252 
 
This is perhaps all the more surprising if medical law is accepted, as described 
by Kennedy and Grubb, ‘as a subset of human rights law.’253  Indeed, attempts 
to use the provisions of the ECHR by David Glass and his mother in Glass v UK 
[2004],254 the only UK case concerning the medical care of disabled child to 
reach the ECtHR,255 had only limited success, as shall be seen in the 
discussion of the case to follow.256   
 
While Hedley J did preface his comment in Wyatt by saying ‘in this case at 
least’ the dearth of references to ECHR rights in the cases following the passing 
of the HRA would seem to indicate that, at least in cases concerning the 
withholding or withdrawal of medical care of severely disabled infants and 
children, that either the HRA made, as Hedley J suggested, little change to 
English law or the courts were overlooking the children’s rights. Unlike the 
UNCRC, the ECHR being mainly concerned with civil and political rights, rather 
than social and economic rights, has no express right to health care.  However, 
s.6 of the HRA makes it unlawful for a public authority, which includes the 
                                                 
252Portsmouth NHS Trust v Charlotte Wyatt [2005] EWHC 117 (Fam), para 25 
253 Kennedy, I, Grubb, A, (2000), Medical Law, 3rd Edition, Butterworths, London, at p.6 
254 Glass v United Kingdom[2004] (Application No 61827/00), Fourth Section, March 9 2004 
255 An attempt in 2017 by the parents of Charlie Gard to get the ECtHR to review the decision of the UK 
Court to permit artificial ventilation to be withdrawn from their son, failed at the admissibility hearing: 
Gard v United Kingdom (Admissibility) (397993/17) [20017] 2 F.L.R 773; (2017) 157 B.M.L.R. 59; (2017) 
65 E.H.R.R. SE9 
256 Chapter two, para 7, pp.61-75 
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NHS257 to act in contravention of the ECHR. Three of the ECHR articles are 
self-evidently the most relevant to best interest decisions for  severely disabled 
children: Article 2, the right to life;258 Article 8, the right to respect for family and 
private life259 and Article 14, the right not be discriminated against in the 
exercise of an ECHR right.260  There is also a theoretical argument that Article 3 
ECHR, the right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment,261 
could also be pleaded in relation to the best interests of a child on the basis that 
continuing treatment allowed: 
suffering attributable to the progression of a disease may amount to such 
treatment [treatment in breach of Article 3] if the state can prevent or 
ameliorate such suffering and does not do so’.262 
 
However, the argument was rejected by the ECtHR in Pretty v UK [2002],263 a 
case brought by a disabled adult arguing for a right to die.  Article 3 was not 
pleaded by David Glass lawyers in the admissibility hearing brought before the 
ECtHR. 
 
The argument was successful in the UK case involving an adult, D v United 
Kingdom [1997].264 A convicted drugs trafficker in the final stages of AIDS faced 
deportation to St Kitts. The ECtHR accepted the argument that the absence of 
vital medical treatment would rapidly accelerate his death and that this would 
                                                 
257 When providing NHS funded treatment: House of Lords & House of Commons Joint Committee on 
Human Rights (2004) The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act, Seventh Report of 
session 2003-2004, HL paper 39, HC paper 382, 23rd February 2004, p.10. 
258 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms(1950) (European 
Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR), Article 2 
259 Ibid, Article 8 
260 Ibid, Article 14 
261 Ibid, Article 3 
262 D v United Kingdom [1997] 24 EHRR 422 at pp. 446-449 paras 446-449 
263 Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] All ER (D) 286 (Apr), 29th April 2002 
264 D v United Kingdom [1997] 24 EHRR 423 
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amount to a breach of Article 3. Subsequent cases arguing that a lack of quality 
medical care at a proposed destination would render a deportation to be a 
breach of Article 3 have failed.265 The ECtHR has repeatedly stressed the high 
bar must be met to succeed in showing a breach of Article 3.266  The English 
High Court’s and the ECtHR’s approach to Article 2, 8 and 14 ECHR in cases 
concerning the medical treatment of disabled infants and children will now be 
explored. 
 
7.1 Article 2 ECHR 
Parker J very briefly considered Article 2 ECHR at first instance in Re OT 
[2009].267  Infant OT had been in intensive care since he was three weeks old.  
He was diagnosed as having a mitochondrial condition.268  He had neurological 
impairment and required a ventilator to breath.  He was also unable to suck or 
swallow. Drawing on current law, Parker J summarised Article 2 in this context 
as imposing:  
‘a positive obligation to give life sustaining treatment, where responsible 
medical opinion is of the view that such treatment is in the best interests 
of the patient, it does not impose an absolute obligation to treat if such 
would be futile’269  
 
Parker J cited with approval Re (Burke) v The General Medical Council 
[2005],270 a case brought by a disabled adult with a degenerative condition 
                                                 
265 See for example GS (India & Ors) v SSHO [20150 EWCA Civ 40; N v SSHD [2005] UKHL 31 affirmed by 
ECtHR in N v UK [2008] 47 EHRR 39 
266 Ibid 
267 Re OT [2009] EWHC 633 (Fam) 
268 A degenerative condition which is usually fatal within infancy. See 
https://www.thelilyfoundation.org.uk/mi/mitochonDrial-disease/ for more detail, accessed 7th October 
2017 
269Re OT [2009] EWHC 633 (Fam), para 97 
270 R (Burke) v The General Medical Council [2005] EWCA 1003 at para.61, approving the dictum of 
Munby J. at first instance. 
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seeking clarification as to when it would be lawful for doctors to withdraw his 
artificial nutrition and hydration holding: 
‘There is a very strong presumption in favour of taking all steps which will 
prolong life and save in exceptional circumstances or where the patient is 
dying the best interest of the patient will normally require such steps to 
be taken.  In case of doubt, that doubt falls to be resolved in favour of the 
preservation of life but the obligation is not absolute.  Important as the 
sanctity of life is, it may have to take second place to human dignity.’271 
 
In the Court’s view in Re OT the doctors in assessing the child’s best interests 
fulfilled the State’s obligation under Article 2.  
 
The problem with this approach is however, that the does seem to be an 
imbalance between the level of scrutiny to which judges subjects a parent’s 
assessment of a child’s best interests compared to the level of scrutiny 
undertaken ‘where responsible medical opinion is of the view that such 
treatment is in the best interests of the patient’.272  While it is understandable 
why judges will want to defer to medics on purely clearly matters, as Parker J 
herself went on to say ‘Best interests are not confined to best medical interests 
but embrace medical, social, emotional and welfare issues. The court is not tied 
to the clinical assessment of what is in the patient’s best interests and it will 
reach its own conclusion on the basis of careful consideration of the evidence 
before it.’273  The Courts perhaps need to explore much more how and why 
medics come to the conclusions they do with regard to a child’s best interests, 
which factors the medics have considered and in particular whether a clinical 
assessment is in fact based on clinical or non-clinical factors? The arguments 
made by counsel in Glass v UK already mentioned 274 and Kennedy’s 
                                                 
271 Re OT [2009] EWHC 633 (Fam), per Parker J 
272 Ibid, para 97 
273 Ibid, para 98 
274 Glass v UK [2003] ECHR Admissibility Decision no. 61827/00 
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arguments275 raised some twenty-five years earlier, seem pertinent here.  
Research question two directly addresses this question by asking doctors 
about which factors they do consider and what weight they put on those 
factors, as will be seen in chapters four and five.276 
 
The Commission of the ECtHR in Glass v UK dismissed as inadmissible the 
question of whether the doctors in that case had breached David’s Article 2 
rights, finding the application ‘manifestly ill-founded.‘277   
 
David, who was born with hydrocephalus, is278 blind and has spastic 
quadriplegia and severe learning difficulties.  He was described by Lord Woolf 
in the English Court of Appeal judgment as ‘very seriously disabled but 
fortunately not terminally ill.’279 Scott Baker J, at first instance, also noted that 
David ‘turned his head to sounds, laughs and smiles and registers his likes and 
dislikes by facial expressions’.280 David (the first applicant) and his mother Carol 
(the second applicant) complained to the ECtHR under Article 2 ECHR. Their 
complaint centred on the claim that following David’s tonsillectomy281 doctors 
‘put the first applicant’s life at risk of premature termination’.  In particular, Carol 
                                                 
275 Kennedy, I, (1979). What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, published in an amended form Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
276 Chapter four, pp. 137-179, chapter five, 181-236 
277   Glass v UK [2003] ECHR Admissibility Decision no. 61827/00.  The ECHR held that the application 
was manifestly ill founded ‘within the meaning of Article 35(3)’, which states ‘The Court shall declare 
inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 which is considered incompatible 
with the provisions of the Convention or the protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of 
the right of application.’ 
278 ‘Is’ is used because, as far as it has been possible to ascertain through research David is still alive. 
279  Glass, R (on the application of) v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust [1999] EWCA Civ 1914 (21 July 
1999), per Woolf L Master of the Rolls 
280 Glass, R (on the application of) v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust [1999] EWHC Admin 343 (22 April, 
1999) 
281 To relieve upper airway obstruction. 
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objected to David being treated with diamorphine without her consent and to the 
doctors putting a ‘Do Not Resuscitate’ notice on David’s medical notes without 
her knowledge or consent.   The case highlighted the importance of putting 
questions directly to paediatricians about any training or education in 
rights, law or ethics they had undertaking and, if any, the impact of this; 
questions explored with research questions three and four.  As will be 
seen, commentators criticised the doctors seeing them as making quality 
of life judgments about David.  This also inspired research question two, 
addressing the factors doctors use in their best interests decisions. Due 
to its significance for this thesis, the case is explored here at some length. 
 
In Glass v UK [2004], the ECtHR did not exclude the possibility  
‘that acts and omissions of the authorities in the field of health care may 
in certain circumstances engage their responsibility under the positive 
limb of Article 2.’282   
 
It was judged that this duty had been discharged by the UK, as adequate 
provision had been made by the government for securing high standards 
among health professionals and protection of lives of patients.  In the ECtHR’s 
view, an error of professional judgment (even if established) by a health 
professional is not sufficient to invoke Article 2.  The court also considered the 
positive obligation to protect life through an effective domestic investigation, the 
procedural aspect of Article 2.283  It found this obligation effectively discharged 
by the GMC. 284 The ECtHR refused to lift the veil, so to speak, on the doctors’ 
                                                 
282 Glass v UK [2003] ECHR Admissibility Decision no. 61827/00 
283  The procedural aspect of Article 2 requires States to conduct an effective investigation into death.  
Osman v UK [1998] 23452/94 ECHR 101 (28 October 1998) established that the procedural aspect of 
Article 2 is triggered of there is a real and immediate threat to life.  The investigation must be carried 
out by an independent body in public; it must be thorough and rigorous and must be capable of 
imputing responsibility for the death (Hugh Jordan v UK, 24726/94, [2001] ECHR 327 (4 May 2001) 
284 The General Medical Council was established by the Medical Act 1983.  It regulates UK doctors. Its 
primary duties are to protect and promote the health, safety and wellbeing of the public (s.1A (a)); 
promote and maintain public confidence in the medical profession (s.1A (b); and promote and maintain 
proper professional standards and conduct for medical professionals (s.1A (c). 
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decision-making for David, holding that they did not need to do so, as the GMC 
provided sufficient protection.   
 
Commenting on the GMC’s investigation into the doctors’ conduct, the ECtHR 
held: 
‘According to the General Medical Council, the test for bringing 
disciplinary proceedings against the doctors was not satisfied on the 
evidence.  It had asked itself in this connection whether the doctors put 
themselves in a reasonable position from which to arrive at the decision 
they did and whether the decision reached was so ‘outrageous’ that no 
reasonable competent doctor could have reached it’.285  
 
The ECtHR judges saw this as allowing the UK a margin of appreciation, but 
this ruling can be criticised for the breadth of this margin.  It is arguably unduly 
deferential to the medical profession in failing to lift the veil on either the 
doctors’ or the GMC’s decisions.  As will be seen in chapter nine, the GMC’s 
own statistics suggest it rarely investigates complaints brought by patients or 
their relatives. 286  Arguably the ECtHR should have looked further and 
considered how and why the doctors decided to administer diamorphine, rather 
than holding as it did, that it was understandable that the domestic court did not 
look into the matter due to the factual dispute between the parties.  The 
question of whether the ECtHR was being unduly deferential to the doctors 
arises, especially when compared with the detailed and forensic level of 
examination the ECtHR gave to examinations of the actions, thoughts and 
motivations of the security forces operating in Northern Ireland in cases such as 
McShane v UK [2002]287 and McCann & Other v UK [1995].288 
 
                                                 
285   Glass v United Kingdom, 61627/00 [2004] ECHR 103 (9 March 2004), at para 43 
 
286 Chapter nine, para 3.1, p.367 
 
287 McShane v UK [2002] 43290/98, ECHR 469 (European Court of Human Rights, May 2002. In this and 
McCann v UK, the ECtHR carried out an investigation of the actions and motivations of the security 
forces in Northern Ireland’s ‘shot to kill’ policy in place in Northern Ireland. 
 
288 McCann & Others v UK {1995] 18984/91 (European Court of Human Rights, September 27, 1995) 
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Although the GMC did not find David’s doctors’ conduct ‘outrageous’, the 
doctors treating David were criticised by other doctors.  Indeed, a doctor who 
later treated David at Southampton General Hospital289 told the Sunday 
Telegraph of his horror at the decision made at St Mary’s to let David die.  He 
said: 
‘He was recovering and getting back to normal.  I am astonished that 
diamorphine was used in a case like this with a child…I sometimes think 
that there is a different set of rules for the very disabled.  Among some 
members of the profession, there is almost a presumption that the right 
to life doesn’t apply to that group of patients.’290  
 
Both the ECtHR judgment and the domestic judgments that preceded it, were 
strongly criticised by legal commentators, such as Huxtable and Forbes,291 and 
Maclean292 for their deference to the medical professionals.293  Indeed, some of 
the conclusions drawn by the Strasbourg judges seem to do no more than defer 
to the St Mary’s doctors.  As Huxtable and Forbes294 and others295 questioned 
the extent to which ‘quality of life reasoning crept into their [the doctors’] 
                                                 
289   Portsmouth NHS Trust the health trust responsible for St Mary’s hospital decided it would not be 
possible to continue treating David following clear break down of trust between the doctors there and 
his mother.  Arrangements were made for David to have all future hospital care at Southampton 
General Hospital. 
 
290 Hall, C, (2000) Rough Justice, The Sunday Telegraph, 16th July, 2000 p.24 
 
291 Huxtable, R, Forbes, K, (2004) ‘Glass v UK: Maternal Instinct v Medical Opinion’, Child and Family Law 
Quarterly, vol.16, No.3, pp.339-354 
 
292 Maclean, AR, (2000) ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Individual’s Right to Treatment,’ Medical 
Law International, vol 4, Issue 3-4, pp 245-276 
 
293  For example, in Glass v United Kingdom [2004] 61627/00 ECHR 103 (9 March 2004), the Court held 
‘the applicants’ complaint under Article 2 amount to in effect a criticism of the doctors' clinical 
judgment.... However, it is not the function under Article 2 to gainsay the doctor's assessment of the 
first applicant's condition at the time’ 
 
294 Huxtable, R, Forbes, K, (2004) ‘Glass v UK: Maternal Instinct v Medical Opinion’, Child and Family Law 
Quarterly, vol.16, No.3, pp.339-354, p. 346 
 
295  See for example: Maclean, AR, (2000) ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Individual’s Right to 
Treatment,’ Medical Law International, vol. 4, Issue 3-4, pp 245-276 
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decision-making’.296 Maclean puts it even more strongly; ‘if he had not been so 
severely handicapped (sic) would the doctors have felt that it would be best to 
treat him palliatively and allow him to die?’297  Maclean, who was himself a 
medical doctor before becoming a legal academic, continues:  
‘if a non-handicapped child developed septicaemia following a routine 
tonsillectomy the doctors would pull out all the stops to save his life.  
There would certainly be no question about giving the child 
antibiotics….Thus the doctors have altered their management because 
they perceived David‘s quality of life to be not worth saving’.298   
 
The concerns raised by commentators on the Glass litigation as to the 
appropriateness of quality of life judgments being included in best 
interest decisions for disabled children, was another way in which this 
case directly influenced the shape of this thesis, leading as it did with 
research question two to doctors being asked about the use of quality of 
life and other factors in their difficult decisions for disabled children.  
What the doctors said about these factors is discussed in depth in 
chapter five.299 
 
7.2 Article 8 ECHR 
In Glass v UK [2004]300 the ECtHR judged both David’s and his mother’s Article 
8301 right to respect for private and family life to have been breached by the 
doctors‘ decision to impose treatment on David in defiance of his mother‘s 
objections.  In particular, David‘s right to physical integrity was breached.302  
                                                 
296  Huxtable, R, Forbes, K, (2004) ‘Glass v UK: Maternal Instinct v Medical Opinion’, Child and Family Law 
Quarterly, vol.16, No.3, pp.339-354, page 346 
 
297  Maclean, AR, (2000) ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Individual’s Right to Treatment,’ Medical 
Law International, vol 4, Issue 3-4, pp 245-276, at p.268 
 
298  Maclean, AR, (2000) ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Individual’s Right to Treatment,’ Medical 
Law International, vol 4, Issue 3-4, pp 245-276, at p. 268 
 
299 Chapter five, pp.181-236 
 
300 Glass v United Kingdom [2004], 61627/00 ECHR 103 (9 March 2004) 
 
302 Glass v United Kingdom, [2004] 61627/00 ECHR 103 (9 March 2004) at para 70.  
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The court was particularly critical of the hospital’s failure to apply for an 
emergency court order when his mother’s firm objection to the administration of 
diamorphine became clear.  While accepting that the doctors in their clinical 
judgment were acting in David’s best interests,303 the ECtHR highlighted the fact 
that doctors had been in discussions with David’s mother for a number of 
months beforehand about the treatment David should receive, should he 
deteriorate.304 They had the time to secure the presence of a police officer,305 but 
chose not to make an emergency application to court. 
The ECtHR also refers to the doctors’ ‘rather insensitive attempts to overcome 
[David mother’s] opposition.’306 The judgment suggests that the hospital had firm 
views about the role of the Court, for example, they asserted that they did not 
apply to court because:  
‘the court could have offered no remedy that could have benefited 
[David’s mother] in the circumstances of the case.  In particular, the High 
Court would not have ordered the doctors to provide treatment that they 
did not consider clinically appropriate and would not have regarded the 
second applicant’s view as determinative if they conflicted seriously with 
the doctor’s view of the first applicant’s best interests’.307  
There is plentiful, strong dicta in support of the hospital’s assertion that the court 
would not order doctors to treat in a manner contrary to their clinical judgment, 
for example Balcombe LJ in the aforementioned Re J [1991].308 However, the 
courts have repeatedly stressed that cases are dependent on their particular 
                                                 
The ECtHR awarded David compensation of 10,000 euros plus costs. 
 
303 Glass v United Kingdom [2004], 61627/00 ECHR 103 (9 March 2004), para 77 
 
304 Ibid, para 78 
 
305 Ibid, para 81 
 
306 Ibid, para 82 
 
307 Ibid, para 66 
 
308 Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] [1991] Fam. 33; [1991] 2 W.L.R. 140,per 
Balcombe LJ 
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facts309 and indeed, in 1997 the year prior to the events in Glass,310 the Court of 
Appeal in Re T [1997]311 did, going against the opinion of the doctors, find in 
keeping with the parents’ wishes that a child should not have an operation, 
doctors believed to be in the child’s best interests.  Of course, in Re T the Court 
of Appeal was not ordering the doctors to act, but rather holding that they 
should not act.  In a later case of MB [2006]312 the Court also agreed with the 
parents’ assessment of their child’s best interests, against the unanimous 
opinion of all the medical experts, declining to make the order sought by the 
medical team that MB’s ventilation should be discontinued.  Hospitals deciding 
not to apply to court on the assumption that the court would be obliged to agree 
with the doctors’ determination of a child’s best interests seems to make a 
nonsense of the purpose of best interest applications and the well-established 
principle that it is not for the doctors nor a child’s parents to determine a child’s 
best interests, but for the court. 313 Indeed, this seems to be the viewpoint of the 
ECtHR judges in Glass v UK, holding as they did, that the trust breach David 
and his mother’s right to a family life pursuant to Article 8, by failing to apply to 
court for a best interests determination.314 The hospital were, however, perhaps 
correct to identify a conflict between a court respecting a doctors’ clinical 
autonomy and acting in a child’s best interests if the court saw this as 
something different from the doctor’s intended action.  Research question four 
in this thesis addresses whether the doctors in this study do apply to 
court when they encounter disagreements as to a child’s best interests 
and the doctors’ thoughts and feelings about applications to court, as will 
                                                 
309 An NHS Trust v MB [2006] EWHC 507 (Fam), para 16 (ix), per Holman J, cited with approval in  
Great Ormond Street Hospital v Constance Yates, Chris Gard, Charles Gard, [2017] EWHC 972 (Fam) para 
39, per Francis J 
 
311 T (A Minor), Re [1996] EWCA Civ 1313 (24 October 1996) (1997)  
312 An NHS Trust v MB [2006] EWHC 507 (Fam) 
 
313 Re B (A Minor) (Wardship, Medical Treatment) [1981] CA,WLR 1421and  Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: 
Medical Treatment) [1991] [1991] Fam. 33, [1991] 2 W.L.R. 140, per Lord Donaldson 
 
314 Glass v United Kingdom [2004] (61827/00) 1 F.L.R 1019 
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be seen in chapters eight and nine. This issue also arises earlier in 
chapter six of this thesis in the context of how doctors balance respect for 
each other’s clinical autonomy with disagreements as to a child’s best 
interests.315 
  7.3 Article 14 ECHR 
Earlier discussion of Article 2 in relation to the Glass litigation considered the 
criticism of the doctors by commentators such as Huxtable and Forbes316 and 
Maclean317 and others.318  Commentators particularly expressed their concern 
that doctors discriminated against David and made value judgments about his 
quality life.  The ECtHR clearly did not think so, rejecting as they did David’s 
application pursuant to Article 14 ECHR.319  It held: 
‘there is no evidence whatsoever on which to base an arguable 
complaint that the first applicant was a victim of discrimination on 
account of the fact that he was severely handicapped’.320   
As English321 in her commentary on the case argues, evidence of discriminatory 
practice in such cases is almost by its nature unforthcoming, making proving 
                                                 
315 Chapter six. Para 7.1-7.2, pp. 253-267 
 
316  Huxtable, R, Forbes, K, (2004) ‘Glass v UK: Maternal Instinct v Medical Opinion’, Child and Family Law 
Quarterly, vol.16, No.3, pp.339-354, at p.346 
 
317 Maclean, AR, (2000) ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and the Individual’s Right to Treatment,’ Medical 
Law International, vol 4, Issue 3-4, pp 245-276 at page 268 
 
318  For example, the Southampton General consultant: Hall, C, (2000) Rough Justice, The Sunday 
Telegraph, 16th July, 2000 p.24 
 
319  Article 14 ECHR ‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any grounds such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status.’ 
 
320  Glass v UK [2003] ECHR, Admissibility Decision, (16 March 2003) 
 
321 English, R, (2007) Human Rights Update: Glass v UK, One Crown Office Row, London, 
http://www.humanrights.org.uk/814/ accessed 3 December 2015 
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discrimination extremely difficult. However, when even, as was seen,322 other 
doctors involved in David’s care, expressed their shock at the treatment David 
received and believed David was discriminated against, suggesting the 
question merits greater level of investigation than that expended by the ECtHR.  
With the Commission of the ECtHR rejecting the possibility that David was a 
victim of discrimination,323 it does seem that the courts lag behind civil society, 
the NHS, UK government and the UN in acknowledging the fact that disabled 
children and adults can and do face discrimination in healthcare in the UK, as 
will now be explored. 
8.  Investigations and reports acknowledge poor care 
During the later years of this review, several government and voluntary sector 
reports found ‘discrimination, negative attitudes, segregation, stigmatization and 
other poor service provision’324 for disabled people within the NHS.  2001 saw 
the publication of the Final Report of the Royal Infirmary Inquiry (‘Bristol’)325 
chaired by, the by now, Sir Ian Kennedy.  It investigated the treatment of 
children receiving complex cardiac care at the Bristol Royal Infirmary between 
1984 and 1995. Bristol identified the culture amongst the medical professionals 
as one of the factors leading to the poor treatment some children received.  It 
referred to the ‘club culture’ among doctors.326  Bristol made 198 
recommendations to improve paediatric care across the UK.  The long-term 
                                                 
322 Chapter two, para 7.1, p.70 
 
323 Glass v UK [2003] ECHR, Admissibility Decision, (16 March 2003), para 5 
 
324 Basnett, I, (2001) ‘Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Towards and Decisions Affecting 
Disabled People’, in G.L. Albrecht, K.D. Seelman and M. Bury (eds), Handbook of Disability Studies, Sage 
Publications, London, pp.450-467 
 
325 The Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry (2001), The Inquiry into the management of care of children 
receiving complex heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary, Final Report, Bristol Royal Infirmary 
Inquiry 
 
326 Ibid, paragraph 8 of Synopsis 
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impact of Bristol is questionable in light of the fact a further inquiry into the same 
service was set up by the Medical Director of NHS England in 2016.327  
The years immediately following the Glass litigation saw a spate of reports, 
suggesting the Commission of the ECtHR’s confident rejection of the possibility 
that the doctors treating David could have discriminated against him, was 
perhaps overly optimistic. A 2006 investigation by the Disability Rights 
Commission (‘DRC’) found the response from government and NHS in England 
and Wales to the major health inequalities faced by people with learning 
disabilities inadequate.328 Significantly for this thesis, the DRC’s investigation 
found that parents of children with the most complex impairments experienced 
the greatest difficulties.  In similar vein, a 2008 Healthcare Commission 
investigation found disabled children with complex health needs ‘do not always 
get the attention and care from healthcare services that they need.’329  
Also in 2008, the Every Disabled Child Matters Campaign reported: 
‘Disabled Children experience unequal access to health promotion 
programmes, universal health services such as GPs, dentists and 
emergency care settings, as well as specialist and appropriate palliative 
care services.330‘   
                                                 
327 Grey, E, Kennedy, I (2016) The Report of the Independent Review of Children’s Cardiac Services in 
Bristol; June 2016; www.thebristolreview.co.uk/Bristol-Review--FINAL-REPORT.pdf; accessed 19 
December 2016  
 
328 Disability Rights Commission (2006) Equal Treatment Closing the Gap, DRC, London, available on line 
at http://www.library.nhs.uk/learningdisabilities/ViewResource.aspx?resID=187482, accessed 1st 
December 2010 
 
329 Healthcare Commission (2008) State of Healthcare, Healthcare Commission (now defuncted), p11 
available on line at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100611090857/http://www.cqc.org.uk/_db/_documents/
State_of_Healthcare_2008.pdf, accessed 1 December 2010 
 
330 Franklin L, (2009) Disabled Children and Health, National Children’s Bureau, London, p5, 
https://www.pmguk.co.uk/data/page_files/publications%20and%20reports/2009/R.Disabledchildrenhe
althEveryChildMatters.pdf, accessed 8 October 2017 
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The same year, as was seen earlier331 the UNCRC Committee raised its 
concerns in its Concluding Observations on the UK, that disabled children 
continue to face significant difficulties in realising their rights to healthcare.332  
In March 2009, the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (‘PHSO’) 
published a report following investigations in the treatment of six adults with 
learning disabilities.  In the words of the PHSO: 
 ‘The investigation reports illustrate some significant and distressing 
failures in service across both health and social care. They show the 
devastating impact of organisational behaviour, which does not adapt to 
individual needs, or even consistently follow procedures designed to 
maintain a basic quality of service for everyone. They identify a lack of 
leadership and a failure to understand the law in relation to disability 
discrimination and human rights. This led to situations in which people 
with learning disabilities were treated less favourably than others, 
resulting in prolonged suffering and inappropriate care.’333 
Kennedy appeared once again when commissioned by the Department of 
Health to write the 2010 report ‘Getting It Right for Children and Young 
People’,334 on the healthcare of children and young people.  This cites the 
hostility parents can face when trying to secure healthcare for their disabled 
child.‘335 The same year the Independent Inquiry chaired by Sir Jonathan 
Michael in 2010 reported ‘people with learning disabilities receive less effective 
                                                 
331 Chapter two, para 4, p.47 
 
332 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (2008) Committee on the Rights of the Child; 
Consideration of reports submitted by state parties under Article 44 of the Convention; third and fourth 
periodic reports of States parties due in 2007 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
CRC/GBR/4, United Nations, Geneva, paras 64-68, para 52 (B)  
333 Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, (2009), Six lives: the provision of public services to 
people with learning disabilities, PHSO, London, p. 7 
334 Kennedy, I, (2010) Getting it right for children and young people: Overcoming cultural barriers in the 
NHS so as to meet their needs, Department of Health, London, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/getting-it-right-for-chilDren-and-young-people-
overcoming-cultural-barriers-in-the-nhs-so-as-to-meet-their-needs, accessed 8th October 2017 
335 Ibid, para 3.9, page 28 
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care than they are entitled to receive’.336  This was followed by Mencap’s 2013 
Death by Indifference report into the seventy-four deaths of cognitively disabled 
adults and children. It found institutional discrimination within the NHS.337 
Reports into institutionalised discrimination against disabled children and adults 
continue to be published on a regular basis,338 suggesting perhaps for many 
severely disabled children and young people rights legislation has had little or 
no impact on the ease with which they access healthcare.   
A recurrent theme in the cases and the commentaries is the lack of impact 
of the HRA and ECHR. The number of inquiries into the poor treatment of 
disabled children and adults at one level suggests that the HRA is having an 
impact in that the rights of disabled children and adults are being taken 
more seriously resulting in the investigations, which would not have 
happened in an earlier era.  However, the need for the investigations and 
the high number of disabled people involved in some of the studies, 
suggests that at front line level, rights are not always being respected.  As 
Laurie says ‘[T]he advent of the Human Rights Act has done little to  change 
the established orthodoxy.’339 One questions the Glass litigation and 
these multiple inquiries prompted in this thesis, is the question, as 
                                                 
336 Michael, J, (2008) Healthcare for all, Learning Disabilities Observatory, London, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130105064756/http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/
groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_106126.pdf, accessed 8th October 2017 
 
337 Mencap (2012) Death by Indifference: 74 deaths and counting, Mencap, London 
https://www.mencap.org.uk/sites/default/files/2016-08/Death%20by%20Indifference%20-
%2074%20deaths%20and%20counting.pdf, accessed 8th October 2017 
338 More recent examples includes Francis (2013), Report of NHS Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust 
Public Inquiry, The Stationery Office, Mazar, (2015)  Independent review of deaths of people with a 
Learning Disability or Mental Health problem in contact with Southern Health NHS Foundation Trust 
April 2011 to March 2015, NHS England https://www.england.nhs.uk/south/wp-
content/uploads/sites/6/2015/12/mazars-rep.pdf, accessed 8 October 2017 and Care Quality 
Commission, (2016), 'Learning candour and accountability' CQC a report which reviews the way the NHS 
investigates patient's deaths, including the deaths of disabled children, in England.   
339 Laurie G (2006) ‘The Autonomy of Others: Reflections on the Rise and Rise of Patient Choice in 
Contemporary Medical law’ chapter 9, in Mclean, SAM, First Do No Harm, Law Ethics and Healthcare, 
Ashgate, Farnham, pp. 135-136 
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part of addressing research question four, put directly to the doctors 
in the thesis survey: ‘Are a child’s human rights a factor you 
consciously consider’?340 
 
This review of the legal and ethical landscape, so far, seems to suggest, 
that little changed in the treatment of disabled children generally or in the 
way best interest decisions were approached for disabled children in 
particular, as a result of the HRA or the national and international child 
rights legislation that preceded it. This chapter now goes on to consider 
whether the introduction of United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (‘UNCRPD’)341 had any more of an impact on the 
lives of the UK’s disabled children than the earlier legislation. 
 
9.  More rights? United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities 
The UNCRPD342 was adopted by the General Assembly of the UN on 13
 
December 2006 and was open for signature on 30 March 2007.  The UK 
ratified the UNCRPD on 8 June 2009 and the Optional Protocols, which 
empowers individuals to make complaints directly to the Committee of the 
UNCRPD and the Committee to conduct inquiries within the UK on 7 August 
2009. 
 
Article 7 UNCRPD343 deals expressly with the rights of disabled children. It is 
                                                 
340 Chapter nine, para 4, p. 378 
 
341 United Nation Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 13
 
December 2006 and was open for signature on 30 March 2007.  




343 Article 7 UNCRPD - Children with disabilities 
‘1. States Parties shall take all necessary measures to ensure the full enjoyment by children with 
disabilities of all human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis with other children. 
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noteworthy that the wording used in Article 7 is much more affirmative than that 
used in Article 23 UNCRC, the article of the UNCRC dealing expressly with 
disabled children’s rights.   It is also of note, that just as all the provisions of the 
UNCRC apply equally to disabled children and not just Article 23, so to do all the 
provisions of UNCRPD apply to disabled children.  As Alkazi344 reports, 
discussion took place during the drafting process as to whether it was necessary 
to have an article in the UNCRPD dealing expressly with the rights of children, 
particularly as the UNCRC existed and included Article 23. The drafters, 
however, agreed to affirm that all UNCRPD rights apply to children.  They 
recognised that states tend to only consider disabled children’s rights in relation 
to Article 23 UNCRC, rather than in relation to the whole UNCRC, as they 
should.345 Perhaps drawing from this negative UNCRC experience, the 
UNCRPD makes further reference to children in other articles. However, there is 
still the risk that State Parties overlook the position of children where express 
reference to them is not made and only address the rights of children where they 
are expressly mentioned in the UNCRPD. 
 
The UNCRPD does not introduce any new rights. It identifies the rights of 
disabled persons and the obligations on State parties to promote, protect and 
ensure existing rights. Like the UNCRC and other international human rights 
conventions, the UNCRPD, introduces an international committee of experts to 
monitor State Parties implementation of the Convention. A Conference of State 
Parties is also established to consider matters regarding implementation.  
 
                                                 
2. In all actions concerning children with disabilities, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration. 
3. States Parties shall ensure that children with disabilities have the right to express their views freely on 
all matters affecting them, their views being given due weight in accordance with their age and 
maturity, on an equal basis with other children, and to be provided with disability and age-appropriate 
assistance to realise that right.’ 
 
344 Alkazi, R (2011) ‘Disability at the UN’, in Dobhai, H, Writing on Human Rights, Law and Society in 
India, Socio-Legal Information Centre, Human Rights Law Network, Delhi 
 
345 Ibid 
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One question that arises, is the extent to which the UNCRPD can be used by 
severely disabled children, particularly considering the barriers already 
exposed in the various investigations mentioned, to disabled people generally 
having their rights within healthcare recognised. The fear is that just as the 
position of disabled children have been largely overlook in the UK’s 
considerations of the UNCRC, likewise the position of disabled children is again 
at risk of being overlooked. The first Concluding Observations of the Committee 
of the UNCRPD346 published in 2017 suggests this fear is a valid one. Children 
are mentioned in relation to Article 7, but otherwise only expressly mentioned 
when consideration is given to just a limited number of the Articles such as, 
Article 24 (education) and Article 16 (protection from exploitation and abuse).  
Talking about access to healthcare, the Committee finds that ‘systematic, 
physical, attitudinal and/or communicative’ (emphasis added) barriers exist in 
the UK347 which prevent disabled people accessing mainstream healthcare, but 
children are not expressly mentioned here or at all in relation to the right to 
healthcare. 
 
There is little evidence then that the UNCRPD had any greater success in 
making disabled children’s rights in healthcare paramount than the domestic or 
international legislation that preceded it.  As was seen however, the UNCRPD 
committee mentioned attitudes as one of the barriers to healthcare for disabled 
people generally in the UK. This chapter now turns to consider literature which 
examines the impact of professional attitudes on disabled people’s healthcare. 
As was discussed in chapter one,348 children rarely feature in this debate,349 so 
literature relating largely to disabled adults is now explored. 
                                                 
346 UNCRPD, (2017) Concluding observations on the initial report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, CRPD/C/GBR/CO/1, United Nations, Geneva 
 
347 Ibid, para 54 
 
348 Chapter one, para 2.2, p.3 
 
349 Coker, M, Davis, JM (2000) ‘Disabled Children (Still) Invisible Under the Law, in Cooper, J, Law Rights 
and Disability, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London 
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10.  Impact of medical professionals’ attitudes on treatment of disabled 
people 
 
There has been much research on the attitudes of healthcare professionals 
towards disabled adults, both here and in other jurisdictions.350  
 
Bryon et al suggest that the consensus of studies find ‘[h]ealth professionals 
especially doctors are perceived as insensitive and patronising’.351  Hordon352 
and Mitchell et al353 did find improvements in attitudes towards disabled patients 
in medical students over the duration of their training, but unfortunately the 
students were not followed up long term.  Negative attitudes do seem prevalent.  
Indeed, a review of studies since Kennedy’s Astor lecture, suggests little 
change in attitudes despite all the legislation and professional guidance 
discussed in this chapter.  French conducted a study in 1988, looking at health 
and social care professionals’ attitudes towards twenty-four individuals with 
                                                 
350 Examples include: French S, (1988)  Experience of disabled health and caring professionals, Sociology 
of Health and Illness, vol.10 Issue f2; pp.170-188; Duckworth SC, (1988), The effects of medical 
education on the attitudes of medical students towards disabled people, Medical Education, vol 22, 
Issue 6,pp.501-505; Gerhart K, Koziol-McLain J, Lowenstein S et al, (1994) Quality of life following spinal 
cord injury: Knowledge and attitudes of emergency care professionals, Annals of Emergency Medicine, 
vol 23, Issue 4, pp.807-812; Fitzsimmons J & Barr O, (1997), A review of the reported attitudes of health 
and social care professionals towards people with learning disabilities: implications for education & 
further research, Journal of Intellectual Disability, vol. 1, Number 2, pp.57-64; Basnett, I, (2001)’ Health 
Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Towards and Decisions Affecting Disabled People’, in G.L. 
Albrecht, K.D. Seelman and M. Bury (eds), Handbook of Disability Studies, Sage Publications, London, 
pp.450-467; Martin, HL, Powell, MM, Reid ,SM et al (2005) Cerebral Palsy what do medical students 
know and believe?, Journal of Paediatrics & Child Health vol.41, Issue 1-2, 2005, pp. 43-47; Rose, N, 
Kent, S, et al (2010) Health professional’s attitudes and emotions towards working with adults with 
intellectual disability and mental ill health, Journal of Intellectual Disability, 56, 854–864 
 
351 Byron, M, Cockshott, Z, Brownett, H, Ramkalwan T (2005) What does ‘disability’ mean for medical 
students? An exploration of the words medical students associate with the term ‘disability, Medical 
Education, 39, 176-183, Blackwell Publishing Ltd 
 
352 Hordon, L.D (1993) The effect of Medical Training on Attitudes to Disabled People, British Journal of 
Rheumatology, 32: 151 
 
353 Mitchell, KR, Hayes, M, Gordon, J & Wallis, B, (1984), An Investigation of the Attitudes of Medical 
Students to Physically Disabled People, Medical Education, 18: 21-23 
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‘substantial’ impairment wanting to enter the health and social care professions.  
French does not define ‘substantial’ but does list the participants’ impairments. 
They include, for example, three participants with cerebral palsy; one with 
epilepsy, four with lower limb amputations and one with tetraplegia. However, 
most of the conditions listed cover a wide spectrum of possible impairment so 
this list is of limited value in clarifying French’s definition.  As the individuals 
were planning to enter health and social care professions it seems their 
impairments, when compared with the children in this study, are likely to have 
been minor.  Moreover, the study seems to cover only individuals with physical 
and not cognitive impairments.  Repeated investigations in recent years have 
shown people with cognitive impairments (or assumed by health professionals 
to have cognitive impairments), experience the most negative attitudes from 
health professionals.354  French found, however, that ‘…while most respondents 
reported either positive or neutral attitudes from colleagues, a sizeable minority 
experienced negative attitudes’355 from health professionals.  In contrast, the 
study found ‘Negative attitudes from patients and clients, ‘exceptionally rare.’356  
The French study therefore suggests that, at that time, health professionals’ 
attitudes were worse than those of non-health professionals.   
 
There are factors, which make it difficult to generalise from French’s study. For 
example, whether the health professionals were particularly hostile to disabled 
people as colleagues or to disabled people in general.  Also, the positive 
attitudes of clients and patients may not be typical of the general population.  
The nature of their relationship with the disabled person as their health 
                                                 
354 See for example: Mencap (2012) Death by Indifference: 74 deaths and counting, Mencap, London 
https://www.mencap.org.uk/sites/default/files/2016-08/Death%20by%20Indifference%20-
%2074%20deaths%20and%20counting.pdf , accessed 8 October 2017 and Mazar, (2015)  Independent 
review of deaths of people with a Learning Disability or Mental Health problem in contact with Southern 
Health NHS Foundation Trust April 2011 to March 2015, NHS England, 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/south/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2015/12/mazars-rep.pdf, accessed 8 
October 2017 
 
355 French S (1988) Experience of disabled health and caring professionals, Sociology of Health and 
Illness, vol.10 Issue f2. pp.170-188, at p.170 
 
356 Ibid 
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professional may have influenced their attitudes.  There may have also been 
factors about the patients which led to unusually positive attitudes, for example, 
some may be disabled individuals themselves.  A comparison can be made with 
a study by Duckworth,357 published the same year, which compared the 
attitudes of Southampton medical students and junior doctors with the general 
population.  Again, this study was only concerned with attitudes towards people 
with physical impairments.  Using a questionnaire developed by Yuker & 
Block,358 Duckworth assessed the difference in attitudes between first and 
fourth year medical students; Senior House Officers (SHOs)359 and a control 
group of the general public.  Duckworth found no significant difference between 
the attitudes of the general public, the medical students and the SHOs.  
However, he did find that more 4th year students and SHOs agreed with the 
statement ‘Disabled people cause more problems to doctors than non-disabled 
people’.360  He also found that within each group there was a sub-population 
with significantly more negative attitudes.  This does tend to suggest that at the 
time of the study, attitudes deteriorated as medical students progressed through 
their training and qualify.  Indeed, it may be significant that students often have 
patient contact for the first time in their 4th year of training, potentially suggesting 
that treating and interacting disabled people impacted negatively on the doctors’ 
attitudes.  Although old, these two studies are of interest to this thesis as, as will 
be seen in chapter four,361 they were conducted at the time when the majority of 
the doctors in this study were in training. 
 
                                                 
357 Duckworth, SC, (1988), The effects of medical education on the attitudes of medical students 
towards disabled people, Medical Education, vol.22, Issue 6, pp.501-505 
358 Yuker, HE, Block, J. R, Young, JH, (1966) The measurement of attitude toward disabled persons, 
Human Resources Study No. 7, Human Resources Center, Albertson 
359 Junior doctors in their first years of training. The term ‘Foundation Doctor’ has now replaced the 
term Senior House Doctor in the UK 
 
360 Duckworth SC, (1988) The effects of medical education on the attitudes of medical students towards 
disabled people, Medical Education, vol. 22, Issue 6, pp.501-505 at p. 501 
361 Chapter four, para 4.5, pp.157-158 
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The following decade, in 1994 Gerhart et al362 published a study in the USA, 
comparing the attitudes towards severe physical impairment of health 
professionals working in a Denver emergency department, with the attitudes of 
individuals living with severe physical impairment.  The disabled participants all 
had high-level quadriplegia, resulting in paralysis usually caused during 
accidents.363     
 
Gerhart et al compared the answers of 233 health professionals with 128 
disabled individuals.  They report that 41% of the health professionals thought 
the resuscitation attempts in such cases were too aggressive.  Further, 22% of 
the health professionals said they would not want treatment at all to survive in 
such circumstances and a further 23% said they would only want pain relief.  
While only 18% of the health professionals said they thought they would be glad 
to be alive after sustaining such an injury, 92% of the individuals with the injury 
reported they were glad to be alive.  Also, while only 17% of the health 
professionals said they thought the quality of life of individuals with such 
impairment would be average or better than average, 86% of the actual group 
reported their quality of life to be average or above average.  A 1989 study by 
Whiteneck364 reported similar findings for individuals with a similar level of 
impairment, but also in addition needing long-term ventilation. Although just two 
studies, these do suggest significant differences in how disabled people with 
very severe physical impairments view the quality of their own lives, compared 
to health professionals’ perceptions.  Moreover, these were individuals who had 
previously been non-disabled so could make a direct comparison between their 
lives before and after they sustained their injuries.  Gerhart et al acknowledged 
some limitations in their study, for example, the survey measured only doctors’ 
                                                 
362 Gerhart, K, Koziol-McLain, J, Lowenstein, S et al (1994) Quality of life following spinal cord injury: 
Knowledge and attitudes of emergency care professionals, Annals of Emergency Medicine, vol. 23, Issue 
4, 1994, pp.807-812 
 
363 Ibid, p.808 
 
364 Whiteneck, G, (1989) Long-term outlook for persons with high quadriplegia, in Whiteneck G, Adler C, 
Carter RE et al (eds) The Management of High Quadriplegia, Demos Publications, New York 
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attitudes in hypothetical not actual situations.  They also acknowledged that 
they had no information on the practitioners’ length of service; their ethnicity 
and their religious beliefs, all of which Gerhart et al acknowledge could impact 
on attitudes.365 Despite these limitations Gerhart et al conclude ‘the existence of 
any underlying ‘better off dead’ assumptions in emergency care providers, may 
have a significant impact on the delivery of care.’366 
 
This study was influential in the questionnaire design in this thesis, 
ensuring questions were asked of the doctors about their length of 
service, ethnicity, gender, religious beliefs and other factors.  To answer 
research question two, doctors were asked about the impact of a child’s 
impairment on their decisions and the doctors responses, as will be seen 
in chapter five367 were mapped against key personal and professional 
characteristics for each doctor to see if any there was any suggestion that 
doctors with particular characteristics behave in a particular way. 
 
The new millennium saw a spate of new studies of medical students’ attitudes 
towards disabled patients.  This in itself was perhaps a positive sign, as it 
suggested a growing recognition that medics’ attitudes towards disabled 
patients were important and worthy of academic study.  These studies also 
tended to be done to assess the impact of disability rights/awareness training 
on medical students, at a time when ‘disability’ was beginning to feature on the 
medical curriculum.  A 1990 study by Marshall & Haines368 had found that 25% 
of UK medical schools had no structured teaching in any department about 
                                                 
365  Gerhart, K, Koziol-McLain, J, Lowenstein, S et al (1994) Quality of life following spinal cord injury: 
Knowledge and attitudes of emergency care professionals, Annals of Emergency Medicine, vol. 23, Issue 




367 Chapter five, para 6, pp. 226-234 
 
368 Marshall, J, Haines, A (1990) Survey of the teaching of disability and rehabilitation to medical 
undergraduates in the UK, Medical Education, 24, pp. 528-530 
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disability.369  What education there was tended to take a very biomedical 
approach, with it seems, at least some of the medical student taking the subject 
less than seriously. As Basnett, whose paper is considered in more detail 
later,370 described in 2001: 
‘My medical training was traditional and typical- biomedical and 
hospital dominated.  The disabled people I came into contact with 
were usually ill or institutionalised.  I was taught about body 
systems and their failures, but rarely about the interaction 
between our bodies, the environment and society….I had one 
memorable afternoon…  We ran around with empty wheelchairs, 
‘learning about obstacles’.  Many of us used it as an opportunity to 
play bumper cars’. 371 
 
As late as 2013 there was no consensus across UK medical schools as to how 
health inequalities, including disability should be taught at undergraduate 
level.372 The example of best practice Williamson & Ayres gave in their 
proposed undergraduate core curriculum, also suggests very little of the 
medical students’ six years undergraduate study be spent on understanding 
disability:  
‘A session on the ‘nature of culture’ which is further explored within 
sociology teaching. In Year 2 there are symposia on both physical 
disability and mental illness.’373 
 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that learning disabilities are not mentioned at all. 
 
                                                 
369 Ibid, p. 529 
 
370 Chapter two, para 10, pp.89-90 
 
371 Basnett, I, (2001)’ Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Towards and Decisions Affecting 
Disabled People’, in G.L. Albrecht, K.D. Seelman and M. Bury (eds), Handbook of Disability Studies, Sage 
Publications, London, pp.450-467, p.451 
 
372 Williamson, A E. Ayres, R. (2013) A core curriculum for learning about health inequalities in UK 
undergraduate medicine, RCGP, London 
 
 
373 Williamson, A E. Ayres, R. (2013) A core curriculum for learning about health inequalities in UK 
undergraduate medicine, RCGP, London, p.6 
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Martin et al’s374 2005 Australian study did unusually consider medical students’ 
attitudes towards children living with cerebral palsy.  It found that 54 medical 
students had very poor knowledge of cerebral palsy, leading to negative 
attitudes, when in the penultimate year of their undergraduate training.  Whilst 
recognising that medical students could not be made aware of all conditions; 
the authors point out that cerebral palsy ’is the commonest cause of childhood 
physical disability.’375  The study found that nearly half the students’ responses 
suggested that they believed a child with cerebral palsy would be better off 
dead.376  As the authors rightly comment: ‘[t]hese views are potentially 
damaging for the care of persons with cerebral palsy.  A doctor who does not 
value the life of their patient as much as other people may be less likely to 
advocate for their rights’.377 The Martin et al study seems to be in keeping with 
the findings of other studies into the health professionals’ attitudes towards 
disabled adults, suggesting that doctors tend to assume disabled people have 
such a poor quality of life that their lives are not worth saving.   
 
Tracey & Iacono‘s378 2008 Australian study took a radical approach for its time, 
of medical students being taught by teachers with learning disabilities. 128 
medical students completed an attitude scale379 at the beginning and end of the 
study.380  The authors report their study show the students were significantly 
                                                 
374 Martin, Hl, Rowell, MM, Reid, SM, Marks, MK, Reddihough, D (2005) Cerebral palsy: What do medical 
students know and believe?’ J. Paediatri. Child Health, 41, pp. 43-47 
 
375 Ibid, p. 43 
 
376 Ibid, p. 46 
 
377 Ibid, p. 46 
 
378 Tracy, J, Iacono, T (2008) People with developmental disabilities teaching medical students – Does it 
make a difference? Journal of Intellectual and Developmental Disability, Vol.33 (4), pp. 345-348 
 
379 Gething, l, (1994) The interaction with Disabled Person Scale, Journal of Social Behaviour and 
Personality, 9, pp. 23-42 
 
380 Tracy, J, Iacono, T (2008) People with developmental disabilities teaching medical students – Does it 
make a difference? Journal of Intellectual and Developmental Disability, Vol.33 (4), pp. 345-348, p. 345 
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more comfortable about interacting with people with learning disabilities after 
their tutorials than before.  Discomfort in interacting with certain patients will 
certainly impact on the care those patients receive.  Indeed, Tracy & Iacono 
cite381 Gill et al recommend better communication between general practitioners 
and patients with learning impairments as a means of improving patients’ 
healthcare.382  Byron et al383 similarly found in their 2005 study, the attitudes of 
381 Bristol medical students changed from using predominantly negative and 
patronising language about disabled people to positive language after disability 
awareness training.   
 
Basnett who described384 his training in disability in the early 1980s, severed his 
cervical spinal cord playing rugby, whilst working as a doctor.  His perspective 
as a newly disabled medic is an illuminating one.  Basnett is in the unusual 
position of being able to speak both from the perspective of a non-disabled 
doctor and following his injury, as a disabled patient with a significant 
impairment. This makes him particularly well placed to put the perceptions of a 
disabled person into the context of the training and culture of the medical 
profession.   
 
Basnett’s paper, as mentioned in chapter one, was highly influential in the 
design of this thesis. It influenced research questions two and three; asking 
doctors about the factors they consider when making best interest 
decisions; their education and training and the impact of this on their 
attitudes and values.  Basnett also articulated the importance of the 
                                                 
381 Ibid, p.346 
 
382 Gill, F, Stenfert Kroesa B, Rose J (2002) General Practitioners attitudes to patients who have learning 
disabilities, Psychological Medicine 32 pp.1445-1455 
 
383 Byron, M, Cockshott, Z, Brownett, H, Ramkalwan T (2005) What does ‘disability’ mean for medical 
students? An exploration of the words medical students associate with the term ‘disability, Medical 
Education, 39, 176-183, Blackwell Publishing Ltd 
 
384 Basnett, I, (2001)’ Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Towards and Decisions Affecting 
Disabled People’, in G.L. Albrecht, K.D. Seelman and M. Bury (eds), Handbook of Disability Studies, Sage 
Publications, London, pp.450-467 
P a g e  | 90 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
interactions between health professionals in creating those attitudes and 
values, something discussed with the doctors in this thesis.  Likewise, it 
influenced the inclusion of a question about doctors’ personal experience 
of disability, if any, be it their own, or a close relative.   
 
Basnett explained very eloquently the dramatic impact his own impairment on 
his attitude towards other disabled people and contrasted this with his previous 
ignorance saying: 
‘I have demonstrated how little I understood of disability as a junior 
doctor and how inappropriately negative my attitudes were….I have 
demonstrated that this was not limited to me. Some of the influences on 
health care professionals, including society as a whole, medical training 
that concentrated on disease and individuals, and the bias towards 
seeing disabled people only when they are sick...’385 
 
However, Basnett’s paper had a greater influence than just drawing attention to 
the possible influence of training and the medical culture.  It also highlighted the 
importance of asking doctors themselves the questions this research 
addresses. This meant not just asking doctors how they make difficult medical 
decisions for disabled children, but also to reflect on what they think influences 
those decisions, the factors they consider and the resources they draw upon.  
Basnett’s paper, was a key influence in empirical research with doctors being a 
major part of this thesis.  
 
Earlier studies as well as the investigation reports cited earlier suggest that 
certainly for adults, doctors’ attitudes can have a huge impact on the treatment 
and care disabled people receive.  As has been seen the position of disabled 
children has rarely been considered, something this thesis does, examining 
                                                 
385 Basnett, I, (2001)’ Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Towards and Decisions Affecting 
Disabled People’, in G.L. Albrecht, K.D. Seelman and M. Bury (eds), Handbook of Disability Studies, Sage 
Publications, London, pp.450-467, p. 462 
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as it does particularly in chapters five,386 six 387 and nine,388the impact of a 
doctor’s attitude on the treatment a disabled child receives. 
 
To conclude this chapter the key issues that emerge from this scanning of the 
landscape since 1979 and this thesis’ contribution are now summarised. 
 
11.  Conclusions: Key Issues from the literature and this thesis’ 
contribution 
 
 11.1 Key Issues 
 
A scan of the key milestones in law and ethics from 1979 to 2010 relevant to 
best interest decision-making for disabled children suggests that potentially, 
very little has changed in how best interest decisions are made for disabled 
children since the late 1970s when Kennedy first asked ‘what is a medical 
decision?’  A question which is a crucial one for the children who are the central 
focus of this study.  It seems it is a question still being asked today and with the 
answer no clearer.  This review also suggests that it is not really known how 
paediatricians do make decisions for disabled children. It is not a question 
academia has addressed and it seems to be a question the courts have 
avoided. 
 
In the almost forty years reviewed in this chapter, ‘on paper’ there have been 
huge changes; with the introduction of international human rights treaties 
directly addressing the rights of children and disabled people; domestic 
legislation stressing the paramountcy of a child’s rights; and professional 
guidance on making these decisions. However, the review suggests very little 
has changed in the way the English High Court addresses best interest 
                                                 
386 Chapter five, pp.181-236 
 
387 Chapter six, pp. 237-284 
 
388 Chapter nine, pp. 347-380 
P a g e  | 92 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
decisions for severely disabled children.  Indeed, as was seen,389 the High 
Court has expressly said nothing has changed.390   Society’s attitudes towards 
disabled children have undoubtedly changed.  They now live at home with their 
parents, rather than in institutions and attend school, many even attending 
mainstream school.  It is, however, unclear the extent to which paediatrician’s 
attitudes towards disabled children have changed and whether, doctors 
approach best interest decisions as narrow medical decisions or as the wide-
ranging welfare decisions.  It is unclear, whether doctors have the training, 
education and expertise to make wide-ranging best interest decisions or 
whether they focus purely on the medical aspects of the decisions and/or make 
assumptions about the non-medical aspects.  Indeed, it seems unclear whether 
doctors are making decisions in the child’s best interests, or being overly 
influenced in their decisions by their personal and professional characteristics. 
 
Through addressing the research questions in this thesis, it is hoped that a 
much clearer picture will emerge as to how paediatricians make best interest 
decisions for disabled children. This thesis cannot and does not try to answer 
whether doctors make decisions in the best interests of individual disabled 
children.  It does address the extent to which paediatricians are making best 
interests as they are guided to do by their professional ethical guidance and, 
the jurisprudence of the English High Court and the part if any, played by law, 
rights and ethics in those decisions.   
 
 11.2 This thesis’ contribution 
The contribution this thesis makes can be summarised as follows: 
 
i) It asks UK paediatricians directly how they make difficult decisions 
(best interest decisions) for severely disabled children, as opposed to 
                                                 
389 Chapter two, para 7, pp. 62-63 
 
390 Portsmouth NHS Trust v Charlotte Wyatt [2005] EWHC 117 (Fam) 
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infants. It asks doctors to reflect on their own and their medical 
colleagues’ decision-making; 
ii) It identifies the factors the paediatricians use to make their decisions 
and the weight they put on each of those factors; 
iii) It inquiries as to the impact, of any, of key professional and personal 
characteristics on the paediatricians’ decisions, including the impact if 
any of personal experience of disability; 
iv) It asks UK paediatrician about their training and education in law, 
rights and ethics; it maps this to what the doctors say about how they 
make their decisions and in doing so tests Kennedy’s hypothesis that 
doctors do not have the training and education needed to make these 
decisions; 
v) It tests the UK government’s claim that all professionals who work 
with children receive training in the UNCRC, by asking UK 
paediatricians directly about their training in child rights; 
vi) It asks, if and how, UK paediatricians use guidance from their 
professional bodies when making their decisions for disabled 
children; 
vii) It highlights importance of differences between children and infants 
when making best interest decisions.  
viii) It builds on the normative debate of should doctors make quality of 
life decisions about disabled patients by asking doctors their views 
and includes disabled children in the debate. It also asks doctors 
directly whether doctors they do make quality of life decisions about 
their disabled child patients; 
ix) It considers the impact of disagreements between doctors as to a 
child’s best interests; 
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x) It identifies two distinct ‘camps’ of paediatricians391 who seem to 
approach best interest decisions qualitatively differently and a 
potential new schema of legal consciousness392; 
xi) It asks doctors about the role played by law, rights and ethics, if any, 
in their difficult decisions for children. 
 
As shall be seen in chapter seven and nine, having analysed that the doctors 
say about law, rights and ethics using the legal consciousness framework 
explained in chapter seven, this thesis also propose a new category of legal 
consciousness. This reflects a legal consciousness identified in some of the 
doctors in this study, but not found in existing legal consciousness literature. 
 
In the next chapter the methodology used in this thesis is set out and explained. 
 
  
                                                 
391 Chapter six, paras 7.2.1-7.2.2, pp.268-271 
 
392 See chapter seven, para 11.3, p.  321 
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This chapter describes the methodology used for the empirical research, 
namely the survey of paediatricians and subsequent interviews, in this thesis.  
The chapter is divided in to three parts (‘A, B, C). Part A describes the methods 
employed in preparation to generating the data, including addressing ethical 
issues.  Part B describes how the data was generated and part C describes 
how it was analysed.  
 
As was mentioned at the very start of this thesis,393 the existing lenses set out 
and discussed in chapter two are used to explore how, by their own accounts, 
UK paediatricians make difficult medical decisions for disabled children.  A legal 
consciousness conceptual framework is then discussed and justified in chapter 
seven,394 before being used in chapters eight and nine, to fill in the gaps left by 
these existing lenses and examine how UK paediatricians make sense off and 
conceptualise law when making these decisions. An on-line survey and semi-
structured interviews were used to gather the data analysed through the rest of 
this thesis.   
 
Semi-structured interviews are commonly used in legal consciousness 
studies,395 as they allow for in-depth reflection and discussion of the issues, 
allowing participants to more freely reveal their legal consciousness.  Surveys 
are less commonly used, as the brevity of the answers do not so readily reveal 
the participants’ legal consciousness.   However, internet based surveys have 
                                                 
393 Chapter one, para 1, p.1 
 
394 Chapter seven, pp.285-321 
 
395 See for example, Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-
legal study of chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74;  
Cooper, D (1995) Local Government Legal Consciousness in the shadow of Juridification, Journal of Law 
and Society, 22(4), 506-26; Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1992), Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An 
Account of Legal Consciousness, New England Law Review, vol. 26 
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been used by some legal consciousness scholars, including, for example, 
Harding,396 who identifies some of their advantages: 
‘including the potential for; access to a diverse range of participants, 
international scope, anonymity and confidentiality, and the potential for 
large number of respondents.’ 397 
 
Not all these reasons apply to this thesis, for example this thesis is only 
concerned with UK paediatricians, but using an online survey did allow for a 
much large number of participants than would have otherwise been possible 
within the time and financial constraints of this study.  It also allowed for 
participants who wanted to remain anonymous to take part, or for participants 
who only wanted to answer some questions to easily do so.  Moreover, several 
of the survey questions, in addition to asking participants to choose from a 
range of answers, allowed for free-flowing text to be added by the participants, 
giving greater insights into their thinking.  More details of the reasons for 
adopting a legal consciousness approach to analyse what the doctors said 
about law are given in chapter seven.398 This chapter focuses on the methods 
used to collect and analyse the data.  
 
Part A: Preparing for Data Generation 
 
2. Ethical Considerations 
 
This study raised several ethical considerations.  These were given 
considerable thought and discussed at some length with the PhD Supervisors. 
The issues raised as a result of the researcher’s personal status were touched 
                                                 
396 Harding, R, (2006) ‘Dogs are ‘registered’, People shouldn’t be’ Legal Consciousness and Lesbian and 
Gay Rights, Social and Legal Studies, 15 (4),511-533 
 
397 Ibid, p. 519 
 
398 Chapter seven, pp.285-321 
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on in chapter one.399  The steps taken to address these and wider ethical issues 
are now presented. 
 
 2.1 Ethical Clearance 
The University of Edinburgh’s College of Humanities and Social Sciences 
research ethics framework guided all ethical considerations and actions in this 
study. The study gained ethical approval from the Law School.  Standard 
research ethics forms were completed setting out the nature of the research, 
identifying the potential ethical risks and the steps to be taken to minimise these 
risks for all parties, including the researcher.  As research was to be conducted 
with NHS employees and potentially on NHS premises, ethical clearance to 
conduct the survey and subsequent interviews was sought from the NHS South 
East Scotland Research Ethics Committee.  The NHS South East Scotland 
Research Ethics Service deemed this thesis to be a best practice audit aimed at 
improving patient care rather than research requiring ethical clearance, stating 
‘it does not need NHS ethical review under the terms of the Governance 
Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees in the UK’.400 
 
The NHS Health Authority Guidance401 also states that research ethics 
committee guidance is not needed where ‘Research limited to the involvement 
of NHS or social care staff recruited as research participants by virtue of their 




                                                 
399 Chapter one, paras. 5.2-5.3, pp.12-21 
 
400 Letter dated 13th April 2010 from South East Scotland Research Ethics Service to the researcher. See 
copy at Appendix 3 
 
401 NHS Health Research Authority, (2011), Governance Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees, 
NHS HRA, London, http://www.hra.nhs.uk/resources/research-legislation-and-governance/governance-
arrangements-for-research-ethics-committees/ last accessed 24 May, 2017 
 
402 Ibid 
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 2.2 Participants’ Status 
The first ethical problem raised by this research is its subject matter.  This study 
raises questions about the care of a very vulnerable population of patients.  The 
patients are vulnerable because they are children; they are sick, indeed often 
seriously ill, even dying and have significant physical - and often also significant 
cognitive impairment. Due to the extreme vulnerability of the patients, a decision 
was made early in the research process not to involve the patients or their 
families directly in the research.  While merit was seen in including the 
perspective of child patients when possible403 and the perspective of their 
families, it was recognised that considerable hurdles would have to be 
overcome to speak directly with patients and their families and these hurdles 
were seen as being too great, in view of the time and resources available, for 
this thesis.  Instead it was decided to focus this study on the perspective of 
doctors as the providers of care, studying their legal consciousness.  The 
perceptive for doctors, as seen in the last chapter,404 has been explored by 
researchers for infants and disabled adults, but not children. 
 
Doctors are clearly not a vulnerable group, rather they are an elite one. 
However, is perhaps important to explain why this assertion is made and what 
is meant in this thesis by ‘elite’. ‘There is no clear-cut definition of ‘elite’ and 
social science scholars to use the term in different ways.’405  The doctors in this 
survey are, professional elites, a status obtained by being ‘highly skilled, 
professionally competent’ and also ‘class specific.’406  
 
                                                 
403 Many of the children will have significant cognitive and communication impairments, although there 
will be a small number of children within the cohort who would be able to communicate their views. 
 
404 Chapter one, para.2, p.3 
 
405 Harvey, WS (2011) Strategies for conducting elite interviews, Qualitative Research, 11(4), 431-441 at 
p.432 
 
406 McDowell, L (1998) Elites in the City of London: some methodological considerations, Environment 
and Planning, 30(12), 2133-2146, at p.2135 
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The term ‘elite’ is used by Stephen407 to indicate the relationship between 
individuals or groups.  Doctors, especially senior consultants408 are elites in 
several senses: elites when compared with the population as a whole;409 elites 
when compared with other health professionals; and most importantly for this 
study, elite in relation to the children at the centre of these decisions and their 
families.  Doctors’ elite status can therefore be seen to arise for several often 
interrelated reasons, including their socio-economic status in society, their 
relationships and their professional expertise.  The potential of this professional 
expertise to lead to deference from the courts towards doctors was seen in the 
last chapter,410 arguably making doctors a particularly powerful elite. The impact 
or otherwise of doctors’ elite status on their legal consciousness is considered 
later in this thesis in chapters three and nine.411 
 
Harvey recognises that within elites there can be a hierarchy, with ‘ultra-elites’ 
being those in the most influential positions within an elite group.412  If l doctors 
as a class are an elite, senior consultants, especially those who hold influential 
positions, for example, heads of departments, clinical directors or posts with 
medical royal colleagues influencing policy and practice nationwide, can be said 
to be ‘ultra-elites’.  Indeed, as shall be seen in chapter six, there is a suggestion 
from doctors in this study, that there is a hierarchy between the paediatric sub-
                                                 
407 Stephens, N (2007) Collecting data from elites and ultra-elites: telephone and face-to-face interviews 
with macroeconomists, Qualitative Research, 7(2), 203-216, at p.205 
 





410 Chapter two, para 3, pp. 34-43 
 
411 Chapter three, para2.2, pp.98-102, Chapter nine, para, 3.1, p.363 
 
412 Harvey, WS (2011) Strategies for conducting elite interviews, Qualitative Research, 11(4), 431-44, at 
p.432 
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specialities, with PICU consultants at the top of this hierarchy.413 However, as 
Harvey recognises: 
‘In many cases, it is not necessarily the figureheads or leaders of 
organisations and institutions who have the greatest claim to their elite 
status, but those who hold important social networks, social capital and 
strategic positions within social structures because they are able to exert 
influence.’ 414 
 
Harvey’s quotation resonates with the concept of the ‘hidden curriculum’ 
suggesting that all doctors can potentially be said to have elite status in relation 
to newcomers to their profession.  The impact of the ‘hidden curriculum’ was 
described by Hafferty and Franks:415  
Most of what the initiates (medical students) will internalize in terms of 
the values, attitudes, beliefs and related behaviours deemed important 
within medicine takes place not within the formal curriculum but via a 
more latent one, a ‘hidden curriculum’ with the later being more 
concerned with replicating the culture of medicine than with the teaching 
of knowledge and techniques’. 416 
 
In other words, medical students are socialised from being merely lay people 
into medics, often learning more from role models rather than from their formal 
teaching. However, Hafferty and Franks voiced a concern that that this process 
is ‘largely unobserved unmonitored and highly idiosyncratic’.417  Students may 
be taught one thing formally, while on the wards learn from more senior doctors 
that very different behaviour is accepted or even expected, leading to 
‘inconsistencies, contradictions and ‘double messages.’418 For example, a 
medical student may learn about disability discrimination in the classroom, but 
                                                 
413 Chapter six, para 5.2, .1.1, p.254 
 
414 Harvey, WS (2011) Strategies for conducting elite interviews, Qualitative Research, 11(4), 431-441 at 
p. 433 
 
415 Hafferty, F, Franks R, (1994) The Hidden Curriculum, Ethic Teaching and the Structure of Medical 
Education, Academic Medicine, Vol. 69(11), pp.861-871 
 
416 Ibid, pp. 864-5 
 
417 Ibid, p. 863 
 
418 Ibid, p.866 
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then hear senior staff referring to cognitively impaired patients as ‘a bunch of 
nutters.’419  The ‘hidden curriculum’ can also manifest itself in, for example, 
ethical issues being given very little time or prominence in the curriculum,420 
suggesting to students’ that ethics are less important than clinical topics.  
Doctors’ room chats can also reinforce a particular attitude towards patients or 
indoctrinate negative attitudes.421  The impact, if any, of the hidden curriculum 
on doctors’ best interest decisions will be considered through this thesis. 
 
 Although clearly elites and in that sense not a vulnerable population,422 it was 
recognised that this study would be asking doctors very probing questions 
about very sensitive issues.  Doctors would, be asked how they decide whether 
an individual child lives or dies.  Doctors were also being asked about their 
knowledge of and adherence to the law, both criminal and civil.  This is an area 
not without controversy and increasingly during the time this study, the political 
and media spotlight has focused more and more on the behaviour of health 
professionals in relation to vulnerable patients, as was seen in the last 
chapter.423 
 
It was recognised that doctors were being asked to reflect on their and their 
colleague’s clinical decisions and analyse these.  They were also being asked 
                                                 
419 Francis, R, (2010) Independent Inquiry into care provided by Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust 
January 2005 – March 2009, Vol 1, The Stationery Office, London, para 212 
 
420 By way of example first year medical students at Edinburgh University study two courses, one dealing 
with clinical aspects of health and the other with ethical aspects.  However, the clinical course is titled 
“The fundamentals of medicine”; whereas the ethics course is titled “health ethics and society”, 
suggesting that clinical aspects are more fundamental to the role of a doctor than ethics. 
 
421Francis, R, (2010) Independent Inquiry into care provided by Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust 
January 2005 – March 2009, Vol 1, The Stationery Office, London, para 212 
 
422 Although see chapters six, pp.237-284 and nine, pp. 347-380 post, where doctors in this study 
suggest they see themselves as vulnerable. 
 
423 Chapter two, para 8. P. 75-79.  See also The Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry 
(2013) Report of the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, volume 3, HC898-111, The 
Stationery Office, London and Kirkup B, (2015), The Report of the Morecombe Bay Investigation, The 
Stationery Office, London 
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to reflect on the care they had given to children who had died and to question 
the judgments they had made.  Considerable thought therefore went into the 
planning of questions for both the survey and interviews.  It was seen as 
important to ensure that data could be obtained, while minimising any distress 
and discomfort to the doctors, while still encouraging them to think deeply about 
and discuss these issues.  To address this, the participants could choose not to 
answer any single or group of questions in the survey.  As will be discussed, 
questions were limited where doctors who advised on the survey content, 
suggested those issues may be particularly sensitive ones for doctors.   Doctors 
who were interviewed could choose the location of their interview to ensure they 
were in a location where they felt comfortable.  The doctors were also told at the 
start of the interview that they could choose not to answer any question or stop 
the interview or withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
 2.3 Researcher’s Personal Status 
The researcher was also in an unusually potentially vulnerable situation as a 
parent (and in the later years of the study, newly bereaved parent) of a child 
who fell within the profile of the children under discussion.  Much thought was 
given in preparing, particularly for the interviews, as to the sort of information 
the doctors may impart, unaware of the researcher’s personal situation.  
Consideration was, for example, given as to how the researcher would deal with 
any distressing information encountered in the survey responses and more 
particularly in the interviews.  The researcher’s many years of engaging with 
doctors as a parent was seen as an asset, since, as mentioned in chapter 
one,424 the researcher was familiar with the types of comments some doctors 
could unwittingly make about disabled children.  As discussed in chapter one,425 
the researcher also had significant experience of working with doctors on 
research; guidance and national investigation committees involving this same 
                                                 
424 Chapter one, paras. 5.2, pp. 12-20 
 
425 Chapter one, para 5.3, p.20-21 
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demographic of children, so was not unaccustomed to hearing, for example, the 
deaths of children being discussed in a dispassionate manner.  Finally, as was 
also mentioned in chapter one,426 the researcher’s experience as a practising 
lawyer was also viewed as helpful in maintaining a professional distance.  
 
The researcher and her supervisors discussed at length the issue of the 
whether doctors should be made aware of the researcher’s personal 
circumstance.  The decision was made that this should not be revealed, unless 
a doctor expressly asked (in which case it was felt important to be honest with 
doctors).   This decision was based on the importance of the doctors 
responding to the survey and interview questions, without being influenced in 
their answers by the researcher’s personal status. 
 
It will be recalled from chapter one427 that this study excluded doctors working 
at the hospital where the researcher’s son had most of his care at the time of 
the survey and interviews. The hospital is a small one.    Even doctors from that 
hospital who had not worked with the researcher’s son were excluded, as it was 
likely they would know of him and there was a real possibility that they may 
work with him in the future.  It also excluded doctors at other hospitals who had 
worked with the researcher’s son, but not doctors generally, due to the low 
likelihood of those doctors knowing the researcher as a parent or working with 
the researcher’s son in the future.  One doctor who responded to the survey did 
subsequently become directly involved in the researcher’s son’s care.  He was 
therefore not approached for interview, although his survey responses were 
kept within the results.  The researcher intended seeking that doctor’s consent 
to keep him in the study, but the doctor was removed from the GMC register, for 
unrelated reasons, before the request could be made.   
 
                                                 
426 Ibid 
 
427 Chapter one, para 5.2, p.17 
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A decision was made not to exclude all hospitals completely where the 
researcher’s son had received care, as they were much larger and the 
researcher’s son had received only short-term care from a small number of 
staff. Excluding all doctors from all these hospitals was thought to be 
unnecessary. It would have excluded too many potential participants from the 
research and excluded doctors from most of the UK’s children’s hospitals with 
no knowledge of the researcher or her son.  
 
As was mentioned in chapter one, the researcher’s son died while this thesis 
was being researched and written.  All the empirical data had been generated 
prior to his death.  The particular circumstance of Adam’s death made reading 
and analysing much of the data exceptionally traumatic. The researcher dealt 
with this by taking time away from this thesis when needed and seeking 
professional bereavement support. 
 
 2.4 Protecting the identities of the participants 
To protect the identity of the doctors in this study, doctors’ names and place of 
work have not been revealed and the doctors were assured of this. In the data 
analysis, each doctor is given a number. Doctors were told that where relevant 
their health region and specialism would be identified, but not in conjunction 
with information that would make a doctor easily identifiable to colleagues.  
Both the researcher and the doctors recognised that complete anonymity could 
not be guaranteed as, particularly within specialisms, doctors tend to know each 
other and may be able to identify a colleague from a quoted phrase or limited 
personal details. By way of (fictional) example, a consultant neurologist working 
in Scotland who trained in a particular region or who worked abroad may be 
identifiable by colleagues from this limited information.  The sample group 
proved to be relaxed about this.  All had personal experience of academic 
research and other than one doctor who expressly asked that a particular 
phrase not be quoted directly, expressed their lack of concern on this issue. 
Data is presented in such a way to avoid a doctor being identified.  Particular 
care was taken not to identify particular doctors when talking about their status 
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as parents of disabled children. This was recognised as being a characteristic, 
which could make a doctor particularly easy to identify, by colleagues.  For this 
reason, this characteristic is analysed in less depth than might have been 
interesting for this study. 
 
Throughout the whole of this thesis all data identifying doctors has been stored 
on a computer only accessed, and only accessible by, the researcher.  All data 
is password protected. 
 
3. Creating the Survey 
 
The Bristol Survey on-line survey tool created by the University of Bristol428 was 
used to develop the survey,429 a copy of which can be found in appendix two.  
The questions included in the on-line survey were developed from the thesis 
research questions listed in chapters one.430 
 
The survey included attitude questions, to assess how the respondents felt 
about something; behaviour questions, questions about the doctors’ beliefs 
about their own behaviour and attribute questions to elicit information about the 
doctors’ ages, education and training, as well as information about their 
religious upbringing and their familiarity and involvement with disabled people 
outside of work. 
 
The survey, was developed with six sections. Section one asked the doctor for 
basic personal and demographic background information, for example, name; 
contact details, specialism and whether the doctor would be willing to discuss 
the issues raised in the survey further with the researcher.  Section two asked 
                                                 
428 http://www.survey.bris.ac.uk 
 
429 See Appendix 4, pp. 427-433 
 
430 Chapter one, para 3, p.7 
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the doctors about their medical education; training and current post.  The 
purpose of these questions was to try to ascertain whether where doctors train 
and work influences their medical decision-making for disabled children with 
complex health problems.  Section three was entitled ‘Child Dependent 
Factors’. This asked doctors about making difficult decisions for disabled 
children.   
 
Doctors were deliberately not asked directly about ‘best interest’ decisions or 
‘end of life’ decisions but rather asked: 
‘What sort of difficult decisions do you find yourself making when dealing 
with disabled children?’431 
 
This was because it was felt important for the doctors to frame what they saw to 
be difficult decisions and to see whether they explicitly or implicitly referenced a 
child’s best interests when not prompted to do so.  Doctors, however, were 
expressly asked about severely disabled children with complex health 
problems,432 rather than children generally.  This is because disabled children 
are the focus of this thesis and not making this clear may have meant 
respondents did not mention disabled children at all.  This in itself would have 
been an interesting finding, but would have given very little data to analyse in 
respect of doctors’ decision-making or legal consciousness in relation to 
disabled children.   
 
The doctors were also asked questions about how they make decisions, both 
what factors they consider and whom they consult with or involve. Questions 
were also included about the doctors’ level of confidence when making 
decisions and whether they encounter disagreement and if so how they deal 
with it.  
 
                                                 
431 Appendix 4, question 19, p. 429 
 
432 Appendix 4, p.427 
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Section four asked doctors about law, rights, ethics and their use of 
professional guidance. There is a view among some legal consciousness 
scholars that law should not expressly be raised with research participants as 
whether a participant mentions law in itself reveals something about his or her 
legal consciousness.433 Other scholars do raise it, indeed, the context of the 
research can make it inevitable, see for example Ewick and Silbey.434   In this 
study, because it was felt important to capture how doctors perceived their 
decisions in relation to the law, rights and professional ethics, reference was 
made to the law in the survey, but only after the doctors had answered detailed 
questions on how they make difficult decisions.  It was also felt important to test 
Kennedy’s 435 assertion and that made in Glass v UK (2004)436 discussed in the 
last chapter,437 that doctors have no training to make legal and ethical 
decisions.  Doctors were, therefore, asked about any training and/or education 
they had undertaken in law, rights and ethics, either pre-or post-qualification. 
They were also asked questions to ascertain how relevant they thought law, 
rights and ethics to be to their decision-making and how, if at all, they used, law, 
rights, ethics and professional guidance when making decisions.   
 
Section five of the survey asked the doctors about resources and the impact of 
resources, if any, on their decision-making, to ascertain whether they saw 
resources as relevant to their decisions for disabled children.  The final section 
of the survey asked doctors more questions about their backgrounds. For 
example, doctors were asked about whether they have lived or worked abroad; 
                                                 
433 Harding, R, (2006) ‘Dogs are ‘registered’, People shouldn’t be’ Legal Consciousness and Lesbian and 
Gay Rights, Social and Legal Studies, 15 (4),511-533 at p.515 
 
434 Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1992) Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An Account of Legal 
Consciousness, New Eng. L. Rev, Vol. 26 
 
435 Kennedy, I, (1979). What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, published in an amended form in Kennedy, I, 2001, Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31. 
 
436 Glass v United Kingdom [2004] 61627/00 ECHR 103 (9 March 2004) 
 
437 Chapter one, para 5.1, p. 11 
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about whether they had children; about their personal experience of disability 
and about any religious upbringing or faith.  The aim of these questions was to 
ascertain as far as possible, whether any of these personal factors influence 
doctors’ decision-making.  It was recognised that with a survey of this size it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to show a causal link between a particular 
attribute of a particular doctor and a particular way of deciding for disabled 
children. Indeed, it seemed possible, if not inevitable that each doctor is 
influenced by a multitude of factors when making a single decision.  However, it 
was hoped that by asking these questions, any potential tendencies for doctors 
with particular attributes to decide in a particular way could be highlighted for 
further research. 
 
4. Piloting and modifying the survey 
 
To ascertain the content validity of the survey, once drafted it was discussed in 
detail with three consultant paediatricians and two PICU nurses. Two of the 
consultants were very senior and one was newly in post. All the doctors and 
nurses worked closely with disabled children with complex health problems and 
were chosen because of their high level of expertise in the field.  The senior 
consultants were involved strategically at national level in the planning of care 
for disabled children with complex health needs.  Kelley et al recommend 
involving:  
‘experts in the field, colleagues and members of the target population in 
question design in order to ensure the validity of the coverage of 
questions included.’438 
 
The discussions involved one face-to-face meeting with one of the senior 
consultants, and a second face-to-face meeting jointly with the other senior 
consultant and the newly qualified consultant.  The two nurses were interviewed 
individually.   The consultants and nurses all answered the survey and the 
                                                 
438 Kelley, Clark, B, Brown, V, & Sitzia, J (2003) Good practice in the conduct and reporting of survey 
research, International Journal for Quality in Health Care, 15(3), 261-266. p. 263 
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anticipated interview questions, as if they were participants.  In addition, they 
discussed the questions, both their content and form.  The meetings proved to 
be extremely constructive and highlighted questions where there was the 
potential for a doctor to understand the question differently from the researcher 
as a lawyer.   
 
Concern had been raised in earlier discussions with supervisors that doctors 
may be wary of taking part or addressing the questions raised in this thesis.  
Whilst this may have been a factor for some doctors and a reason not 
participating, the positive responses of the three consultants involved in these 
early discussions was noteworthy. All three commented upon how important 
they thought the questions the survey was addressing to be and how pleased 
they were that the research was being done.  These sentiments were, as was 
seen in chapter one,439 later echoed by a number of the research participants.   
 
5. Planning the interviews 
 
The purpose of the interviews in this study was to hear from doctors how the 
doctors themselves understand their own difficult medical decisions for disabled 
children with complex health problems.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen due to their ‘flexible and fluid nature’,440 
which is ‘intended to generate interviewees’ accounts of their own perspectives, 
experiences, understandings, interpretations and interactions’441 and ‘allow 
unexpected themes to emerge’.442  Indeed, as shall be seen in chapter six,443 
                                                 
439 Chapter one, para 5.2, p.16 
 
440 Mason, J, (2011)’ Semi-structured Interview’, in Lewis-Bench, MS, Bryman, A, Futing, L, (eds), The 






443 Chapter six, paras 7, pp. 261-275 
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disagreements between doctors emerged as a strong theme in this thesis.  This 
had not been expected.  The semi-structured nature of the interviews enabled 
the researcher to address with the participants the research questions, but also 
allowed the researcher the freedom to explore them slightly differently with each 
doctor, depending on the individual doctor’s responses, experiences and views.  
It also enabled the doctors to talk about the issues they felt most relevant and 
important to them.  Indeed, the extent to which individual doctors chose in his or 
her interview to talk about law can, to an extent, be seen as an indication of 
how relevant that doctor saw law to his or her best interest decision-making. 
 
Prior to planning the interview questions, a preliminary analysis of the doctors’ 
survey responses was undertaken and key emerging themes identified.  These 
were disagreements between doctors; the impact of a child’s cognitive ability; 
uncertainty and relevance to law to difficult medical decisions for disabled 
children. Interview plans were then drafted addressing these themes in the 
context of the study’s research questions.  A sample interview plan is included 
at appendix four. 
 
Questions were also prepared to encourage doctors to expand on the answers 
they had given in their survey responses.  The aim of the questions was to 
encourage doctors to reflect on their clinical decision-making.  As with the 
survey a ‘difficult decision’ was intentionally not defined but left for the doctors 
to define in an attempt to ascertain what types of decisions doctors themselves 
perceive to be difficult.  Questions were also drafted inquiring about doctors’ 
training in law, rights and ethics and how, if at all, doctors used these in their 
decision-making.   
 
Care was taken to word all questions so that they were open, with the aim of 
encouraging doctors to reflect, consider and discuss at length their view and 
opinions, so revealing their decision-making and their legal consciousness.  
Care was also taken in the language used, not to give the impression that a 
particular answer was expected, or that there was a right or a wrong answer. 
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Questions were prepared asking doctors how they made difficult medical 
decisions for disabled children with complex health problems; whom they 
involved in the decision-making, and how easy or difficult they found each 
aspect of these decisions to make. 
 
Particular questions were also drafted for particular doctors based on their 
survey responses.  For example, specific questions for doctors who had trained 
or lived abroad asking about the impact, if any, of this experience on their 
decision-making, or questions for doctors who highlighted the importance of 
their faith on their decisions.  Specific questions were also put to doctors who 
were parents.   Questions were drafted as mere prompts to encourage doctors 
to reflect and speak freely and at greater length about a particular issue that 
they had mentioned in their survey. 
 
A quotation from Aaron and Schwartz,444 which was cited in a 1994 House of 
Commons research paper on rationing health,445 was also prepared to use as a 
prompt to encourage doctors to reflect on their role, if any, in the allocation of 
resources to disabled children with complex health problems: 
‘British physicians often appear to rationalize or at least redefine, medical 
standards so that he can deal more comfortably with resource 
constraints…Thus it is clear that not all British doctors believe they are 
providing all potential beneficial care to their patients.  Many realize, 
according to one consultant, that they are acting as society’s agent in 
rationing care’.446  
 
A quotation was chosen to prompt discussion as it thought unlikely that doctors 
would acknowledge that treatment for disabled children is rationed if asked 
directly.  A 1984 quotation, rather than a contemporary one was deliberately 
                                                 
444 Aaron, HJ, Schwartz, WB, (1984) The Painful Prescription, Rationing Hospital Care, Brookings Institution 
Press, Washing DC 
 
445 House of Commons (1993) Prioritising Health – The Debate about Health Care Rationing, Research 
Paper, 93/49, Houses of Parliament, London 
 
446 Ibid, p.10 
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chosen, as it seemed less threatening to doctors, by not suggesting in any way 
that it described their current practice. However, it is acknowledged that it also 
potentially facilitated the doctors challenging the quote too easily as being out of 
date.  The doctors were asked if the quotation chimed with their experiences, in 
the hope that this would lead on to further discussion on the impact of resource 
allocation on disabled children with complex medical problems.447 
 
PART B– Generating the data  
 
6. The Population 
 
The population of interest for this thesis and therefore the potential participants 
for this research, were UK-based paediatricians.  The survey was conducted 
between April and September 2010. The RCPCH, the professional body for 
paediatricians in the United Kingdom, conducts periodic studies of the 
demographics of UK paediatricians.  The RCPCH did not conduct a workforce 
survey in 2010, however, its workforce survey for 2009, published two years 
later in 2011, reports that there were then 4,789 paediatricians employed in the 
UK.448 This figure fell to 4,605 by the time of the next workforce survey in 
2011.449 
                                                 
447 For reasons of space, due to the majority of doctors not seeing resources as an issue in decision-
making for disabled children, this question is not returned to in any depth in later chapters. Dr 24 did 
however, say in her interview that she thought resources did play a part with a parent and doctor’s 
ability to lobby hospital managers on behalf of a particular child playing an important part in the support 
a child received, especially in the community.  Dr 32, as is discussed in chapter ten, voiced strong 
criticisms of what he saw as intensive care consultants seeing themselves as gate keeper of resources 
and so making resource based decisions as to whether a disabled child should have access to intensive 
care. 
 
448 RCPCH, (2011), RCPCH Medical Workforce Census 2009, Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, 
London, 
http://www.rcpch.ac.uk/system/files/protected/page/RCPCH%20Workforce%20Census%202009%20for
%20web2_1.pdf accessed 1 November 2015 
 
449 RCPCH, (2013), RCPCH Medical Workforce Census 2011, Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, 
http://www.rcpch.ac.uk/system/files/protected/page/RCPCH%20census%20FINAL_0.pdf accessed 1 
November 2015 
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A sample pool of 368 paediatricians was selected using the methods outlined 
below, but in simple terms, being the paediatricians, whose contact details 
could be sourced from the public domain within the restraints of this study, with 
particular effort being made to recruit consultants working in the paediatric 
subspecialties thought most relevant to this thesis.  In addition to the 368 
paediatricians approached directly, professional bodies for key paediatric sub-
specialisms were also approached and asked to pass a link to the survey to 
their members, as described later in this chapter.  
 
Paediatricians were selected with the aim of harnessing the insights of as many 
paediatricians as possible, who regularly make difficult medical decisions for 
disabled children with complex health problems. It was recognised right from 
the start of this study that since the participants once invited, were self-
selecting, the doctors in this study might not to be representative of 
paediatricians generally.  The aim of the survey was therefore to generate a 
sample, but not necessarily a representative sample, of the views of highly 
experienced paediatricians, particularly those who are making decisions 
whether to withhold or withdraw care from disabled children with complex health 
needs in the day-to-day course of their work.   
 
PICU consultants, paediatric neurologist and paediatric respiratory consultants 
were particularly targeted when they could be identified as such, being the sub-
specialties of paediatricians most commonly involved in best interest decisions 
for disabled children with complex health problems.  The sampling was 
therefore purposive, as it was based on the judgment of the researcher450 as to 
which paediatricians would be most likely to be involved in these sorts of 
decisions.  However, the survey was also sent to paediatricians beyond these 
sub-groups, both to allow for the researcher’s judgment to be challenged and 
also, if the data showed the researcher’s judgment to be correct, to enable a 
                                                 
 
450 See Chapter one, paras 5.2-5.3, pp.12-21, for a discussion of the researcher’s background 
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comparison to be made between different sub-specialties. The issue of non-
participation by doctors in this study and its significance or otherwise is 
discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Thirty-nine requests to participate were sent to doctors who could be identified 
as PICU consultants; fifty-five to paediatric consultants identified as respiratory 
specialists and sixty-three to paediatric consultants identified as being 
neurology consultants.  A further seventy-five requests were sent to paediatric 
consultants whose specialisms could be identified, but were not neurologists, 
respiratory or PICU consultants.  This sub-group included, for example, 
paediatric endocrine, oncology and nephrology consultants.  A further 136 
requests to take part in the study were sent to consultants who could be 
identified as paediatricians, without a sub-specialty within paediatrics being 
identifiable.  It is possible that this group included some who were PICU, 
respiratory or neurology consultants.  Finally, six requests were sent to 
community paediatric consultants. Although community consultants will not 
usually be the primary doctor making the type of decision which is the subject of 
this study, they can commonly be the lead consultant for a disabled child and so 
play a very influential role in the lives, including being involved with acute 
doctors in decisions. The insights of community paediatricians were therefore 
felt to be relevant to this study not just for what they could say about their 
involvement in the decisions, but also for their perceptions as to how their acute 
colleagues make such decisions.  Community consultants will often have 
knowledge of or be involved in decisions about a child’s life outside of the 
hospital, for example, their schooling or access to therapies or support services.  
They also often have very long-term relationships with children and their 
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7. Paediatric Sub-Specialties 
 
 
As at November 2009451 there were 128 PICU consultants, 110 paediatric 
neurologist/neuro-disability consultants, and eighty-one respiratory consultants 
in post within the UK.452   This study therefore approached 30% of PICU 
consultants; 57% of the UK’s paediatric neurology consultants and 68% of the 
UK paediatric respiratory consultants.  The percentage of PICU consultants is 
lower than for the other two specialisms as PICU consultants proved more 
difficult to access, their email contact details not usually being in the public 
domain. As shall be discussed later, a higher percentage of respiratory 
consultants were contacted over a period of time, because of the initially low 
response rate from consultants practicing this sub-specialism.  
 
Figure 1: Survey requests issued and potential population 
 




4,789 368 8% 
PICU consultants 
128 39 30% 
Respiratory 
consultants 
81 55 68% 
Neurologists 








unknown 136  
  
 
                                                 
451 The date of the closest RCPCH workforce survey to the time when doctors completed the survey 
 
452 RCPCH, (2011), RCPCH Medical Workforce Census 2009, Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, 
London, 
http://www.rcpch.ac.uk/system/files/protected/page/RCPCH%20Workforce%20Census%202009%20for
%20web2_1.pdf accessed 15 November 2015  
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8. Demographics and diversity in the sample  
 
Consultants as opposed to junior doctors453 were primarily approached for two 
reasons. First, the care of disabled children with complex health needs is 
usually consultant led and secondly, for the practical reason that, unlike 
consultants, the email addresses of junior doctors are not normally in the public 
domain.  Consultants were, however, asked to pass the link to the survey to 
junior doctors, as well as to complete the survey themselves.   The views of 
junior doctors were thought to be relevant, not least to ascertain whether, and if 
so how, they were involved in these decisions.  The perceptions of junior 
doctors as to how they believed consultants made decisions was also of 
interest.  Since this study was also interested to learn from doctors the impact 
on their legal consciousness of any training in law, the views of junior doctors 
were sought to try capture the impact of any changes in the curriculum in this 
regard in recent years.  The consultants would have qualified at least ten years 
prior to the survey and most, many years earlier, whereas the junior doctors 
would have qualified much more recently 
  
An effort was made to include female doctors in the sample group.  This study 
explores different sorts of influences upon doctors’ difficult decision-making and 
so it was thought important to include female doctors where possible. As at 
November 2009, 46.6% of the paediatric consultant workforce were women, 
although this drops to 40.4% in tertiary care, where most the target sample 
group were based.454  The RCPCH survey does not report the percentage of 
women working in individual sub-specialties, so it is not possible, within the cost 
and time restraints of this thesis, to ascertain the number of women working as 
                                                 
453 A qualified doctor who has not completed his or her training and obtained consultant status.   
 
454 RCPCH, (2011), RCPCH Medical Workforce Census 2009, Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, 
London 
http://www.rcpch.ac.uk/system/files/protected/page/RCPCH%20Workforce%20Census%202009%20for
%20web2_1.pdf accessed 1 November 2015 
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consultants in the core target specialties of PICU, neurology and respiratory 
medicine. The female doctors in this study are not said to be representative of 
female doctors. All but one455 of the female respondents held senior clinical 
positions.   
 
The RCPCH survey does not report data with regard the number of doctors 
employed from black and ethnic minority (‘BME’) backgrounds, but a conscious 
effort was also made to include BME into the sample group, by ensuring the 
inclusion of BME doctors in those sent an invitation to take part in the survey. 
The identification of BME doctors was by necessity crude, in that the doctors’ 
names were the only information available. Obviously, this is not the best way to 
ensure a diverse sample. More widely beyond paediatrics as a specialism, the 
GMC record just 39.5% of UK registered doctors being ethnically ‘white British’ 
as at December 2015.456  Although 16.1% of UK registered doctors describe 
themselves as of Indian or Pakistani ethnic origin in the GMC’s statistics,457 it is 
acknowledged that a doctor could have a name which appears to suggest he or 
she is from an black or ethnic minority group, but not be so and likewise, a 
doctor may be from a black or ethnic minority ethnic group, but this may not be 
apparent from his or her name.  However, in the financial and time confines of 
this study, including doctors on the assumption that they are of black or ethnic 
minority origin based on their names was felt to be the best option. The survey 
then included a question asking doctors to confirm their ethnic origin. As with 
women doctors, the views of doctors from black and ethnic minority groups 
were sought in an attempt to have a more diverse sample, and to explore, as far 
as possible, whether a doctor’s cultural upbringing and background, including 
any religious upbringing, influences how they make difficult medical decisions 
for children with complex needs and disability. 
                                                 
455 One female respondent was a senior registrar, a junior doctor towards the end of her training. 
 
456 GMC (2015) List of Registered Medical Practitioners – statistics, GMC, London 
 
457 Ibid  
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9. Geographical spread 
 
This study is UK-wide so doctors were sampled from each of Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland and the nine NHS English Regions existing at the time of 
the survey, namely Eastern, London, North & Yorkshire, North West, South 
Central, South East, South West, Trent and West Midlands. 458 
 
Where possible a tertiary hospital, either a specialist children’s hospital or 
tertiary hospital with a paediatric unit was identified.  If neither were identified in 
the region, a district hospital459 employing paediatricians was identified.  
Paediatric consultants are not distributed equally throughout the UK, as the 
RCPCH workforce census confirms: 
‘London has the highest ratio of consultants to child population (40.9 
WTE) compared to 37.4 in 2007. The North East again is the net highest 
with 33.9 WTE (31.2 in 2007) per 1000,000 0-15 year olds.  In contrast 
the South-East Coast SHA has a ratio of less than 20 consultants per 
100,000 children, 19.4 compared with 17.4 in 2007‘.460 
 
Although not precise, in broad terms, the sample of doctors approached to take 
part in this survey reflected this regional variation, largely because, self-
evidently, there were more potential doctors to approach in the regions with 
more doctors. 
                                                 
458 NHS Medical Directorate, (2009), A Junior Doctor’s Guide to the NHS, Department of Health, London, 
p. 9 
 
459 Although there is no official definition of teaching hospital or district hospital, doctors often 
distinguish between the two.  A teaching hospital is generally understood as a centre of secondary or 
tertiary care in a major city that is affiliated with a medical school, often with a large academic 
department and a reputation for excellence in research. A district hospital (often also called a district 
general hospital), although a major provider of secondary care in the local area, traditionally lacked a 
research focus.  However, in recent years the distinction has become blurred, as many district hospitals 
have now become part of medical schools and are actively involved in research. Source: Khan M, (2012) 
‘Teaching hospital versus district hospital’, BMJ 
http://careers.bmj.com/careers/advice/view-article.html?id=20006282 accessed 20 January 2018 
 
460 RCPCH, (2011), RCPCH Medical Workforce Census 2009, Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, 
London, at p. 29 
http://www.rcpch.ac.uk/system/files/protected/page/RCPCH%20Workforce%20Census%202009%20for
%20web2_1.pdf accessed 1 November 2015 
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10. Identifying potential participants – Survey 
 
Initial contact was made with the consultants in the sample group by email.461  
In England, obtaining the contact details for consultants was relatively straight 
forward, as most English NHS trusts provided this information on their websites.  
In the devolved nations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, NHS Trusts 
and Boards did not, at the time the sample group was being identified and 
indeed, mostly still do not, include on their websites, the names and contact 
details of consultants employed. 
 
 To obtain contact details of consultants when this information could not be 
obtained from trust or board websites, the website 
http://www.drfosterhealth.co.uk/, which collects and publishes statistical 
information about healthcare in the UK, was used.  The postcode of the relevant 
hospital was entered in the ‘find a consultant’ section of the website.  ‘Children’ 
was then selected as the category; ‘any children’s disorder’ was selected as the 
condition or procedure and ‘paediatrics’ was selected as the specialty.  The 
website then produces the names and contact details of paediatric consultants 
working at the relevant hospital.  The search was repeated specifically for 
paediatric neurologists by selecting ‘paediatric neurology’ as the ‘condition or 
disorder’ and for respiratory consultants by selecting ‘lung disorders’ as the 
‘condition or disorder’, having already selected ‘children’ as the ‘body area or 
category’.  The website does not give an option to search for a PICU specialist.   
When contact details were available on NHS Trust or Board websites, these 
would also give details of the consultant’s paediatric sub-specialty.  When 
details of the sub-specialty were not available on the Dr Foster’s website, these 
could sometimes be found by googling the doctor.  Often details of the doctor’s 
sub-specialty would be in the public domain because, for example, the doctor 
                                                 
461 See Appendix 3, p.425 
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had spoken at a conference, been featured in the media, written a paper or 
served on a committee, where their sub-specialism was mentioned. 
The secretaries of the Paediatric Intensive Care Society; the British Paediatric 
Respiratory Society and British Paediatric Neurology Association were also 
contacted by email and asked to forward the link to the survey to their 
members.  
 
 A link to the on-line survey was also distributed by email to the UK Disabled 
Children’s Research Network, a network of academics working in the field of 
child disability, which includes paediatricians.  It was also circulated to 
members, who are predominately doctors and nurses, of NHS Scotland’s 
National Clinical Network for Children with Exceptional Healthcare Needs by 
that network.  In an attempt to get responses from junior doctors, the BMA UK 
Junior Doctors’ Committee were contacted by email and put information about 
the study and a link to the survey on the BMA Junior Doctors list server.  All 
doctors sent an invitation to take part in the survey were also asked to forward 
details of the study and the link to colleagues.   
The email sent to all participants outlined the nature of the research and 
included a link to the survey on the Bristol Survey website. It was sent to 368 
individuals.462  All individual doctors sent an email who did not reply were sent a 
second follow up email. Due to the very low response rate from respiratory 
consultants those doctors were also sent a second follow up letter by post. 
 
Doctors completed the survey by accessing the link to the Bristol Survey 
website, which took the doctors directly to the survey for this thesis.  Two 
doctors chose to complete a hard copy of the survey and to return it by post.  
Their data was entered onto the Bristol Survey website by the researcher. 
 
 
                                                 
462 The emails sent to the organisations mentioned above were sent in addition to these 368 individual 
invitations 
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11. Survey response rate 
 
Figure 2: Survey response rate 
Sub-specialism Number of doctors 
approached 
Number of doctors 
completed survey 
% of approached 
doctors who 
completed survey 
PICU 39 10 26% 
Neurologists 63 9 14% 
Respiratory 55 2 4% 
Other 211 12 6% 
Total 368  9% 
 Note: The ‘other’ figure is made up of 75 doctors whose sub-specialism was known to be a 
sub-specialism other than PICU, neurology or respiratory and 136 paediatricians whose sub-
specialism was not known. 
 
Thirty-three (9%) of the doctors approached responded to the request and 
completed the survey. Although this response rate is low, it is comparable with 
some surveys sent by the RCPCH to its members.463 Doctors as a professional 
group are also reported by researchers464 to be notoriously difficult to get to 
respond to surveys, because of their busy time schedules and difficulty in 
locating them 465 as well as being resistant to surveys.466  The researcher also 
received emails from three doctors apologising for not being able to take part, 
explaining that their employer had a policy that staff could only respond to 
research requests from the university linked to their trust.467 
 
                                                 
463 For example, a 2014 survey sent by the RCPCH to its members in Northern Ireland had a 10% 
response rate; http://www.rcpch.ac.uk/news/rcpch-northern-ireland-office-launches   accessed 11th July 
2016 
 
464 see for example, Parsons, JA, Warnecke, RB, Czaja, RF, Barnsley, J, Kaluzny, A (1994) Factors 
associated with response rates in a national survey of primary care physicians, Evaluation Review, 18(6), 
756-766. p. 756 & Sobal, J, DeForge, BR, Ferentz, K., Muncie Jr, HL, Valente, CM, Levine, DM (1990) 
Physician responses to multiple questionnaire mailings, Evaluation Review, 14(6), 711-722, p. 712 
 
465 & Sobal, J, DeForge, BR, Ferentz, K., Muncie Jr, HL, Valente, CM, Levine, DM (1990) Physician 
responses to multiple questionnaire mailings, Evaluation Review, 14(6), 711-722, p. 712 
 
466 Parsons, JA, Warnecke, RB, Czaja, RF, Barnsley, J, Kaluzny, A (1994) Factors associated with response 
rates in a national survey of primary care physicians, Evaluation Review, 18(6), 756-766. p. 756 
 
467 Requests had not been sent to the hospital linked to the one where the researcher was based, as this 
was the hospital where she and her son were already known to most of the doctors. 
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The response rate varied greatly between the three key sub-specialisms, of 
PICU, neurology and respiratory medicine, with only one respiratory consultant 
responding, despite fifty-five respiratory consultants being approached (as 
compared with sixty-three neurologists and thirty-nine PICU consultants). This 
does raise the question as to why respiratory consultants did not respond.  As 
Bryman identifies:  
‘The problem with non-response is that those who agree to participate 
may differ in various ways from those who do not agree to participate. 
Some of the differences may be significant to the research question or 
questions.’468 
 
As they have not responded, it is difficult to know exactly why there was such a 
poor response rate from respiratory consultants.  Is it a reflection of how 
relevant respiratory consultants think the care of disabled children with complex 
health needs is to their practice? As Barclay et al 469 in their assessment of the 
non-response of GPs to a postal questionnaire reports, a number of studies470 
have identified a lack of response with a lack of interest in the survey topic. 
Alternatively, there may be a more prosaic explanation. For example, do 
respiratory consultants work in a different way, which makes it less likely that 
they will respond to a survey of this sort?  It is of course not wise to speculate 
as to why there was a noticeably poor response from respiratory consultants, 
but the fact that the response rate from one specialism as compared to the two 
others targeted was so poor, does hint that there was some characteristic 
specific to respiratory consultants which made them less inclined or able to 
respond than some of their colleagues.  The one respiratory consultant who did 
take part in the research was asked, when interviewed, for his view on why so 
                                                 
468 Bryman A, (2015) Social Research Methods; Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 175 
 
469 Barclay, S, Todd, C, Finlay, I, Grand, G, Wyatt P, (2002) Not another questionnaire! Maximizing the 
response rate, predicting non-response and assessing non-response bias in postal questionnaire studies 
of GPs, Family Practice 19(1), 105-111 doi, 10.1093/fampra/19.1.105 
 
470 E.g. Armstrong D, Ashworth M (2000) When questionnaire response rates do matter: a survey of 
general practitioners and their views of NHS changes, Br J Gen Pract, 50: 479–480; Cockburn, J, 
Campbell, E, Gordon, J, Sanson-Fisher, R (1988) Response bias in a study of general practice, Fam Pract 
,15 18–23 and Ashworth M (2001) When response rates do matter, Br Med J, 322: 675  
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few respiratory consultants responded to the request to take part.  He 
responded: 
 “I’m not sure really. I think pretty much all respiratory consultants will be 
involved in some degree in these sorts of decisions because at the end 
of the day it is often respiratory system which is the cause of death or 
failure of the respiratory system. I’m not sure. I don’t know for sure how 
things work in other areas, in our hospital we are almost the gate 
keepers to ventilation, for children with severe neuro-disability because 
at the end of the day we are the people who end up looking after them 
and I think that is pretty much the same everywhere. I don’t know if 
doctors see themselves as rather tangential to these decisions and they 
are actually made in intensive care or by neurologists, but certainly in our 
institution in tends to be respiratory doctors who are fundamental to the 
final decision, so I don’t know sorry” 
      Dr 14 Respiratory Consultant 
Sobal et al suggests a low response rate is not necessarily a problem when the 
questions are asked ‘of someone occupying a particular role about matters of 
concern in that role’ asserting that if there is uniformity amongst the people 
being asked the responses will be similar.471 However, the difficulty here is not 
knowing the extent to which there is uniformity or whether there is something 
different about respiratory consultants which would mean their answers would 
be different.  As there were sufficient responses from both PICU consultants 
and neurologists, it was possible, as shall be seen, to compare the responses 










                                                 
471 Sobal, J, DeForge, BR, Ferentz, K. S, Muncie Jr, H., Valente, C M, Levine, DM (1990) Physician 
responses to multiple questionnaire mailings, Evaluation Review, 14(6), 711-722, p. 712 
P a g e  | 124 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
PART C – Analysing the data 
 
12. Analysing the survey data 
 
As was seen in chapter one472 this thesis was strongly influenced by both 
Kennedy473 and the litigation concerning David Glass474 in the development of 
the research questions for this thesis.  The impact of the author’s personal 
experience was also acknowledged.475  The influence of the three 
paediatricians with whom the draft survey was piloted and discussed, was also 
described in part A of this chapter.476  For these reasons it would not be correct 
to say that grounded theory, as explained by Glaser and Strauss477 and more 
recently by for example Charmaz,478 was used as the research questions in this 
thesis were not developed just by the analysis of the data generated in the 
survey and semi-structured interviews conducted with doctors. However, the 
emerging data did go on to strongly influence the direction of the thesis.  For 
example, in chapter one,479 it was seen that the choice of legal consciousness 
as the theoretical framework to explore what the doctors said about law and 
ethics emerged from the data.  It will also be seen that 31 of the 33 doctors 
identified end of life decisions as the difficult ones they face, confirming this as 
the central focus of the thesis. Also, for example, as will be seen, the doctors’ 
                                                 
472 Chapter one, para 2, pp. 25-34, para 7, pp.60-70 
 
473 Ian Kennedy, What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, (Middlesex Hospital Medical School, London 
1979). Also published in an amended form in Ian Kennedy, Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, (OUP 2001) 19-31 
 
474 Glass, R (On the application of) v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust (1999) EWCA Civ 1914; Glass, R (On 
the application of) v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust (1999) EWHC Admin 343; Glass v UK (2003) ECHR 
Admissibility Decision no. 61827/00 
 
475 Chapter one, para 5.2 pp. 12-20 
 
476 Chapter three, para 4, pp. 108-109 
 
477 Barney G. Glaser & Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory (Aldine Publishing Company 
1967) 
478 Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory (SAGE Publications 2006) 
479 Chapter one, para 1, p.1 
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sub-specialisms became Nvivo codes, as did themes raised across survey 
responses, such as advanced care plans or disagreements. 
 
The survey data was analysed using the inbuilt Bristol Survey tools and Nvivo 
software.  The Bristol survey tools allowed for the doctors’ responses to both 
individual survey questions and to the survey as a whole to be considered. The 
tools also allowed for all the responses to a particular question or groups of 
questions to be analysed so that common themes, points of similarity and 
difference between doctors could be identified. Finally, the tools also allowed for 
particular combinations of responses to be compared. For example, a doctor’s 
sub-specialism, age or parental status could be analysed alongside his or her 
response to whom the doctor involves in decisions or the weight the doctor puts 
on a child’s cognitive impairment, if any, when making decisions. 
 
The Nvivo software allowed for the survey data to be analysed in more detail.  
Nodes (the Nvivo term for codes) were first created drawing on the data by 
identifying repeated concepts in the doctors’ survey responses. The researcher 
linked these to the relevant research question. The doctors’ sub-specialisms 
were also coded, as were any references to best interests.  
 





RQ1 RQ2 RQ3 RQ4 
best interests emergency colleagues clinical mentor ethics 












 intensive care emotions nurses  public 
inquiries 
 neonatology parents other 
professionals 
 rights 
 Neurology uncertainty parents  withholding 
& 
withdrawing 
 paed. surgery  prognosis   
 paed. oncology  quality of life   
 palliative care     
 respiratory     
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As concepts emerged, the text was searched for direct mentions of any of the 
above terms or words or phrases that seemed to the researcher to be clear 
proxies.  For example, references to benefits and burdens of treatment were 
coded as a reference to ‘best interests’. 
 
Additional nodes were added during the analysis of the survey data to group 
together comments made in the surveys by the doctors relating to: doctors’ 
personal characteristics; comments doctors made about the use of advanced 
care/end-of-life plans; comments in relation to the question on resources; and 
any recommendations for improvements doctors made. 
 
13. Interview recruitment 
 
Doctors were asked to indicate in their survey responses whether they would be 
willing to discuss the issues raised in the survey further with the researcher.  
Twenty-two out of the thirty-three (66.6%) of the doctors indicated a willingness 
to further involvement with the study. Ultimately, semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with nine doctors, six males and three females.  Three of the 
interviews were face to face and six were by telephone.   
 
Of the thirteen other doctors who had indicated a willingness to be interviewed 
in their survey response, one doctor was not interviewed because she 
emigrated and could not be contacted.  Another doctor died, and a third was 
removed from the GMC register.  Six doctors did not respond to emails and the 
other six proved impossible to arrange interviews with the doctors within the 









                                                 
480 The critical illness and death of the researcher’s own son at this time also reduced the time available 
for interviews 
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Figure 4: Interviewee statistics 
 
Doctors who completed survey 
33 
Doctors who indicated willingness to be 
interviewed 
22 
Doctors interviewed by telephone 
6 
Doctors interviewed face-to-face 
3 
Doctors who did not respond  6 
Doctors who emigrated 1 
Doctors who died 1 
Doctors removed from GMC register 1 
Doctors too busy 4 
 
The nine doctors interviewed included doctors from the three key sub-
specialisms, namely PICU, neurology and respiratory medicine, plus doctors 
from other sub-specialisms who could potentially provide an interesting 
comparison. They also included both male and female doctors and doctors from 
across the full potential age range for consultants.  The doctors worked or had 
worked in all UK regions apart from Trent and Eastern.  
 
Figure 5 Regions interviewees employed (current and past) 
Note: This data is kept separate from other data in this thesis as some doctors could easily be 
identified if their region of work is revealed linked to other data. Note that a single doctor can 
appear in both columns and so the total is greater than nine, even though only nine were 
interviewed. 
 
Region No. Doctors Currently 
Employed 
No. Doctors Previously 
Employed 
Eastern 0 0 
London 3 1 
North & Yorkshire 1 1 
North West 2 1 
Northern Ireland 0 0 
Scotland 0 1 
South East 0 1 
South West 1 2 
Trent 0 0 
West Midlands 1 0 
Overseas 0 1 
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Figure 6 Sub-specialties, gender and age band of interviewees 
Sub-
specialism 
Gender Age band 
Neurology M 45-54 
Neurology M 55-64 
Oncology M 45-54 
Respiratory M 45-54 
PICU F 35-44 
PICU F 55-64 
Neurology F 55-64 





14. Conducting the semi-structured interviews 
 
Prior to each interview, each doctor was sent an email481 reminding him or her 
of the nature of the research; how the data generated would be used and the 
steps, which would be taken to avoid identifying them.  They were also told 
again of the ethical clearance obtained and again asked consent for the 
interview to be recorded.  At the start of their interview all nine doctors were 
reminded this information and their consent again confirmed. As previously 
mentioned, they were also told that they could decline to answer any question; 
stop the interview at any time or leave the study at any time. The doctors were 
all told that the researcher would be transcribing the interviews and were all 
asked if they would like the transcribed interview sent to them for them to check, 
but none of the doctors took up this offer.  As mentioned earlier, all the doctors 
had themselves been involved in academic research and all appeared to be 
very relaxed about the parameters of the research and, in particular, 
appreciated the difficulty of ensuring anonymity in a relatively small field of 
specialists. 
 
The first three interviews were conducted face to face and the remaining six 
were conducted by telephone.  The original intention was that all the interviews 
                                                 
481 see Appendix 5, p.435 
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be face to face.  There was concern that not doing so could lead to poorer data, 
especially as the opportunity to see the doctor’s body language and facial 
expressions as they answered the questions put to them, would be lost.  Like 
Stephens:482 
‘I suspected the medium would inhibit the establishment of rapport so 
essential for in depth qualitative interviewing. It would not allow space for 
probing and exploring questions.’483 
 
However, when circumstances beyond the researcher’s control dictated that the 
fourth and fifth interview be conducted by telephone, those interviews proved to 
be successful despite the anticipated potential limitations of this method.   
 
The doctors appeared to find it easier to make time for the telephone interviews, 
particularly as they could be interviewed on days they were working from home 
or in the evenings from home.  The doctors found they could give more time to 
the interview, particularly when they were being conducted away from their 
workplace. They were not constrained by clinical work and were free from 
interruptions.  The doctors speaking from home appeared to speak more freely 
from the start of their interviews and to speak in much greater depth than those 
interviewed at work, but even those doctors talking by telephone from work 
appeared to be more candid than those interviewed face to face. The doctors 
interviewed face to face did all seem to become more relaxed and more candid 
as their interviews progressed.  Holt484 suggests interviewees relax more when 
talking on the phone.485  The doctors talking by phone, even at work seemed 
more relaxed, especially at the start of their interviews. They were speaking 
from their office, away from their clinical environment, so seemed less 
                                                 
482 Stephens, N, (2007) Collecting data from elites and ultra-elites: telephone and face-to-face interviews 
with macroeconomists, Qualitative Research, 7(2), 203-216 
 
483 Ibid, p.205 
 
484 Holt, A (2010) Using the telephone for narrative interviewing: a research note, Qualitative Research 
10(1), 113-121 
 
485 Ibid, p. 117 
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preoccupied, whereas those interviewed face to face chose to be interviewed, 
although in a private space, within their clinical environment. They were alert to 
potential interruptions should their work require this.   This appeared to make 
the doctors on the phone more relaxed.  
 
The doctors had been asked during email correspondence if they were happy to 
be recorded and again before the start of the interview, whether face to face or 
by telephone.  All the doctors were very relaxed about being recorded.  A digital 
recording app on a mini iPad was used to record all interviews.  This was 
arguably less intrusive than a conventional digital recorder, especially as iPads 
and similar devices are now so commonplace.  However, arguably those 
doctors talking on the phone were in part less reserved as they more quickly 
‘forgot’ that their words were being recorded, than those sitting with the iPad in 
front of them. 
 
As Holt found, interviewing by telephone 
‘enabled a far greater degree of control for the participants than a face to 
face interview may have.  If I called at the agreed time and something 
had come up…there was no embarrassment or difficulty in re-arranging 
the appointment’.486   
 
This happened with doctors asking to phone back, for example, half an hour or 
more later, with no detriment to the amount of time available for the interview.  
In contrast, when the start of one face to face interview was delayed as the 
doctor has held up in evening handover, the amount of time available to speak 
with that doctor was limited both by the doctor’s need to get home and the 
researcher’s need to catch a train.  For this reason, it was decided to continue 
interviewing the doctors by telephone, rather than face to face.   
 
A further advantage of interviewing by telephone was that as travel around the 
UK was not required, interviews could be conducted with doctors in different 
                                                 
486 Ibid, p.116 
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parts of the UK on consecutive days. This seemed to facilitate exploring 
common themes with doctors from one interview to the next much more easily, 
than when interviews were conducted with a significant time lapse between 
each, albeit with previous interviews being reviewed prior to each new interview.   
 
Other researchers have also found that interviewing by telephone rather than 
face-to-face has not had a negative impact on their data when undertaking 
qualitative research.   Sturges and Hanrahan suggest that when the topic is 
sensitive, as the subject of this thesis undoubtedly is, participants may prefer 
the relative anonymity of the telephone, increasing their sense of anonymity.487  
Researchers who have compared telephone with face to face interviews ‘have 
generally concluded that telephone interviewing was an acceptable and 
valuable method of data collection’.488   Bryman also suggests that interviewing 
by telephone rather than face-to-face may have the advantage that the 
researcher’s personal characteristics, such as age, class and ethnicity is less 
likely to affect the interviewee’s answers.489 Stephens490 suggests that this is 
particularly the case when the interviewees, are, as in this research, elites.  
 
Although not a reason to continue interviewing by telephone, doing so also 
proved to have other benefits for the researcher. Conducting interviews by 
telephone considerably reduced the costs and time involved.  It was also not 
necessary to arrange to interview doctors on set days or at set times, to fit in 
with the researcher’s travel requirements.  
 
                                                 
487 Sturges JE, Hanrahan KJ, (2004) Comparing telephone and face to face qualitative interviewing: a 
research note, Qualitative Research, vol 4(1) SAGE Publications, London,107-118, p.108 
 
488 Ibid, page 110 
 
489 Bryman, A (2012) Social Research Methods, 4th Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, pp.214-
215 
 
490 Stephens N, (2007) Collecting data from elites and ultra-elites: telephone and face to face interviews 
with macroeconomists, Qualitative Research, vol. 7(2), SAGE Publications, London, 203-216 
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15. Analysing the interview data  
 
The interview data was analysed using Nvivo software, initially using the same 
nodes as were used to analyse the survey data, listed in figure 3 above.491 
 
To facilitate the analysis of what the doctors said using legal consciousness 
theory, once the interview data had been classified using the nodes outlined 
above, interview data which seemed to reveal something about a doctor’s legal 
consciousness was recoded using Nvivo software using the categories of legal 
consciousness developed by Ewick and Silbey,492  Halliday et al493 and 
Harding494 as the Nvivo codes.  This allowed the schema of legal 
consciousness exhibited by the doctors to be identified in accordance with 
existing legal consciousness schema.  It also allowed for any gaps in the 
existing schema to be identified; namely any categories of legal consciousness 
exhibited by the doctors, which did not appear to the researcher to fit into 
existing schema, thus indicating whether additional schema are needed 
 
Figure 7: Nvivo Codes: categories of legal consciousness  
Ewick & Silbey schema Halliday et al schema Harding Schema 
before the law law as a sword stabilising resistance 
with the law law as a shield moderating resistance 
against the law law as a barrier fracturing resistance 
 collective dissent  
 
To enable classification of the doctors’ observations into existing legal 
consciousness schema, key characteristics of each schema, as described by 
                                                 
491 Chapter three, figure 3, p.125 
 
492 Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1992) Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An Account of Legal 
Consciousness, New Eng. L. Rev, Vol. 26 
 
493 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J, (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74 
 
494 Harding, R, (2010), Regulating Sexuality: Legal Consciousness in lesbian and gay lives, Routledge, 
Abingdon 
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the schema’s authors, were identified and doctors’ comments expressing any of 
these were classified as being within that schema: 
 
Figure 8: Characteristics attributed to Ewick and Silbey’s schema 
Before the law With the law Against the law 
Remote, kept at a 
distance, grand, imposing, 




Present in every-day life, 
empowering, accessible, 
helps to achieve aims, 
game, tool, knowledge & 
expertise, more accessible 
to some than others, 
lawyers as go-betweens. 
Net, traps ordinary people, 
need to struggle for 
freedom, resistance, 




Figure 9: Characteristics attributed to Halliday et al’s schema 
Law as a sword Law as a shield Law as a barrier Collective dissent 
Power, weapon, 
disconnected from 
justice, used for 
personal gain. 














subverted by their 
collective efforts. 
 
Figure 10: Characteristics attributed to Harding’s schema 
Stabilising resistance Moderating resistance Fracturing resistance 
Challenges power, not 
through deliberate acts but 
by being oneself outside of 
the norm. 
Openly challenging the 
status quo e.g. through 
public demonstrations. 
Acts of resistance 
requiring immediate or 
almost immediate action 
by the state. 
 
 
16. Study Limitations 
 
The following limitations were recognised as the data was being analysed. 
i) Only one respiratory consultant and one respiratory specialist 
registrar,495 opted to take part in this study. 
ii) The doctors who opted to take part, especially those who opted to be 
interviewed, all indicated that they were particularly interested in the 
subject matter of this study and as was seen earlier496 indicated they 
were pleased this study was being done.  It is recognised that it is 
                                                 
495 Junior doctor at the end of her training specialising in paediatric respiratory medicine. 
 
496 Chapter one, para 5.2, p.16 
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possible that the doctors are atypical of paediatricians making best 
interest decisions for disabled children generally. 
iii) As will be seen in the next chapter, a disproportionate number of 
male doctors opted to take part in the study compared with female 
doctors.  This made an examination of the impact of gender on 
decision-making difficult. 
iv) As will also be seen in the next chapter, a surprising number of 
doctors with a personal connection with disability, especially doctors 
who are parents of disabled children themselves, took part in this 
study.  However, it is recognised that discussing this personal 
characteristic in connection with any other personal and particularly 
any professional characteristic of the doctor, is likely to make the 
identity of doctors concerned too easily identifiable to colleagues.  
This has meant this personal characteristic which is potentially an 
important one in the context of this study, is not as explored as fully 
as the characteristic merits. 
v) Only one respiratory consultant chose to take part in the study, this 
means it was not possible to compare the responses of respiratory 
consultants, as one of three sub-specialisms often involved in end-of-
care decisions for disabled children, with those of neurologists and 
PICU consultants, the other two sub-specialisms. 
vi) As will be seen in the next chapter, the doctors who responded to this 
study are not very diverse. However, it seems likely that this reflects 
the population under study, rather than a limitation of this study and a 
reflection of their elite status. 
vii) A strength of this study is that the respondents were mostly senior 
paediatric consultants in positions of influence with regard to best 
interest decisions for disabled children regionally and nationally.  
However, this is also a limitation of this study.  The respondents tend 
to be doctors who have been qualified for many years, with all but 
one doctor, being consultants. This study therefore does not reflect 
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the thoughts and observations of junior doctors who have qualified 
more recently. 
 
Having presented and explained the methodology used in this study, the next 
four chapters in this thesis focus on the voices of the doctors, presenting the 
empirical data from surveys and interviews conducted with UK paediatricians 
with the aim of addressing the research questions in this thesis. 
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PART TWO 
Chapter Four 
Who are the doctors in this study; what decisions do they find difficult; 
what makes those decisions difficult, and what factors do they consider 




This chapter, presents data from the study survey explaining who the doctors 
are in this study.  It also addresses research question one, again drawing on 
data from the study survey, answering which decisions paediatricians find 
particularly difficult when working with severely disabled children and what 
makes those decisions particularly difficult?’  In answering both these questions 
the existing lenses discussed in chapter two497 are drawn upon to analyse what 
the doctors wrote in their survey responses. The debate started by Kennedy in 
1979498 (‘the Kennedy debate’), best interest decision-making as defined by the 
English High Court from Re B (A Minor) [1981]499 onwards and the doctors’ 
professional ethical guidance are used as benchmarks for this analysis.  The 
first part of research question two, is also addressed in this chapter, again using 
data from the doctors’ survey responses, to answer what factors the doctors 
take into consideration when making difficult decisions for disabled children?  
The existing lenses found in chapter two are also used to evaluate these 
responses.   The second part of research question two, the weight the doctors 
                                                 
497 Chapter two, pp. 23-94 
 
498 Kennedy, I, (1979). What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, published in an amended form in Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
 
499 Re B (A Minor) (Wardship, Medical Treatment) [1981] WLR 1421 CA, August 1981 
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put on these factors when working with severely disabled children is addressed 
in the next chapter.500 
   
This and the next chapter consider the extent to which there is consensus 
amongst doctors as to how decisions both should and are made.  This is an 
important question because if doctors seem to decide unilaterally how to make 
best interest decisions, as opposed to, deciding in keeping with their 
professional guidance and the jurisprudence of the English High Court, the 
concerns explored in the Kennedy debate501 seem all the more valid. It would 
then seem that there is little or no oversight as to how doctors decide a child’s 
best interests.  There would be nothing, for example, to stop a doctor deciding a 
child should not receive PICU treatment due to some random rule created by 
the doctor.  If, however, doctors are making best interest decisions as 
recommended by the courts and their professional bodies, a way tested in 
earlier legal cases and carefully consideration by a professional body, then 
Kennedy’s concerns seem less pressing.   
 
This chapter starts by defining the term ‘clinical factors’. This is to contextualise 
what the doctors say about how difficult decisions are made for disabled 
children in the context of the on-going Kennedy debate.  As was seen, Kennedy 
identified that ‘medical decisions’ namely, decisions taken by doctors, can 
encompass both clinical factors - seen as being legitimately within the unique 
expertise and experience of a doctor - and non-clinical factors, which are 
arguably outside this realm.  An understanding of what is meant by ‘clinical 
factors’ is therefore important when considering the responses of the doctors in 
this study.  
 
                                                 
500 Chapter five, pp.181-236 
 
501 Kennedy, I, (1979). What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, published in an amended form in Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
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Before turning to the doctor’s responses, the doctors’ professional guidance is 
briefly revisited. This is to help contextualise the doctors’ responses and 
compare how the guidance says difficult decisions for disabled children should 
be made, with how the doctors say they and their colleagues actually make 
these decisions.  
 
A summary of the profiles of the doctors, giving key demographic details is 
presented.  Details are given of the doctors’ gender, age, ethnic origin, places 
of work and training, paediatric sub-specialties, duration of practice, personal 
experience of disability, and faith. As mentioned in the last chapter, data that 
could make an individual doctor identifiable is not included.  
 
This chapter then presents what types of decisions doctors say they find difficult 
and what they say makes those decisions particularly difficult. It then explores 
how the doctors make these decisions.  The doctors’ responses are then 
analysed in the context of the doctors’ professional and personal 
characteristics, the aim being as far as is possible within the parameters of this 
study, to ascertain what influences individual doctors’ decisions and the impact, 
if any, of individual doctors’ personal or professional characteristics on their 
decision-making for disabled children.  
 
2. Defining a clinical factor 
The distinction between ‘clinical’ and ‘non-clinical’ factors gets to the heart of 
the on-going Kennedy debate started almost 40 years ago, as to which 
decisions are or should be within the assumed unique competence of a doctor.  
This question is pertinent to this thesis especially because, as shall be seen in 
this and later chapters, some of the doctors in this study voiced concerns, some 
strongly, that there are non-clinical factors doctors should not be considering 
when deciding for disabled children. Other doctors in this study had no such 
concerns and indeed said they put great weight on those very same factors 
when making decisions for disabled children. Defining ‘clinical factors’ is 
therefore important.  
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In this thesis ‘clinical’ is used to refer to a decision founded on actual 
observation by, and treatment of, the patients by health professionals.502It is 
distinguished from what might be termed a wider ‘medical decision’ consisting 
of factors wider than just clinical ones.  An assessment that a child has a poor 
quality of life, is happy at school, or has a worthwhile relationship with his or her 
family are classified as ‘non-clinical decisions’.  As discussed in chapter two,503 
Kennedy504 illustrated that the term ‘medical decision’ can unhelpfully mean no 
more than a decision taken by a doctor.  In this thesis, the term ‘clinical’ is used 
to mean factors relating to the child’s diagnosis, prognosis, and current clinical 
assessment.  For example, whether a child has pneumonia,505 a tumour,506 
respiratory distress507 or perhaps a raised lactate508 or a raised C-reactive 
protein test result.509  
                                                 
502.www.medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com 
 
503 Chapter two, para 2. pp. 25-34 
 
504 Kennedy, I, (1979). What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, published in an amended form in Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
 
505 Defined as ‘inflammation of the lung caused by bacteria, in which the air sacs (alveoli) become filled 
with inflammatory cells and the lung becomes solid.’  Source: Oxford Concise Medical Dictionary (2014); 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 
 
506 Defined as ‘any abnormal swelling in or on a part of the body. The term is usually applied to an 
abnormal growth of tissue, which may be benign or malignant’ Source: Oxford Concise Medical 
Dictionary (2014); Oxford University Press, Oxford 
 
507 Defined as ‘severe difficulty in achieving adequate oxygenation in spite of significant efforts to 
breathe: it is usually associated with increased respiratory rate and the use of accessory muscles in the 
chest wall. It can occur in both obstructive and non-obstructive lung conditions.’ Source: Oxford Concise 
Medical Dictionary (2014); Oxford University Press, Oxford 
 
508 A test undertaken ‘to help detect and measure the severity of low levels of oxygen in the body 
(hypoxia) and also lactic acidosis.’ Source: Association of Clinical Biochemistry & Laboratory Medicine; 
http://labtestsonline.org.uk/understanding/analytes/lactate/tab/test/; last accessed 2 July 2017 
 
509 Defined as ‘a protein whose plasma concentrations are raised in infections and inflammatory states 
and in the presence of tissue damage or necrosis’: Source: Oxford Concise Medical Dictionary (2014); 
Oxford University Press, Oxford  
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‘Clinical factors’ can be compared with ‘non-clinical factors’. These include 
factors such as: whether a child is happy; a parent’s ability to cope; the child’s 
ability to interact with those around him or her; the child’s quality of life and level 
of understanding; the child’s school environment and the allocation of NHS 
resources.  Although there is debate as to the extent to which any aspect of 
medical opinion can be objective,510 another way of distinguishing between the 
clinical and non-clinical factors is that the clinical ones are those which it is 
easier to describe as objective, in that they can be scientifically established or 
tested by a doctor, such as a blood test; MRI scan or other investigation. 
Moreover, such factors are verifiable and repeatable by others using similar 
methods or approaches. In contrast, non-clinical factors require subjective 
evaluation and judgment, such as an assessment of the child’s happiness; 
quality of life or even ability to interact and communicate. These factors are 
more difficult to quantify, let alone ‘repeat’ accurately in any consistently 
verifiable fashion.  Clinical and non-clinical factors can also be distinguished as 
clinical being factors doctors are explicitly taught to assess in their biomedical 
education and training, while non-clinical are factors are not explicitly covered in 
this education. This is not to say, however, that elements of subjectivity do not 
form part of medical education and training, but they are rarely overtly 
acknowledged.   
 
Before looking at the data, a second issue that it is helpful to address now is 
how their professional bodies guide doctors to make difficult decisions,511 as 
                                                 
510 see for example Hayatt, MA, (2007) Cancer Imagining: Lung & Breast Carcinomas, Volume 1, 
Academic Press, p.48 (Subjective nature of interpretation of cancer imagining) & McClatchey, KD, (2002) 
Clinical Laboratory Medicine, Lippincott, Williams & Wilkins, p. 814 (subjective interpretation of blood 
samples) 
 
511 A presumption can perhaps be made that while doctors may or may not be expected to be aware of 
legal cases which set out how, for example, best interest decisions, it is perhaps reasonable to expect a 
doctor to be aware of guidance from the General Medical Council which the GMC itself says ‘all doctors 
are required to be familiar,’ and a consultant paediatrician to be aware of guidance pertinent to his or 
her sub-specialism from the RCPCH 
 
P a g e  | 142 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
this is the second existing lens through which what the doctors in this study said 
is analysed. 
 
3. What does medical professional guidance say about decision–making 
for children? 
 
The guidance produced by the RCPCH512 on withholding and withdrawing 
treatment for children was discussed in chapter two,513 being one of the 
landmarks in best interest decision-making for disabled children.  It is, however, 
worthwhile briefly repeating the main points of that professional guidance here, 
because it sets the UK benchmark for best practice for paediatricians when 
making difficult decisions for disabled children.  As UK registered doctors, the 
participants in this study also have a professional duty to follow guidance 
produced by the GMC. Therefore, what that guidance says about best interest 
decision-making for children is also considered here. 
 
As was seen in chapter two,514 at the date the doctors were surveyed RCPCH 
2004515 was in place, providing the normative framework for best interest 
decisions for paediatricians. RCPCH 2004 gives express guidance with regard 
to disabled children, warning paediatricians against devaluing disabled 
children’s lives, stating that a life with impairment is not incompatible with a life 
of quality and that disabled children should be provided with high quality health 
                                                 
512 RCPCH (2004) Withholding Life Sustaining Treatment in Children, A Framework for Practice, second 
edition, RCPCH, London 
 




515 RCPCH (2004) Withholding Life Sustaining Treatment in Children, A Framework for Practice, second 
edition, RCPCH, London 
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care.516 As was also seen in chapter two,517 paediatricians are further guided to 
‘avoid over pessimistic views about life with disability’518 and to be aware that a 
disabled person’s view of quality of their life can differ from a non-disabled 
person’s view of life with impairment.519  The guidance, as was seen earlier, 
suggests five scenarios where the RCPCH’s law and ethics committee judged a 
doctor might consider withholding or withdrawing treatment.520  As UK 
registered doctors, the doctors in this study would also be expected to follow 
the GMC’s ‘0-18 years: guidance for all doctors’ published in 2007 (‘GMC 
2007’).521  
 
GMC 2007 guides doctors as to how they should practice when working with 
children.  In a letter to the assistant clerk of the Public Petitions Committee of 
the Scottish Parliament dated 14 January 2014, the GMC’s Scottish Projects 
Officer set out the status of GMC guidance.522  The Officer stated: 
‘Good medical practice sets out the principles and values on which good 
practice is founded and all doctors are required to be familiar with and 
follow the guidance in GMP and our explanatory guidance on a range of 
issues.  If a doctor seriously or persistently breaches the guidance we act 
to protect patients, if necessary removing the doctor from the register, or 
restricting or removing their right to practice medicine’. 523  
                                                 
516 RCPCH (2004) Withholding Life Sustaining Treatment in Children, A Framework for Practice, second 
edition, RCPCH, London para 2.7.1, p. 24 
 
517 Chapter two, para 6 p.49-57 
518 RCPCH (2004) Withholding Life Sustaining Treatment in Children, A Framework for Practice, second 
edition, RCPCH, London para 2.7.2 p. 24 
 
519 RCPCH (2004) Withholding Life Sustaining Treatment in Children, A Framework for Practice, second 
edition, RCPCH, London para 2.7.2, p. 27 
 
520 RCPCH (2004) Withholding Life Sustaining Treatment in Children, A Framework for Practice, second 
edition, RCPCH, London, p.11 
 
521 GMC (2007) ‘0-18 Guidance for all doctors’, GMC, London 
 
522 GMC (2014) Letter dated 14th January 2014 from Jackie Bell, Scottish Projects Officer GMC to Andrew 
Howlett, Assistant Clerk, Public Petitions Committee, Scottish Parliament, http://www.gmc-
uk.org/GMC_response_to_the_consultation_on_the_Scottish_Parliament_Public_Petitions_Committee
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GMC 2007 tells doctors that a child’s best interests should be the doctor’s 
guiding principle when deciding for a child.524 It recognises that identifying an 
individual child’s best interests may not be an easy task: 
‘Doctors should always act in the best interests of children. This should 
be the guiding principle in all decisions, which may affect them. But 
identifying their best interests may not always be easy.’525 
 
GMC 2007 (see figure 11 below) also guides the doctors as to how to assess a 
child’s best interests.526 
 
Figure 11: Paragraphs 12-13, GMC 0-18 Guidance (Source GMC) (footnotes omitted) 
 
When analysing the data in this study, the extent to which doctors draw on 
clinical and non-clinical factors and seem to reflect in their actions RCPCH 2004 
and GMC 2007 will be considered.  
 
                                                 
524 GMC (2007) ‘0-18 Guidance for all doctors’, GMC, London, para 8 
 
525 Ibid, para 8 
 
526 Ibid, paras 12 & 13 
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Having established these preliminaries, the data from the doctors is now 
presented. 
 
4. Doctors’ Attributes 
 
The personal attributes of the doctors in this study were of particular interest 
because a number of studies527 have found that characteristics attributable to 
the doctor as opposed to the patient’s diagnosis, prognosis and clinical status 
can have a significant impact on doctors’ difficult decisions.  Among these 
studies, Cuttini et al 528 and Richer et al529 have involved doctors from different 
nation states and have found, based on the same hypothetical scenarios, 
doctors from different states make different treatment decisions for the same 
patient.  This suggests that the doctors’ training, education, socio-economic 
factors and as far as they can be separated from other factors, their personal 
beliefs, are potentially influencing the treatment doctors give, rather than just 
characteristics intrinsic to the patient and their medical condition.  For example, 
Richter at al530 found significant differences between Swedish, German and 
Russian doctors when presented with a series of hypothetical scenarios 
concerning the care of an 82-year-old patient with Alzheimer’s and an acute life-
                                                 
527 See for example: Cuttini, M, Nadai, M, Kaminski, M, Hansen, G, de Leeuw, Lenoir, S, Persson, J, et al 
(2000) End-of-life decisions in neonatal intensive care: physicians' self-reported practices in seven 
European countries, The Lancet 355.9221: 2112-2118; Richter, J, Eisemann, M, Zgonnikova, E, (2001) 
Doctors' authoritarianism in end-of-life treatment decisions. A comparison between Russia, Sweden and 
Germany. Journal of Medical Ethics, 27(3), 186-191 & Mebane, EW, Oman, RF, Kroonen, LT, Goldstein, 
MK (1999) The Influence of Physician Race, Age, and Gender on Physician Attitudes Toward Advance 
Care Directives and Preferences for End‐Of‐Life Decision‐Making, Journal of the American Geriatrics 
Society, 47(5), 579-591 
 
528 Cuttini, M, Nadai, M, Kaminski, M, Hansen, G, de Leeuw, Lenoir, S, Persson, J, et al (2000) End-of-life 
decisions in neonatal intensive care: physicians' self-reported practices in seven European countries, The 
Lancet 355.9221: 2112-2118 
 
529 Richter, J, Eisemann, M, Zgonnikova, E, (2001) Doctors' authoritarianism in end-of-life treatment 
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threatening condition. They also found doctors decided differently when making 
decisions such as whether to give cardiopulmonary resuscitation and whether to 
follow a patient’s known wishes, depending on the age, gender and length of 
practice of the doctor.  In their United States study, Mebane et al531 found 
significant differences in the end-of-life decisions made by white and black 
doctors when controlling for age and gender.  Cuttini et al’s (2000)532 study of 
1,235 neonatologists in eight European states, including the UK, which asked 
neonatologists to complete a survey concerning their practices when making 
end of life decisions, like Richter et al found variations in practice, in their study, 
both between states and between doctors within a single state.  Cuttini et al 
report: 
‘Age, length of professional experience, and the importance of religion in 
the physicians’ life affected the likelihood of reporting of non-treatment 
decision’.533 
 
Earlier studies have therefore found that factors as varied as a doctor’s age, 
gender, place of training, ethnic origin and religion seem to influence whether a 
doctor withheld, withdrew or gave treatment in life critical situations involving 
both infant and adult patients.   
 
The present thesis is conducted on a small scale, so there is insufficient data to 
claim a direct influence between a particular personal or professional attribute 
and a particular attitude or way of behaving towards disabled children on the 
part of the doctor, even if all the doctors in the study with a particular attribute 
act in one way and all the other doctors act differently.  It is, however, perhaps 
possible to say that data suggests that particular personal or professional 
                                                 
531 Mebane, EW, Oman, RF, Kroonen, LT, Goldstein, MK (1999) The Influence of Physician Race, Age, and 
Gender on Physician Attitudes Toward Advance Care Directives and Preferences for End‐Of‐Life 
Decision‐Making, Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, 47(5), 579-591 
 
532 Cuttini, M, Nadai, M, Kaminski, M, Hansen, G, de Leeuw, Lenoir, S, Persson, J, et al (2000) End-of-life 
decisions in neonatal intensive care: physicians' self-reported practices in seven European countries, The 
Lancet 355.9221: 2112-2118 
 
533 Ibid, p.2112 
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attributes may lead to a tendency on the part of the doctors to behave in a 
particular way and that a larger study would be merited.  
 
A descriptive summary of key professional and demographic data for the study 
participants is included in figure 12. Key characteristics are used, for example 
doctors age, gender, parental status when analysing the data provided by the 
doctors.  Why each characteristic is chosen is explained throughout the 
presentation and analysis of the data. 
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Figure 12: Professional and demographic profiles of study survey participants 
 
Dr Sub-specialism Gender Age band Decade 
qualified 
Parent Lived outside 






Ethnic Origin Has religious 
faith 
1* Neurology M 45-54 1980s YES YES NO NO White British YES 
2 PICU F 45-54 1980s YES YES YES YES White  
British 
YES 
3 General Paeds ? 45-54 1980s YES NO NO NO White British NO 
4 Endocrinology M 45-54 1980s YES NO NO NO British NO 
5 General Paeds M 55-64 1970s YES YES NO NO White British YES 
6 Paediatric 
Surgeon 
M 55-64 1970s YES YES YES YES White 
British 
? 
7* Neurology M 55-64 1970s YES NO NO NO White British YES 
8 Metabolic  M 45-54 1980s YES NO NO NO White British YES 
9 Neurology M 45-54 1980s YES NO NO NO White British YES 
10* Oncology M 45-54 1980s YES YES YES YES White British YES 
11 PICU M 45-54 1990s NO YES NO YES White British NO 
12 PICU F 45-54 1980s NO YES NO YES White British NO 
13 Resp. Registrar F 35-44 1990s NO YES NO YES White British NO 
14* Resp. M 45-54 1980s YES NO NO NO White 
British 
NO 
15 PICU ? 45-54 1980s YES YES YES YES ? YES 
16 PICU M 45-54 1990s YES YES YES YES European YES 
17* PICU F 35-44 1990s NO YES NO NO White British NO 
18* PICU F 55-64 1980s NO YES YES YES Asian YES 
19 Neurology M 55-64 1970s YES NO NO NO White British YES 
20 General 
Paediatrics 
? 45-54 1980s NO YES YES YES ? NO 
21 Neonatology M 35-44 1990s YES NO NO NO White British NO 
22 Neurology F ? 1990s YES YES YES YES European YES 
23 Neurology M 45-54 1980s YES NO NO NO White British NO 
24* Neurology F 55-64 1970s YES YES NO NO White British YES 
25 Endocrine M 45-54 1980s YES NO NO NO White British NO 
26 Emergency F 45-54 1980s YES NO NO NO White British NO 
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27 General Paeds M 45-54 1980s YES YES YES YES White British YES 
28 PICU M 35-44 1980s YES NO NO NO White British YES 
29* Neurology M 65-74 1960s YES NO NO NO White British YES 
30 Neurology M 45-54 1980s YES NO NO NO White British YES 
31 PICU F 45-54 1980s NO NO NO NO White British YES 
32* Palliative 
Medicine 
M 45-54 1980s NO NO NO NO ? YES 
33 PICU ? 35-44 1990s NO YES YES YES White British NO 
Key: 
 Decade rather than date of qualification is given as doctors could too easily be identified from year of qualification 
 Ethnic origin is presented in broad categories e.g. white British to avoid doctor being identified if precise ethnic origin provided 
 Only parental status is presented and not whether individual doctor is a parent of a disabled child, to avoid identification 
 Region is not presented as would make some doctors too easily identifiable  
 Age is presented in a band to avoid a doctor being identified if exact age is given 
 = interviewed 
 ? = information not provided 
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4.1 Place of Work 
The potential importance of culture on a doctor’s attitudes and behaviours 
especially towards vulnerable patients was seen in chapters one and two,534 
when both Bristol535 and Basnett’s536  reflections on his medical training were 
discussed. Details of the doctors’ places of work were therefore sought as it 
was anticipated that each place of work would have, to an extent, its own 
unique culture. Differences in workplace culture across the NHS are 
recognised.537  For such reasons, in the design of this research it was also 
important to know whether any of the doctors worked in the same hospital, 
particularly within the same sub-specialisms within that hospital, as if this 
occurred, comparisons could be made between the responses of doctors 
working within the same culture.  The differences in culture across the NHS also 
made it important to ensure that the doctors in this study worked around the UK, 
not just in one hospital or region. If doctors did all work in the same place, this 
study would, to an extent, only tell us about how doctors make difficult decisions 
for disabled children in that hospital or region.  If doctors from across the UK are 
saying similar things about their decision-making for disabled children, the 
doctors’ responses can be generalised with much more confidence. Either way, 
the important and influence – or otherwise – of a workplace needs to be 
explored.  
 
 No doctor from a district hospital completed the survey. Self-evidently it is not 
possible to ask doctors who had chosen not to take part in research, why this 
                                                 
534 Chapter one, para 5.1, p.67,& chapter two, para 8, p.75 
 
535 The Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry (2001), The Inquiry into the management of care of children 
receiving complex heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary, Final Report, Bristol Royal Infirmary 
Inquiry 
 
536 Basnett, I, (2001) ’Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Towards and Decisions Affecting 
Disabled People’, in G.L. Albrecht, K.D. Seelman and M. Bury (eds), Handbook of Disability Studies, Sage 
Publications, London, pp.450-467 
 
537 For example, Dixon -Wood M, et al (2016) Culture and behavior in the English National Health 
Service: overview of lessons from a large multi-method study, BMJ Qual Saf doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2013-
001947, BMJ, London, last accessed 6th April 2016 
P a g e  | 152 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
was so, as part of that research.  However, one possible reason why doctors 
from district hospitals did not choose to take part, is that the children who are 
the subject of this study have particularly complex health needs and so are 
more likely to have their healthcare provided by specialists in tertiary hospitals. 
PICUs are in tertiary hospitals.  It is also where paediatric neurologists and 
respiratory specialists tend to work. 
 
Figure 13: Places of work of participants at date of survey 
 
The thirty-three respondents to the thesis survey included paediatricians 
working or having worked in every region of the United Kingdom. Twelve (36%) 
of the paediatricians reported having worked in just one NHS region throughout 
his or her career; the same number reported having worked in two NHS 
regions; six (18%) had worked in three NHS regions; three (9%) in four NHS 
regions and one (3%) in five regions.  Three of doctors who had worked in more 
than one NHS region also reported having worked as a qualified doctor abroad, 
in either Canada or Australia.  
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Figure 14: Health regions in which participants have worked 
 
 
4.2 Place of undergraduate medical training 
The doctors were asked where they had completed their undergraduate 
training. Five (15%) completed it in Scotland; nineteen (57%) in England; one 
(3%) in each in Wales and Northern Ireland and five (15%) overseas.  This data 
was sought as medical training is not uniform throughout the United Kingdom.  
Different medical schools teach different syllabi; the doctors would also have 
encountered the different hospital cultures, just discussed and different attitudes 
from their teaching staff and when on their placements as medical students.  All 
the doctors whose undergraduate training included any law and ethics 
completed their undergraduate training outside of England.  Consideration is 
given in chapters eight538 and nine539 as to whether doctors with more or less 
training in law and ethics approach difficult decisions in different ways.  
  
                                                 
538 Chapter eight, pp.323-346 
 
539 Chapter nine, pp.347-380  
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Figure 15: University undergraduate medical training completed 
 
 
4.3 Overseas training and employment 
The doctors were asked about any overseas medical training or employment. It 
was recognised that doctors who had trained or worked overseas will have 
been exposed to different cultures from those who had not done so and this 
may impact on how, a doctor approaches difficult decisions, for disabled 
children.  Four doctors (12%) had completed part or all of their medical training 
abroad and five (15%) had worked as a qualified doctor outside of the UK. This 
compares with the GMC statistics of 37% of UK registered doctors in 2010 who 
had qualified overseas,540 but again this is a global figure for all UK doctors, 
with no breakdown available between consultants and junior doctors. 
 
4.4 Sub-specialties 
It was anticipated that doctors from different sub-specialisms may approach 
difficult decisions for disabled children differently, as doctors from the different 
sub-specialisms would have different experience of disabled children. Some of 
the sub-specialists are likely to see the child both when the child is ill in hospital 
and when the child is well at out-patient appointments.  They will also attend 
(possibly over several years) multi-disciplinary meetings attended by a range of 
health; social care and educational staff, as well as the child’s parent and in 
                                                 
540 GMC (2011) ‘The state of medical education and practice in the UK, GMC, London, p.28 
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some cases the child him or herself, where many aspects of the child’s life will 
be discussed. These sub-specialists are therefore likely to have a broad 
overview of the child, including non-medical aspects of the child’s life. They may 
have long-term relationships with the children and their families. In contrast, 
other doctors will only ever see a disabled child when he or she is ill, in the case 
of PICU specialists, when the child is critically ill.  These doctors are unlikely to 
have a long-term relationship with a child and will provide highly specialized 
care in a crisis.  It therefore seems that doctors from different sub-specialisms 
may approach difficult decisions for disabled children from different 
perspectives. This makes it important for this study to classify doctors according 
to his or her sub-specialism. This forms an important part of the detailed 
analysis of the data in chapter five.541   
 
All the participants were paediatricians542 and all but one543 were consultants.544 
The doctors came from eleven different sub-specialties.  Ten doctors (30%) 
were PICU consultants,545 nine (27%) were neurologists,546 four (12%) were 
                                                 
541 Chapter five, pp.181-236 
 
542 Defined by the British Medical Association as ‘Specialists in the medical management of conditions 
affecting babies, children and young people.’ Source: British Medical Association, (2016) Doctors’ Titles 
Explained, BMA, London, p. 10 
 
543 Dr.13 was a specialist registrar, defined by the British Medical Association as ‘a junior doctor who has 
completed their foundation training but is still in training in a specialty area of medicine.’ 
Source: Source: British Medical Association, (2016) Doctors’ Titles Explained, BMA, London, p. 3  
 
544 Defined by the British Medical Association as ‘a senior doctor who has overall responsibility for the 
care of patients in hospital. They have completed a minimum of six years training in their specialty area 
to gain a certificate of completion of training (CCT) and listing on the GMC’s specialist register’ 
Source: Source: British Medical Association, (2016) Doctors’ Titles Explained, BMA, London, p. 4 
 
545 Doctors working in paediatric intensive care units caring for children when they are critically ill. 
  
546 Doctors who treat children who have disorders of the brain, spinal cord, nerves and muscles or 
specialist in neuro-disability: www.rcpch.ac.uk/training-examinations-professional-
development/postgraduate-training/sub-speciality-training/paedia-9, last accessed 9 March, 2016 
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general paediatricians547 and two (6%) were respiratory548 doctors.549 A further 
two doctors (6%) were endocrine 550specialists.  
The remaining participants were a metabolic551 specialist; an oncologist;552 an 
emergency specialist;553 a neonatologist;554 and a surgeon.555 
  
                                                 
547 A hospital based doctor specialising in the care of children, although some will also specialise in a 
particular area of medicine, often they will be generalists, similar to a general practitioner in the 
community. Source: RCPCH, (2016), Paediatric Sub-Specialty Glossary, RCPCH, London 
http://www.rcpch.ac.uk/training-examinations-professional-development/paediatric-careers-and-
recruitment/careers/what-pae-, last accessed 16 June 2017 
 
548 Doctors who deal with breathing and lungs. Source: RCPCH, (2016), Paediatric Sub-Specialty Glossary, 
RCPCH, London http://www.rcpch.ac.uk/training-examinations-professional-development/paediatric-
careers-and-recruitment/careers/what-pae-0, last accessed 16 June 2017 
 
549 One respiratory doctor was a consultant, the other was a specialist registrar, a junior doctor towards 
the end of her training. 
 
550 Doctors who treat illnesses related to the hormones Source: RCPCH, (2016), Paediatric Sub-Specialty 
Glossary, RCPCH, London http://www.rcpch.ac.uk/training-examinations-professional-
development/paediatric-careers-and-recruitment/careers/what-pae-0, last accessed 16 June 2017 
551 Doctors who treat inborn errors of the metabolism Source: RCPCH, (2016), Paediatric Sub-Specialty 
Glossary, RCPCH, London http://www.rcpch.ac.uk/training-examinations-professional-
development/paediatric-careers-and-recruitment/careers/what-pae-0 , last accessed 16 June 2017 
 
552 Doctors who specialise in the treatment of cancer. Source: RCPCH, (2016), Paediatric Sub-Specialty 
Glossary, RCPCH, London http://www.rcpch.ac.uk/training-examinations-professional-
development/paediatric-careers-and-recruitment/careers/what-pae-0, last accessed 16 June 2017 
 
553 A doctor providing immediate treatment and care in an accident and emergency department. Source: 
RCPCH, (2016), Paediatric Sub-Specialty Glossary, RCPCH, London http://www.rcpch.ac.uk/training-
examinations-professional-development/paediatric-careers-and-recruitment/careers/what-pae-0, last 
accessed 16 June 2017 
 
554 Neonatologists specialise in the care of the sickest and most premature babies in neonatal intensive 
care units. Source: RCPCH, (2016), Paediatric Sub-Specialty Glossary, RCPCH, London 
http://www.rcpch.ac.uk/training-examinations-professional-development/paediatric-careers-and-
recruitment/careers/what-pae-0, last accessed 16 June 2017 
 
555 Specialists who treat disease through surgery. Source: RCPCH, (2016), Paediatric Sub-Specialty 
Glossary, RCPCH, London http://www.rcpch.ac.uk/training-examinations-professional-
development/paediatric-careers-and-recruitment/careers/what-pae-0, last accessed 16 June 2017 
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Figure 16: Participants’ paediatric sub-specialties  
 
 
4.5 Duration of practice 
 
The doctors were asked their duration of practice to enable a comparison to be 
made between doctors who qualified at different points along the time-line set 
out in chapter two.  The doctors who responded to this survey include doctors 
who qualified in the 1960s and 1970s, prior to Kennedy’s Astor lecture,556 the 
trial of Dr Arthur557 and Re B.558  The doctor who qualified most recently, a 
specialist registrar, did so the same year as the HRA received royal assent.559  
This span allows for the doctors’ responses to be analysed to see whether any 
patterns of answers emerge suggesting any changes in the way doctors 
approach best interest decisions for disabled children, from the different eras. 
One doctor (3%) qualified in the 1960s; five (15%) in the 1970s; twenty doctors 
                                                 
556 Kennedy, I, (1979). What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, published in an amended form in Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
 
557 R v Arthur (1981) 12 BMLR 1, heard before Farquharson J, 3-5th November, 1981 
 
558 Re B (A Minor) (Wardship, Medical Treatment) (1981) WLR 1421, CA, August 1981 
 
559 Human Rights Act 1998 c 42 
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(60.5%) qualified in the 1980s and seven doctors (21%) qualified in the 1990s. 
Including the specialist registrar, the participants reported having between 18 
and 52 years professional experience. Twenty-four doctors (72%) had been 
qualified between 24-36 years.   
 




The doctors were asked their age in addition to their duration of practice, 
recognising that doctors with the longest duration of practice where not 
necessarily those who were the eldest.  Doctors were asked which age band 
they fell within rather than their precise age, as identifying a doctors’ exact age 
may make the doctor identifiable.  Twenty-one (63%) of the respondents overall 
(thirteen (65%) of the male respondents and four (44%) of the female 
respondents) reported being between 45-55 years old.  The RCPCH reported 
an overall mean age of 48.8 for male consultants and 46.5 years for female 
consultants in 2009.560  The mean age of female and male doctors in this study 
is in line with that for paediatric consultants, as reported by the RCPCH. 
  
                                                 
560 RCPCH (2011) RCPCH Medical Workforce Census for 2009, RCPCH, London p. 42 
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Figure 18: Participants’ age
 
 
4.7 Ethnic Origin 
As was seen earlier,561 Mebane et al562 suggest that a doctor’s ethnic origin 
may influence a doctor’s decisions whether to withhold or withdraw treatment 
from patients.  It will be recalled from chapter two563 that Whiteneck564 had 
found discriminatory attitudes towards disabled people amongst doctors, but 
identified a lack of data as to the doctors’ personal characteristics as a 
weakness in his study. He recognised that these characteristics may influence 
doctors’ attitudes and behaviours.  This study therefore asked doctors their 
ethnic origin with the aim of exploring this as one characteristic, which may 
impact, on doctors’ difficult decisions for disabled children.   
 
The doctors were asked their ethnic origin using the UK standard classifications 
of ethnicity utilised in the English version of the UK census. The English rather 
than Scottish classifications were used as it was anticipated that most 
                                                 
561 Chapter four, para 3, p.146 
 
562 Mebane, EW, Oman, RF, Kroonen, LT, Goldstein, MK (1999) The Influence of Physician Race, Age, and 
Gender on Physician Attitudes Toward Advance Care Directives and Preferences for End‐Of‐Life 
Decision‐Making, Journal of the American Geriatrics Society, 47(5), 579-591 
 
563 Chapter two, para 10, p. 85 
 
564 Whiteneck, G, (1989) Long-term outlook for persons with high quadriplegia, in Whiteneck G, Adler C, 
Carter RE et al (eds) The Management of High Quadripledgia, Demos Publications, New York 
P a g e  | 160 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
respondents would be based in England, where the majority of paediatricians 
are located. This was borne out in the responses with twenty-five doctors (76%) 
being employed in England; four (12%) in Scotland and three (9%) in Wales. 
One doctor (3%) did not reveal his or her location. Doctors were asked to 
indicate their ethnic origin from the following list: English, Scottish, Welsh, 
Northern Irish, British, Gipsy/Traveller, Polish, European, Pakistani, Indian, 
Bangladeshi, Chinese, African, Caribbean, Arab, Mixed or multiple ethic origins.  
The doctors could indicate that they were from one or more ethnic groups and 
also add a comment if they wished. 
 
Twenty doctors (60.5%) identified themselves as ethnically English, Scottish, 
Welsh or from Northern Ireland.  While recognising that a doctor may identify as 
being English, Scottish, Welsh or from Northern Ireland and not be white, it is 
thought likely that, for example, a doctor who is a third-generation immigrant 
would identify him or herself as having mixed or multiple ethnic origins or by 
listing all his or her ethnic origins (this option being available).  This does tend to 
suggest that when compared with the population of doctors as a whole, the 
sample in this survey was disproportionately white, but not disproportionately so 
for consultants.  The GMC recorded just 47.7% of UK registered doctors being 
ethnically ‘white’ as at 2010.565  Although 18.7% of UK registered doctors 
describe themselves as of Asian ethnic origin in the GMC’s statistics,566 the 
statistics do not distinguish between consultants and junior doctors in their 
ethnic breakdown. The GMC do state, however, that the consultant workforce is 
‘still predominantly white’.567 In this study, just one doctor (3%), who described 
herself as Chinese, can based on this, be classified as Asian.   
 
                                                 




567 Ibid, p. 36 
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Much is written about ‘the snowy white peaks’ of the NHS568 whereby despite 
having the most ethnically diverse workforce in the UK, those from ethnic 
minority backgrounds face significant difficulties in obtaining senior positions.  
Thirty-two doctors (97%) in this study, held senior clinical positions, some also 
senior managerial positions such as clinical director.  The ethnic profile of the 
participants seems to reflect the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities within 
the senior ranks of the medical profession.  
 
Figure 19: Participants’ ethnic origin
 
Due to the lack of diversity amongst the doctors in this study, it was not possible 
to compare responses of doctors from different ethnic groups. 
 
4.8 Gender 
A doctor’s gender was also recognised as a factor that could potentially impact 
on how a doctor approached difficult decisions for disabled children.  Twenty 
doctors (60.5%) identified themselves as being male and nine (27%) as being 
                                                 
568 See for example, Kline, R, (2014) The ‘snowy white peaks’ of the NHS: a survey of the discrimination in 
governance and leadership and the potential impact on patient care in London and England, Middlesex 
University, London and Priest, N, Esmail, A, Williams, DR, Sprague, Norman, F, Smart, Norman, L (2015) 
Promoting equality for ethnic minority NHS staff –what works?’, BMJ 2015: 351: h3297 
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female.  The remaining four doctors (12%) did not specify their gender. All the 
participants apart from Dr.13569 were on the GMC Specialist Register,570 which 
had 70% male and 30% female doctors in 2010.571 The ratio of male to female 
doctors in this survey is therefore fairly similar to the ratio of male to female 
doctors on the GMC’s Specialist register. 
 
Figure 20: Participants’ gender 
 
 
The workforce census conducted by the RCPCH in 2009, however, indicates 
that 46.6% of paediatric consultants were female and 53.4% were male.572  By 
the next RCPCH workforce census in 2011 the percentage of female paediatric 
consultants had risen to 48.6%.573  As noted earlier, the doctors in this study all 
worked in tertiary hospitals where the RCPCH workforce census indicate the 
ratio of female to male consultants is lower, with 39.6% of tertiary paediatric 
                                                 
569 A specialist registrar, a junior doctor in the last stage of training. 
 
570 This is the GMC register of doctors eligible for appoint as a consultant. See http://www.gmc-
uk.org/doctors/register/information_on_the_specialist_register.asp last accessed 12 June 2017 
 
571 GMC (2011) ‘The state of medical education and practice in the UK, GMC, London, p.21 
 
572 RCPCH (2011) RCPCH Medical Workforce Census for 2009, RCPCH, London, p.41 
 
573 RCPCH (2013) RCPCH Medical Workforce Census for 2011, RCPCH, London, p.46 
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consultants being female in 2009574 and 43.9% being female in 2011.575 The 
doctors in this study were, for paediatricians, disproportionately male. One 
reason for this may be that, as the RCPCH reports, female consultants are 
more likely to be working part-time than their male colleagues, potentially giving 
them less work time for tasks such as completing this survey: RCPCH (2014) 
states that as at 2013, 35% of the female paediatric consultant workforce 
worked part-time, compared with 9.5% of male paediatric consultants.576 
 
4.9 Parental status & personal experience of disability 
Being a parent and have personal experience of disability were also seen as 
personal characteristics which could impact on how a doctor approached 
difficult decisions for disabled children.  Twenty-five doctors (76%) in this study 
described themselves as a parent. 
 
Figure 21:Participants’ parental status 
 
Ten doctors (30%) reported personal experience of disability; defined as the 
doctor being disabled him or herself, or having a close family member who was 
disabled.577 Six doctors (18%) reported this experience to be parenting a 
disabled child.  Four (12%) reported having a disabled close relative other than 
their child. Two doctors (6%) did not answer the question. No doctor declared 
him or herself to be disabled. 
                                                 
574 RCPCH (2011) RCPCH Medical Workforce Census for 2009, RCPCH, London, p.41 
 
575 RCPCH (2013) RCPCH Medical Workforce Census for 2011, RCPCH, London, p.46 
 
576 RCPCH (2014), RCPCH Medical Workforce Census 2013, RCPCH, London, Main Findings, p. 2 
 
577 This category also allowed for doctors to identify him or herself as being disabled, but no doctor in 
this study did so. 
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Figure 22: Participants’ personal experience of disability 
 
 
UK government statistics report 0.8 million (6%) of children in the UK were 
disabled in 2010/201,578 according to the Equality Act 2010 definition of 
disability.579  The number of doctors in this study who are parents of disabled 
children at 18%, is therefore unexpectedly high.  Indeed, distribution of disability 
is not equal through UK society, as Graham reports: 
 ‘socioeconomic inequalities in ill-health and disability typically 
take the form of a ‘social gradient’, in which those in higher 
socioeconomic groups have better health and fewer disabling conditions 
than groups below them’580 
 
                                                 
578 DWP (2012) Family Resources Survey United Kingdom 2010/2011, Department of Work & Pensions, 
London, p. 79, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/222839/frs_2010_11
_report.pdf, last accessed 16 June 2017 
 
579 s.6 Equality Act, 2010, c.15, Part 2, Chapter 2, 
‘Disability 
(1) A person (P) has a disability if— 
(a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and 
(b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P's ability to carry out 
normal day-to-day activities.’ 
 
580 Graham, H (2016) Socioeconomic inequalities in health in the UK: Evidence on patterns and 
determinants, A short report for the Disability Rights Commission, DRC, London, p. 4 http://disability-
studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/graham-socioeconomic-inequalities.pdf; last accessed 7/7/16 
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The paediatric consultants in this study, being elites if not ultra-elites, as defined 
in chapter two,581 can be seen as being on a par with the medical consultants 
identified by The Sutton Trust, namely being both a socially and economically 
very advantaged group.582 It would, in the light of this and the reported 
decrease in the prevalence of disability with greater social and economic status, 
be expected that the prevalence of consultants who are parents of disabled 
children or have close family connections to a disabled individual, to be lower 
than the national average, not higher, as appears to be the case.  Even if 
doctors as a group have an average number of disabled children, it is possible 
that the figure for doctors who are parents of disabled children is higher in this 
study, because doctors who are parents of disabled children were more 
motivated than others to respond to the request to join this study, due of their 
personal interest in disabled children. Doctors who were parents of disabled 
children who were interviewed did comment that they had been particularly 
drawn to the study due to their personal interest.  The potential limitations this 
may create for this study are discussed in chapter ten.583 
 
4.10 Religion or Faith 
The study by Cuttini584 el al mentioned earlier585 found their religious faith 
impacted on neonatologists across Europe end-of-life treatment decisions 
whether to withdraw life sustaining treatment from neonates.586  It was therefore 
thought important to ask doctors in this study about their religious faith, if any, to 
                                                 
581 Chapter three, para 2.2, pp. 99 
 
582 The Sutton Trust (2009) The Educational Background if Leading Lawyers, Journalists, Vice Chancellors, 
Politicians, Medics and Chief Executives, The Sutton Trust, Sutton, www.suttontrust.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/04/ST_MilburnSubmission.pdf, last accessed 7 July 2016 
 
583 Chapter ten, para 4.4, p.398 
 
584 Cuttini, M, Nadai, M, Kaminski, M, Hansen, G, de Leeuw, Lenoir, S, Persson, J, et al (2000) End-of-life 
decisions in neonatal intensive care: physicians' self-reported practices in seven European countries, The 
Lancet 355.9221: 2112-2118 
 
585 Chapter four, para 3, p. 145 
 
586 Infant up to the age of 28 days 
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assess whether this seemed to impact on the doctors’ difficult decisions for 
disabled children.  
 
Nineteen doctors (57%) describe themselves as belonging to a particular 
religion or faith, predominantly Christianity.  This is likely to reflect the ethnicity 
of the sample, being predominantly doctors who describe themselves as being 
white, English, Scottish, Welsh or British. 
 
Figure 23: Participants’ religion or faith 
 
Key personal and professional characteristics established so far will be used in 
the next chapter to compare the decision-making of doctors.  For example, a 
comparison will be made between female and male doctors; between doctors 
from the different sub-specialisms and between doctors who have personal 
experience of disability and those who do not, to see whether there is any 
suggestion that any of these personal or professional characteristics impact on 
how a doctor approaches difficult decisions for severely disabled children.   
Having established the doctors’ personal and professional characteristics, 
consideration is now given to what sort of decisions they found difficult when 
working with disabled children and what made those decisions difficult.  
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5. Defining Difficult Decisions 
 
It will be recalled from chapter two,587 that a description of the types of 
impairments and health problems the children who were of particular interest to 
this study, might be expected to experience were given to the doctors at the 
start of this study.588 Considerable thought was given whether to provide this 
information to the doctors.  Merit was seen is leaving the doctors to define the 
types of impairments and health problems the children might have themselves, 
recognising that how a doctor described a child could say something not only 
about the doctor’s approach to decision-making, but also about how the doctor 
conceptualised ‘disability’. However, it was also recognised that, not only, as 
was seen in chapter two,589 are children often left out of the debate on 
disability,590 but also in real life situations when the needs of disabled children 
are being considered, those with the most severe impairment and complex 
health problems can be overlooked.591 For, this reason, to ensure the doctors 
reflected on their treatment decisions for severely disabled children with 
complex health problems, some guidance as to the children of interest was 
provided for the doctors in the survey introduction. 
  
The doctors were then asked in the survey: ‘what sort of difficult decisions do 
you find yourself making when dealing with disabled children?’  
  
                                                 
587 Chapter one, para 2.3, p.4 
 
588 See Appendix 4, 427 
 
589 Chapter two, para 9, p.80 
 
590 Coker, M, Davis, JM (2000) ‘Disabled Children (Still) Invisible Under the Law, in Cooper, J, Law Rights 
and Disability, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London 
 
591 Whiting. M (2012) Impact, meaning and need for help and support: The experience of parents caring 
for children with disabilities, life threatening illnesses or technology dependence, Journal of Child 
Health, 17(1), 92-108, at p.94 
P a g e  | 168 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
5.1 The responses 
Decisions whether to withhold or withdraw treatment when a disabled child was 
critically ill were, however, cited by thirty-one doctors (94%) as the sort of 
difficult decision he or she found themselves dealing with when working with 
disabled children.  The two doctors who did not cite this scenario were Dr 6, a 
paediatric surgeon, and Dr 4, a paediatric endocrine consultant.  These two 
doctors cited scenarios very specific to their sub-specialties.  For Dr 6, this was 
the decision whether to agree to a parental request for a severely disabled 
Muslim boy to be circumcised for religious reasons. For Dr 4, it was whether 
treatment should be given to disabled children to, for example, delay menarche; 
to treat metabolic bone disease in a child or to give growth hormone to a child 
who uses a wheelchair. Because 94% of the study participants cited ‘best 
interest’ decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment as the difficult decisions 
they face, this is the focus of the rest of this study. This finding matches what 
was expected before this study started, based on the researcher’s experience 
in the field, but had the doctors suggested different types of decisions were 
particularly difficult when treating disabled children this would have been 
reflected in the study’s focus.  As previously mentioned,592 for the rest of this 
thesis the terms ‘difficult decisions’, ‘best interest decisions’ and ‘end-of-life 
decisions’ will now be used interchangeably. 
 
5.2 Decisions to limit treatment 
As mentioned, thirty-one doctors (94%) in the study cited decisions whether to 
withhold or withdraw treatment, as the difficult decisions they face when working 
with disabled children.  Most of the doctors simply stated the decision, for 
example: 
Dr 2 
“Limitations of invasive care, one-way extubation, choice of palliative 
care route, decision to embark on intensive care at all” 
 
                                                 
592 Chapter one, para 2.4, p. 6 
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Dr 22  
 ‘‘end of life decisions, i.e. withdrawal of acute care, change to   
palliative/terminal care” 
Dr 26  
 “whether they should be offered PICU treatment and/or support, 
 how aggressive to be with resuscitation” 
Dr 32  
 “treat/don’t treat (e.g. ventilation)” 
 
A few doctors expanded on their answers giving a greater insight into  
what made these decisions particularly challenging, (an issue explored with all 
the doctors in later questions). For example: 
Dr 8  
 “How far to purse hope of recovery from acute illness when a condition is 
known to be ultimately fatal. How aggressively should I intervene, for 
example, is invasive treatment such as intensive care appropriate? 
 The point at which treatment becomes futile? At what point would I 
consider withholding a treatment? When do I have these discussions 
with the family? Will they think I just want to give up? Do I just want to 
give up? My own feelings, am I making a value judgment on ‘quality of 
life’, which I have no right to make? When do I suggest hospice care or 
terminal care? When and how do I have discussions about ‘do not 
attempt resuscitation’ orders? How often (or how repeatedly) do I bring 
this up? Some treatments of limited benefit are very expensive, should 
this concern me?” 
 
and Dr 21  
 “We may have discussions about the appropriateness of continuing 
neonatal intensive care in the context of massive brain injury (on cranial 
ultrasound or MRI). We may decide in children with a ‘lethal’ congenital 
abnormality/disability that escalation of supportive care is not 
appropriate. We may have occasions when medical decisions are not 
supported by the family – this is rare.” 
 
“Transition to palliative care/comfort care from intensive care can involve 
very difficult decisions largely due to the change in emphasis and 
adjustment of parental and team expectations.” 
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5.3 Why is withdrawing or withholding treatment mentioned so 
frequently? 
As was seen earlier593 many of the doctors who took part in this study worked in 
sub-specialties where end-of-life decisions feature frequently, for example 
PICU, neurology,594 palliative care and oncology. This may explain why so 
many of the doctors raised the withholding/withdrawing of treatment as the most 
difficult decision they make, working frequently as they do with children with life 
limiting or life-threatening conditions. 
 
 For example, as was seen earlier, ten doctors (30%) were PICU consultants. 
Information as to how commonly children die in PICU is contradictory.  The 
Paediatric Intensive Care Audit Network (‘PICUNet’), which collects data on all 
children admitted into intensive care, reports:  
‘It is extremely rare for a child to die in paediatric intensive care and        
nearly 96% of children were discharged alive in 2008-2010’595   
 
However, RCPCH 2015 states: 
‘Despite increased options for the provision of end-of-life care, many 
deaths still occur in hospital settings following decisions to withhold, 
withdraw or limit lifesaving treatment.’596   
 
Arguably the RCPCH could be making a distinction between decisions to 
withhold or limit treatment where a child never enters PICU and decisions to 
withdraw treatment from a child in PICU.  If this is the distinction being made, it 
                                                 
593 Chapter four,  figure 4, p.157 
 
594 Many of the conditions neurologists manage are life limiting, such as muscular dystrophy or other 
rare degenerative or life-threatening conditions such as meningitis and epilepsy.  Many children with 
neuro-disability will also be prone to life threatening infections such as pneumonia meaning that like 
PICU consultants, they often deal with dying children. 
 
595 Paediatric Intensive Care Audit Network (2011) Annual report of the Paediatric Intensive Care Audit 
Network, January 2008- December 2010, Summary Report, Universities of Leeds and Leicester, para 12, 
p. 11 
 
596 Larcher, V, Craig, F, Bhogal, K, Wilkinson, D, Brierley, J (2015) ‘Making decisions to limit treatment in 
life-limiting and life-threatening conditions in children: a framework for practice’ Archives of Disease in 
Childhood 2015;100: s1-s23 
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suggests that a significant number of children do not access PICU and die, but 
very few (according to PICUNet) who enter PICU die. As will be seen in chapter 
six,597 several doctors in this study do voice their concerns that disabled 
children can be denied access to PICU in circumstances where those doctors 
believe the child would benefit from PICU care.  Other consultants in this study 
voice their own reluctance to admit disabled children to PICU.   
 
5.4 What makes these decisions difficult? 
The doctors were next asked, ‘what aspects of these decisions do you find most 
difficult?’ Doctors raised a range of difficulties, with several citing more than 
one.  Seventeen doctors (51%) raised discussions or communicating with a 
child’s parent as the aspect they found most difficult when dealing with difficult 
decisions. Perhaps it is noteworthy that the doctors did not talk about 
discussions with parents as being emotionally difficult, as perhaps might be 
expected, especially if doctors are having to discuss a child’s potential death 
with a parent.  It is possible that doctors do not find these discussions 
emotionally difficult, or chose not to talk about this difficulty if they did. The 
doctors spoke instead of disagreements they encountered with parents of 
disabled children as to a child’s best interests, describing the parents as being 
difficult: 
Dr 11  
 “Rationalising extreme views, especially intransigent religious doctrine” 
and 
Dr 17  
 When the family have unrealistic expectations – disabled children often 
have impaired physiology and are more unstable and often more difficult 
to get out of PICU successfully.” 
 
Other doctors, in contrast used language suggesting empathy towards a child 
and his or her parents, for example: 
 
                                                 
597 Chapter six, para 5.2, p.254 
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Dr 10  
“To determine the needs of child and family and make sure that they 
make the best decision for themselves and their child” 
and  
Dr 16  
 “Getting it right given the different circumstances of each child, i.e. what 
is the best interests of the child and its family” 
  
However, most doctors, while highlighting that dealing with parents was the 
most difficult aspect of their decision-making, tended to use more neutral 
language. For example: 
Dr 2  
“being in a position where you have a very different view of the child’s life 
and you feel continuing care is not the right decision for the child, 
however the parents are not at that point yet.” 
 
Two doctors, Drs 33 and 11, suggested disagreements with parents as to the 
child’s best interests arose from the parents’ religious beliefs. This is particularly 
significant in the context of the findings in this study of the possible impact of a 
doctor’s own religious beliefs presented in the next chapter.598  
 
Whilst seventeen doctors (52%) cited what in broad terms can be described as 
communicating with parents, as the most or one of the most difficult aspect of 
difficult decision-making, there was a notable difference between the sub-
specialties namely the PICU consultants, neurologists and the other doctors 
(‘Other Doctors’) as a group. Whilst seven PICU consultants (70%) cited 
communication with parents or another as the most difficult aspect of decision-
making for disabled children, only two neurologists (22%) did.  Eight Other 
Doctors (57%) also cited dealing with parents as being the most or one of the 
most difficult aspect of these decisions.  
 
                                                 
598 Chapter five, pp. 181-236 
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Other difficulties in decision-making were also highlighted. Disagreements with 
other health professionals was cited by five doctors (15%) - Drs 5, 11, 13, 18 
and 20 - as among the most difficult aspects of these decisions. Two doctors 
(6%), Drs 32 and Dr.14 both cited the difficulty of gaining the child’s perspective 
as one of the most difficult aspect of these decisions. Uncertainty also featured 
repeatedly in the doctors’ answers, with eleven doctors (33%) citing uncertainty 
as to when or whether to withhold or withdraw treatment as amongst the most 
difficult aspects of the decision.  Neurologists seemed to particularly cite 
uncertainty with four neurologists (44%) mentioning it, compared with just one 
PICU consultants (10%).  However, three doctors (9%); (two neurologists and 
one PICU consultant) said they did not find any aspect of these decisions 
difficult. Dr 9 writing “It all takes focus and the ability to listen carefully to parents 
and the child (if able to contribute).” One doctor, Dr 6 cited the child ‘declining,’ 
as a difficult aspect of these decisions. 
 
Figure 24: Factors doctors find most difficult when making difficult decisions for disabled 
children 
Presented as a % of 33 doctors surveyed, with some doctors citing more than one factor. 
 
 
6. Which factors do doctors consider when making decisions? 
 
Having established what kind of decisions doctors found difficult when deciding 
for disabled children and what, in the doctors’ views made those decisions 
particularly difficult, the doctors were then asked about how they made their 
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decisions.   The aim of these questions was to ascertain what factors the 
doctors considered when deciding for disabled children and what weight the 
doctors put on those factors. These responses can then be compared with how 
doctors are guided to make their decisions by their professional bodies and the 
extent to which, going back to the Kennedy debate, doctors draw on clinical and 
non-clinical factors, as defined as the start of this chapter. 
 
The first question the doctors were asked was: ‘What are the main factors you 
consider when making these decisions?’ Their responses classified as clinical 
or non-clinical factors are now presented. 
 
6.1     Clinical Factors 
It will be recalled that clinical factors in this thesis599 refers to biomedical 
observable and measurable factors within the unique expertise and 
competence of a medical doctor. They are distinguished from non-clinical 
factors such as a child’s quality of life. 
 
Five doctors (15%) unambiguously stated they included clinical factors when 
deciding for a disabled child. For example: 
Dr 1   
“Likelihood of future disease recovery/deterioration/deterioration & related 
impact on need for future intensification of support” 
Dr 13  
“Previous response to acute therapy” 
Dr 31  
“chances of recovery to baseline, burden of therapies” 
 
A further eleven doctors (33%) included factors that can be read as clinical 
factors, however the words used are ambiguous so could also be read to mean 
or include non-clinical factors, for example: 
 
                                                 
599 Chapter four, para 2, pp. 139-141 
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Dr 3  
“what is medically achievable” 
Dr 7  
“Consensus of health care staff” 
Dr 11  
“Impact on the child” 
Dr 11’s response is particularly vague.  
 
What is perhaps striking about the doctors’ responses is how few of the doctors 
mention or use words that can be clearly understood to refer to clinical factors, 
namely the child’s prognosis (only four doctors (12%)) or diagnosis (one doctor 
(3%)). Only nineteen doctors (57%) mentioned the child’s current clinical 
condition.  The variation as to the clinical factors doctors said they considered is 
also noteworthy.  For example, Dr 6 considers the trajectory600 of a child’s 
illness; Dr 28 considers the invasiveness of the procedure and Dr.14 the 
likelihood of future disease.  Clearly, it is possible that doctors do consider 
many more factors than they cited in response to this question, indeed, there is 
some suggestion in the doctors’ responses to later questions in the survey, that 
suggest they do.  Moreover, although no doctor wrote about taking different 
factors into consideration for different children, it is also possible that this is 
what doctors do. The doctors did, however, seem to suggest that clinical factors 
are not, as perhaps might be expected, the factors upon which doctors put the 
greatest weight when making difficult decisions for disabled children.  Rather 
non-clinical factors, those Kennedy argued doctors do not have the unique 
                                                 
600 Health professionals refer to these patterns as the trajectory of an illness. See for example: Steele, R, 
Siden, H, Cadell, S et al (2013), Archdischild, 99(8), http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/archdischild-2013-305246 
accessed 12 January 2018. Different life limiting conditions are associated with different patterns of 
illness.  With some conditions, such as cancer the trajectory is usually fairly predictable. For example, 
doctors are usually able to predict fairly accurately the course of an illness for an individual based on 
their signs and symptoms. For other conditions, such as many life limiting neurological conditions, 
doctors say it is far more difficult to predict the trajectory of an illness. This is often because patients 
with the condition follow too many variations in their trajectory or sometimes because the conditions 
are comparatively rare and doctors do not have enough evidence from other cases to predict a 
trajectory. 
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competence to assess, seemed to dominate. The doctors’ responses, however, 
suggested a lot of variation between doctors as to the factors the doctors 
consider and the weight the doctors put on those factors.  This is explored in 
more detail in the next chapter.601 
 
6.2 Non-clinical factors 
Non-clinical factors include a child’s quality of life; how well a child interacts with 
friends and family, whether a child attends school and even whether a child is 
happy.  Law and ethics, discussed later in chapters eight and nine602 are also 
included as non-clinical factors. Non-clinical factors are particularly relevant to 
the Kennedy debate, being he argues, outside the unique competence or 
education and training of doctors.  Moreover, while doctors’ professional 
guidance guides them to include these wider issues, the key question is 
perhaps, how the doctors include these wider issues, whether they make a 
judgment of these factors themselves, or canvass the views of those with 
appropriate knowledge and/or expertise.  
  
Seventeen doctors (54%) listed the child’s family or the child as a factor they 
consider, without stating in their brief answers what it was about the child or 
family that they consider.  Thirteen doctors (39%) cited the child’s quality of life 
as a factor considered when deciding for a disabled child. One doctor (3%), Dr 
15 expressly stated that he or she603 did not make a judgment as to a child’s 
quality of life.  Another doctor (Dr 2) said in answer to this question that a child’s 
cognitive ability is a relevant factor, however, as will be seen in the next 
chapter,604 when asked expressly whether they considered a child’s cognitive 
ability, eight doctors (24%) suggested they put considerable weight on a child’s 
                                                 
601 Chapter five, pp.181-236 
 
602 Chapter eight, pp. 323-346, chapter nine, pp.347-380 
 
603 Dr.15’s gender was not declared. 
 
604 Chapter five, para 6.2, p.227 
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cognitive ability as a factor in their decisions.  This is further support to the 
earlier contention that the doctors’ answers to this question covers just some of 
the factors doctors consider when making best interest decisions.  At best, 
perhaps the factors the doctors list in answer to this question are the ones 
which come first to the doctors’ mind.  In the next chapter the weight doctors put 
on different factors is explored in detail. 
 
6.3 Law and ethics 
Five doctors (15%) cited law and ethics in their survey responses - without 
prompting - as among the factors they consider when making difficult decisions 
for disabled children. Dr 8 said he considers “The legal and ethical framework in 
which I work”; Dr 16 listed “ethical considerations, legal considerations”; Dr 20 
said he or she consider “The law, as applicable”; Dr 29 said he includes in his 
decision ‘evidence, which may be of a law order’ and Dr 21 said he considered 
“very occasionally the views of the court.” These five doctors do not have any 
common professional or personal characteristics which distinguish them from 
the doctors who did not mention law, rights or ethics as a factor, other than 
three of the four, seem from their responses to later questions, to have had 
more in depth education and training in law and ethics than the other doctors, 
including for two of the doctors (Drs 8 & 16) received significant undergraduate 
education and training in law and ethics and undertook further post graduate 
studies in law and ethics. As a corollary, it is worthy of note that twenty-eight 
doctors (85%) did not unprompted mention law, rights or ethics as factors they 
consider when making difficult decisions for disabled children. In chapters eight 
and nine605 doctors’ legal education and training is mapped against their 
responses across the survey and interviews, when the impact, if any, of law, 
rights and ethic on the doctors’ decision-making is considered.  
  
                                                 
605 Chapter eight pp.323-346, chapter nine, pp.347-380 
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Figure 25: Factors doctors cite when asked ‘What are the main factors you consider when 
making these decisions?’ 




6.4 Best interests 
Despite the professional guidance discussed earlier606 just four doctors (12%) 
expressly used the term ‘best interests’ or ‘interests of the child’ when listing 
factors that they consider. All the doctors who cited ‘best interests’ were PICU 
consultants. Dr.25 who referred to “interests of the child” was an 
endocrinologist.  Two of the PICU consultants worked in the same hospital, but 
otherwise there are no shared characteristics that seem to distinguish them 
from other participants.  Although ‘best interests’ were not expressly mentioned 
by the majority of doctors, a further nine doctors did cite factors which are 
important elements of the best interest test.607  For example, Drs 3; 31 and 32 
all cited the balancing of benefits and burdens of treatment and Drs 1, 9; 8; 20, 
27; and 21 all cited consulting widely with other health professionals and the 
child’s parents. Dr 27 also included the child if possible, in the people to be 
consulted and Dr.1 included the child’s siblings. This, however, left twenty 
                                                 
606 Chapter two, para 6, pp. 52-61 & chapter four, para 2, p.142 
 
607 As the test is set out in cases such as Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991]; 2 WLR 
140 
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doctors (60.5%), who did not mention best interests or cite factors that very 
obviously could be read as a proxy for best interests, in response to this 
question.  As can be seen in the next chapter, when analysing what the doctors 
said about prognosis, futility, quality of life and a child’s cognitive ability, more 
detailed consideration is given to whether the doctors do use any proxies for 
‘best interests’ which might help explain the limited express references to best 
interests in the doctors’ survey responses. 
 
7. Further Analysis 
 
Having in this chapter, explained who the participants are in this study; 
identified which decisions they find difficult; what makes these decisions 
particularly difficult; and in broad terms what factors the doctors consider, in the 
next chapter, chapter five, the weight put on key factors by the doctors is 
considered in detail.  
 
In chapter six, the final chapter of part two, this thesis then turns to explore what 
the doctors who were interviewed, said about the part played by uncertainty and 
disagreement in their difficult decisions.  
 
Part three of this thesis is concerned with a detailed exploration of the part 
played by law, if any, in doctors’ best interests decisions.  As previously 
explained, it starts with an explanation of legal consciousness theory, the 
theoretical framework used to explore the part played by law in the doctors’ 
decisions. It then moves on in chapter eight to explore what can be learnt about 
the role of law from the doctors’ survey responses and then in chapter nine to 
what can be learnt about the role law from the doctors’ interviews.  Part three 
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Chapter Five 
 
Prognosis, Futility, Quality of Life and Cognitive Ability  
 
1. Introduction   
 
This chapter expands on the last, by exploring in more depth what the doctors 
say about four key factors used in difficult decisions for disabled children, 
namely, prognosis, futility, quality of life and the child’s cognitive ability.  These 
four factors are chosen both because they were identified by the consultant 
paediatricians who advised on the survey questions, as being of particular 
interest in difficult decisions for disabled children and because the survey 
participants’ responses seem to support this view.  The survey responses, as 
shall be seen, suggest a lack of consensus amongst paediatricians, not just 
about what each factor actually addresses, but also as to which factors should 
be used. The three paediatricians who piloted the survey, as was discussed in 
chapter three,608 cautioned that some factors were so controversial that doctors 
may be wary of completing a survey that probed the doctors about them. They 
saw futility and quality of life as being particularly controversial and therefore 
sensitive.  
  
With this in mind, a key aim when drafting the survey was to reach a balance 
between encouraging open reflection by the doctors about their decision-
making, while not probing so deeply into sensitive areas that doctors were 
deterred from responding.  However, while not wanting to alienate doctors, the 
controversial nature of these factors made it important to seek participants’ 
views on them.  It made it important to explore how widely concerns about their 
use are shared; important to ascertain the extent to which they are used in 
difficult decisions for disabled children; the weight put on them; and the extent 
to which there is consensus among paediatricians as to how best interest 
                                                 
608 Chapter three, para 4, p.139 
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decisions for disabled children are and should be made.  However, avoiding 
alienating potential participants was also important so that as wide a range of 
paediatricians’ views as possible could be canvassed. For this reason, a 
compromise position was adopted with more questions asked in the survey 
about less controversial factors such as prognosis and fewer questions about 
the more controversial factors such as futility and quality of life.  More data was 
therefore sought in relation to some factors than others and this is reflected in 
the balance of this chapter.  
  
2. Analysing doctors’ responses  
 
All four factors are analysed in the context of five professional and personal 
characteristics; namely the doctors’ sub-specialism; gender; personal 
experience of disability; duration of practice and religious faith.  This was done 
to assess whether there is any suggestion in the data that doctors who share 
particular characteristics think or act differently from doctors who do not share 
those characteristics.  These five characteristics are used, first, because they 
seem to be most pertinent and also because each of these characteristics is 
shared by a number of doctors in the pool making comparisons of groups of 
doctors (as opposed to individual doctors) possible.  
  
When analysing the weight doctors placed on each factor, the doctors’ 
responses were categorised into four groups.  These were answers:   
i.     suggesting the doctor uses and puts a lot of weight on that factor;   
ii.  suggesting that the doctor showed unease at the factor being used;                
iii. suggesting a middle ground between (i) and (ii) for example, the doctor 
uses the factor but with some reservations or uses it in particular 
circumstances but not others; and   
iv. the doctor either did not answer the question or gave an unclear answer.  
  
To enable comparison between the different paediatric sub-specialties, the 
doctors are divided into three groups, namely PICU consultants, neurologists 
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and ‘Other Doctors’.  With ten PICU consultants and nine neurologists 
responding to the survey, comparison between these two groups is particularly 
instructive.  The comparison is a particularly interesting one, as doctors from 
these two sub-specialties are likely to have very different experiences of the 
children and their families.    
  
Neurologists are among the sub-specialisms more likely to have long- term 
involvement in a child’s healthcare. Moreover, most children with whom 
neurologists work will have, to a greater or lesser extent, some level of 
impairment and many will have severe physical and/or cognitive impairment, 
making neurologists medical experts on child disability.    
  
In contrast, a PICU consultant will see a child when he or she is critically ill and 
possibly sedated.  A PICU consultant is very unlikely to see a child patient when 
he or she is well.  Although a small number of children may be admitted to PICU 
more than once; a child would not necessarily be under the care of the same 
PICU consultant for each admission. It is more usual for a child to attend PICU 
only once, if at all.  A PICU consultant is unlikely to be involved in the multi-
disciplinary meetings routinely held for disabled children, unless a meeting 
happens to fall at a time whilst the child is in PICU, so is likely have less 
background knowledge about a child than a neurology consultant. A PICU 
consultant is unlikely to have long term relationship with a child or his or her 
family, or have been involved in discussions concerning non-medical aspects of 
a child’s life.  A PICU consultant will be a medical expert on child critical illness. 
Neurologists and PICU consultants who responded to this survey will therefore 
be coming to the questions with very different professional experience of 
disabled children and their families.    
  
The ‘Other Doctors’ group is made up of the remaining 14 doctors who 
responded to the survey in this study.  As was seen in the last chapter, they 
come from a range of paediatric sub-specialties.  They are grouped together as 
there are too few doctors from any single sub-specialty to enable a meaningful 
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comparison of that specialty’s training, expertise or culture on decision-
making.  The Other Doctors will have a range of experiences of disabled 
children and their families. Some, such as the neonatologists are, similarly to 
PICU consultants, more likely to see the children only when they are acutely 
unwell. Others such as the palliative care consultant and oncologist are, like the 
neurologists, more likely to have long term relationships with the children and 
their families, and be involved in multi-disciplinary discussions and non-medical 
aspects of the child’s life.  
  
What the doctors wrote about each of the four factors in now presented and 
analysed in turn.   
  
3. Prognosis  
 
3.1   Defining prognosis  
Prognosis can be defined as:-  
’a forecast of the probable course and outcome of an attack of disease 
and the prospect of recovery as indicated by the nature of the disease 
and the symptoms of the case.’609 
  
Arguably a child’s prognosis, being an indication of the disease trajectory and 
likelihood of recovery, would seem to be the most important factor a doctor 
considers when deciding whether to withhold or withdraw treatment.  A child, it 
is presumed, will be treated if there is a good prospect of recovery, but may not 
if the prospect of recovery is poor and the burden of any treatment is seen to 
outweigh the benefit.  Prognosis as defined above, can be viewed as a clinical 
factor, the scientifically measurable progression of the disease.  
 
The doctors’ responses gave some indication of how they conceptualise 
‘prognosis’ and the extent to which there is consensus amongst doctors as to its 
relevance to best interest decisions. The doctors started by explaining the 
                                                 
609 Source: www.medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/prognosis; last accessed 25 March 2016 
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weight they put on prognosis as a factor in their decisions, by answering the 
question ‘What part does a child’s medical prognosis play?’ They then 
explained what factors they include when making a prognosis. 
  
3.2 Weight attributed to prognosis  
The doctors were divided as to the weight that should be put on a disabled 
child’s prognosis.  Their responses were assessed using the four categories of 
a lot of weight, unease, middle ground or no or unclear answer, outlined 
earlier.610 Some doctors saw it as a key factor. For example:  
Dr 15 (Other) “large part” 
Dr 23 (neurologist) “A huge part” 
Dr.28 (PICU) “Fundamental”  
  
Other doctors expressed more reservations. For example:  
Dr 1 (neurologist)  
“In theory a major part – in connect with the concept of futility- although 
in practice uncertainty over prognosis means role is less dominant.”  
  
Dr 27 (Other) “hugely but sometimes hard to judge.”  
  
For some doctors, prognosis was part of a balance of several factors. For 
example:  
 
Dr 12 (PICU)  
“Weighed in balance with other acute clinical factors. Not overriding, 
consideration if the other conditions are readily remediable.”  
 
Dr 24 (neurologist)  
“It is always a consideration but not the only one. For instance, even 
when death is expected relatively soon, there may be a lot of merit in a 
procedure which will enhance the child’s remaining quality of life.”  
  
                                                 
610 Chapter five, para 2, p. 182 
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Overall twenty doctors (60.5%) gave answers suggesting prognosis was either 
the most important factor or one of the most important, in their best interest 
decisions. Three doctors (9%) expressed unease at its use and eight doctors 
(24%) expressed mixed feelings. The remaining doctors either did not answer 
the question or gave answers where the meaning was unclear. 
  
3.3 How is prognosis assessed?  
To further evaluate the doctors’ understanding of prognosis and whether they 
all meant the same thing, doctors were also asked what factors they consider 
when making a prognosis for a disabled child.  The trajectory of illness was 
mentioned by eight doctors (24%), three neurologists (Drs 7, 19 & 24); two 
PICU consultants (Drs.16 & 33) and three Other Doctors; (Drs.8, 26 and 14). 
Two doctors (6%), (Drs 11 & 15), both PICU consultants, commented that they 
consider the same factors for both a disabled and a non-disabled child, but did 
not indicate what these were.  Other factors listed by the doctors included 
“severity” (Dr.1 Neurologist) ‘pain and discomfort’ (Dr.20, Other); “current 
clinical knowledge about the condition” (Dr.26, Other) and “parental aspiration” 
(Dr.31, PICU). It is unclear what Dr 31 meant by this, in this context.  
  
3.4 How do the sub-specialties compare on prognosis?  
When the doctors’ answers are compared by sub-specialty using the 
methodology outlined earlier, as Figure 26 illustrates, the responses seem to 
suggest that PICU consultants were more likely to use prognosis as a factor in 
their decisions than neurologists. Seven PICU consultants (70%) expressed 
enthusiasm for its use and none of the PICU consultants expressed unease.  In 
contrast four neurologists (44%) expressed unreserved enthusiasm for its use 
and two (22%) stated they did not think prognosis should be used as a factor in 
these decisions. The Other Doctors were also largely positive about its use, with 
nine Other Doctors (64%) endorsing its use and only one (7%) expressing 
concerns.  When it came to doctors who took a middle ground position; seeing 
some positives but also recognising that at least in some situations there could 
be problems relying on prognosis, there was more parity between the sub-
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specialties, with two PICU consultants (20%), two neurologists (22%) and four 
(29%) of the Other Doctors adopting this position in their survey answers.   
  
Figure 26: Use of prognosis by sub-specialties  
Presented as a percentage of each sub-specialty  
PICU (10 doctors); Neurology (nine doctors); Other Doctors (14 doctors)  
  
  
Many of the doctors’ answers seem to suggest the doctors were answering a 
different question from the one asked: namely what do they consider once they 
have a prognosis?  However, based on the responses the doctors gave, the 
answers were analysed to examine the extent to which doctors cited clinical and 
non-clinical factors, as defined in the last chapter.611   
  
The doctors’ responses suggest that the neurologists were potentially more 
inclined to define prognosis based on clinical factors, compared with PICU 
consultants who seemed from their responses more likely to include non-clinical 
factors.    For example, three PICU consultants (30%) cited ‘family expectations’ 
(Dr.15); “parental aspirations” (Dr.31) and “how much time spent at home, what 
do the parents think about quality of life” (Dr.17).  These are arguably factors 
one would expect to see in a best interest evaluation, including wider-ranging 
welfare factors, rather than an assessment of a child’s prognosis. It is possible 
that these doctors were using prognosis as a proxy for best interests. It is also, 
of course, possible that the doctors misunderstood the question. Five PICU 
consultants (50%) listed just non-clinical factors compared with no neurologists 
and five Other Doctors (36%). In contrast, two PICU consultants (20%) listed 
                                                 
611 Chapter four, para 2, pp. 139-142 
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just clinical factors as those they consider when making a prognosis compared 
with four neurologists (44%) and six Other Doctors (43%).  No neurologists 
gave a mixed answer, so no neurologists suggested he or she used non-clinical 
factors when making a prognosis. One PICU consultant (10%) gave a mixed 
answer suggesting they used clinical and non-clinical factors and three Other 
Doctors (21%) did the same.  Five neurologists (56%) and two PICU 
consultants (20%) did not answer this question.  This included the doctors who 
had indicated earlier in the survey that they did not use prognosis when 
deciding for disabled children.    
  
In summary, the doctors’ responses to this question suggest that doctors mean 
different things by the term prognosis.  For neurologists, it seems to be a clinical 
determination and for PICU consultants and Other Doctors it seems to 
encompass non-clinical factors, those factors the Kennedy Debate suggested 
doctors should not be using.  Moreover, as was seen earlier,612 PICU 
consultants, it is argued, are less likely to be familiar with the non-clinical 
aspects of a disabled child’s life, than a neurologist.  It seems that particularly 
for PICU consultants and Other Doctors, prognosis was possibly being used as 
a proxy for best interests.  A key question and a major theme of the doctors’ 
interview discussions, considered in the next chapter,613 is how the non-clinical 
aspects are assessed, particularly by PICU consultants? We shall also see that 
doctors discussed at some length disagreements between doctors, what is not 
clear here, is the extent to which these disagreements arise because different 
doctors have different understandings of key factors, such as prognosis, when 





                                                 
612 Chapter five, para 2, p. 182 
 
613 Chapter six, para 7, p.261-282 
P a g e  | 189 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
Figure 27: Use of clinical and non-clinical factors when assessing prognosis  
Presented as a percentage of each sub-specialty; PICU 10; Neurology 9; Other Doctors 14  
  
  
3.5 How do male and female doctors compare on prognosis?  
The responses given by male and female doctors were also compared using 
the same methodology to identify any differences in the responses given. As 
was seen in the last chapter, twenty doctors (60.5%) indicated they were male 
and nine (27%) that they were female doctors. Four doctors (12%) did not 
reveal their gender.  
  
No great differences between the genders can be seen in attitudes towards 
prognosis as a factor; with twelve male doctors (60%) and five female doctors 
(56%) giving answers suggesting they are enthusiastic about its use. It is 
however, noteworthy that while only three doctors expressed significant unease 
at the use of prognosis in these decisions, they were all male doctors.  The pool 
of male doctors was more than twice that of the female pool. With a larger pool 
of female doctors, it is possible that one or more female doctor could have also 
expressed unease. Three female doctors (33%) expressed a mixed view, 
seeing both positives and negatives in its use, as did four male doctors (20%) 
but again, the small number of female doctors means that drawing firm 
conclusions about gender differences is not possible.   
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Figure 28: Use of prognosis and gender  
Presented as a percentage of each gender  
Male (20 doctors); Female (nine doctors); Unknown (4 doctors)  
  
 
The doctors’ responses were also examined to consider whether male and 
female doctors show any differences in their use of clinical or non-clinical 
factors when making a prognosis.  Nine male doctors (45%) used clinical 
factors compared with three female doctors (33%).  Three male doctors (15%) 
used non-clinical factors compared with four female doctors (44%). This 
suggests the male doctors were more inclined to use clinical factors and female 
doctors, non-clinical factors to define prognosis. Again however, the numbers 
are too small to come to reliable conclusions.    
 Figure 29: Doctors’ use of clinical and non-clinical factors when assessing prognosis   
Presented as a percentage of each gender  
Male (20 doctors); Female (nine doctors); Unknown (4 doctors)  
 
 
Having considered the impact, if any, of a doctor’s gender on the doctor’s use of 
prognosis as a factor when deciding for disabled children, consideration is now 
given to the impact, if any, of a doctor’s personal experience of disability.   
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3.6  How do doctors with different personal experience of disability 
compare in their approaches to prognosis?  
The responses given by doctors classified by their personal experience of 
disability were compared using the methodology outlined above, to ascertain 
whether there were any differences in the responses given.   The doctors were 
classified into three groups, namely, (i) doctors who indicated they were a 
parent of a disabled child, (‘parent doctors’); (ii) doctors who had indicated they 
had a close disabled relative, other than their child, (‘relative doctors’) and (iii) 
doctors who had no personal experience of disability, (‘no-experience doctors’).  
  
As figure 30 illustrates, fifteen no-experience doctors (65%) indicated they put 
considerable weight on prognosis as a factor; compared with two parent doctors 
(33%) and two relative doctors (50%).  Parent doctors seemed more likely than 
no-experience doctors or relative doctors to object to the use of prognosis, with 
two parent doctors (33%) indicating this, compared with one no-experience 
doctor (4%) and none of the relative doctors. None of the relative doctors took a 
mixed approach to prognosis, but two parent doctors (33%) and six no-
experience doctors (26%) took this approach. The remaining doctors did not 
answer the question.  
 
Figure 30: Use of prognosis and personal experience of disability  
Presented as a percentage of doctors by personal experience of disability  
Parent (6 doctors); Relative (4 doctors); Neither (23 doctors)  
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The doctors’ responses were also analysed to consider any differences in the 
extent to which the three groups of doctors included clinical or non-clinical 
factors when deciding a prognosis. As can be seen from figure 31, while three 
parent doctors (50%) and nine no-experience doctors (39%) used clinical 
factors to make a prognosis; none of the relative doctors said they did.  In 
contrast two relative doctors (50%) reported using non-clinical factors, while 
only one parent doctor (17%) did so. This compares with seven no-experience 
doctors (30%) reporting using non-clinical factors.   It is also noteworthy that the 
no-experience doctors who answered this question seemed to express strong 
views one way or the other, with none giving a mixed answer.  It should, 
however, also be noted that two parent doctors (33%) and two relative doctors 
(50%) did not answer the question or gave an unclear answer regarding clinical 
or non-clinical factors. These findings seem to suggest that doctors who have 
personal experience of disability may approach difficult decisions for disabled 
children differently from doctors who do not. Moreover, the nature of that 
personal experience seems to potentially make a difference, with parent doctors 
seeming to answer questions differently from relative doctors.  It is perhaps 
noteworthy, that neurologists (the doctors as a group who have the most day-to-
day professional experience of disabled children’s lives) and parent doctors, 
(the doctors who have the most personal experience of disabled children’s 
lives), seem to both as sub-groups, be less inclined to put weight on prognosis, 
but when they do, both groups tend to define prognosis as a clinical factor. This 
seems to echo the finding in chapter four614 of neurologists, when compared 







                                                 
614 Chapter four, para 5.4, pp.172 
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Figure 31: Use of clinical and non-clinical factors when assessing prognosis by the doctor’s 
personal experience of disability  
Presented as a percentage of doctors by personal experience of disability  
Parent (6 doctors); Relative (4 doctors); Neither (23 doctors)  
  
   
3.7 How do different generations of doctors compare in their 
approaches to prognosis?  
Consideration was also given as to whether doctors who qualified in different 
decades approached prognosis as a factor the same or differently.  If there 
were differences this could be due to doctors changing their approaches as 
they gained more experience or it could reflect differences in cultures, values 
and training from different eras. The responses from doctors who qualified 
during the 1960s; 1970s; 1980s and 1990s were compared using the same 
methodology as for the other factors.  Only one doctor who qualified in the 
1960s responded to the survey. His responses are included in the illustrative 
charts in this chapter for completeness, but not in any discussion, as he 
represents just a single viewpoint from that decade. As was seen in the chapter 
four,615 one doctor (3%) qualified in the 1960s, (‘1960s qualifiers’); five (15%) in 
the 1970s, (‘1970s qualifiers’); twenty (60.5%) in the 1980s, (‘1980s qualifiers’) 
and seven doctors (21%) qualified in the 1990s (‘1990s qualifiers’).  
  
The doctors’ responses do seem to indicate a possible trend, with doctors 
seeming to put less weight on prognosis the longer they are in practice. Two 
1970s qualifiers (40%) indicated they put considerable weight on prognosis and 
the same number of 1970s qualifiers indicated unease at its use. However, this 
compares with six 1990s qualifiers (86%) being positive about prognosis as a 
                                                 
615 Chapter four, para 4.5, pp. 157-158 
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factor. None of the 1990s qualifiers expressed unease at its use.  The 
responses from 1980s qualifiers showed positions between these two, with 
eleven (55%) indicating positive views of the use of prognosis as a factor and 
one (5%) expressing unease at its use.   
  
Figure 32: Use of prognosis and duration of practice  
Presented as a percentage of doctors qualifying in each decade  
1960s (1 doctor); 1970s (5 doctors); 1980s (20 doctors); 1990s (7 doctors)  
 
  
When the data is further examined to explore whether duration of practice 
seemed to influence whether doctors perceived prognosis as clinical or non-
clinical, there also seemed to be differences reflecting the decades in which 
doctors qualified.  The doctors’ responses suggest that the longer a doctor has 
been qualified the more likely a doctor is to use clinical factors when making a 
prognosis and the less likely a doctor is to use non-clinical factors. Three 1970s 
qualifiers (60%) listed clinical factors; this reduced (in percentage terms) to 
seven 1980s qualifiers (35%) and two 1990s qualifiers (29%). In contrast while 
three 1990s qualifiers (43%) reported using non-clinical factors; this reduced to 
six 1980s qualifiers (30%) and one 1970s qualifier (20%). This seems to 
suggest that doctors qualifying in the era of the Kennedy Debate were less 
likely to use non-clinical factors than more recently qualified doctors. 
  
These findings perhaps also say something about the impact or otherwise of 
the hidden curriculum highlighted in chapter three.616  More recently qualified 
doctors are trained and educated by doctors who qualified in earlier decades 
                                                 
616Chapter three, para 2.2, pp.100-101 
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both formally and Hafferty and Franks617 suggested through the hidden 
curriculum.  However, these results tend to suggest that either doctors train 
juniors to make decisions differently from how they say they make them 
themselves, or the more recently qualified doctors are influenced by something 
other their senior colleagues.  Doctors who were later interviewed addressed 
the difference in approach of doctors from different generations to these 
decisions, as is seen in chapter six.618 
 
Figure 33: Use of clinical and non-clinical factors when assessing prognosis by the doctor’s 
decade of qualification   
Presented as percentage of doctors from each decade: 1960s (1 doctor); 1970s (5 doctors); 




3.8 How do doctors with and without a religious faith compare in their 
approaches to prognosis?  
The doctors’ responses were also examined using the same methodology to 
explore whether there was any suggestion in the data that doctors who practice 
a religious faith approach prognosis differently from doctors who do not have a 
faith.  
  
As was seen in chapter four,619 larger studies have found that a doctor’s 
religious faith can influence his or her decision-making for patients.  As was 
                                                 
617 Hafferty, F, Franks R, (1994) The Hidden Curriculum, Ethic Teaching and the Structure of Medical 
Education, Academic Medicine, Vol. 69(11), pp.861-871 
 
618 Chapter six, para.7.1.3, pp. 267-268 
 
619 Chapter four, para 3, p.146 
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seen in the last chapter620 nineteen doctors (57%) in this study describe 
themselves as belonging to a particular religion or faith, predominantly 
Christianity. The answers from doctors who said they followed a faith (‘religious 
doctors’) were compared with those who said they did not (‘non-religious 
doctors’).  One religious doctors (5%) reported putting weight on prognosis, 
compared with ten non-religious doctors (78%). Three religious doctors (11%) 
reported unease at the use of prognosis, none of the non-religious doctors did 
so. Similar percentages of religious doctors and non-religious doctors had 
mixed views about prognosis, with five religious doctors (26%) suggesting this 
and three non-religious doctors (23%).     
  
Figure 34:  Use of prognosis and religious faith  
Presented as a percentage of doctors with and without religious faith  
With faith (19 doctors); With no faith (13 doctors); Unknown (1 doctor)  
  
The doctors’ responses were also examined to consider whether religious 
doctors and non-religious doctors showed any differences in their use of clinical 
or non-clinical factors when making a prognosis. Ten religious doctors (52%) 
used clinical factors compared with two non-religious doctors (15%).  Three 
religious doctors (11%) used non-clinical factors compared with seven non-
religious doctors (54%).  These findings seem to support earlier studies621 and 
confirm that a doctor’s faith may impact his or her decisions for disabled 
children. 
 
                                                 
 
620 Chapter four, para 4.10, p.166 
 
621 For example, Cuttini, M, Nadai, M, Kaminski, M, Hansen, G, de Leeuw, Lenoir, S, Persson, J, et al 
(2000) End-of-life decisions in neonatal intensive care: physicians' self-reported practices in seven 
European countries, The Lancet 355.9221: 2112-2118 
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Figure 35: Use of clinical and non-clinical factors when assessing prognosis by the doctor’s 
religious faith  
Presented as a percentage of doctors with and without religious faith  
With faith (19 doctors); With no faith (13 doctors); Unknown (1 doctor)  
 
  
To summarise, what the data suggests about the use of prognosis: a doctor’s 
professional and personal characteristics do seem to potentially impact on how 
a doctor uses prognosis when making difficult decisions for disabled children 
and how a doctor defines prognosis. PICU consultants; Other Doctors; non-
religious doctors; 1990s qualifiers and no-experience doctors, seem to put more 
weight on prognosis than doctors who do not share these characteristics.  For 
all doctors who use prognosis, neurologists; male doctors, religious doctors; 
1970s and parent doctors seem more likely to include clinical factors within their 
definitions of prognosis.  PICU consultants; female doctors; non-religious 
doctor; 1990s and no-experience doctors, seem more likely to include non-
clinical factors in their definition of prognosis. This supports Kennedy’s 
contention that doctors use non-clinical factors. However, it also perhaps 
suggests that these doctors are using prognosis much more as a proxy for best 
interests, drawing on wider welfare factors.  The questions addressed in chapter 
six,622 (while addressing research question two),623 is how the doctors make 
these non-clinical assessments and whether, as Kennedy argues, in doing so 
doctors are going beyond their knowledge and expertise. 
  
                                                 
622 Chapter six, para 4.2, pp. 246-251 
 
623 ‘What factors do UK paediatricians take into consideration when making difficult decisions for 
disabled children and what weight do they put on those factors?’ 
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Consideration is now given to comparing what the same sub-groups of doctors 
wrote in their surveys about their use or other wise of futility as a factor in their 
difficult decisions for disabled children.  
  
4. Futility  
 
4.1 Defining Futility  
Criticism of the use of futility as a factor in doctors’ decision making for patients 
generally is not hard to find.624 Laurie et al describe futility as ‘fraught with 
difficulties and contradictions’.625 As was seen at the start of this chapter,626 the 
three paediatricians who piloted the study survey identified futility as being a 
particularly controversial factor in difficult decisions for disabled children, not 
least because of a lack of consensus as to its meaning.   This concern is shared 
by others. For example, Jecker and Perlman627 identified four different ways in 
which medical treatment can be deemed futile, namely:  
“(1) is useless or ineffective; (2) fails to offer a minimum quality of life or a 
modicum of medical benefit; (3) cannot possibly achieve the patient’s goals; 
or (4) does not offer a reasonable chance of survival.”  
  
It can be seen that even if agreement were reached as to which definition is the 
optimum one, the meaning of each is open to further debate.  For example, 
what is a ‘minimum quality of life’ or a ‘reasonable chance of survival’?  It can 
be seen why the paediatricians were cautious about its use.  
  
                                                 
624 see for example: Gampel, E (2006) Does Professional Autonomy Protect Medical Futility Judgments? 
Bioethics, Vol. 20, Number 2, pp.92-104; Lantos, JD, Singer, PA, Walker, RM (1989) The Illusion of Futility 
in Clinical Practice, AM J Med 87:81-84; & Ardagh, M (2000) Futility has no utility in resuscitation 
medicine, Journal of medical ethics, 26.5 396-399 
 
625 Laurie GT, Harmon HE, Porter G ‘(2016) Medical Futility,’ Chapter 15 in Laurie GT, Harmon S, Porter G 
in Mason & McCall Smith’s Law & Medical Ethics (10th edn), Oxford University Press, p. 516, Para 15.06 
 
626 Chapter five, para 1, p. 181 
 
627 Jecker, NS, Pearlman, RA (1992) Medical Futility: Who Decides?, Arch Intern Med. 152(6), pp 1140-
1144, at p.1140 
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A distinction is often made between quantitative futility and qualitative futility. 
Quantitative futility is where a treatment is seen as having little likelihood of 
benefit to the patient in clinical terms, namely the procedure or medication is 
unlikely to work for the patient. In contrast, qualitative futility is where the 
procedure or medication will work, but it is viewed as doing little to improve the 
quality of the patient’s life, so is futile.628   An example might be that ventilating 
a patient will keep the patient alive, but the quality of the patient’s life is 
considered to be so poor that the patient’s life is not perceived to be worth 
saving.  The case of Re J [1991]629 discussed in chapter two,630 was an early 
example of the consideration of qualitative futility by the courts in the context of 
a disabled infant’s best interests, concerning as it did, the question of whether 
J’s life was one that should be saved, rather than one that could be saved.  In 
the context of the Kennedy debate, quantitative futility can perhaps be framed 
as an assessment within the legitimate expertise of a doctor. It involves 
questions such as whether a medication or procedure will scientifically work.  In 
contrast, qualitative futility; questions such as what quality of life is worth 
preserving, are as Kennedy argued, perhaps beyond the legitimate and unique 
training, expertise and experience of a doctor.  The link between qualitative 
futility and quality of life assessments is an important one. The discussion later 
in this chapter in relation to the doctors’ quality of life assessments is therefore 
also relevant in relation to qualitative futility assessments.  
 
The doctors’ responses in this study showed a variety of viewpoints as to 
whether futility should be used in difficult decisions for disabled children and the 
weight that should be put on it.  
  
                                                 
628Foxall, F (2009) ‘Ethical Issues’, Chapter 4, in Jevon P (ed) Care of the Dying and Deceased Patient: A 
Practical Guide for Nurses, John Wiley & Sons, p.89  
  
629 Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment [1991] [1991] Fam. 33; [1991] 2 W.L.R. 140; per Lord 
Donaldson 
 
630 Chapter two, para 3, pp. 39-43 
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4.2  Weight attributed to futility  
The doctors’ answers to the one question asked about futility: ‘What part does 
futility play in difficult decisions for disabled children?’ were mostly very 
brief.  They ranged from doctors who saw it as an important factor in their 
decisions, for example: Dr 1 (neurologist) who answered “significant”; Drs 18 
(PICU) and Dr 19 (neurologist), both answered “Large part”; Dr.25 (Other) 
‘Considerable’ and Dr 33 (PICU) “Major”, to Dr 30 (neurologist) who answered 
“None in my practice.”    
  
Doctors talked of the difficulty in obtaining consensus as to whether treatment 
was futile. For example, Dr12 (PICU) said, “Difficulty is often reached in getting 
all parties agreement that treatment is futile.” Dr 24 (neurologist) also expressed 
difficulties with the term and saw it as the source of conflict between both the 
healthcare team and the child’s family, stating:  
“Can make the process harder as this is often where professionals and 
family do not see eye to eye, with professionals generally having a 
stronger sense of futility than the family who are desperate to ‘try 
anything’. This has the potential to led to a breakdown in the professional 
relationship, which has to be avoided. It can also result in conflict 
between members of the healthcare team.”   
  
Dr 20 (Other) also expressed concerns at how some doctors use the term 
stating   
“futility is not a very helpful term, it’s kind of shorthand for the doctor’s 
opinion that the child’s life isn’t worth living. When used it needs to be 
fleshed out a bit.”   
  
What is unclear from the brief survey answers is how doctors are understanding 
the term futility and whether they are referring to quantitative or qualitative 
futility. It is possible that doctors who express opposing views are using the 
term differently. 
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4.3 How is futility assessed?  
For the reasons discussed earlier631 the doctors were not asked, as they were 
for prognosis, what factors they included when considering futility. However, 
some doctors did comment further on futility in their responses.  For example, 
Dr 2 (PICU) described the assessment of futility as a “judgment and not a clear 
black and white science, it is difficult.”  This was a view echoed by other 
doctors. For example, Dr 16 (PICU) “in real life futility is often relative and it is a 
balance between medical opinion.”   
 
4.4 How do the sub-specialties compare on futility?  
When the doctors’ answers are compared by sub-specialty using the 
methodology outlined earlier, there is some indication of perhaps a difference in 
attitudes between PICU consultants and neurologists. PICU consultants seem 
perhaps more inclined to include futility as a factor in their decision-making. 
Whereas only one neurologist (11%) wrote positively about futility as a factor; 
five PICU consultants (50%) were positive about its use.  However, the picture 
was far from clear-cut as four PICU consultants (40%) and four neurologists 
(44%) expressed concerns about its use.  Indeed, the data seems to suggest 
that PICU consultants and neurologists have clearer opinions on futility than 
Other Doctors. No PICU consultant indicated a middle ground position and only 
two neurologists (22%) doing so.  In contrast, the Other Doctors who expressed 
a view were equally spread across the viewpoints with four (29%) favouring the 
use of futility in difficult decisions; four (29%) indicating unease at its use and 
four (29%) taking a middle ground stance.  It is the diversity of views among the 
doctors, (something the pilot consultants suggested would be found) which is 
perhaps the most striking here. PICU consultants seemed to have less 
reservations about its use when deciding for disabled children compared in 
particular to neurologists.  
  
                                                 
631 Chapter five, para 1, p.181 
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The doctors were not asked which factors they considered when assessing 
futility, so no analysis of the use of clinical and non-clinical factors when 
assessing futility was undertaken. However, while expressing strong views 
about futility, the doctors in this study showed no unwillingness of express their 
views, indeed, quite the opposite. The pilot consultants had perhaps been over 
cautious with their warnings.  This may be explained by the fact that they were 
all neurologists, the sub-specialism found in this study to be most cautious 
about the use of futility in difficult decisions for disabled children.  
 
Figure 36: Use of futility and sub-specialties  
Presented as a percentage of each sub-specialty  
PICU (10 doctors); Neurology (nine doctors); Other Doctors (14 doctors)  
  
  
4.5 How do male and female doctors compare on futility?  
The responses given by male and female doctors about futility were also 
compared using the same methodology. Five male doctors (25%) were positive 
about its use compared with three female doctors (33%).  Seven male doctors 
(35%) expressed unease compared with four female doctors (44%). Five male 
doctors (25%) took a mixed position, seeing some positives and some 
negatives in its use, but only one female doctor (11%) did so.  While the 
disparity in numbers of male and female doctors in this study makes drawing 
any firm conclusions about difference in approach between doctors of different 
gender difficult, there does seem to be some suggestion that the female doctors 
were slightly more inclined to express a view either in favour or against the use 
of futility, than the male doctors.  
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Figure 37: Use of futility and gender  
Presented as a percentage of each gender  
Male (20 doctors); Female (nine doctors); Unknown (4 doctors)  
  
  
4.6 How do doctors with different personal experience of disability 
compare in their approaches to futility?  
The responses on futility given by doctors classified by their personal 
experience of disability were also compared using the same methodology.  
  
Three relative doctors (75%) expressed unease at futility being used as a factor 
in these decisions.  In contrast, unease was expressed by just eight no-
experience doctors (35%) and one parent doctor (17%).  There was less 
diversity of opinion for doctors who were positive about futility being used, with 
two parent doctors (33%); seven no-experience doctors (30%) and one relative 
doctor (25%) indicating this. No relative doctor had a mixed view, but the same 
number of parent doctors (two/33%) held mixed viewpoint as were positive 
about futility.  Once again, the diversity of views between the doctors here, 
which is striking, as it seems to suggest that personal and professional factors 
related to the doctor, rather than factors relating to the child are potentially 
impacting on how decisions are made for disabled children.   
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Figure 38: Use of futility and personal experience of disability  
Presented as a percentage of doctors by personal experience of disability  
Parent (6 doctors); Relative (4 doctors); Neither (23 doctors)  
  
  
4.7 How do the different generations of doctors compare in their 
approaches to futility?  
Consideration was also given as to whether doctors who qualified in different 
decades approached futility as a factor the same or differently.    
The doctors’ responses seem to suggest that doctors who qualified in different 
decades approached futility differently. All the doctors who gave answers 
suggesting futility played an important part in his or her decisions qualified 
between 1980 and 1993.  The doctors who qualified earlier either expressed 
unease or did not answer the question.  This seems to parallel the findings 
reported earlier regarding prognosis, with doctors who qualified earlier seeming 
to put less weight when making difficult decisions on both prognosis and futility, 
than their more recently qualified colleagues. None of the 1970s qualifiers 
indicated they viewed futility positively, while two (40%) indicated unease and 
three (60%) indicated mixed views.  In contrast, seven 1980s qualifiers (35%) 
and three 1990s qualifiers (43%) were positive about futility. Nine 1980s 
qualifiers (45%) indicated unease with futility, but just one 1990s qualifier (14%) 
was uneasy about its use. Two 1980s qualifiers (10%) and one 1990s qualifier 
(14%) held mixed views. Again, it seems from this study that more recently 
qualified consultants approach at least some aspects of difficult decisions for 
disabled children differently from their older colleagues, suggesting as 
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mentioned earlier,632 that perhaps the hidden curriculum does not have as 
much impact on decisions for disabled children as might be expected.  
  
Figure 39: Use of futility and duration of practice  
Presented as a percentage of doctors qualifying in each decade  
1960s (1 doctor); 1970s (5 doctors); 1980s (20 doctors); 1990s (7 doctors)  
  
 
4.8 How do doctors with and without religious faith compare in their 
approaches to futility?  
The doctors’ responses were also examined using the same methodology to 
explore whether there was any suggestion in the data that doctors who practice 
a religious faith approach futility differently from doctors who do not have a 
faith.  
  
While four religious doctors (22%) expressed positive views about futility this 
increased to seven for non-religious doctors (53%).  Likewise, while eight 
religious doctors (44%) expressed concerns about using futility, three non-
religious doctors (21%) also did so.  As other studies have found,633 the doctors’ 
here, seem to suggest that religious doctors may approach difficult decisions, or 
certain aspects of them, differently from non-religious doctors.  This does seem 
to add weight to the concerns expressed in the Kennedy Debate.  It is difficult to 
                                                 
632 Chapter five para 3.7, pp. 194-195 
 
633 Cuttini, M, Nadai, M, Kaminski, M, Hansen, G, de Leeuw, Lenoir, S, Persson, J, et al (2000) End-of-life 
decisions in neonatal intensive care: physicians' self-reported practices in seven European countries, The 
Lancet 355.9221: 2112-2118 
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think of a cogent argument as to why the religious beliefs of a doctor should 
impact on a patient’s treatment, especially if the patient or the patient’s family 
have no knowledge of or choice in this.  
 
It will be recalled, as was seen in chapter four634 two doctors were particularly 
critical of parents allowing their religious beliefs to influence their views as to 
their child’s best interests. No doctor in this study, however, expressed similar 
concern concerning a doctor’s religious beliefs. 
  
To summarise the findings from this study on futility, the data suggests that a 
doctor’s personal and professional characteristics potentially impact on the 
weight a doctor puts on futility, although the results for futility were less clear cut 
than for prognosis.  PICU consultants seem more inclined to put weight on 
futility than neurologists, as did non-religious doctors. 1970s qualifiers were less 
likely to put weight on futility as were relative doctors.  With further questions on 
futility it may have been possible to discover whether doctors were considering 
quantitative or qualitative futility and the extent to which the differences found 
here can be explained because futility was being used and understood by 












                                                 
634 Chapter four, para 5.4, p.172 
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 Figure 40:  Futility and a doctor’s faith  
Presented as a percentage of doctors in each category: religious doctors (faith) (18 doctors);  
Non-religious doctors (no faith) (14 doctors); not known (1 doctor)  
 
Consideration is now given as to what doctors wrote about the use of quality of 
life as a factor in their decisions in their survey responses.  
  
5. Quality of Life  
 
5.1 Defining Quality of Life   
As mentioned earlier, there are clear links between qualitative futility and quality 
of life assessments, so what the doctors said about quality of life can be read as 
also being relevant to their assessments of futility. 
 The World Health Organisation defines ‘Quality of Life’ as:   
‘individual’s perception of their position in life in the context of the culture 
and value systems in which they live and in relation to their goals, 
expectations, standards and concerns.’635   
  
However, when talking about ‘quality of life’ the doctors in this study may 




                                                 
635 World Health Organisation; Measuring Quality of Life: WHO/MSA/MNH/PSF/97.4; 1997; 
www.who.int/mental_health/media/686.pdf last accessed 23 June 2016 
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5.2 Weight attributed to quality of life   
The doctors were asked two questions about quality of life, the first being ‘what 
impact does a child’s quality of life have on these decisions?’  and the second 
being ‘‘If you assess a child’s quality of life, what factors do you feel are relevant 
to this assessment?’  
  
As with futility, the pilot paediatricians had identified quality of life as a 
controversial topic in these decisions.  The purpose of the first question was 
therefore to canvas the views of the doctors as to role of quality of life in these 
decisions and, in particular, the weight the doctors attribute to quality of life as a 
factor.  
  
It will be recalled that Kennedy argued that quality of life assessments have no 
place in doctors’ decision-making.636 With this in mind, what is perhaps most 
striking about the doctors’ responses, is the strength of doctors’ views both for 
and against the use of quality of life in difficult decisions for disabled children. 
Nineteen doctors (57%) stated categorically that quality of life was one of, if not 
the most important issue when deciding for disabled children.  It is perhaps 
noteworthy that this is six more doctors than those who cited quality of life as a 
factor in response to the earlier survey question, asking doctors which factors 
they consider when making difficult decisions for disabled children. This 
suggests that the doctors’ initial list of factors was not a complete one. Doctors 
who described quality of life as an important factor said, for example that it 
was:  
Dr 3 (Other)  
“Most important’” 
Dr11 (PICU)  
“Major” 
Dr 19 (neurologist)  
“fundamental” 
                                                 
636 Chapter two, para 2, p.33 
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Dr 29 (neurologist)  
“critical’” 
In contrast seventeen doctors (52%) expressed caution about its use when 
making a difficult decision for a severely disabled child.  For example:  
Dr 1 (neurologist):   
“in practice, often a subjective judgment particularly of perceived pain, 
whilst recognising that in some fields (e.g. muscular dystrophy) research 
has shown that professionals consistently under estimate ‘quality of life’ 
in relation to the boy’s own assessment of this.” 
  
Dr 12 (PICU)  
‘‘Quality of life is very difficult to judge”  
Dr 15 (PICU)   
“QoL is a subjective concept.”  
and   
 
Dr 24 (neurologist)  
“A child’s quality of life is of great importance but can very difficult to 
assess and again there often (sic) differences in the perceptions of 
professionals and others e.g. family members and non-health 
professionals.”  
  
Some doctors expressed their concerns more strongly.  
For example:  
Dr 9 (neurologist)  
 “I am deeply suspicious of clinician opinion on quality of life.”    
Dr 8 (metabolic)  
“I resist value judgments on quality of life”   
The doctors in this survey therefore suggested that almost forty years on from 
Kennedy’s Astor lecture637 that the use or not of quality of life as a factor when 
deciding for a disabled child, is controversial amongst paediatrician.  
                                                 
637 Kennedy, I, (1979) What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, published in an amended form in Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
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5.3 How is quality of life assessed?  
 The purpose of the second question asked about quality of life: ‘if you assess a 
child’s quality of life, what factors do you feel are relevant to this assessment?’ 
was to gain an insight into how doctors assess a child’s quality of life.  The 
doctors’ answers to this question give an insight into not just how doctors make 
an assessment in practical terms, but also into how they define and understand 
the concept.  Are they, for example, using to term to talk about clinical factors638 
such as pain or are they talking about more nebulous concepts, non-clinical 
factors, such as the child’s happiness; life at home and school; ability to 
communicate and such like?  This distinction is of course an important one for 
the Kennedy Debate.  Clinical factors can be more readily seen than non-
clinical factors as part of the unique expertise and experience of a 
doctor.  Using the definition of clinical and non-clinical factors presented in the 
last chapter,639 the doctors’ responses show that seventeen doctors 
(51%) include both clinical and non-clinical factors when determining a child’s 
quality of life.  
For example:  
Dr 3 (Other)  
“Evidence of pleasure; is the child in pain or likely to become in pain due 
to intervention. Parental ability to cope with additional support. Likelihood 
of needing increased hospitalisation. Can the child be cared for in more 
comfort and with less pain if palliation instituted instead.” 
 
Dr 29 (neurologist)  
“Pain and discomfort; ability to play, interact’” 
  
However, all the doctors who cite a combination of both clinical and non-clinical 
factors, cited many more non-clinical than clinical factors, for example:  
 
                                                 
 
638 Chapter four, para 2, pp.139-141 
 
639 Ibid 
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Dr 2 (PICU)   
“Independence, comfort and pain free, joy, happiness, enjoyment, 
interaction with others and how much time others have to give them’” 
  
Dr 17 (PICU)   
“Can he show pleasure; how much life is spent in pleasure compared 
with pain?” 
  
Seven doctors (21%) cited just non-clinical factors, for example:  
Dr 27 (Other)  
“family view; parents view; school environment; ‘happiness.” 
Dr 13 (Other)  
“‘Level of dependence and expression of needs, ability to participate in family 
life, ability to experience pleasure.”  
Two doctors (6%) cite just clinical factors, for example, Dr 1 (neurologist) who 
cited “perceived pain”, but qualified his answer by commenting that doctors are 
not good at accurately assessing this.  Pain can however, be distinguished from 
non-clinical factors, such as a child’s happiness, as doctors are trained to 
assess pain and provided with tools to make such an assessment.  
  
The doctors listed factors arguably not just beyond the unique education, 
training and competence of the doctor, but also beyond a doctor’s knowledge, 
unless the doctor consults with others, for example education staff; the child’s 
parents and where possible, the child.  Fifteen doctors (45%) said they sought 
parents’ views as to their child’s quality of life; three doctors (9%) said they 
sought other health professionals’ views; four (12%) said they sought the child’s 
view and just two doctors (6%) said they sought the views of non-health 
professionals, such as teachers or social workers. Moreover, the doctors who 
sought the views of parents are the same doctors who sought the views of other 
parties, suggesting the majority of doctors in this study assess a child’s quality 
of life without consulting with others.   
  
An important argument for this thesis is the differences between making 
decisions for disabled children when compared to infants. Most notably, far 
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more information, it is argued, is known about a child than an infant.  This is 
particularly important here.  For example, the pattern of the child’s illness; how 
well the child communicates and interacts with family and friends; details of the 
child’s education; the child’s day to day routine and activities; and how well the 
child copes with his or her health problems and impairments, would in many 
cases be documented and readily available from a range of parties including 
the child, his or her parents, wider family, care and education staff, in a way 
such information will not be for infants.  As was seen in chapter two,640 the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics Working Party,641 emphasised the uncertainty 
inherent in best interest decisions for neonates, with factors such as the extent 
of an infant’s health, physical and cognitive impairment being little more than 
speculation.  In contrast, for children, the more so the older the child, 
speculation of this kind will often not be needed as this information will be 
available.  However, the doctors’ responses seem to suggest that potentially for 
more than half the doctors in this study, rather than seeking this information 
from other parties, doctors seem to make assumptions about a child’s quality 
life. It is unclear from the doctors’ responses, upon what their assumptions are 
based.  This was a concern raised by doctors themselves in their interviews, as 
will be seen in chapter six.642  
  
The wide range of factors doctors say they include when assessing quality of 
life, suggest that doctors are in effect using it as a proxy for a child’s best 
interests.  Many of the factors doctors list, such as a child’s happiness, or 
whether a child attends school, could be classified as the ‘wider welfare 
issues’,643 the courts and the doctors’ professional guidance advocate including 
                                                 
640 Chapter two, para 6, pp.54-55 
 
641 Nuffield Council (2006) Critical Care Decisions in fetal and neonatal medicine: ethical issues. Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, London 
 
642 Chapter six, para 7, pp.261-282 
 
643 Re OT [2009] EWHC 633 (Fam), Para 98 
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in best interest decisions.  Figure 41 illustrates the range of factors the doctors 
identified. 
 
Figure 41: Factors doctors cite as relevant to Quality of Life assessments  
Presented as a percentage of all doctors (33) with some doctors citing multiple factors and three 
doctors stating assessment should not be made.  
  
  
It will be noted that these factors include the views of other parties. Fifteen 
doctors (45%) cited parents’ view. Three doctors (9%) indicated they include a 
parent’s ability to care for a child as a factor, which while no doubt impacting on 
a child’s quality of life, is perhaps controversial. It is unclear both why this 
should be deemed relevant and on what basis the doctors are making the 
decision. For example, is it based on a doctor’s subjective opinion of a parent’s 
ability to cope or on something else?  This does seem to be a prime example of 
the type of decision cited by Kennedy as being beyond the legitimate 
competence of a doctor, as discussed in chapter two.644   
 
5.4 How do the sub-specialties compare on quality of life?  
Using the methodology outlined earlier, the doctors’ answers on quality of life 
were compared by sub-specialty.  As can be seen from figure 42, some small 
                                                 
644 Chapter two, para 2, pp.25-34 
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differences in the weight doctors’ place on quality of life are seen between the 
three sub-specialty groups.  Six neurologists (67%), five PICU consultants 
(50%) and eight Other Doctors (57%), were all positive about its use. Three 
neurologists (33%); two PICU consultants (20%) and two Other Doctors (14%) 
all expressed concerns at quality of life being used. The neurologists were very 
clear cut in their responses, either being very positive about quality of life or 
expressing strong concerns. In contrast three PICU consultants (30%) and four 
Other Doctors (29%) gave mixed answers expressing some ambivalence about 
its use. The reason for this is unclear from the doctors’ responses, but could be, 
as discussed earlier, the neurologists are more likely to have long term 
relationships with the children and broader knowledge of their lives. It may also 
be because the different groups understood and used the term differently. 
 
Figure 42: Use of quality of life and sub-specialities  
Presented as a percentage of each sub-speciality  
PICU (10 doctors); Neurology (nine doctors); Other Doctors (14 doctors)  
  
  
To explore whether this was the case, the doctors also answered the question 
‘if you assess a child’s quality of life, what factors do you feel are relevant to this 
assessment?’  The doctors’ answers were, once again, analysed to examine 
the extent to which doctors cited clinical and non-clinical factors as defined in 
the last chapter.645 The doctors’ responses suggest that as with prognosis, the 
neurologists seem at least slightly more inclined to use clinical factors in their 
assessment of quality of life, especially when compared PICU consultants, 
                                                 
645 Chapter four, para 2, pp. 139-142 
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although the differences here are small.  While one neurologists (11%) cited 
purely clinical factors as those they use when assessing quality of life, none of 
the PICU consultants did so.  One Other Doctor (7%) cited just clinical factors. 
When the percentage of doctors who use just non-clinical factors for their 
assessment of quality of life is explored, similar percentages of neurologists one 
(11%) and PICU consultants (one doctor) (10%) were found to do so.  This 
compares with five Other Doctors (36%) who cited purely non-clinical 
factors.   Far more doctors gave a mixed answer including both clinical and non-
clinical factors when writing about quality of life than prognosis.  Six 
neurologists (67%); five PICU consultants (50%) and six Other Doctors (43%) 
all gave mixed answers.  Figure 41646 earlier showed the range of factors 
doctors cited, suggesting that quality of life was perhaps, as suggested earlier, 
used by doctors as a proxy for best interests, with different doctors factoring in 
different aspects of a child’s health and wider welfare issues, into their definition 
of quality of life.   
 
Figure 43: Use of clinical and non-clinical factors in doctors’ quality of life assessments  
Presented as a percentage of doctors from each sub-specialty group: PICU (10 doctors); 
Neurologists (9 doctors) & Other Doctors (14 Doctors)   
 
 
5.5 How do male and female doctors compare on quality of life?  
The responses given by male and female doctors about quality of life were also 
compared using the same methodology as before, to ascertain whether there 
was any difference in the responses given. The doctors’ answers suggest that 
                                                 
646 Figure 41, p. 213 ante 
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the male doctors are potentially more inclined to include quality of life in their 
decisions than female doctors.  Thirteen male doctors (65%) gave answers 
putting considerable weight on quality of life compared with four female doctors 
(44%).  Three male doctors (15%) expressed concerns about the use of quality 
of life and two female doctors (22%). Three female doctors (33%) and four male 
doctors (20%) expressed mixed views.  The doctors did not provide enough 
information to explain these differences and as with earlier findings, the low 
number of female doctors in this study compared with male doctors may be 
impacting on these findings.   
 
Figure 44: Use of quality of life and gender  
Presented as a percentage of doctors from each gender: Males 20; Females 9; Unknown 4  
  
  
The doctors’ responses were also examined to consider whether male and 
female doctors show any difference in their use of clinical or non-clinical factors. 
While two male doctors (10%) used solely clinical factors to make their quality 
of life assessments, none of the female doctors did so.  Nine male doctors 
(45%) used clinical factors to some degree compared with three female doctors 
(33%).  Three male doctors (15%) used non-clinical factors compared with four 
female doctors (44%). However, the majority of doctors and similar percentages 
of male (eleven/55%) and female (five/56%) doctors used both clinical and non-
clinical factors in their quality of life assessments.  This suggests that, as with 
prognosis, a doctor’s gender does not seem to be an important influence on 
how a doctor uses quality of life.  However, once again it is recognised that the 
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disparity between the number of male and female doctor in this study makes 
comparison difficult.   
 
Figure 45: Use of clinical and non-clinical factors in doctors’ quality of life assessments  
Presented as a percentage of male and female doctors: male (20 doctors); female (9 doctors) & 
Unknown (4 Doctors)  
 
  
5.6 How do doctors with different personal experience of disability 
compare in their approaches to quality of life?  
The doctors’ responses on quality of life classified by their personal experience 
of disability were also compared using the same methodology. The data seems 
to suggest that doctors who have personal experience of disability are perhaps 
more likely than doctors who do not, to use quality of life as a factor in these 
decisions.  Four parent doctors (67%) expressed views suggesting they strongly 
favoured the use of quality of life as a factor, as did three relative doctors 
(75%).  This compares with twelve no-experience doctors (52%).  None of the 
parent doctors and none of the relative doctors expressed a mixed view, 
compared with seven no-experience doctors (31%).  This suggests that doctors 
who have personal experience of disability favour the use of quality of life as a 
factor when compared with doctors with no personal experience of disability.   
It will be recalled from chapter two,647 that Basnett,648 a doctor and disability 
advocate, like Kennedy, was critical of doctors including quality of life 
                                                 
647 Chapter two, para 10, p. 87-91 
 
648 Basnett, I, (2001)’ Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Towards and Decisions Affecting 
Disabled People’, in G.L. Albrecht, K.D. Seelman and M. Bury (eds), Handbook of Disability Studies, Sage 
Publications, London, pp.450-467 
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assessments in their best interest decisions. It might then be expected that 
similar concerns be expressed by doctors with personal experience of 
disability.  The doctors in this study suggest otherwise.  There are a number of 
possible reasons for this. The doctors in this study, unlike Basnett are not 
disabled themselves and it is perhaps wrong to assume that a relative of a 
disabled person will adopt the same viewpoint as a disabled person.  Moreover, 
a distinction needs to be drawn between deciding based on a disabled child’s 
actual quality of life, which may or may not be controversial and the decisions 
Basnett criticises, those made, based on prejudicial assumptions about a 
disabled person’s quality of life, which are more clearly controversial, being 
based on prejudice rather than fact. It will be seen in the next chapter, that in 
their interviews, doctors who were critical of colleagues who made quality of life 
decisions, seemed to be mostly criticising decisions based on prejudicial 
assumptions of quality of life, rather on actual quality of life.649 
 
Figure 46: Quality of life and personal experience of disability  




The doctors’ responses were also examined to consider whether there is any 
difference in the extent to which the three groups of doctors included clinical or 
non-clinical factors when evaluating a disabled child’s quality of life. As can be 
seen from figure 47, while three no-experience doctors (9%) used just clinical 
factors, none of the parent doctors or relative doctors, did so. Three parent 
                                                 
649 Chapter six, para 7.1, p. 262-266 
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doctors (50%) however used just non-clinical factors in their assessments of a 
disabled child’s life. This again suggests that quality of life is perhaps being 
used as a proxy for best interests to draw on a child’s wider welfare, as well as 
medical factors.  Three relative doctors (75%) used both clinical and non-clinical 
factors as did thirteen no-experience doctors (57%) and one parent doctor 
(17%).  Four no-experience doctors (17%) also reported using just non-clinical 
factors.  None of the relative doctors did so.  
  
Although the pool of doctors here is comparatively small, the data does suggest 
that quality of life is a particularly controversial factor for paediatricians. Doctors 
with a personal connection with disability seem in particular to have a strong 
view for or against its use, paralleling the position of neurologists, the doctors 
with the most professional experience of disabled children.  The doctors with a 
personal connection with disability also, however, seem more likely to favour 
quality of life and also to include non-clinical factors in their assessments, 
suggesting, they in particular use quality of life as a proxy for best interests.   
 
Figure 47: Use of clinical and non-clinical factors in doctors’ quality of life assessments & 
personal experience of disability.  
Presented as a percentage of doctors’ personal experience of disability: parent (6 doctors); 
relative (4 doctors) & neither (23 Doctors)  
   
 
5.7 How do different generations of doctors compare in their 
approaches to quality of life?  
Consideration was also given as to whether doctors who qualified in different 
decades approached quality of life as a factor the same or differently.  There 
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was noticeable similarity in the data between doctors who qualified in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  Three 1970s qualifiers (60%) and twelve 1980s qualifiers (60%), 
were positive about using quality of life. One 1970s qualifier (20%) and four 
1980s qualifiers (20%) expressed unease at the use of quality of life. Twenty 
percent of doctors from each of these decades also suggested mixed feelings 
towards the use of quality of life.  This consistency contrasts with the 
differences in approach of doctors from the 1970s and 1980s towards prognosis 
and futility.  
  
The 1990s qualifiers showed a slight shift in approach to quality of life with three 
(43%) expressing support for its use; two (29%) expressing concern and two 
(29%) expressing mixed views. This contrasts with the earlier findings 
concerning the doctors’ use of futility, where 1990 qualifiers seemed more likely 
to use the factor than earlier qualifiers.  This perhaps suggests that 1990s 
qualifiers are using futility quantitatively rather than qualitatively, not using it as 
a synonym for quality of life discussed here.  Two of the older doctors later 
interviewed discussed the shift in approaches generally from more experienced 
to new consultants, as will be seen in the next chapter.650  
 
Differences in approaches here between different generations of doctors is 
perhaps another indication that the hidden curriculum is impacting on doctors’ 
decision making for disabled children less than might be expected, with 1990 
qualifiers seeming to be more influenced in their decision making for disabled 
children by factors other than the hidden curriculum.  What these factors might 
be considered in chapters six651 and nine.652 
  
                                                 




652 Chapter nine, para 3.4, pp.374-378 
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Figure 48: Use of quality of life and duration of practice  
Presented as a percentage of doctors qualifying in each decade  
1960s (1 doctor); 1970s (5 doctors); 1980s (20 doctors); 1990s (7 doctors)  
 
  
When the data is further examined to explore whether duration of practice 
seems to impact on whether a child’s quality of life is assessed as a clinical or 
non-clinical factor, small differences can be found.  One doctor from each of the 
1970s and 1980s listed solely clinical factors, this represented 20% of 1970s 
qualifiers but 5% of 1980s qualifiers. No 1990s qualifier listed solely clinical 
factors, suggesting overall few doctors listing purely clinical factors.  One 1970s 
qualifier (20%) and five 1980s qualifiers (25%), cited just non-clinical factors, as 
did one 1990s qualifier (14%).  The majority of 1970s qualifiers and 1990s 
qualifiers cited both clinical and non-clinical factors, as those they consider 
when assessing quality of life; with three 1970s qualifiers (60%) and five 1990s 
qualifiers (72%) doing so.  In contrast, fewer than half of the 1980s qualifiers 
(eight /40%) cited both clinical and non-clinical factors in their 
assessments.  However, six 1980s qualifiers (30%) and one 1990s qualifier 
(14%) did not answer the question. This included doctors who had expressed 
unease at quality of life being used as a factor when deciding for a disabled 
child.  The prevalence of doctors from all decades who use both clinical and 
non-clinical factors when assessing the quality of life of a disabled child, over 
those that use either just clinical or just non-clinical factors, does seem to 
support the contention that doctors are using quality of life widely, as a proxy for 
best interests in these decisions, drawing as the doctors do when assessing 
quality of life, on a range of medical and welfare factors.  The consistency 
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between doctors from the 1970s and 1980s is noticeable, as is the slight shift 
towards more 1990s qualifiers feeling uneasy at the use of quality of life as a 
factor.  There is not sufficient information in the doctors’ survey responses to 
explain this shift.  However, as mentioned, older generation doctors did discuss 
this in their interviews.653  
 
Figure 49: Use of clinical and non-clinical factors in doctors’ quality of life assessments & 
duration of practice.  Presented as a percentage of doctors qualifying in each decade  




5.8 How do doctors with and without religious faith compare in their 
approaches to quality of life?  
The doctors’ responses were also examined using the same methodology to 
explore whether there was any suggestion in the data that religious doctors 
approach quality of life as a factor differently from non-religious doctors.  The 
doctors’ responses do suggest some difference with nine non-religious doctors 
(69%) giving positive responses about its use, compared with nine religious 
doctors (47%).  However, similar percentages of religious and non-religious 
doctors expressed significant unease about using quality of life, with four 
religious doctors (21%) and three non-religious doctors (23%) doing so. 
Religious doctors seem more likely to have mixed views (six/32%) compared 
with non-religious doctors (seven/8%).    
                                                 
653 Chapter six, para 7.1.3, pp.267-268 
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A doctor’s religious faith, therefore, does seem potentially to impact on a doctor 
use of quality of life, as well as prognosis and futility, in these decisions for 
disabled children. This, as was seen in chapter four654 is in keeping with 
findings from larger studies such as Cuttini et al,655 a pan-European study of 
neonatologists which, as will be recalled, found doctors’ religious beliefs to 
influence whether or not they withdrew treatment from neonates.   
  
This finding adds further weight to the Kennedy debate as the legitimate 
relevance of a doctor’s religion (or non-religion) to a child patient’s best interests 
is arguably difficult to establish.  As Wilkinson & Truog656 (a paper discussed in 
more detail in chapter six),657 suggest, if personal morality plays a part in best 
interest decisions, it should be the morality of the patient or patient’s family in 
the case of a child whose views cannot be ascertained, not that of the doctor.  
 
Figure 50: Use of quality of life and a doctor’s faith  
Presented as a percentage of doctors in each category: follow a faith (religious) (18 doctors); 
without a faith (non-religious) (14 doctors); not known (1 doctor)  
  
The doctors’ responses were also examined to consider whether religious 
doctors and non-religious doctors showed any difference in their use of clinical 
or non-clinical factors when assessing a disabled child’s quality of life. Two 
                                                 
654Chapter four, para 4, p.145-146 
 
655 Cuttini, M, Nadai, M, Kaminski, M, Hansen, G, de Leeuw, Lenoir, S, Persson, J, et al (2000) End-of-life 
decisions in neonatal intensive care: physicians' self-reported practices in seven European countries, The 
Lancet 355.9221: 2112-2118 
 
656 Wilkinson, D, Truog, RD, (2013) The luck of the draw: physician-related variability in end-of-life 
decision-making in intensive care, Intensive Care Medicine, 39, 1128-1132 
 
657 Chapter six, para 3.4, p.243 
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religious doctors (11%) listed just clinical factors, none of the non-religious 
doctors did so.  The two groups of doctors were closer when it came to those 
who used solely non-clinical factors, with four religious doctors (21%) 
suggesting they did this and three non-religious doctors (23%) doing so.  The 
non-religious doctors seemed more inclined to use a mixture of clinical and non-
clinical factors with eight (62%) of them doing so, compared with eight of the 
religious doctors (42%).  Five religious doctors (26%) and two non-religious 
doctors (15%) did not answer the question or gave an answer, which was 
unclear as to whether the doctor used clinical and/or non-clinical factors. As 
with prognosis and futility, the doctors’ responses do tend to suggest that the 
religious doctors in this study were more inclined to use clinical factors than the 
non-religious doctors, who in turn seemed more inclined to use non-clinical 
factors when compared with the religious doctors.  
 
Figure 51: Use of clinical and non-clinical factors in doctors’ quality of life assessments & a 
doctor’s faith.  
Presented as a percentage of doctors’ with and without a religious faith (non-religious): with 
faith(religious) (19 doctors); without faith (13 doctors) & Unknown (1 Doctor)   
 
 
To summarise the findings in relation to quality of life, it does seem that doctors 
are potentially using quality of life as a proxy for best interest decisions, 
especially the non-religious doctors. There is evidence of quality of life being 
used to evaluate wider welfare issues, not just clinical issues.  Overall doctors 
do seem to put more weight on non-clinical aspects than clinical aspects of 
quality of life and there seems to be little consensus between doctors as to what 
they are or should be assessing when they assess a child’s quality of 
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life.  Indeed, there was no consensus between doctors as to whether quality of 
life should even be assessed as a factor in these decisions.  The findings on 
quality of life seem to suggest further that while almost half of the doctors 
consult with other parties when assessing a child’s quality of life, over half 
report not doing so.  Consultation also seems to be limited in the cases, where it 
does happen, to the child’s parents and rarely extend to others, such as a 
child’s teacher who will often spend a lot of time with a child and be able to 
provide important evidence as to a child’s quality of life.  These findings do tend 
to support Kennedy’s contention that doctors may be making decisions they are 
not trained or educated to make. 
 
These findings also highlight a potential clash between the two lenses of the 
Kennedy Debate and best interest decision-making as outlined by the 
jurisprudence of the English High Court and doctors’ professional 
guidance, used to analyse the doctors’ decision in this study.  While Kennedy 
was highly critical of doctors assessing a patient’s quality of life, viewing such 
assessments as beyond the scope of a doctors’ competence, as was seen in 
chapters two and four, the court and doctors’ guidance instructs doctors to 
consider wider welfare issues, which would seem to include a child’s quality of 
life.  This conflict can perhaps be reconciled, if doctors making best interest 
decisions are seen as being in a quasi-judicial position. The doctor’s job is then 
not to decide the child’s best interests but to gather evidence from all relevant 
parties and balance this to determine a child’s best interests, with other key 
parties, such as the child’s parents and others closely involved in the child’s 
care.  It seems this conflict only arises if, as some of the doctors in this study 
suggest they do, a doctor makes the decision without this wide consultation and 
involvement.  This question is returned to in chapter ten, when consideration is 
given as to whether a doctor or someone else should take on this quasi-judicial 
role when these decisions are being made.658 
  
                                                 
658 Chapter ten, para 5.2, pp.400-401 
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This chapter now explores what the doctors said about a child’s cognitive ability 
as a factor in difficult decisions for disabled children.  
 
6. Cognitive Ability 
 
6.1 Defining cognitive ability  
The BMJ’s Best Practice Guide ‘Assessment of learning difficulty and cognitive 
delay’659 states that intellectual impairment: 
‘may be either generalised (cognitive impairment) or specific to one   
area (learning difficulty)’.660 
 
The guide defines children with cognitive impairment as children having an IQ 
below 70. It goes on to say: 
‘about 1% of children have cognitive impairment. Down’s syndrome and 
foetal alcohol syndrome are among the most common identified causes 
of cognitive impairment’.661 
 
The guide also states that cerebral palsy, (as noted in chapter one, 662 the most 
common condition for the children considered by the doctors in this study)  
‘is not a cause of cognitive impairment. However, the two conditions can 
co-exist and for this reason a cause and effect relationship is often 
mistakenly assumed both by clinicians and the general public’.663 
  
This may be significant for the children at the centre of this study for three 
reasons.  It suggests that doctors may not be good at assessing a child’s 
                                                 
659 BMJ (2016) Assessment of learning difficulties and cognitive delay; Best Practice, BMJ, London, 
http://bestpractice.bmj.com/best-practice/monograph/884/diagnosis/step-by-step.html; last accessed 
20 July 2016 
 




662 Chapter One, para 2.3, p.4 
 
663 BMJ (2016) Assessment of learning difficulties and cognitive delay; Best Practice, BMJ, London, 
http://bestpractice.bmj.com/best-practice/monograph/884/diagnosis/step-by-step.html; last accessed 
20 July 2016 
 
P a g e  | 227 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
cognitive ability.  This may mean assumptions are wrongly made that might 
impact on doctors’ assessment of futility or quality of life, as doctors’ responses 
suggest they make links between these factors. This makes cognitive ability as 
a factor, like futility and quality of life, particularly pertinent to the Kennedy 
Debate. Also, children who are competent may be excluded from decisions 
about their treatment and care.  
 
It will be recalled from chapter four,664 that doctors are warned in their 
professional guidance against making prejudicial assumptions about a disabled 
child.665  It was also seen in chapter two,666 that repeated investigations have 
found that cognitively impaired patients can face particularly extreme difficulties 
in accessing NHS treatment and care, due largely to negative assumptions 
made by health professionals. 
  
6.2 Weight attributed to cognitive ability  
The doctors were asked ‘what part does a child’s cognitive ability play in these 
assessments?’  As was seen with prognosis, futility and quality of life, the 
doctors in this study expressed a diversity of views as to the weight, which 
should be put on a child’s cognitive ability when making difficult decisions for 
severely disabled children. Eight doctors (24%) described cognition as being an 
important factor in their considerations.  This compared with eleven doctors 
(33%) who either stated they did not use a child’s cognitive ability or placed very 
little weight on it. Four doctors (12%) saw cognitive ability only relevant to their 
decisions, to the extent a child’s ability impacted on whether the child could to 
take part in the decision-making process.   
  
                                                 
664 Chapter four, para 3, p.142-143 
 
665 RCPCH (2004) Withholding Life Sustaining Treatment in Children, A Framework for Practice, second 
edition, RCPCH, London para 2.7.1, p. 24 
 
666 Chapter two, para 8, p.75-79 
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6.3 How is cognitive ability assessed?  
The doctors were asked the question ‘if you make such an assessment, how do 
you make an assessment of a disabled child’s level of cognitive ability?’ Two 
doctors, Drs 21 and 32 (both Other), reported not making such an assessment. 
However, the same two doctors did later report being moderately confident in 
their ability to assess a child’s cognitive ability.  Their responses can be read 
either as contradicting each other, or as the doctors reporting that they were 
confident of their ability to make an accurate assessment, but chose not or had 
not had a reason to make such an assessment.   
 
The remaining thirty-one doctors (94%) described using observation; parental 
views; formal testing or the views of colleagues to assess a child’s cognitive 
level.  Six doctors (18%) used a combination of two of more of these.    
  
Eight doctors (24%) wrote that they sought the views of parents as to a child’s 
cognitive ability, six (18%) in combination with their own observation or formal 
testing. Six doctors (18%) mentioned some form of formal testing, such as Dr.7 
(neurologist): “clinical exam may need to be complemented by formal 
psychometry.”  Four doctors (12%) wrote that they sought advice from 
psychologists and just one doctor from education staff.  As the children will 
mostly be in some form of education and as the cognitive ability of the children 
discussed can range from profound cognitive impairment to educationally able, 
it is perhaps surprising that doctors do not more often ask a child’s teacher or 
educational psychologist about a child’s cognitive level.    
 
6.4 How do the sub-specialties compare on cognitive ability?  
When the doctors’ answers are compared by sub-specialty using the 
methodology outlined earlier, as can be seen from figure 52, neurologists and 
Other Doctors seem to use a child’s cognitive ability in their difficult decisions 
more than PICU consultants.  Three neurologists (33%) and five Other Doctors 
(29%) indicated they put considerable weight on cognition compared with one 
PICU consultant (10%).  Neurologists as a sub-group made up four (66%) of the 
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doctors who said they formally tested cognition, the remaining being one PICU 
consultant (17%) and one Other Doctor (17%).  This may explain why 
neurologists are more inclined to use cognition as a factor, as they are more 
likely to test it. Although neurologists appear to be more likely to use cognition 
as a factor than the other two sub-specialty groups, they are also the sub-
specialty who were most likely to express unease at its use.  The same number 
of neurologist (three/33%) reported unease as reported putting a lot of weight 
on cognition. Neurologists therefore seem to disagree amongst themselves as 
to whether a child’s cognitive ability is relevant.  More PICU consultants 
(two/20%) also expressed unease at its use than said they put weight on 
cognition as a factor (one/10%).  In contrast, fewer (one/7%) of the Other 
Doctors expressed unease.  The majority of Other Doctors (nine/64%) took a 
mixed view towards cognition, as did half of PICU consultants (five/50%). Fewer 
neurologists (two/22%), however, took a mixed approach than either put weight 
or expressed unease at the use of cognition.  These results seem to suggest 
that neurologists are slightly more inclined to put weight on a child’s cognitive 
ability, perhaps because they are the sub-specialty most likely to assess it. 
However, the results also seem to suggest the use or otherwise of a child’s 
cognitive ability is contentious between doctors from the same sub-specialism, 
as well as amongst paediatricians generally.  
 
Figure 52: Use of a child’s cognitive ability and sub-specialties  
Presented as a percentage of each sub-specialty  
PICU (10 doctors); Neurology (nine doctors); Other Doctors (14 doctors)  
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6.5 How do male and female doctors compare on cognitive ability?  
The responses given by male and female doctors about a child’s cognitive 
ability were also compared using the same methodology to ascertain whether 
there were any differences.  Some difference in approach between male and 
female doctors were found, with six male doctors (30%) favouring its use 
compared with one female doctor (11%) and three female doctors (33%) 
expressing unease at its use compared with three male doctors (15%). Three 
female doctors (33%) expressed a mixed view towards the use of cognition, 
suggesting six female doctors (66%) had at least some reservations. This 
compares with ten male doctors (50%) who expressed a mixed view, 
suggesting a similar percentage (65%) of male doctors (thirteen doctors) also 
like the female doctors, had at least some reservations.  
 
Figure 53: Use of a child’s cognitive ability and gender  
Presented as a percentage of each gender  
Male (20 doctors); Female (nine doctors); Unknown (4 doctors)  
 
 
6.6 How do doctors with different personal experience of disability 
compare in their approaches to the use of a child’s cognitive 
ability?  
The doctors’ responses about a child’s cognitive ability were also classified by 
the doctors’ personal experience of disability and compared using the same 
methodology.    
 
It is noteworthy that none of the parent doctors expressed a view suggesting 
they put significant weight on a child’s cognitive ability in their 
P a g e  | 231 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
decisions.  However, one relative doctor (25%) and seven no-experience 
doctors (30%) suggested that they did so. Three parent doctors (50%) 
expressed unease at the use of a child’s cognitive ability as a factor, whereas 
none of the relative doctors did.  Only three no-experience doctors (13%) did 
so.  Three relative doctors (75%) did however express a mixed view, suggesting 
at least some concern at its use as a factor, but also seeing some merit.  Three 
parent doctors (50%) and ten no-experience doctors (43%) also expressed a 
mixed view.    
  
This data seems to suggest that while the majority doctors had at least some 
unease about the use of the child’s cognitive ability in these decisions, parent 
doctors seem more likely to express unease than their colleagues.  What is 
perhaps noteworthy here, is that whereas the doctors who professionally have 
most experience of child disability, the neurologists, were marginally more likely 
than the other sub-specialisms to be positive about the use of a child’s cognitive 
ability when making these decisions, none of the parent doctors who, are likely 
to have to most personal experience of child disability, were positive about its 
use.  A possible reason for this is, as was seen earlier, neurologists were more 
likely to formally assess a child’s cognitive ability, so perhaps some neurologists 
felt more inclined to use this factor than other paediatricians.  However, this 
may also suggest that the circumstances or capacity in which experience is 
gained can make a difference to how doctors approach their difficult decisions 
for disabled children. Indeed, differences in approach were found between 
parent doctors and relative doctors were also found. 
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 Figure 54: Use of a child’s cognitive ability and personal experience of disability  
Presented as a percentage of doctors by personal experience of disability  
Parent (6 doctors); Relative (4 doctors); Neither (23 doctors)  
 
  
6.7 How do different generations of doctors compare in their 
approaches to a child’s cognitive ability?  
Consideration was also given as to whether doctors who qualified in different 
decades approached a child’s cognitive ability as a factor the same or 
differently.  As was seen with futility, the doctors’ responses suggest (when 
compared with other personal and professional characteristics) a remarkable 
level of consistency between doctors who qualified in the different decades, 
especially between doctors who qualified in the 1970s and 1980s.  Once again 
there does seem to be a slight shift in approach for doctors who qualified in the 
1990s, compared with those from the two preceding decades. One 1970s 
qualifier (20%) and four 1980s qualifiers (20%) were positive about the use of a 
child’s cognitive ability in these decisions.  This rises to two for 1990s qualifiers 
(29%).  Likewise, one 1970s qualifier (20%) and four 1980s qualifiers (20%) 
expressed unease at its use, with this falling to one 1990s qualifier 
(14%).  However, this data also suggests a lack of consensus between doctors 
generally, just that the extent of that lack of consensus seems to be consistent 
regardless of when doctors qualified.  Most doctors expressed a mixed 
viewpoint, with three 1970s qualifiers (60%), ten 1980s qualifiers (50%) and 
three 1990s qualifiers (43%) doing so.  There does seem to be a suggestion in 
the data that doctors who qualified most recently are less likely to have 
reservations about the use of cognitive ability as a factor than doctors to 
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qualified longer ago.  This perhaps contradicts the suggestion made earlier, that 
more recently qualified doctors seem to possible take a more child rights 
approach to difficult decisions for disabled children and be more cognisant of 
the legislative changes outlined in chapter two.667 
 
Figure 55: Use of a child’s cognitive ability and duration of practice  
Presented as a percentage of doctors qualifying in each decade  




6.8. How do doctors with and without religious faith compare in their 
approaches to a child’s cognitive ability?  
 
The doctors’ responses were also examined using the same methodology to 
explore whether there was any suggestion in the data that the religious doctors 
approach a child’s cognitive ability differently from non-religious doctors.  The 
doctors’ responses suggest little difference in approach between religious 
doctors and non-religious doctors. Any differences found were small.  Four 
religious doctors (21%) were positive about the use of a child’s cognitive ability 
in these decisions, compared with four non-religious doctors (31%). In similar 
vein, three religious doctors (16%) expressed unease at its use compared with 
three non-religious doctors (23%).  The percentage of doctors with and without 
faith who expressed a mixed view was even closer, with nine religious doctors 
(47%) doing so and six non-religious doctors (46%). The suggestion then from 
this data is that a doctor’s faith does not seem to impact on the weight a doctor 
puts on a child’s cognitive ability when making difficult decisions for a disabled 
                                                 
667 Chapter two, pp.23-94 
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child. However, once again there does seem to be a lack of consensus 
amongst the doctors in this study as a whole, as to what weight should be put 
on this factor.   
 
 Figure 56: Use of a child’s cognitive ability and religious faith  
Presented as a percentage of doctors with and without religious faith (religious) 
With faith (non-religious) (19 doctors); With no faith (13 doctors); Unknown (1 doctor)  
 
 
To summarise the findings on the use of a child’s cognitive ability, the doctors’ 
survey responses suggest a lack of consensus amongst doctors as to whether it 
should be used when making difficult decisions for disabled children.  More 
neurologists indicated that they do use it than doctors from other sub-
specialisms, but an equal number of neurologists also express their unease at 
its use.  In contrast to quality of life, but in keeping with futility, 1990s qualifiers 
seem happier to use it in their decisions than their more experienced 
colleagues, parent doctors seem most inclined to object to its use. 
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7. Conclusions to be drawn about how doctors make difficult decisions 
for disabled children from what doctors in this study wrote about 
prognosis; futility; quality of life and a child’s cognitive ability.  
 
The overwhelming conclusion to be drawn from the data presented in this 
chapter is the diversity of views expressed by a pool of thirty-three 
paediatricians who, as was seen in chapter four,668 come from a relatively 
narrow spectrum of society and even of the medical profession.  With every 
factor, the doctors showed diversity as to the weight they put on that factor and 
as to what should be considered when evaluating that factor.  There is an 
indication in the data that certain personal and professional characteristics do 
potentially influence a doctor’s approach to a factor, but there was 
inconsistency as to the impact of personal and professional characteristics 
across the factors considered. 
 
1990s qualifiers when compared with earlier qualifiers, for example, seemed 
more inclined to use futility and a child’s cognitive ability as a factor, but less 
inclined to use a child’s quality of life, despite the seeming links between these 
three factors.  Neurologists seem to stand out as approaching difficult decisions 
differently from PICU consultants and Other Doctors, and seem more inclined to 
use clinical factors than non-clinical factors in their decision-making.  It is of 
interest that parent doctors seem to approach difficult decisions in some 
respects differently from relative doctors, suggesting that the nature of a 
doctor’s personal experience of disability is important not just whether a doctor 
has personal experience of disability.  There are indications that the hidden 
curriculum may not be as influential as might be expected, with possibly the 
changes in law discussed in chapter two, impacting more on 1990s qualifiers’ 
decisions, than on the decisions of more experienced consultants, however, the 
data suggests this is not clear cut.  
  
                                                 
668 Chapter four, para four, pp.139-157 
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Quality of life as a factor stands out for the diversity of ways it is used by 
doctors, suggesting, more than the other factors, doctors use it as a proxy for a 
child’s best interests, using it to draw upon a wide range of clinical and non-
clinical or welfare factors. 
  
When examined through the lens of the Kennedy Debate, the findings in this 
chapter suggest a mixed picture.  In generational terms, doctors who qualified 
close to the start of the Kennedy Debate seem to, in general terms, be less 
inclined to use the non-clinical factors, Kennedy suggested doctors should not 
be assessing, than more recently qualified doctors.  However, as was seen, 
quality of life as a factor seems to contradict this. 
 
When examined through the lens of the jurisprudence of the English High Court 
and doctors’ professional guidance, the findings in this chapter seem to suggest 
that the doctors in this study are inclined to explore best interests widely, 
especially the wider welfare issues, as they are guided. Indeed, the data seems 
to suggest the overall doctors put more weight on non-clinical than clinical 
factors when deciding for a disabled child.  The potential conflict here with what 
Kennedy advocated has been highlighted.  In the next chapter, the last in part 
two of this thesis, the question as to how doctors make these non-clinical 
assessments is considered as part of the discussion of what the doctors said at 
interview about uncertainty and disagreement. 
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Chapter Six  
Uncertainty and Disagreement  
  
1. Introduction  
 
This chapter presents and discusses what the doctors said in their interviews 
about uncertainty and disagreement. In doing so this chapter answers the 
second part of research question one, namely what aspect of their difficult 
decisions the doctors found most difficult.  It also expands on what was learnt in 
the last chapter about what factors the doctors used in their difficult decisions, in 
so doing, further answering research question two.  
Uncertainty and disagreement are chosen for detailed analysis, as they were 
highlighted in the doctors’ survey responses as being the most difficult aspects 
of these decisions.  They were then both discussed by all the interviewed 
doctors in some detail, reinforcing the suggestion in the study survey responses 
that they are the two topics the doctors believed to be most pertinent to their 
best interest decisions for disabled children.  
 
The interviews were semi-structured enabling each doctor to concentrate on the 
issues he or she thought most pertinent.  Some of the doctors spoke at great 
length, the longest interview lasting over two hours, other doctors spoke for a 
shorter amount of time, the shortest interview lasting fifty minutes.  The doctors 
also had different personalities, some being very outgoing and eager to talk, 
such as Drs 17, 10 and 32, with others seeming to be much quieter 
personalities, such as Drs.1 and 18.  Some were very earnest, such as Drs 17 
and 18, while others were much more relaxed, at times laughing and joking, 
such as Drs 10 and 29.  All the doctors showed great interest in the subject 
being discussed, but for some it was clearly a topic of great interest, even 
passion. The doctors showed great eagerness to share their knowledge and 
insights on the topic at length. While some doctors talked more about their 
training and education, others talked more about law and ethics.  Uncertainty 
and disagreements were, however, raised repeatedly by the doctors.    
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The main focus of this chapter is what was said by the nine doctors interviewed, 
but this chapter will also refer back to the responses from the surveyed pool of 
doctors, when this adds a wider perspective.   This chapter starts with a table 
(figure 57), summarising the key characteristics of the interviewed doctors. It 
then considers uncertainty before moving on to disagreement.   Three classes 
of uncertainty described by doctors: (i) diagnostic and prognostic; (ii) moral 
and(iii) roster uncertainty are first defined before each of these manifestations 
being considered in more detail. In their discussions of disagreements, rather 
than talking about different types of disagreement, the doctors instead talked 
about disagreements with different groups of people. For example, they talked 
about disagreements between sub-specialists; disagreements between doctors 
from different generations and disagreements between doctors and parents.  
The categories of disagreement identified by the doctors are therefore used as 
the basis for the discussion in this chapter of those disagreements.  
 
As with the previous chapters, the existing lenses of the Kennedy Debate and 
best interest decision-making as defined by the English High Court and doctors’ 
professional guidance are used in this analysis.
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2. The interviewees 
 
Figure 57: Doctors who were interviewed  




Parent  Lived 
outside 
UK for  







Ethnic Origin  Follows 
religion  
1  Neurology  M  45-54  1980s  YES  YES  NO  NO  White British  YES  
7  Neurology  M  55-64  1970s  YES  NO  NO  NO  White British  YES  
10  Oncology  M  45-54  1980s  YES  YES  YES  YES  White British  YES  
14  Respiratory  M  45-54  1980s  YES  NO  NO  NO  White British  NO  
17  PICU  F  35-44  1990s  NO  YES  NO  NO  White British  NO  
18  PICU  F  55-64  1980s  NO  YES  YES  YES  Asian  YES  
24  Neurology  F  55-64  1970s  YES  YES  NO  NO  White British  YES  
29  Neurology  M  65-74  1960s  YES  NO  NO  NO  White British  YES  
32  Palliative 
Medicine  
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3. Defining Uncertainty  
 
“Medicine is a very uncertain business and I think, well I suppose any 
time one prognosticates you are just setting yourself up for a fall because 
it is hugely uncertain. Even if there is a clear diagnosis and there is a well 
described natural history of a particular condition, every child is 
different.’”  
        Dr 14   
3.1 Dominance of uncertainty  
Uncertainty featured prominently in the data in this study.  For example, Dr 14 
quoted above, spoke at great length about uncertainty and saw it as having 
considerable impact on not just doctors’ decision making, but also their 
careers.  He suggested that some doctors coped better with uncertainty than 
others and that this influenced a doctor’s choice of sub-specialism. He said:  
“I think there is a greater or lesser need for certainty I think one thing that 
strikes me,[is] that, there are some specialties where certainty almost 
doesn’t exist. There are a lot of difficulties in making precise diagnosis; 
the natural history of diseases. In other specialties it is very cut and 
thrust really, you need to make a quick diagnosis, quick treatment and 
get on with it and the outcome is either good or bad.’” 
  
The doctors not interviewed had also stressed the significance of uncertainty on 
their difficult decisions for disabled children in the survey. For example, Dr 9 
(neurologist) wrote, “we really have little accurate ability to predict long term 
outcome.”  Writing about futility, Dr 2 (PICU) wrote that it is a “judgment and not 
clear cut’ and Dr 13 (Other) wrote it is “difficult to assess.”  The doctors also 
wrote of the difficulty of assessing a child’s quality of life.  For example, Dr 19 
(neurologist) said it is “notoriously difficult to get this right; most doctors tend to 
assume children are worse than they really are.”  Dr 28 (PICU) explained 
“There are no validated tools [for] the ventilator dependent child. I get a 
community paediatrician to give an objective assessment, but they struggle.”  
  
3.2 What is diagnostic and prognostic uncertainty?  
 The doctors talked about diagnostic and prognostic uncertainty; the high level 
of uncertainty they and their colleagues face when making any assessment for 
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a severely disabled child. They discussed the great uncertainty in a child’s 
diagnosis or prognosis and the difficulty they face in making, for example, an 
accurate assessment of a disabled child’s cogitative ability or quality of life.     
  
The doctors explained that diagnostic uncertainty might happen because a child 
had a very rare condition or because of huge variation in children with the same 
condition.  However, the outcome for an individual child did not just depend on 
the child’s diagnosis, prognosis, clinical presentation or indeed medical 
factors.  They spoke of the importance a child’s home environment and the 
support available to the child locally, could have.  Another aspect of prognostic 
and diagnostic uncertainty, which troubled doctors, was the uncertainty as to 
what level of impairment was acceptable for a child; at what point did an 
impairment become too much for a child?  In summary, the doctors suggested 
that there were often too many variables to be certain for an individual child.  
  
3.3 What is moral uncertainty?  
The second class of uncertainty the doctors raised is perhaps best described as 
a moral uncertainty; a lack of certainty as to whether they or their colleagues 
had made the right decision for a child, especially when that decision was to 
withhold or withdraw treatment.  This moral uncertainty seemed to arise less if a 
decision had been made to treat a child as then all options were still open, 
which they clearly are not once a child has died.  When treatment is withheld or 
withdrawn doctors seem to worry about the ‘what ifs?’  
 
The doctors seemed to vary in their approaches, some clearly struggling greatly 
with this moral uncertainty. The doctors who knew the children best tended to 
have more self-doubt, perhaps because they had an emotional attachment to 
the child, while the doctors who did not know the children well seem to express 
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3.4 What is roster uncertainty?  
The third class of uncertainty described by the doctors was an uncertainty more 
for the children and their families than for the doctors.  With this type of 
uncertainty, the doctors describe outcomes for the child, even whether a child 
lives or dies, being dependent not on factors related to the child, but rather the 
‘chance’ of which doctor happened to treat the child.  Wilkinson & Truog 
describe this phenomenon as the ‘roster lottery’669 so perhaps roster uncertainty 
is a suitable name for it.  This variation in treatment decisions based on doctors’ 
professional and personal characteristics and values has also been identified by 
other researchers, as was discussed in chapter four.670  Wilkinson and Truog’s 
paper671 is, however, drawn upon particularly here, because their study is 
contemporaneous with the empirical research in this thesis, meaning that they 
were writing about the issue at the same point in time, as the doctors in this 
study were reflecting upon it.  Wilkinson’s writing about decision-making for 
neonates672 is also chosen for discussion, as the comparison between the 
process of decision-making for infants and for older children, as has be seen,673 
is an important one for this thesis.  Wilkinson’s discussion of neonates helps 
draw out the distinction this thesis makes. 
 
The doctors in this study described how differences in values held by doctors 
towards severely disabled children, not just from one hospital to another, or 
between doctors with different sub-specialties, but between consultants from 
the same sub-specialism within the same unit, lead to differences in care and 
                                                 
669Wilkinson, D, Truog, RD, (2013) The luck of the draw: physician-related variability in end-of-life 
decision-making in intensive care, Intensive Care Medicine, 39, 1128-1132 at 
 P.1128 
 
670 Chapter four, para.4, pp.145-146 
 
671 Wilkinson, D, Truog, RD, (2013) The luck of the draw: physician-related variability in end-of-life 
decision-making in intensive care, Intensive Care Medicine, 39, 1128-1132 
 
672 Wilkinson D; (2013) Death or Disability? The ‘Carmentis Machine’ and decision-making for critically ill 
children.’ Oxford University Press, Oxford 
 
673 Chapter five, para 5.3, pp.211-212 
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treatment and potentially to the difference between life or death for an individual 
child.  
  
What the doctors said about uncertainty in each of these classes is now 
presented and then discussed.  
  
4. Prognostic and Diagnostic Uncertainty   
 
4.1 What the doctors said  
Several of the doctors talked about the difficulty of predicting outcomes or 
assessing a child. When asked how easy it is to come to a prognosis for a 
severely disabled child Dr 1 (neurologist) replied:  
“The short answer is not easy. There are some conditions you recognise 
are inherently progressive and obviously those are going to have a 
shorter life expectancy. There are others, which are not inherently 
progressive, but are life threatening. But you know that there are children 
who have particularly respiratory complications with neurological disease 
who are going to have shorter life expectancies, you know, but in general 
terms.” 
  
Dr 14 (Other) went further in his answer to the same question:  
“It can be frighteningly difficult in some of these cases…in many of these 
cases we don’t have a diagnosis, a diagnosis is never made and 
therefore the prognosis is completely unknown and there an anecdotal 
cases where children have looked hopeless in the first few months of life 
and then have made fantastic strides and then, like a patient of mine, 
who I can just bring to mind, who by the age of five, was doing ballet 
dancing and things, but at the time looked just like children I have seen 
who had a hopeless prognosis and would have died.”  
  
Likewise, PICU consultants spoke of the difficulty of knowing which patients 
would benefit from intensive treatment.  Dr 18, for example, talking about 
predicting the outcome of intensive care said:  
“It is not easy, it is not easy at all’” 
Another PICU consultant, Dr 17 also talked of uncertainty when a decision is 
made to withdraw treatment:  
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“Now it is very difficult to be a 100% certain and when you withdraw 
intensive therapy it is not always a self-fulfilling prophecy. I have children 
survive withdrawal of intensive therapy, you always have to parallel plan 
for palliative therapy on going. The longest survivor I’ve got of withdrawal 
of intensive therapy is 18 months.”  
  
The doctors also talked about uncertainty when assessing a child’s quality of life 
or cognitive ability; the second of these factors being, some of the doctors 
suggested, intrinsic to a worthwhile quality of life.   As was seen in the chapter 
five,674 doctors making assessments as to a child’s quality of life or cognitive 
ability is far from controversial, with a lack of consensus between doctors as to 
whether these are factors should be assessed or the weight to be put on each 
of these factors and in the case of quality of life, what it even means.  However, 
as was also seen, doctors do make these assessments.  As such, the doctors 
can be said to be making a prognosis as to a child’s quality of life or cognitive 
ability and so these assessments are included within this discussion.   
  
Talking of assessing a child’s quality of life, Dr14 (Other) said: 
“I just think that we are absolutely hopeless at judging the quality of life of 
people with disabilities and I suppose having insight and cognisance of 
that, is in some ways reassuring, but it makes the judgment more 
difficult.” 
  
Dr 7 (neurologist) expressed the opinion, echoing the findings of Martin et al’s675 
discussed in chapter two,676 that doctors can under estimate the ability of 
children with severe physical impairment to understand, conflating, wrongly in 
his view, a physical inability to communicate with severe cognitive impairment, 
while acknowledging the uncertainty of assessing a child’s abilities.  He said:  
“for children with cerebral palsy you can fall into the trap of 
underestimating their ability because of their lack of ability to 
                                                 
674 Chapter five, pp. 182-236 
 
675 Martin, Hl, Rowell, MM, Reid, SM, Marks, MK, Reddihough, (2005) Cerebral palsy: What do medical 
students know and believe? J. Paediatri. Child Health, 41, 43-47 
 
676 Chapter two, para 10, p.88 
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communicate… but in some children you look at the scan showing 
widespread brain injury and you look at any level of response which is 
pretty minimal and you can always raise the argument, are there pockets 
of huge ability locked in, but in life sometimes you have to say, you can 
never be sure about anything in biological terms”     Dr 7 
 
A concern that his colleagues could underestimate the abilities of severely 
disabled children was also one expressed by Dr 32 (Other). Indeed, with both 
Drs 7 (neurologist) and 32 (Other) there was a sense in their remarks that some 
of their colleagues were, in their view, being too certain about some things, 
rather than recognising factors as being uncertain:  
“I do think there is a sense that people who do not know children who are 
cognitively delayed will often assume that they are not engaged with their 
environment, that they cannot enter relationships. It is of course 
extremely rare for even the most profoundly impaired child not to be able 
to participate in relationships, not to be able to do most of those 
things.”  Dr 32  
 
4.2 Discussion  
Uncertainty is inherent in medicine.  In the words of Donald Irvine, a former 
president of the GMC: 
Many people outside the profession do not appreciate that medicine is 
not an exact science.  In fact, it is prone to error and inherently risky.’677  
 
A doctor’s opinion concerns: 
‘what will happen in the future, often we cannot know with certainty, or 
indeed with any real degree of assurance, the outcome of each choice 
we might make.’678  
 
The extent to which doctors struggle with uncertainty can be seen in research 
conducted by Lantos and Meadows679 in a neonatal intensive care unit in the 
USA.  It assessed the ability of staff to identify infants who would survive to 
                                                 
677 Irvine, DH, (2007) Everyone’s Entitled to A Good Doctor, Med J Aust, vol. 186; no.5, 256-261, at p.258 
 
678 Nuffield Council (2006) Critical Care Decisions in fetal and neonatal medicine: ethical issues. Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, London, at para 2.25, p.16 
 
679 Lantos, JD, Meadows, W (2006) Neonatal Bioethics: the moral challenges of medical innovation, The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp. 95-96 
 
P a g e  | 247 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
leave the unit and those who would not.  The study lasted 18 months and 
involved 333 infants.  They report:  
‘of the babies who were so sick that on at least one day every single 
doctor and nurse predicted that the infant would die, almost one-quarter 
of these babies still lived to be discharged’.680  
The authors concluded:  
‘Neither objective, quantifiable measures of illness severity nor institutive 
qualitative assessment by experienced clinicians can eliminate the gray 
[sic] zone of clinical uncertainty.  Both prognostic approaches appear 
best at anticipating impending death only when accuracy does not matter 
much – for doomed infants with the worse physiology, who will die soon 
anyway.’681  
  
For severely disabled infants, Wilkinson, an ethicists and neonatologist, 
suggests that uncertainty is all the more prevalent because:  
‘Apart from variation in physical susceptibility and recovery from injury 
there are also differences in psychological susceptibility in the ability of 
individuals to adjust and cope with adversity. Different children have 
different degrees of resilience to injury and illness’682  
  
Wilkinson argues that two infants can have very similar neurological injuries, but 
the outcome for the two can be very different depending on a broad spectrum of 
factors, including the child’s genetic make-up; family and society support and 
the child and his or her family’s resilience,683 a view echoed by doctors in this 
study.  
  
While, the doctors describe, uncertainty as to prognosis and diagnosis as 
inherent in the care of many severely disabled children, there is the argument 
made earlier,684 that once a child progresses beyond infancy, in many respects, 
                                                 




682 Wilkinson, D (2013) Death or Disability? The ‘Carmentis Machine’ and decision-making for critically ill 
children, Oxford University Press, p. 163 
 
683 Ibid pp 163-164 
 
684 Chapter five, para 5.3, pp. 211-212 
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assessments should be less uncertain than for infants.  As Wilkinson identifies 
infants are much harder to assess neurologically because:  
‘their limited repertoire of skills means that neurological assessment is 
necessarily more broad-brush and more uncertain.’685  
 
In comparison, much more should be known about older children with 
neurological impairments. They have an identifiable history, in some cases of 
more than a decade, and not just a medical history, but also a social and 
educational one.  They are known to many more people: wider family, health 
professionals and wider professionals.686 A child’s likes and dislikes will be 
known, as will, very likely, how he or she reacts to medical procedures and 
copes with his or her impairment.  For an older child, it is much more likely that 
a clear pattern of health will be established.  It should be known, for example, 
whether the child is one who becomes acutely unwell, but copes with treatment 
well and recovers well, or whether a child is becoming more and more unwell 
and the burdens of any treatment are outweighing the benefits.  Some older and 
more cognitively able children will be able to express an opinion on treatment 
decisions, including end-of-life decisions.  Even younger and less cognitively 
able children may, as previously suggested, have communicated preferences 
through their reactions to past episodes of acute illness and treatment.  As Dr 
32687 suggested, it is extremely rare for a child not to be able to interact at all. In 
short, far more will be known about the child, by a much wider group of people. 
This seemingly makes the task of exploring the child’s best interests ‘in the 
widest sense,’688 much easier, as so much more is known about the child.   This 
brings to the fore one of the reasons why it is important to know how, in the 
                                                 
685 Wilkinson, D (2013) Death or Disability? The ‘Carmentis Machine’ and decision-making for critically ill 
children, Oxford University Press, p.166 
 
686 The voluntary organisation Together For Short Lives lists some of the people likely to be involved in a 
child’s life  
 
http://www.togetherforshortlives.org.uk/assets/0000/1704/Who_s_who.pdf accessed 16 August 2017 
 
687 Chapter six, para 4, p. 246 
 
688 Re OT [2009] EWHC 633 (Fam), per Parker J 
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context of this thesis, doctors make best interest decisions for disabled children, 
because it allows for an assessment to be made as to whether doctors are 
consulting widely on these issues, as they are guided to do by their professional 
guidance and the jurisprudence of the English High Court. 
 
A concern raised by doctors in this study who work with the children long term, 
was that despite this information being known, some of their ‘acute’ colleagues, 
rather than balancing the benefits and burdens of any treatment to the individual 
child based on this information, fall back on heuristics.689  
What this means will be briefly explained.  
 
Heuristics, as Brush690 explains, are used by doctors to ‘simplify difficult 
decisions’ and to ‘avoid analysis paralysis‘ under conditions of uncertainty that 
demand speed.’691 However, problems can arise if a doctor uses a heuristic 
‘fast and frugal rule of thumb’692 rather than carries out a more detailed best 
interest assessment.  The main criticism of heuristics in the context of the 
decisions under discussion in this thesis, is that they do not seem to distinguish 
between different children who superficially may seem similar.  For example, 
many children have severe cognitive or physical impairment, but may need very 
different treatment to meet their individual best interests. In the words of Dr 18 
(PICU) talking about colleagues who use rules or heuristics when deciding who 
to treat:   
“You can’t have ‘in this scenario do this and in that scenario do that’, 
because every patient has a completely different scenario and for one 
patient it might be the right thing to do and for another patient it might 
not.”   
  
                                                 
689 Brush, EJ, (2015) Decision-Making shortcuts: the Good and the Bad, New England Medical Journal, 
Massachusetts, www.knowledgeplus.nejm.org accessed 15 July 2016 
 
690 Ibid, para 2 
 
691 Ibid, para 2 
 
692 Ibid, para 2  
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Doctors use heuristics because they ‘often have to make rapid decisions, either 
because of a medical emergency or because they need to see many patients in 
a limited time,’693 but their use in potential end-of-life decisions it seems from 
the doctors’ accounts, is too simplistic and sometimes does not pay sufficient 
attention to the individual circumstances of the patient.  Klein694 identifies 
several pitfalls of heuristics in medical decision-making among them ‘the 
representative heuristic’, that is, ‘the assumption that something that seems 
similar to other things in a certain category is itself a member of that 
category’.695 Dr.17(PICU) used a rule that a child can only have one admission 
to PICU.  It can be argued that Dr 17 is putting all disabled children who have 
had a previous admission to PICU in the same category, of children for whom it 
is not in their best interests to have PICU treatment.  However, there is a 
significant difference between a child who has had repeated recent admissions 
to PICU and a child who had one earlier admission to PICU, perhaps a decade 
ago.  Although speaking at great length, Dr 17 did not suggest that she would 
make these kinds of distinctions, but instead suggested she would rely on the 
heuristics she had devised to guide her decision-making.  Being a PICU 
specialist, as has been previously discussed,696 Dr 17 is unlikely to know a child 
prior to considering whether to admit him or her to PICU or to have an in-depth 
knowledge of the child’s medical or social history. In these circumstances, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the Dr 17 had developed a series of heuristic 
markers to guide her decisions.  This is all the more so when dealing with a 
child whose symptoms suggest urgent action is needed.   
  
However, heuristic markers are arguably far too crude and blunt instruments, 
particularly when the outcome of the decision will determine whether the child 
                                                 
693 Klein, JG, (2005) Five pitfalls in decisions about diagnosis and prescribing, BMJ, 330: 781-784, p. 781 
 
694 Klein, JG, (2005) Five pitfalls in decisions about diagnosis and prescribing, BMJ, 330: 781-784 
 
695 Ibid, p.781 
 
696 Chapter five, para 2, p.183 
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lives or dies.  The use of heuristic markers also seems to be a long way 
removed from how doctors are guided to make best interest decisions by their 
professional bodies and the English Court. Relevant information about a child 
can also be overlooked and ‘physicians can be insensitive to the reliability of 
information, or to the degree to which information allows an accurate judgment 
to be made and over-weight low-relevance diagnostic information’697 as some of 
the doctors seem to suggest they do in this study.  
The relevance of doctors using heuristics, especially about non-clinical factors, 
to the Kennedy Debate is clear. 
  
Using heuristics can mean the best interests of the individual child are not 
always examined. It does seem that the doctors who use heuristics do so to 
overcome uncertainty and gaps in their knowledge about the individual 
child.  Some doctors in this study (for example Drs 24 and 14), did express 
concerns that treatment is being withdrawn or withheld from disabled children 
inappropriately.  It seems that one significant reason as to why this is 
happening, may be that doctors are addressing uncertainty by adopting 
heuristics rather than seeking out information (which, in the case of a child 
beyond infancy, is likely to be available) that is needed to make an informed 
decision, as their professional guidance guides them to do.  
 
5. Moral Uncertainty  
 
5.1 What the doctors said  
The second type of uncertainty several of the doctors describe is moral 
uncertainty, namely, an uncertainty as to whether the doctor did or even 
routinely does the right thing.  This manifested itself in two forms. Firstly, 
doctors express uncertainty as to whether they themselves made the correct 
decision for a child, usually a decision to withdraw or withhold 
                                                 
697 Brush, EJ, (2015) Decision-Making shortcuts: the Good and the Bad, New England Medical Journal, 
Massachusetts, www.knowledgeplus.nejm.org accessed 15 July 2016, para 11 
 
P a g e  | 252 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
treatment.  Secondly, moral uncertainty is expressed as to whether a doctor 
was correct not to challenge a colleague who held a different view as to a 
child’s best interests, especially if the doctor experiencing the uncertainty knew 
the child better than the doctor making the decision.  Although not something 
that can easily be conveyed here, moral uncertainty was often expressed by 
doctors in how they spoke, often speaking much more hesitantly than in the rest 
of their interviews.698 When doctors talked about their uncertainty in this context, 
they often spoken more slowly, more quietly and with lots of pauses, while they 
seemed to reflect.  This contrasted with how many of the doctors spoke in other 
parts of their interviews, which was often in a very animated fashion, quite fast 
and quite loudly, often conveying confidence in their opinions, and excitement at 
discussing the subject matter.  
  
Dr 29 (neurologist) seemed to express the first of these manifestations of moral 
uncertainty when talking about trying to decide whether to ventilate or 
resuscitate a child:  
“I really don’t know what to do. My inclination would have been to give 
everybody the benefit of every doubt, but in the end, to see it as being a 
method of departing life as well.  
You see somebody who has plainly suffered a major piece of brain 
damage, you can’t sort of remove that, er my guess is you resuscitate 
them anyway, because you don’t precisely know the form of the and they 
will have some sort of life and I suppose you have to give them that 
opportunity.”   
  
Dr 14 (Other) expressed similar moral uncertainty as to the point at which 
treatment should be withheld or withdrawn:  
“I suppose this is the difficulty really, isn’t it, whether one has some line 
on the support one would give in that situation’” 
  
He went on to vividly describe the impact this moral uncertainty has on him:  
“I lie awake at night thinking that I have consigned a child to death and I 
do not know if that is the right decision.  
We have to make a decision for what is right and what is wrong for 
individual patients, a whole variety of things, I think you can, you can get 
                                                 
698 When doctors used ‘ems’ and ‘ers’ while speaking, these have been left in their quotes. 
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lost in the maze of the philosophical and the moral arguments and lose 
the ability to make decisions.” 
 
Talking of some decisions made to withdraw treatment Dr 14 concluded:  
“You think, I’m, not sure we did the right thing there, em, but we will 
never know’” 
 
Dr 24 (Neurologist) expressed her moral uncertainty with the question:  
“Are we doing too much?’” 
In contrast Dr 17 (PICU) addressed her uncertainty by ‘doing it all’:  
“Often we will go into ITU not knowing if it is going to be useful. If I am in 
a situation where I don’t know I would rather do it all and stop it all later.” 
 
5.2  Discussion  
It seems clear from their comments and also their manner and tone when 
making those comments, that some of the doctors encounter huge moral 
uncertainty when making difficult decisions for disabled children.  As Wilkinson 
& Truog identify, decisions whether to limit or continue life support in all critically 
ill patients can be ‘highly value-laden and contentious’.699 This is likely to be all 
the more so when the patient is a child and, as research has found, has an 
even greater emotional impact on the doctor.700 Indeed, the doctors who 
expressed moral uncertainty in this study tended to be doctors who had long-
term relationships with the child.  Some of the doctors had worked with 
particular children over many years and formed close relations with them. This 
is recognised in the current version of the RCPCH’s guidance for doctors on 
making decisions to limit treatment, (‘RCPCH 2015’) which states:  
                                                 
699 Wilkinson, D, Truog, RD, (2013) The luck of the draw: physician-related variability in end-of-life 
decision-making in intensive care, Intensive Care Medicine, 39, 1128-1132, p.1128 
 
700 For example, Smith, Hamilton, S, Grimard, L J (2014) The emotional and psychological impact on 
radiation therapists of treating children. Journal of Medical Imaging and Radiation Sciences, 45(3), 276-
282 found 81% of radiotherapists in their study reported treating children caused higher anxiety than 
treating adults. 
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‘the fact that some members of the team may have difficulties ‘letting go’ 
should be acknowledged and addressed’701    
The guidance does not, however, explain how this should be addressed.  
  
Dr 18 (PICU) suggested that the outcome, particularly for a disabled child “very 
frequently” depends on “how assertive the referring doctor, [or] how assertive 
the parents are.” Despite this, doctors suggested that they often did not speak 
up if they disagreed with colleagues’ decisions.  It seems then that best interest 
decisions for disabled children are not always as wide ranging as they should 
be, at times because some doctors are reluctant to offer information they know 
about the child, despite believing it to be relevant.   
  
The doctors’ observations suggest they face a choice between respect for their 
colleagues’ autonomy of clinical judgment on the one hand and their duty to act 
in a child’s best interests on the other.  The doctors suggest, first, that this is not 
an unusual dilemma for them when the best interests of a disabled child are 
being evaluated; and secondly that they will often seemingly prioritise a 
colleague’s autonomy of clinical judgment over a disabled child’s best 
interests.  There is a suggestion from the doctors in this study of a hierarchy of 
consultants, with PICU consultants often placed at the top of that hierarchy, the 
ultra-elites described in chapter three.702  Dr 14 (Other) illustrated the 
sentiments expressed by several of the doctors who expressed moral 
uncertainty in their answers when he spoke of a fear of “rocking the boat” and it 
being easier to “just go with the flow.”  Doctors talked of a deep-rooted culture 
of respect for colleagues ingrained in them since medical school. This chimes 
with the statements of Irvine, who talks of the same ‘intrinsically self- protective 
nature of medical culture’703 where he said ‘Turning a Nelsonian blind eye was 
                                                 
701 Larcher, V, Craig, F., Bhogal, K, Wilkinson, D, & Brierley, J (2015) Making decisions to limit treatment 
in life-limiting and life-threatening conditions in children: a framework for practice, Archives of disease 
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703 Irvine, DH, (2007) Everyone’s Entitled to A Good Doctor, Med J Aust, vol. 186; no.5, 256-261, p. 257 
 
P a g e  | 255 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
the easiest thing to do’.704 However, Irvine suggests this culture died out 
following the Bristol,705 cited in chapter two,706 which he says shocked the 
medical profession.873 Bristol was undoubtedly a catalyst for changes in the 
professional regulation of doctors, as Irvine describes,707 however, comments 
from the doctors in this study, all but one, senior paediatric consultants, suggest 
that the changes Irvine describes were not universal. Several of the doctors 
suggest they do turn a blind eye, rather than rock the boat.   It is noteworthy that 
at the time of Bristol and the changes it led to, the majority of consultants in this 
study would have been well established in their careers.  They are the doctors 
who lead on difficult decisions for disabled children at present.  What is not 
clear is the extent to which there has been a culture shift in the attitudes and 
behaviour of doctors who have qualified post Bristol in terms of speaking up if 
they disagree with a colleague.  This is a question that merits further 
research.708  
  
Once again, there appears to be a gap between what doctors according to their 
professional ethical guidance and the law, should be doing, and what they 
report happens day-to-day in practice.  The doctors suggest that best interest 
decisions are not always wide-ranging decisions, involving all parties, as they 
should be.  In part, the doctors suggest, this is because of a reluctance on the 
part of doctors to share their opinions. It does seem that if decisions were being 
made as guided, moral uncertainty, like prognostic and dynastic uncertainty, 
could potentially also more easily be addressed. 
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When the doctors talked about their moral uncertainty, their comments 
suggested that it caused them real distress. Some doctors appear to avoid this 
distress by using heuristics, discussed earlier, which seem to distance doctors 
from their decisions, in part perhaps because they appear to treat children as 
‘types’ and avoid dealing with them as individuals.    
Unfortunately, however, in doing so, they seemed to be adding to their other 
colleagues’ distress, as those colleagues appear to suffer moral uncertainty 
over their failure to challenge the decisions of the doctors using heuristics.   
  
Moral uncertainty may not, however, be all bad from the child’s perspective. A 
doctor experiencing some moral uncertainty could be positive, if it encourages 
the doctor to stop, think and more actively consider the individual child’s best 
interests.  However, as Fox709 identifies, too much moral uncertainty acts as a 
barrier to doctors making decisions, leading to ‘paralysis analysis,710(an inability 
to make any decision), if they experience decision-making as overwhelming. It 
can also, it seems, encourage the use of heuristics, rather than a detailed 
analysis of an individual child’s best interests.  
  
6 Roster Uncertainty   
  
6.1  What the doctors said  
Dr 14 (Other) talked about the “Russian Roulette” of care for severely disabled 
children. He refers to a sense some doctors had that whether a child lived or 
died was uncertain, not because of factors relating to the child, but rather 
factors relating to the doctor treating the child.  Dr 14 went as far to say that 
whether an individual disabled child lived or died could depend not on the 
child’s condition, but on what day of the week the child arrived at hospital, which 
                                                 
709 Fox, CR (2010) ‘Medical Uncertainty Revisited’ in Albrecht, GL, Fitzpatrick, R, Scrimshaw, SC, (Eds), 
Handbook of Social Studies in Health and Medicine, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks 
 
710 Brush, EJ, (2015) Decision-Making shortcuts: the Good and the Bad, New England Medical Journal, 
Massachusetts, www.knowledgeplus.nejm.org accessed 15 July 2016, para 2 
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would dictate which doctors, treated the child and so the treatment the child 
received: 
“I can think of the combinations of doctors that, let’s say intensive care 
doctors, neurology doctors and respiratory doctors, I can think of 
combinations of those that would make a decision go one way or 
another. So what I worry about is equity and that it just so happens that it 
you pitch up on a Wednesday in May you get this particular combination, 
if you pitch up on a Thursday in April you get a different combination and 
that will determine your outcome.”  
 
He went on to say:  
“I think doctors are very conscious of the fact that there is a huge 
variation in medical opinion about everything. If you put 12 respiratory 
physicians together you get 12 different answers, we are talking about 
critical decisions which may mean life or death. Any decision you get a 
huge variance of opinion and everybody in medicine is fully cognisant of 
that and I suppose it comes down to what is a reasonable body of 
opinion and er, present opinion might be a reasonable body, but I think, 
er, it is almost you can’t just have it as a poll, the majority wins, because 
that still might not be right and I think what is right for the patient is a very 
intangible quality really, difficult to pin it down to something that can, can 
have certainty, because it has always got an element of uncertainty.”  
  
Other doctors also raised this variation in approach leading to different 
outcomes for a child.  The two PICU specialists interviewed spoke of how their 
own practice varied from that of their PICU colleagues.  
 
Dr 17 (PICU) explained:  
“We all have a slightly different line that we, em believe is the time to 
stop intensive therapy, we are not all completely the same.  Myself and 
one of my colleagues are known to be the doctors who will withdraw 
intensive therapy the most frequently, the most actively.”  
  
Dr 18 (PICU) also spoke of the impact of different doctors’ approaches for a 
child’s outcome. She started by saying that she thought a doctor’s religious 
beliefs were a factor, but qualified this saying:  
“I suppose it is not so much religion, but how aggressive some 
intensivists can be in not offering treatment. Even in how they talk to 
parents they can project a very negative view, or a slightly more positive 
hopeful view and I have had some colleagues saying that I have 
changed treatment and the difficulties is not black and white, say if you, 
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the patient was awful and they felt that the patient shouldn’t be treated, 
but if things change and things improve, then you can’t stick to a DNR 
order just because that was decided by a colleague two days ago. Also, 
how you say something, you can create a negative or a positive spin 
and some parents have said some people can be very, very negative 
and can almost condemn the child to no recovery and an awful 
prognosis.”  
 
Doctors suggested that they tended to take very individual approaches based 
on their values, rather than the child’s clinical presentation, echoing the findings 
of chapter five.711 
  
6.2 Discussion  
In line with the views of the doctors in this study, others have also identified this 
seemingly random variation in care depending on the doctors treating a patient. 
As discussed earlier, Wilkinson and Truog712 refer to it as the ‘roster lottery’ 
saying ‘This variability implies that how a patient’s death is managed and even 
potentially whether or not they die, is influenced by which physician happens to 
be on call.’713 
  
In light of what doctors said about how they make difficult decisions for disabled 
children in their survey responses, especially the great variation seen between 
doctors, it is perhaps not altogether surprising that the outcome for an individual 
child can vary greatly depending on which doctor or doctors are making 
treatment decisions.  As discussed in chapter two714 larger studies715 have also 
                                                 
711 Chapter five, pp.181-236 
 
712 Wilkinson, D, Truog, RD, (2013) The luck of the draw: physician-related variability in end-of-life 
decision-making in intensive care, Intensive Care Medicine, 39, 1128-1132 
 
713 Ibid p.1129 
 
714 Chapter four, para. 4, pp.145-146 
 
715 See for example: Cuttini, M, Nadai, M, Kaminski, M, Hansen, G, de Leeuw, Lenoir, S, Persson, J, et al 
(2000) End-of-life decisions in neonatal intensive care: physicians' self-reported practices in seven 
European countries, The Lancet 355.9221: 2112-2118; Richter, J, Eisemann, M, Zgonnikova, E, (2001) 
Doctors' authoritarianism in end-of-life treatment decisions. A comparison between Russia, Sweden and 
Germany. Journal of Medical Ethics, 27(3), 186-191 & Mebane, EW, Oman, RF, Kroonen, LT, Goldstein, 
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found that factors such as a doctor’s gender, age, religion, sub-specialism, 
personal experience of disability and duration of practice all potentially 
influenced how a doctor approached best interest decisions for disabled 
patients.   
  
It was also seen in chapter two716 that findings from studies into health 
professionals’ attitudes towards disabled patients suggest that decisions made 
for disabled people by doctors can be misinformed, and based on generalised 
prejudicial assumptions. Rather than informed decisions being made based on 
the individual’s circumstances: ‘ill-informed social judgments about disability’ 
are substituted for ‘medical ones’.717 Doctors in this study who work closely with 
disabled children long-term expressed similar concerns.  Wilkinson and Truog 
suggest that ‘physician-related variability may be most prevalent when the 
patient’s values were not known’.718 Indeed, rather than drawing on known 
information about a child, assumptions about that child can be made.  If, as 
research suggests, it is not unusual for doctors to have negative attitudes 
towards disabled patients, roster uncertainty creates a particular risk for the 
children in this study.   Doctors in this study were clearly concerned by this 
roster uncertainty.  Wilkinson and Truog also describe it as ‘ethically 
problematic’719 To be clear, the concern arises because the different opinions 
seem to emerge due to doctors’ drawing on personal values, such as religious 
values or presumptions about the quality of a disabled child’s life, rather than 
                                                 
MK (1999) The Influence of Physician Race, Age, and Gender on Physician Attitudes Toward Advance 
Care Directives and Preferences for End‐Of‐Life Decision‐Making, Journal of the American Geriatrics 
Society, 47(5), 579-591 
 
716 Chapter two, para 10, pp. 82-91 
 
717 Basnett, I, (2001)’ Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Towards and Decisions Affecting 
Disabled People’, in G.L. Albrecht, K.D. Seelman and M. Bury (eds), Handbook of Disability Studies, Sage 
Publications, London, pp.450-467, p.455 
 
718 Wilkinson, D, Truog, RD, (2013) The luck of the draw: physician-related variability in end-of-life 
decision-making in intensive care, Intensive Care Medicine, 39, 1128-1132, p.1129 
 
719 Ibid, p. 1128 
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their clinical assessments of the patient. A doctor’s values may be very different 
from those of the patient or his or her family. As Wilkinson and Truog conclude:  
‘The ethically relevant factors for these decisions include the best 
interests of the patients, the patient’s preferences and values and 
potentially those of their surrogates, available resources and the 
prevailing law, but not the identity of the doctor’720   
  
There seems to be agreement between many of the doctors in this study and 
the authors of the wider studies referenced here, that doctors should not bring 
their personal values to these decisions.  It would also seem to chime with the 
concern expressed in the Kennedy Debate and contradict the doctors’ 
professional guidance.721  However, there also seems to be agreement that this 
is what commonly happens.  To an extent, however, it is perhaps inevitable that 
doctors will bring their personal values to their decisions.  Indeed, it is possible 
that doctors draw on their personal values to help cope with the moral 
uncertainty discussed in the previous paragraph, meaning that roster 
uncertainty is possibly in part an inevitable consequence of moral uncertainty.  
  
While, there may be an element of inevitability in roster uncertainty, it is still 
ethically troubling and if, individual doctors are, for example, acting in ways 
which breach equality legislation, legally troubling as well.  However, it does 
seem that if best interest decisions were made as doctors are guided to do by 
their professional ethical guidance and the law, many of the problems inherent 
in roster uncertainty, could to a large extent be overcome.  If a full team of 
professionals who know the child rather than an individual or small team of 
doctors, together with the child’s parents and where appropriate the child him or 
herself, are able to fully contribute to a best interest discussion, it seems there 
is less chance that the values of one or two members of that team will dominate 
the decision.  Even more importantly, as Wilkinson and Truog suggest, when it 
comes to values, it is the values of the child (when these are ascertainable) or 
                                                 
720 Ibid, p.1129 
 
721 Chapter four, para 3, pp.142-145 
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his or her family, that should dominate the discussion, not that of the doctor.  
Indeed, doctors are told, by the GMC, as was seen at the start of the last 
chapter, to ensure they take into consideration of values of the family when 
making best interest decisions. 722   Doctors in this study however, suggest that 
it is the values of a doctor that can sometimes influence the outcome instead.  
  
This topic will be returned to in the final chapter of this thesis, when 
consideration will be given to whether changes in law or procedure are need to 
help address this issue.723  
 
Having presented and analysed what doctors said in their interviews about 
uncertainty this chapter will now turn to the closely related topic of 
disagreements that arise when making difficult decisions for disabled children.  
  
7. Nature of Disagreements  
The doctors talked a lot about disagreements in both their surveys and their 
interviews.  In the survey, twenty-six doctors (78%) reported experiencing 
disagreements with other doctors as to an individual child’s best interests and 
nineteen (57%) reported similar disagreements with a child’s parents.  The 
doctors talked about disagreements between doctors from different sub-
specialists, most notably (but not exclusively) between PICU specialists and 
doctors from sub-specialties who tend to have long term working relationships 
with a child and his or her parents, such as neurologists. The PICU specialists 
also talked about disagreements amongst PICU consultants. Disagreements 
between doctors from different generations were also raised, as were 
disagreements between doctors and parents.  
 
The rest of this chapter will now explore first, what doctors said about 
disagreements with other doctors, and secondly, what they said about 
                                                 
722 See figure 11, p.138 
 
723 Chapter ten, para 5.2, pp. 400-402 
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disagreements between doctors and parents.  In each case, what the doctors 
said will first be presented, followed by an analysis of those discussions.  
  
7.1 What the doctors said  
7.1.1 Disagreements between sub-specialities  
Dr 14 (Other) talked of “polar differences” between doctors from different sub-
specialities. He explained some of the differences in approach of sub-
specialities commonly involved in these difficult decisions:  
“So the triumvirate that are often involved in decisions are neurologists, 
intensive care doctors and respiratory doctors and of course they are 
going to come at the cases from slightly different perspectives. We also 
have core differences in the way we approach things. Intensive care 
doctors like to sort things out and get them moving through. Neurology 
doctors tend to take a much longer-term view and possibly have a more 
optimistic outlook and we find ourselves somewhere in the middle.”  
  
Dr 32 (Other) also identified differences in approaches between different 
paediatric sub-specialities. He suggested the disagreements often arose 
between doctors who know the children well and so, in his view, wanted to offer 
appropriate treatment and those who do not know the children and wanted to 
offer less:  
  
“So I am thinking of intensive, neo-natal intensive care people, people 
who see the children when they are very sick and don’t get to know them 
as people and people who spend a lot of time getting to know those 
families and children; I’m thinking of palliative care and community 
paediatricians, perhaps general paediatrics and think what you find is 
that the people who get to know children, regard them as being, regard it 
as being more important to offer them appropriate treatment.” 
  
PICU consultants were criticised by several doctors for their attitudes towards 
disabled children.  Doctors gave examples, unprompted, of situations where 
they believed a PICU consultant had made an inappropriate judgment to 
withhold or withdraw treatment from a disabled child.  All the neurologists 
interviewed were critical of PICU consultants.  Dr 29, for example, talked of 
PICU consultants “wish to move neurology patients on in a way that is not 
always appropriate”, echoing what Dr 14 (Respiratory consultant) had said.   Dr 
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29 confirmed when asked to clarify what he meant by “move on” that he meant 
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.  Dr 1 (neurologist) also spoke of 
PICU consultants pressuring colleagues to get parents to agree to withdraw or 
withhold treatment from disabled children.  Dr 24 talked of “prejudicial 
assumptions” she had met from PICU consultants. She spoke of PICU 
consultants assuming that disabled children must have poor quality of lives and 
so should not receive PICU care.  She gave an example of a PICU consultant 
refusing disabled children intensive care based on a mistaken belief that they 
did not attend school. Dr 32 (Other) also suggested that PICU consultants did 
not see disabled children as people:  
“The problem is of course, that almost by their nature, intensivists, when 
they [see a disabled child] see just physical molecules if you like, they do 
not see any of the metaphysical person really, if I can call it that. It is not 
their fault, you know the child is unconscious when they are seeing them. 
I think it is difficult and I think, it is very inappropriate for intensivist to see 
themselves as gatekeepers for that reason”  
  
Doctors complained of PICU consultants seeing themselves as the ‘gate 
keepers’ of NHS resources. Dr 24 for example, spoke of being told: “I don’t think 
I can give her a resource” in relation to a disabled child she believed needed 
PICU treatment.  Dr 32 (Palliative Consultant) summed up a viewpoint, 
expressed by others;  
“I think there is misunderstanding with physicians particularly those in 
intensive care, that they are supposed to be gate keepers for the state to 
an extent. That is in my view absolutely ethically unjustifiable.”  
  
Several doctors spoke of having to advocate on behalf of disabled children with 
PICU consultants to get children treatment the doctors thought were in the 
child’s best interests.  Dr 24 (neurologist) for example, spoke “pleading with the 
intensivists.”  
  
Dr 18 (PICU), although a PICU specialist herself, also shared many of the 
concerns expressed about PICU consultants. She spoke of the fear and dread 
she saw in non-PICU colleagues when dealing with PICU colleagues reluctant 
to treat disabled children. 
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As well as criticising PICU consultants’ values, doctors also criticised PICU 
consultants for failing to properly assess disabled children. Although they did 
not use the term, they appeared to be complaining about PICU consultants’ use 
of heuristics.894 Dr 29 (neurologist) said:  
“You often find that they have made a mistake, quite honestly and they 
have grouped the whole set of things together and produced a single 
score and what they haven’t done is looked at the child’s islands of 
development which means that they have got potential.”  
  
As was seen earlier,724 doctors described a hierarchy of consultants, with PICU 
consultants viewed by non-PICU doctors as being ‘in charge’ when difficult 
decisions were being made.  The doctors identified differences in values as the 
source of these disagreements. Dr 14 summed up the view saying:  
“I think it is not so much medical, I think it is more down to belief systems 
and what one values. It comes down to one’s personal morality, that will 
come from our cultural background, one religious background and just 
what makes us really.’” 
  
The two PICU consultants interviewed perhaps best illustrate these differences 
in values.  As senior PICU consultants they worked with similar patient groups 
in a similar working environment, but expressed contrasting views. 
Disagreements among PICU consultants are now explored.   
 
7.1.2 Disagreements amongst PICU consultants  
 
Dr 17 and Dr 18, the two PICU consultants, spoke about disagreements they 
had with their respective PICU colleagues.   
  
Dr 17 described how she and other PICU consultants, who shared her values, 
restricted severely disabled children’s access to PICU. She described in 
essence, using heuristics, making decisions based on a type of child.  For 
example, Dr 17 described how she created her own tests to decide admission, 
such as whether a child could perform a particular physical task or had been to 
                                                 
724 Chapter six, para 5.2, p.254 
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PICU before. Dr 17 described herself as being more willing to withdraw 
intensive care than many of her colleagues.  As she spoke, Dr 17 conveyed as 
sense of pride through her tone of voice, in being recognised as being more 
willing to withdraw or withhold treatment from disabled children.  
“It interesting that most of time the group I work in there are two of us 
who have, you don’t want to be an outlier and I’m probably an outlier. 
Myself and one of my colleagues are known to be the doctors who will 
withdraw intensive therapy the most frequently, the most actively.”  
 
However, Dr 17 suggested that her approach was out of step with that of the 
majority of her colleagues and expressed a sense of her own vulnerability in this 
regard, talking as shall be seen in chapter nine725 of her fear of legal or 
disciplinary action being taken against her because of her stance.  She did 
however, from her tone, appeared to be very confident that her approach was 
the right one.  
  
Dr 18 the other PICU consultant interviewed, in contrast, used language and 
expressed views that had much more in common with the non-PICU doctors 
who worked long term with disabled children and were critical of PICU 
consultants. For example, she described children being admitted to PICU based 
on an assessment of their needs as an individual, rather than on the basis of a 
pre-determined heuristic, or ‘type’ of child.  She spoke about the benefits of 
treatment as well as the burdens and emphasised the need for each disabled 
child to be assessed as an individual.  She also talked of the importance of 
continually assessing children once they were receiving care.  She compared 
her approach to her PICU colleagues, who she complained were reluctant to 
change a plan to withdraw treatment even when there were clear signs that a 
disabled child was improving.  As the non-PICU consultants had done, she 
complained that many of her PICU consultants were unwilling to give disabled 
children the time they needed in PICU or parents the time she felt they needed 
to make difficult decisions.   
  
                                                 
725 Chapter nine, para 3.1, pp.365-369 
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Like Dr 17, Dr 18 also expressed a sense of vulnerability and isolation from her 
colleagues for taking a different approach to treating disabled children, despite 
the two doctors holding opposing viewpoints. One explanation for this is that the 
two consultants worked in different hospitals, perhaps in units where attitudes 
towards disabled children are at opposing ends of the spectrum.   
  
Both Dr 17 and Dr 18 when asked, offered explanations as why, in their views, 
PICU consultants have such diverse values and opinions as to the appropriate 
treatment for a disabled child.   
Dr 17 said:  
“Part of it is cultural, part of it is religious, part of it is ethical, I’m not a 
religious person, but part of it is probably is religion, em, part of it is your 
interface and interaction with family, so what they have said to you, as 
opposed to what they have said to other people, part of it is your 
experience”   
  
Dr 18 suggested, “some intensivists can be quite narrow in their way of 
thinking.” She also suggested doctors’ personal views and experiences could 
have an impact. She added that some PICU consultants often referred to 
disabled children as “no hopers” they tend to remember just the difficult cases, 
and in her view, they tend to remember the unusual cases of children who 
stayed in PICU long-term or had bad outcomes and forget the disabled children 
where PICU treatment had been quick and successful.  
  
Once again, as was seen in chapter five726 data from the doctors suggests that 
it is the doctors’ characteristics and values that influence their decisions rather 
than the child’s clinical presentation.   Doctors using their values in this way 
would seem to echo the concerns highlighted in the Kennedy Debate and be in 
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P a g e  | 267 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
7.1.3 Disagreement between doctors from different generations  
All the doctors interviewed were senior consultants, however, they ranged in 
age from doctors under 45 years to over 65 years.  Three older doctors spoke 
of younger consultants having a different attitude from their own when treating 
disabled child patients.  Dr 24 (neurologist) who qualified in the 1970s was 
one.  She spoke of a new generation of PICU consultants who in her view were 
too willing to treat disabled children without due regard to the children’s best 
interests.  She saw this being due to their disability awareness training:  
“[W]e have a newer generation of younger consultants, who have had a 
lot of disability awareness training, so they no longer discriminate 
negatively and deny resources to people, but they haven’t kind of 
acquired the wisdom.  
  
I think [they] are now very very keen to treat absolutely everybody and 
technically they can do lots of things and they often don’t have a real 
comprehension of how the child is and how they fit into the wider society 
and the family and so on, they don’t really see beyond the walls of the 
intensive care unit and we may have been working with the child for the 
last several years and have known that it has been getting more and 
more difficult and the family are on their knees and actually the long term 
is really not good and sometimes and sometimes the first thing we have 
to do is we to persuade our colleagues that, alright, they are in the 
hospital because the ambulance turned up, but we don’t infact have to 
put them on to a ventilator.” 
  
Dr 14 (Other), who qualified in the very early 1980s, also expressed concerns 
that younger consultants reflected too little on their difficult decisions for 
disabled children: 
“Over the last few years, maybe I am just getting old, there is a new fleet 
of doctors who are much less questioning, who are much more likely just 
to point and shoot and not to think about these bigger issues and I think 
there has been, as I said before, there has been a sea change in that 
people are much more likely just to follow parental wishes and part of 
that is not really weighing the burdens against benefits, just hearing the 
benefits, if the benefits are there are worth pursing at any costs.” 
 
Both the doctors suggested that the older doctors had a wisdom gained through 
experience, which they suggested the younger doctors lacked.  However, these 
doctors’ comments also suggest that changes in education, cultural and social 
attitudes and possibly even the law may have influenced the younger doctors.    
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What the doctors said about disagreements between doctors will now be 
analysed, this will be followed by discussion of what the doctors said about 
disagreements with parents. 
  
7.2 Discussion  
7.2.1 Softliners and Hardliners  
As found in chapter five,727 the doctors’ survey responses suggest that doctors 
can take very individualistic approaches to their difficult decisions for disabled 
children.  It was seen in chapter two728 that both commentators and 
investigations identified that decisions by doctors for disabled patients can be 
particularly values laden. The subsequent interview discussions with doctors 
seem to reinforce this.  However, the doctors seem to fall into two camps when 
making difficult decisions for disabled children.  In one camp were doctors, most 
often but not always, who had long-term relationships with the child and family, 
who seemed to tailor their decisions to the individual child; the ‘softliners’. In 
the other camp were doctors who tended to be, but again were not always, 
acute specialists, called in during a crisis, who did not have long-term 
relationships with children or families; the ‘hardliners’. Indeed, Dr 17 who 
seems to fit well within this second category used this label to describe herself 
and fellow PICU consultants who shared her values.  These labels have been 
adopted in the discussion in this chapter and the rest of this thesis, to describe 
the varying approaches of these two groups of doctors. These labels are 
particularly relevant to disagreements as the doctors suggest that most 
disagreements between doctors arise between the two camps.  Moreover, the 
doctors also suggest that it is the hardliners doctors who have disagreements 
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728 Chapter two, para 8, p.72, pp.75-79 and para 10, p. 82-91  
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  7.2.2 Softliner and hardliner characteristics  
In this study, softliner doctors tend to make full and wide-ranging best interest 
decision for the individual child, while a hardliner tends to use heuristics and 
treating according to ‘type’ of child.  The soft and hardliner distinction made 
here is about how the decisions are made, rather than the outcomes of those 
decisions.  A decision led by a softliner may lead to treatment being withheld or 
withdrawn, but will be based on a detailed analysis of the child’s best interests. 
It does however, seem from the doctors’ comments that, in general terms, the 
softliners’ approach tends more often to result in a child receiving treatment, 
whereas the hardliner doctors, will more actively withhold or withdraw 
treatment.  
 
It should be noted that the hardliner and softliner classification is devised by the 
researcher based on analysis of all the doctors’ surveys and interviews.  
Moreover, it is based both on the behaviours and values exhibited by the study 
participants themselves and also on the behaviours and values the study 
participants attribute to their colleagues.  For example, PICU consultants are 
particularly identified as being hardliners, as the doctors in this study repeatedly 
identified PICU consultants as exhibiting what have been classified in this study 
as hardliner attributes. 
 
Neurologists in contrast, seem more likely to be softliners.  To say that it is the 
doctors’ sub-specialisms which lead them to a particular ‘camp’ would, however, 
be too simplistic.  As was seen earlier, Dr 18, a PICU consultant, expressed 
opinions that put her in the softliner camp. There were also neurologists, for 
example, Dr 7 who expressed some views that were more in tune with that of a 
hardliner. Dr 14 suggested, that it may be more a case of doctors with particular 
values being drawn to certain specialisms, rather than a sub-specialism 
moulding a doctor’s values.  An example of this can perhaps be seen in the 
spread of doctors across the sub-specialisms who said they practice a religion, 
if we assume that, in very broad terms, following or not following a religion can 
be said to give some indication of a doctors’ values. As was seen in chapter 
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four729 89% of neurologists, 50% of PICU consultants and 40% of Other Doctors 
said they practiced a religion. While acknowledging that the sample size of this 
study is small, this might suggest that doctors with certain religious values are 
more or less likely to become neurologists.  In keeping with other studies,730 
doctors interviewed suggested that they saw their own and colleagues’ religious 
or non-religious values as impacting on difficult decisions for disabled children.   
 
The divide between hardliners and softliners is not binary, but perhaps more of 
a spectrum of positions.  For example, some of the older doctors in particular 
seem to straddle the two camps, most notably Drs 24 and 14.   
  
The doctors from the two ‘camps’ tended to speak differently about disabled 
children.  The softliners tended to talk about the positive aspects of a child’s life, 
such as close loving relationships with parents and siblings.  The hardliners, in 
contrast, tended to talk about the burdens of treatment to a child, for example 
the discomfort of being suctioned731 or the pain of blood tests.  Hardliners also 
stressed the risks of treatment, such as the possibility of a child becoming 
ventilator dependent and indeed, the burdens to the child of physical or 
cognitive impairments.    
  
In essence the two camps seemed to approach difficult decisions for disabled 
children from two sides of a best interests balance sheet,732 with the softliners 
                                                 
729 Chapter four, para 4.10, p.270 
 
730 For example, Cuttini, M, Nadai, M, Kaminski, M, Hansen, G, de Leeuw, Lenoir, S, Persson, J, et al 
(2000) End-of-life decisions in neonatal intensive care: physicians' self-reported practices in seven 
European countries, The Lancet 355.9221: 2112-2118 
 
731 ‘Suction is used to clear retained or excessive lower respiratory tract secretions in patients who are 
unable to do so effectively for themselves. This could be due to the presence of an artificial airway, such 
as an endotracheal or tracheostomy tube, or in patients who have a poor cough due to a variety of 
reasons such as excessive sedation or neurological involvement.’ Source 
http://www.gosh.nhs.uk/health-professionals/clinical-guidelines/suction, last accessed 20 August 2017  
 
732 The English High Court has suggested that doctors draw up a best interest balance sheet in which 
they list the pros and cons of treatment.  In A NHS trust v MB [2006], EWHC 507 (Fam) Holman J made 
the balance sheet available in his judgment. 
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looking largely to the benefits of treatments and the hardliners largely to the 
burdens.  If doctors from the two camps brought these two perspectives to 
difficult decisions for disabled children, in addition to seeking the views of others 
who know the child well, and where possible the child, it seems that optimum 
best interest decisions in line with professional and legal guidance would be 
made. However, the doctors in this study suggest this often does not happen, 
with instead, decisions being made by a limited number of, sometimes single 
doctor, using limited amounts of information known about the child and, 
sometimes, heuristics.  
  
7.2.3 Ethical Implications  
The importance of this to the Kennedy debate is clear.  The legitimacy of 
doctors making life or death decisions for disabled children based solely on their 
personal values is clearly ethically and indeed legally questionable.  Indeed, 
doctors rightly apply to the High Court if they believe a parent is allowing their 
religious values to determine the parent’s assessment of their child’s best 
interests.733 In contrast, doctors suggest a reluctance to challenge colleagues’ 
values, or indeed treatment decisions generally when they disagree with them, 
either formally or informally.  
  
Current ethical guidance on end-of-life best interest decisions provided to 
doctors by both the GMC and RCPCH recognises the subjective nature of 
qualitative best interest decisions.   The RCPCH 2015 guides doctors that:  
 ‘Courts have recognised that quality of life determinations should be 
based on the individual circumstances of the person taking account of his 
or her perceptions without discrimination; quality of life that could be 
considered intolerable to one who is able- bodied may not be intolerable 
                                                 
 
733 see for example Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v A & Others [2015] 
EWHC 2828 (Fam); where the hospital applied to court for an order that it was in the best interests of 
fourteen-month old twins with a progressive neuro-degenerative disorder to have life support removed. 
The parents had refused to consent to life support being withdrawn due to their Muslim faith. 
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to one who is born with disability or has developed long- term 
disability.’734   
  
It acknowledges that ‘all decisions about best interests of a child involve value 
judgements’735 and recognises that parties involved in a decision may 
disagree ‘because they have different values’736  Guidance from the GMC also 
cautions doctors: ‘You must be careful not to make judgments based on poorly 
informed or unfounded assumptions about the impact of a disability on a child or 
young person’s quality of life’.737 The guidance is less clear as to how doctors’ 
should address value judgments when they encounter them in their colleagues.   
 
Indeed, as has already been seen, the doctors do not seem to openly challenge 
colleagues. They were, at least in their discussions with the researcher, highly 
critical of colleagues who they perceived as allowing their values to influence 
decisions. However, while they also acknowledged that their own values 
influenced their own decisions, they seemed to see no problem with that.  A 
distinction can, however, perhaps be seen here.  On the one hand, the findings 
suggest that the softliners when making decisions, consult widely, looking at the 
child’s life more broadly, and then allowing their personal values, perhaps 
inevitably, to influence the decision they make, drawing on all that 
information.  On the other hand, the hardliners talk about using heuristics as the 
starting point for their decisions.  These heuristics, as described by the 
hardliners, seems to be based on assumptions, rather than informed knowledge 
about an individual child.  It seems then that for hardliners, their values are the 
deciding factor rather than an inevitable gloss on a wide-ranging assessment.  
                                                 
734 Larcher V, Craig F, Bhogal K, Wilkinson D, Brierley J, (2015) ‘Making decisions to limit treatment in 
life-limiting and life-threatening conditions in children: a framework for practice’, Archives of Disease in 
Childhood, 100, s1-s23, Para.2.3.6 
 




737 GMC, (2013), Good Medical Practice, GMC, London, para 96 
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One thing that is unclear, is the extent to which hardliner doctors when making 
decisions, are even aware of their colleagues’ concerns. Most softliners 
interviewed suggest they kept their concerns to themselves.  
 
A possible solution is recommended.  Just as doctors now have a duty of 
candour738 to patients and families, perhaps what is needed is an ethical duty 
included in GMC guidance (or possibly even a legal duty) requiring doctors to 
share with colleagues information they believe is important to best interest 
decisions.  Such a duty would perhaps empower reluctant doctors to put 
forward relevant information and voice concerns.  It would arguably help ensure 
best interest decisions are ethical and indeed legally sound and considered the 
child’s interest in the widest possible way. This is considered as a 
recommendation for research study in chapter ten.739   
 
RCPCH 2015, published just after doctors completed their interviews, makes 
clear that doctors have an individual and collective responsibility to act in a 
child’s best interests.911 It states:  
‘All members of the treating team need to be part of the decision-making 
process: their individual views should be sought and accorded due 
weight.’740  
  






                                                 
738 Regulation 20, Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 
 
739 Chapter ten, para 5.2, pp.400-401 
 
740 Larcher V, Craig F, Bhogal K, Wilkinson D, Brierley J, (2015) ‘Making decisions to limit treatment in 
life-limiting and life-threatening conditions in children: a framework for practice’, Archives of Disease in 
Childhood, 100, s1-s23, para 3.3.1 
 
P a g e  | 274 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
7.2.4  Different Values between different generations of doctors  
The second distinction discerned by doctors was between older, more 
experienced doctors and younger, newly qualified consultants, particularly 
between 1970s qualifiers and 1990s qualifiers, as to how they made difficult 
decisions for disabled children. These differences were also seen in the doctors’ 
survey responses, as was discussed in chapter five.741  
  
These differences raise the question as to what does influence doctors’ values? 
Some of the doctors made some suggestions about this in their interviews. It 
will be recalled that Dr 14 expressed the view that younger consultants were too 
willing to follow parents’ wishes and there does seem to be some indication that 
the older generation of doctors do take a more paternalistic approach, seeing 
themselves more often as the decision-makers, rather seeing best interest 
decisions as collective decisions.   
  
The ‘hidden curriculum’ was also considered earlier.742 It is of particular interest 
when considering differences in practice between different generations of 
doctors. As was seen in chapter four743 the doctors in this study, were, but for 
one senior registrar, all senior consultants who were all influential in their 
hospitals, some also strategically regionally and nationally. They were arguably 
not just elites744, but within the medical profession, ultra-elites.  If the hidden 
curriculum were at play, it might be expected, that junior colleagues would be 
highly influenced by them, in effect ‘copying’ how they make best interest 
decisions for disabled children.  However, both the older consultants in their 
interviews, and the younger consultants in their survey responses, seem to 
suggest that this is not the case.  Both seem to suggest that junior consultants 
                                                 
741 Chapter five, pp.181-236 
 
742 Chapter three, para 2.2, pp. 100-101 
 
743 Chapter four, figure 12, p.149 
 
744 Chapter three, para 2.2, pp.98-100 
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are approaching difficult decisions for disabled children differently from older 
consultants.  Both also seem to suggest that a greater recent awareness of 
disability and child rights, may be the catalyst for this perceived change in 
culture among paediatricians.   
  
As was seen in chapter two745 the legal landscape for disabled children has 
changed considerably since the 1970s and this has been reflected in the 
professional guidance produced for doctors by bodies such as the GMC. The 
needs of disabled patients increasingly feature on medical undergraduate 
curriculum, although significant challenges remain.746  The doctors’ responses 
suggest that this may have also had an impact on how doctors approach 
difficult decisions for disabled children, but it seems this might be so only for 
doctors who qualified since those changes came about.  The older doctors in 
this study would have been well established in their careers before these 
changes happened. It seems from the doctors’ comments that, at least with 
regard to difficult decisions for disabled children, once doctors are established 
in their careers, they gain confidence in their own approach and may not 
change the way they approach decisions when new guidance or even new 
legislation is published. As will be seen in part three of this thesis, if changes in 
the law or guidance occurred, with which they did not agree, doctors 
commented, as was seen with Dr 24’s comments about equality training, 
suggest doctors can resist these changes rather than assimilate them into their 
practice.747 
 
Doctors’ disagreements with parents were the final area of conflict raised by the 
doctors. What the doctors said in this regard is now presented and discussed.  
                                                 
745 Chapter two, pp. 23-94 
 
746 Tracy, J, McDonald, R (2015) Health and Disability: Partnership in Health care, Journal of Applied 
Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 28(1), pp.22-32 
 
747 Chapter nine, para 3.4, pp.374-378 
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7.3 Disagreements between doctors and parents 
7.3.1 What the doctors said  
Several of the doctors interviewed discussed disagreements between doctors 
and parents as to whether a child should continue to receive treatment, 
although they said much less about these disagreements than they did about 
disagreements with colleagues. As was seen in chapter four748 nineteen doctors 
(57%) cited communications with parents as the most difficult aspect of their 
decision-making.  Data from the surveyed doctors showed a difference between 
sub-specialities, with eight PICU consultants (80%) surveyed citing 
communication with parents as particularly difficult, whereas just three 
neurologists (33%) doing so.   
  
Dr 17 (PICU), suggested a doctor can feel pressured to act in accordance with 
parental wishes, rather than a child’s best wishes, to avoid complaints.  Dr 14 
(Other) who expressed views that could be classed as both softliner and 
hardliner, but taking his interview as a whole is more of a hardliner, also 
referred to the pressure doctors feel to follow parents’ wishes:  
“I think there has been a sea change in my career towards doing what 
the parents ask really and being rather reticent? to do what one feels is 
in the best interests of the child, if that is not what the parents want.” 
  
Dr 7, neurologist but a hardliner, spoke in very strong terms about parents who 
disagreed with doctors:  
“Their behaviour pattern is pathological, often bizarre.  
‘I’ve known colleagues who have been involved in extraordinary sets  
of circumstances where the parental pattern of behaviour is way outside 
the 97th percentile’” 
 
The hardliner doctors used language suggesting moral judgments when they 
talked about parents, for example describing them as “cruel” or “selfish” if 
parents’ views as to their child’s best interests differed from that of the 
doctors.  On the hand, as reported earlier, Dr 18 (softliner) also complained that 
                                                 
748  Chapter four, para 5.4, p.172 
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some hardliner PICU consultants are too negative when talking about a 
disabled child to parents, ruling out, often in her view inappropriately, any 
possibility of a child recovering from an acute illness.  Many of the comments 
from doctors interviewed, predominantly from the softliners, but also from some 
of the hardliners (for example Drs 7,14 and Dr 24749), suggest that they believe 
some hardliner doctors are inappropriately withdrawing or withholding treatment 
from disabled children.   
  
The softliners tended to talk about parents compassionately, talking of the pain 
parents suffer seeing their child seriously ill and possibly dying.  They tended to 
speak of the role parents play in supporting and caring for their children and 
parents’ expertise in their child’s health. Dr 18 (PICU), as was seen earlier, 
talked of the importance of giving parents time to come to terms with the fact 
their child was dying.  Dr 32 (Other) suggested that disagreements arose not so 
much from differences as to a child’s best interests, but, in his view, from the 
way in which hardliner doctors communicated with parents. He described 
colleagues as being too dismissive of parents’ opinions and the value the 
parents placed on their child’s life.   
  
7.3.2 Discussion  
Doctors in this study covered a full spectrum of viewpoints as to the role parents 
should play in end-of-life decisions, from those who saw the decision as one 
solely a decision for doctors, to those who saw it as the parents’ decision 
supported by doctors.   RCPCH 2015 tells doctors of a presumption that parents 
should always be involved in decisions to limit treatment and always be invited 
to take part in best interest decision-making.750 However, even when parents 
                                                 
749 These three doctors have all been classified as hardliners but were all situated on the spectrum of 
positions towards to softliner end of the hardliner doctors. 
 
750 Larcher V, Craig F, Bhogal K, Wilkinson D, Brierley J, (2015) ‘Making decisions to limit treatment in 
life-limiting and life-threatening conditions in children: a framework for practice’, Archives of Disease in 
Childhood, 100, s1-s23, para. 2.4.3 
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are included in the decision-making process, the doctors’ accounts suggested 
that often doctors see the purpose of discussions to convince parents to accept 
the doctors’ view of the child’s best interests, rather than an exchange of 
viewpoints.   
  
This study did not seek the views of parents, but others have studied parent 
involvement in best interest decisions for their children.  This wider research 
suggests parents commonly feel pressured by doctors to agree with the doctor’s 
viewpoint as to their child’s best interests.751  Smith et al’s752 review of thirty-four 
studies of the experiences parents of children with long-term conditions, 
including ten studies from the UK, found parents reported ‘information given 
quickly with little opportunity for discussion’753 Smith et al, along with other 
studies754 also report ‘parents describe difficulties in obtaining information’755 to 
enable them to make an informed decision. This does seem to suggest that 
doctors’ perceptions of decision-making discussions with parents and the 
extent, to which parents feel empowered to express their views in such 
discussions, may be somewhat different from parents’ perceptions and 
experiences.  
                                                 
751 Zaal-Schuller, IH, Willems DC, Ewals, FVPM, van Goudoever, J.B, de Vos MA, (2016) How parents and 
physicians experienced end-of-life decision-making for children with profound intellectual & multiple 
disabilities, Research in Developmental Disabilities, vol. 59, pp 293-293, p. 290; Brotherton, A, Abbott, J, 
(2012) Mothers’ process of decision making for gastrostomy placement. Qualitative Health Research, 
22(5), 587–59, p.590; de Vos, MA, Seeber AA, Gevers SK, Bos AP, Gevers, F, Willems, DL, (2015) Parents 
who wish no further treatment for their child, Journal of Medical Ethics, 41(2), 195-200, p.197; Guon, J, 
Wilfond, BS, Farlow, B, Bragg, T, Janvier, A (2014) Our children are not a diagnosis. The experience of 
parents who continue their pregnancy after a prenatal diagnosis of trisomy 13 or 18, American Journal 
of Medical Genetics, Part A, 164 A (2), 308-318, p.312 
 
752 Smith, J, Cheater, F, Bekker, H (2013) Parents experiences of living with a child with a long-term 
condition: a rapid structured review of the literature, Health Expectations, vol. 18, issue 4, 452-474 
 
753 Ibid, p.456 
 
754 see for example, Allen, KA (2014) Parental decision-making for medical complex infants and children. 
An integrated literature review, International Journal of Nursing Studies, 51(9), 1289-1304 
 
755 Smith, J, Cheater, F, Bekker, H (2013) Parents experiences of living with a child with a long-term 
condition: a rapid structured review of the literature, Health Expectations, vol. 18, issue 4, 452-474 
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As was seen, the hardliner and softliner doctors also tended to talk very 
differently about parents.  Indeed, hardliner doctors were more likely to report 
disagreements with parents than softliner doctors.756   
  
This also echoes the findings of wider studies, which have also found that 
doctors with long-term relationships with a child and family are less likely to 
have disagreements with parents at the end of a child’s life.757 Part of the 
reason for this may well be that the doctors who work with the families long-
term, this study suggests,758 seem to have more of a shared perception of a 
child with the child’s parents, than with some of their acute colleagues and 
shared perceptions as to the factors to be considered and their weight.  Indeed, 
there are certainly echoes between the concerns the softliner doctors voiced 
about the values and opinions of some of their colleagues as to the quality of 
life of severely disabled children, with the concerns voiced by parents about the 
perceived negative attitudes of some doctors in other studies. Parental 
concerns that the lives of disabled children, particularly those with cognitive 
impairment are not understood or valued by doctors making end-of-life 
decisions about their child are widely reported in research studies.759 
  
Comments from several of the doctors suggested that rather than using ‘best 
interests’ to open up discussions and consider the child’s welfare widely, as the 
law and professional ethical guidance say they should, doctors seem to use the 
term to close down discussions; asserting their clinical expertise and dismissing 
                                                 
756 Chapter six, para 7.3, pp. 276-282 
 
757 Zaal-Schuller, IH, Willems, DC, Ewals, FVPM, van Goudoever, JB, de Vos MA, (2016) How parents and 
physicians experienced end-of-life decision-making for children with profound intellectual & multiple 
disabilities, Research in Developmental Disabilities, vol. 59, pp 293-293, p.287 
 
758 Chapter five, para 7, pp.235-236 
 
759 Zaal-Schuller, IH, Willems, DC, Ewals, FVPM, van Goudoever, JB, de Vos MA, (2016) How parents and 
physicians experienced end-of-life decision-making for children with profound intellectual & multiple 
disabilities, Research in Developmental Disabilities, vol. 59, pp 293-293, p.291 
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parents’ views as not in the child’s best interests, without full discussion.  For 
example, Dr 7 and Dr 24 both spoke of Muslim families who had children where 
there were disagreements between the doctors and the families as to whether 
treatment should continue.  Both spoke of the families talking of their child 
having a quality of life worth preserving, but both doctors attributed these beliefs 
to the families’ religious beliefs although Dr 7 added, unprompted he was 
unsure why he did this.   Dr.18 (softliner), (echoing what Dr 32 said about 
doctors being dismissive of parents’ views) also spoke of hardliner colleagues 
closing down options and discussions in the negative language they used about 
the children and of how compared with her hardliner colleagues, she was 
prepared to give families more time to come to a decision saying:  
“I’m prepared to give parents, families and the child a little bit more time 
to come around to decisions about withdrawing or withholding, whereas 
they more keen to set limits and withhold and withdraw and go down the 
legal route and all that, rather than trying to get the parents round by 
talking to them and giving them a bit more time”  
  
These finding are also echoed in studies of parents and more widely patients 
reported experiences of shared decisions making, for example, Joseph-Williams 
et al760 in their systematic review of barriers to shared decision making found   
‘Authoritarian or dismissive clinicians who dominate decision-making 
encounters, do not listen to or respect patient’s concerns, or use 
negative verbal or non-verbal behaviours as a barrier to shared decision-
making for many patients’.761  
 
The disagreements with parents raise ethical questions in respect of the child, 
the parents and the doctors. For the child, the same point can be made as was 
made earlier, to question how ethically and legally sound a decision can be 
deemed to be if information, in this case known to a parent and pertinent to the 
decision, is not considered by the decision-maker.    
                                                 
760 Joseph-Williams. N, Elwyn, G, Edwards, A (2014) Knowledge is not power for patients: A systematic 
review and thematic synthesis of patient-reported barriers and facilitators to shared-decision making, 
Patient Education & Counseling, 94. 291-309 
 
761 Ibid, p.305 
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Turning to the position of the parent; the doctors in this study seemed unclear 
as to the extent of any ethical duty they had towards a child’s parents.  RCPCH 
2015 describes under ‘fundamental considerations’ doctors’ duty to a child’s 
parents, but is less clear as to the nature and extent of that duty:   
‘Children’s healthcare professionals have an additional duty to the child’s 
family. Part of good paediatric care involves an assessment of the harms 
and benefits for parents for families as a whole. Challenge may arise 
when the duty to benefit the child conflicts with a duty to the parents’.762  
   
Some softliner doctors suggested that the decision-making process, as much as 
the whether a child lives or dies, can also impact on parents’ wellbeing.  The 
doctors suggested parents want to be fully involved in the decision to ensure all 
relevant aspects of the child’s life are fully examined and all options are fully 
explored.  Indeed, as shall be seen in chapter nine, the few doctors who had 
been involved in court cases, reported that while both families and doctors felt 
initial concerns at lawyers being involved, they ultimately found it helpful and 
experienced relief that the child’s best interests had been fully explored and 
scrutinised.  Just as there seems to be a moral imperative to ensure all known 
information about a child is considered in best interest decisions so too, this 
study, alongside other research in the field, seems to suggest, that it is 
important for doctors to ensure that parents are fully involved in the 
decisions.  This is critical not just to ensure an ethically sound and informed 
decision is made about the child, but also help safeguard the parents’ mental 
and physical well-being, arguably also an ethically important consideration for 
doctors involved.  Although this thesis did not examine the issue, it seems likely 
that a decision-making process fraught with conflict or where some doctors feel 
excluded from the decision for whatever reason, is also likely to have 
detrimental impact on the doctors involved.  Indeed, the comment by Dr 14, (a 
doctor as was seen earlier, although close on the hardliner/softliner spectrum to 
                                                 
762 Larcher V, Craig F, Bhogal K, Wilkinson D, Brierley J, (2015) ‘Making decisions to limit treatment in 
life-limiting and life-threatening conditions in children: a framework for practice’, Archives of Disease in 
Childhood, 100, s1-s23, para 2.4.1 
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softliners classified overall as a hardliner) about sleepless nights and the moral 




The doctors identified uncertainty and disagreements as the two biggest 
barriers they faced when making difficult decisions for disabled 
children.  Although the doctors talked about these two factors as separate 
issues, it does seem that they are in fact closely interlinked.  It seems from 
discussions with doctors that much of the disagreement arises because doctors 
approach the uncertainty they face in different ways.  The softliners seem to 
want to address uncertainty by drawing on as many people and as much 
information as possible, when they lead on decisions. The softliners’ approach 
seems to be in-line with the doctors’ professional guidance and the 
jurisprudence of the English High Court.  In contrast the hardliners seem much 
more inclined to fall back on heuristics, which often seem to be based on self -
created rules, or at least assumptions about disabled children and their 
lives.  This approach seems to be at odds with the wide-ranging approach 
advocated by the doctors’ professional guidance and the courts.  It also seems 
to be an approach which would cause Kennedy concern. 
 
There however, seems to be a link between the softliners reluctance to 
challenge, in particular PICU consultants, when they think decisions are not 
being made in a child’s best interests and to volunteer information they have 
about the child, and the hardliners using heuristics, it seems in part, to fill the 
gaps in the doctors’ knowledge about an individual child. Certainly, as has been 
seen, wider research with doctors and parents suggests that parents’ 
perceptions of best interest discussions can be very different from how doctors 
believe them to have been and perhaps intend them to be.  It also seems 
possible that the hardliners, the softliners in this study criticise, are unaware of 
their softliner colleagues’ concerns, or indeed, parents’.   
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Francis J, suggested at the end of the first judgment in recent and much 
publicised litigation concerning infant Charlie Gard,763 that in cases where there 
is clear disagreement between parents and doctors, third party assistance, 
perhaps mediation is needed to ensure a child’s best interests are fully 
explored.  In that case, there was no disagreement between the treating 
doctors. The doctors in this study suggest, however, that disagreement between 
doctors can be a common problem, with as was seen earlier938 twenty-six 
doctors in this study (78%) reporting it as something they experience when best 
interest decisions are being made for disabled children.   As has been argued, 
there do seem to be some solutions, most notably for best interest decisions to 
be made in the full and detailed way required by the doctors’ professional 
ethical guidance and the law.  As has also been argued, when dealing with 
children beyond infancy, and increasingly so the older the child becomes, much 
of the uncertainty inherent in best interest decisions for infants can be overcome 
by drawing on available information about the child. Indeed, it is likely that the 
children who are the focus of this study have all aspects of their lives much 
more closely documented than their non-disabled peers.  
  
The factors identified in this chapter it seems, are preventing the ethically sound 
examination of some disabled children’s best interests, possibly to their 
detriment as well as that of their parents and the doctors involved. Perhaps, if 
Francis J’s suggestion of mediation is seen as a step too far for day to day best 
interest decisions, instead, best interest discussions could be led by someone 
not directly involved in the care of the child, who is trained in the task, and 
skilled at ensuring all voices are heard, and also educated in the relevant 
professional guidance and law. This could be a positive way forward to help 
ensure best interest decisions are made for disabled children, as they should 
be.  It could also help address the concerns the Kennedy Debate raises, 
particularly if it encouraged wider participation in best interest decisions by 
relevant expert, such as, the child’s parents and education staff. 
                                                 
763 Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates & Gard [2017] EWHC 972 (Fam); para 130 
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It can be argued that there may be occasions when treatment is needed so 
quickly that the time is not available to make best interest decisions in a manner 
that is ideal, both ethically and legally.  The doctors in this study suggest that for 
children who are the focus of this study, such occasions will be rare as acute 
events can be anticipated, planned for and the agreed decision as to the child’s 
best interests documented.  Moreover, if such an event did arise, doctors are 
now guided by RCPCH 2015 to give treatment and then have the discussions 
afterwards.764 It does seem that better application by doctors of current 
professional ethical guidance would help address much of the uncertainty and 
avoid many of the disagreements which the doctors in this study identify as 
barriers to good best interest decisions for severely disabled children.  
  
This thesis now moves to part three, where the focus moves from the detail of 
doctors’ decisions for disabled children to consideration of the part played if 
any, by law in those decisions. 
  
                                                 
764 Larcher V, Craig F, Bhogal K, Wilkinson D, Brierley J, (2015) ‘Making decisions to limit treatment in 
life-limiting and life-threatening conditions in children: a framework for practice’, Archives of Disease in 
Childhood, 100, s1-s23, para 3.1.2, s.13 
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This thesis now adopts a legal consciousness theoretical framework to analyse 
the doctors’ difficult decisions for severely disabled children. This is needed as 
the existing lenses used so far, do not adequately explain how doctors use and 
understand the law when deciding for disabled children. 
 
  ‘Legal consciousness’ is ‘a term of art within the sociology of law’.765  It is 
concerned with how non-lawyers766 use and understand law.767 Legal 
consciousness is not what individuals think about the law, nor a set of opinions 
about the law, but rather a process used to create meaning in everyday life in 
relation to the law.768 Using legal consciousness theory will help in an 
understanding of how the doctors make sense of their everyday difficult 
decisions for disabled children.  It is concerned with how they ‘interpret, use, 
and resist law, and how they embed and re-enact those meanings in their 
practical everyday settings’.769   
 
                                                 
765 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74 
766 Although as will be seen some scholars have more recently used it to study lawyers. 
767 Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1992) Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An Account of Legal 
Consciousness, New Eng. L. Rev, Vol. 26, at p.731 
768 Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1998) The Common Place of Law, Stories from everyday life, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, p.247 
769 Davies, M (2017) ‘Law Unlimited,’ Routledge, Abington, Oxford 
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It was seen in chapter four770 that the doctors (but for two participants), 
identified end-of-life treatment decisions, as the most difficult ones they face 
when working with severely disabled children. It is when life and death 
decisions are being made, that the interface between law and medicine is at its 
sharpest. It was also seen in part two771 that by their own account, doctors do 
not always consult widely, as they are guided to do by the law and their 
professional ethical guidance.772   As was seen in chapter four,773 doctors’ 
professional guidance, in essence, guides them to follow the law as it relates to 
best interest decisions for children.  This thesis is interested in what the doctors 
say about ethics, but it is their legal consciousness, rather than their ethical 
consciousness, which is explored.  For example, do the doctors embed the law 
as it is ‘on the books’ into their everyday lives?774 Alternatively, do they resist 
this interpretation of best interests and apply their own tests as to when 
treatment should be withheld or given?  Law in this thesis is used broadly to 
include anything the doctors say about legal issues, including but not limited to, 
legislation, case law and soft law such as professional guidance.775 
 
In adopting a legal consciousness approach, it is assumed that best interest 
decisions are first and foremost legal decisions, where a test established in law 
is the one to be applied.  This assumption is based on the fact that the 
jurisprudence of the English High Court states clearly that the ultimate decider 
                                                 
770 Chapter four, para 5.1, p.168 
771 Chapter four, para 6, pp.173-179 
772 Chapter four, para 3, pp.142-145 
773 Ibid 
774 Merry, SE (1990) Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness Among Working Class 
Americans, Chicago Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago, p.5 
775 For example, professional guidance issued by the Royal Medical Colleges or the General Medical 
Council 
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of a child’s best interests is the court.776  In contrast, that same jurisprudence 
clearly states that the courts will not interfere with a doctor’s clinical 
judgment.777 A conclusion is therefore drawn, that a best interest decision is a 
legal one, rather than a medical one, with medical evidence playing an 
important part in that decision. It is acknowledged that this interpretation of the 
best interest test is indicative of the author’s own legal consciousness778 and 
that it is possible, if not likely, that as non-lawyers, the doctors in this study may 
see the best interest test differently.779 It is how the doctors see the best interest 
test, how ‘it affects their lives and defines their relationships’,780 which is the 
focus of the rest of this study. 
 
This chapter will explain legal consciousness theory, how it will help further an 
understanding of doctors’ best interest decisions, and where this thesis is 
located in the extant body of legal consciousness scholarship.  The situation of 
study participants is significant in legal consciousness scholarship,781 so this 
chapter will then say something about the structures, both legal and non-
legal,782 within which the doctors are situated.  This chapter will conclude by 
summarising how using legal consciousness theory adds to an understanding of 
                                                 
776 Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] [1991] Fam. 33; [1991] 2 W.L.R. 140 
777 Ibid 
778 Chapter one, paras 5.2-5.3, pp.12-21 
779 Merry, S. E. (1992). Culture, power, and the discourse of law. NYL Sch. L. Rev., 37, 209. 
780 Ibid 
781 Marshall, AM, Barclay, S (2003) In their own words: how ordinary people construct the legal world, 
Law & Social Inquiry, 28(3), 617-628; Merry, SE (1990) Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal 
Consciousness Among Working Class Americans, Chicago Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago; Garcia-Villegas, 
M (2003) Symbolic Power without violence? Critical comments on legal consciousness studies, 
International Journal of Semiotics of Law, 16(4), 363-393; Hoffman, EA, (2003) Legal consciousness and 
dispute resolution: different disputing behavior at two similar taxicab companies, Law Soc. Inq, 28:691–
718 
782 Although it is acknowledged that perhaps this distinction may not be a valid one within legal 
consciousness theory. 
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paediatricians’ best interest decisions for disabled children and in turn, how 
studying doctors’ best interest decision-making, adds to an understanding of 
legal consciousness. 
 
2. Development of Legal Consciousness Theory 
 
Legal Consciousness emerged as a socio-legal theory in the USA in the 1970s 
and 1980s; just as in the UK, Kennedy783 was questioning which decisions were 
legitimate ones for doctors to make.  Legal consciousness became more 
prominent and was adopted by scholars in the UK and Europe in the 1990s.784   
Traditionally, it was used to examine the lives of marginalised, disempowered or 
discriminated against groups, where the interaction with the law was often very 
clear: for example, Bumiller’s785 study of victims of discrimination; Merry’s786 
study of working class Americans; and Sarat’s787 study of welfare recipients.  
This focus has continued in more recent times, for example, Abrego’s788 study 
of undocumented Latinos; Blackstone’s789 study of victims of sexual 
                                                 
783 Ian Kennedy, What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, (Middlesex Hospital Medical School, London 
1979). Also published in an amended form in Ian Kennedy, Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, (OUP 2001) 19-31 
784 Engel, DM, (1998) ‘How Does Law Matter in the Constitution of Legal Consciousness?’ in Garth, BG, 
Sarat, A, (Eds) How Does Law Matter? Northwestern University Press, Illinois 
785 Bumiller, K (1988) The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of Victims, John Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore 
786 Merry, SE (1990) Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness Among Working Class 
Americans, Chicago Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago 
787 Sarat ,A,  (1990) ‘The law is all over’: power, resistance and the legal consciousness of the welfare 
poor, Yale J. Law Humanit. 2:343– 79  
788 Abrego, LJ (2011) Legal consciousness of undocumented Latinos: Fear and stigma as barriers to 
claims‐making for first‐and 1.5‐generation immigrants, Law & Society Review, 45(2), 337-370 
789 Blackstone, A, Uggen, C, McLaughlin, H (2009) Legal consciousness and responses to sexual 
harassment, Law & society review, 43(3), 631-668 
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harassment, and Halliday et al’s790 study of relatives of people with chronic 
disorders of consciousness.  The ‘ordinary’ status of these participants 
emphasises the power dynamic, the comparative power of the different actors 
and the power of law itself.791 Studying ‘ordinary lives’ - lives of people who 
commonly simply would not have access to law in its conventional sense of 
lawyers and courtrooms - also meant that law as it impacted on day-to-day 
lives, rather than in extraordinary circumstances, could be examined.   
 
The doctors in this study, were, as has been seen, elites, in some cases, at 
least professionally, ultra-elites,792 so significantly distinguishable from the 
participants traditionally studied by legal consciousness scholars.  Doctors as a 
profession are also seen by those outside the profession as powerful,793 in stark 
contrast to the traditional study participants.  However, legal consciousness is 
concerned with what the participants think and feel, and as Nimmon and 
Stenos-Hayes794 found in their study of thirty experienced doctors, they do not 
necessarily perceive themselves as being powerful.  Moreover, power is relative 
to another individual or groups.  A doctor’s perception of his or her own power in 
a given situation, will, it seems, impact on his or her legal consciousness. It will 
play an important part in how the doctor defines relationships, with for example 
colleagues, patients or their families or indeed, with the law. 
 
                                                 
790 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74 
791 Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1992) Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An Account of Legal 
Consciousness, New Eng. L. Rev, Vol. 26, at p. 731 
792 Chapter three, para 2.2, p.99 
793 See for example: Kennedy, I, (1979). What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital 
Medical School, London, Published in an amended form in Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in 
Medical Law and Ethics, OUP, Oxford, p.27 
794 Nimmon, L, Stenfors-Hayes, T (2016) The ‘Handling’ of power in the physician-patient encounter: 
perceptions from experienced physicians. BMC medical education, 16(1), p.114 
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Legal consciousness scholarship takes law far beyond the study of case law.  
As Halliday and Morgan identify,795 if the study of law is restricted to the study of 
case law, with most disputes not being litigated and only a small percentage of 
those reaching trial, it will be restricted to the unusual, may be even unique 
cases, not the everyday.  If only case law and lawyers are studied, the true 
impact of law on society will remain unknown.  Legal consciousness studies are 
therefore the study of people’s everyday experience of law.  It ‘decenters formal 
institutions and procedures and takes seriously the idea that ordinary people 
can be legal actors’.796 
 
Doctors making best interest decisions illustrate this particularly vividly.  When 
making these decisions, doctors are in possibly a unique situation of having to 
interpret and apply a legal test.  It has been argued in part two,797 that doctors 
can be said to be acting in a quasi-judicial role, adjudicating as to a child’s best 
interests, despite not being legally trained.  Indeed, this in essence is what 
Kennedy argues.798  The nature of the doctors’ decisions; the doctors’ 
perception of the importance of law to those decisions and the doctor’s training 
and education in law, rights and ethics are all explored in chapters eight and 
nine.799 
 
This study follows a transition in legal consciousness studies, away from the 
study of the marginalised, disempowered or discriminated against, to the study 
                                                 
795 Halliday, S, Morgan, B (2013) I Fought the Law and the law Won? Legal Consciousness and the Critical 
Imagination, Current Legal Problems, vol. 66, pp.1-32, p.2 
796 Marshall, AM, Barclay, S (2003) In their own words: how ordinary people construct the legal world, 
Law & Social Inquiry, 28(3), 617-628 
797 Chapter five, para 5.8, p. 225 
798 Kennedy, I, (1979). What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, published in an amended form Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
799 Chapter eight, pp.323-346, chapter nine, pp.347-380 
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of more mundane, often workplace situations.  For example, Cooper’s800 study 
of local government officers; Hoffman’s801 study of taxi-cab Drivers; and 
Albiston’s802 study of workers’ family and medical leave.  Kennedy803 and 
Jaremba804 both push the boundaries of legal consciousness scholarship 
significantly, studying as they do, in the first case, American lawyers and in the 
second Polish judges, moving from marginalised non-lawyers to elite decision-
makers and lawyers. However, the doctors in this study can, despite any 
perception they may have themselves, be seen to be more obviously an elite 
than Coopers and Hoffman’s participants and - unlike Kennedy’s and Jaremba’s 
participants, are not lawyers. This thesis therefore expands on existing legal 
consciousness scholarship by examining a non-legal elite making a legal (albeit 
also medical) decision.  This is an important next step in legal 
consciousness studies, because it creates a bridge between existing 
studies.  It also illustrates vividly the extent to which non-lawyers can 
create and apply law that affects not only their own lives, but perhaps 
even more so, that of their child patients and families. 
 
3. The creation of legal consciousness 
 
The situation of the study’s participants is important in legal consciousness 
studies and more is said about the doctors’ situation later in this chapter.  It 
                                                 
800 Cooper, D (1995) Local Government Legal Consciousness in the shadow of Juridification,  Journal of 
Law and Society,  22(4), 506-26 
801 Hoffman, EA, (2003) Legal consciousness and dispute resolution: different disputing behavior at two 
similar taxicab companies, Law Soc. Inq, 28:691–718 
802 Albiston, CR (2006) ‘Legal Consciousness and Workplace Rights’, chapter 3 in Fleury-Steiner B, Nielsen 
LB (Eds), The New Civil Rights Research, A Constitutive Approach, Ashgate Publishers Ltd, Oxford, p.55-
76 
803 Kennedy, D (1980) ‘Towards an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical 
Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940’, in Spitzer S (Ed) Research in Law and Sociology, vol. 3, 3-24, JAI 
Press, Greenwich CT  
804 Jaremba, U (2013) National Judges as EU law judges: The Polish civil law system, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden  
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provides a context within which the participants’ legal consciousness can be 
better explored and understood.805  More than that, context is an important part 
of creating participants’ legal consciousness.806  Garcia-Villegas807 criticises 
Ewick and Silbey808 for failing to investigate the relationship between their 
participants’ status in society and their legal consciousness.  This seems 
particularly important in this study.  How the doctors see themselves in society, 
in relation to colleagues, to patients and their families, to others, indeed to the 
law, will be reflected in their legal consciousness.  For example, it is possible to 
imagine that if a doctor sees himself or herself as being in a senior position in a 
hierarchy in relation to a colleague or  parent, the doctor will potentially perceive 
best interest decisions differently from a doctor who sees him or herself as 
working with colleagues and parents in an equal partnership.  Indeed, the 
central tenet of Hoffman’s809 study is the way in which each group of taxi 
drivers, in two very different taxicab firms,810 create a different legal 
consciousness.   In chapter eight811 it will be seen that two PICU consultants 
working in different units seem to have very different approaches to best 
interest decisions and different legal consciousness.  However, while a 
participant’s situation seems important in creating his or her legal 
consciousness, there are perhaps surprising similarities to be found between 
                                                 
805 Marshall, AM, Barclay, S (2003) In their own words: how ordinary people construct the legal world, 
Law & Social Inquiry, 28(3), 617-628, p. 617 
806 Merry, SE (1990) Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness Among Working Class 
Americans, Chicago Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago 
807 Garcia-Villegas, M (2003) Symbolic Power without violence? Critical comments on legal 
consciousness studies, International Journal of Semiotics of Law, 16(4), 363-393, p.386 
808 Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1992) Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An Account of Legal 
Consciousness, New Eng. L. Rev, Vol. 26, & Ewick, P, Silbey. SS (1999) Common Knowledge and 
Ideological Critique, Law and Society Rev, 33, 1027 
809 Hoffman, EA, (2003) Legal consciousness and dispute resolution: different disputing behavior at two 
similar taxicab companies, Law Soc. Inq, 28:691–718 
810 One was co-operative and the other a more traditional hierarchical company. 
811 Chapter eight, pp.323-346 
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quite disparate groups. For example, Cooper812 reports finding unexpected 
similarities in the legal consciousness of the relatively socio-economically 
secure local government officers in her study, to the welfare poor in Sarat’s.813 
Although Cooper does not make the point, this could perhaps be because, as 
the Nimmon and Stenos-Hayes814 study mentioned earlier found, some 
individuals may not perceive themselves as powerful and influential, as others 
do. Legal consciousness is essentially about self-perceptions.  Groups 
perceived by others as elite, may perceive themselves as vulnerable. As will be 
seen in chapter nine,815 this seems to be important in this study. 
 
What the literature makes very clear is that the creation of legal consciousness 
is a complex process. Social practices;816 unconscious ideas;817 habitual 
patterns of talk and action;818 background assumptions819 and past 
experience820 all play an important part.  Legal consciousness is not a passive 
                                                 
812 Cooper, D (1995) Local Government Legal Consciousness in the shadow of Juridification,  Journal of 
Law and Society,  22(4), 506-26, p.510 
813 Sarat ,A, (1990) ‘The law is all over’: power, resistance and the legal consciousness of the welfare 
poor, Yale J. Law Humanit. 2:343– 79 
814 Nimmon, L, Stenfors-Hayes, T (2016) The ‘Handling’ of power in the physician-patient encounter: 
perceptions from experienced physicians. BMC medical education, 16(1), p.114 
815 Chapter nine , para 3, pp.361-378 
816 Marshall, AM, Barclay, S (2003) In their own words: how ordinary people construct the legal world, 
Law & Social Inquiry, 28(3), 617-628, p.625; Silbey, SS (2005) After legal consciousness, Annu. Rev. Law 
Soc. Sci, 1, 323-368, p. 327 & Garcia-Villegas, M (2003) Symbolic Power without violence? Critical 
comments on legal consciousness studies, International Journal of Semiotics of Law, 16(4), 363-393, 
p.365 
817 Nielsen, B, (2000) Situating Legal consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens About 
Law and Street Harassment Law and Society Review, p.1058 
818 Merry, SE (1990) Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness Among Working Class 
Americans, Chicago Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 5 
819 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74, p. 57 
820 Marshall, AM, Barclay, S (2003) In their own words: how ordinary people construct the legal world, 
Law & Social Inquiry, 28(3), 617-628, p.622 
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reaction to the law.  It is a dynamic interaction by which individuals construct 
their understanding of law, creating different meanings of the law based on their 
individual identities.821 This can be seen in this thesis in the way individual 
doctors create different understandings of best interests, through their 
interpretations of the test in the light of their experiences, assumptions, 
unconscious ideas and professional and personal backgrounds.  
 
Central to legal consciousness theory is the belief that law does not just 
construct individuals’ lives, but individuals also construct the law.822 Individuals 
are seen not only to challenge existing meanings and understandings about 
their lives by drawing on the law, but also to draw on existing non-legal 
discourses to challenge changes in the law.823  Individuals constantly interpret 
the law and in so doing create ‘new versions of legality’.824 Thus, for legal 
consciousness scholars, ‘[L]aw acts as an important site for the construction of 
meaning’.825  As will be seen in chapter nine,826 the doctors in this study can 
clearly be seen to create their own meanings of best interests, drawing, in 
particular, on medical but also wider discourses, to recreate the law and at 
times challenging the law (whether consciously or not). It seems that the unique 
position of the doctors interviewed in this thesis, as non-lawyers but undertaking 
                                                 
821 Fleury-Steiner, B, Nielsen, LB, (2006) The New Civil Rights Research, A Constitutive Approach, Ashgate 
Publishers Ltd, Oxford 
822 Mezey, N (2001) Out of the ordinary: law, power, culture, and the commonplace, Law & Social 
Inquiry, 26(1), 145-167, p.148 
823 Ibid p.6 
824 Marshall, AM, Barclay, S (2003) In their own words: how ordinary people construct the legal world, 
Law & Social Inquiry, 28(3), 617-628, p. 618 
825 Merry, SE (1990) Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness Among Working Class 
Americans, Chicago Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 2 
826 Chapter Nine, pp. 347-380 
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what is clearly, at least to lawyers,827 an obviously legal task, emphasises very 
vividly, the way in which non-lawyers can and do construct law.  Shining a light 
on the way in which non-lawyers create law is important. It allows for questions 
to be asked about the legitimacy of what individuals, here the doctors, are 
doing.  They can be asked, as Kennedy828 did, about doctors’ competence and 
expertise to make best interest decisions.  Questions can also be asked about 
whether sufficient checks and balances are in place to protect those, in the case 
of this study, severely disabled children, who lives are affected by the actions 
and decisions of these law creators. 
 
This process of construction is seen by scholars829 to be a collective 
phenomenon, the interplay between members of a group being an important 
part of the creative and construction process. Engel sees this as the attraction 
of legal consciousness theory as it enables researchers to study the thoughts of 
whole groups or even whole cultures.830 This is an obvious attraction of this 
theory for this study of doctors.   
 
Other scholars talk much more of individuals, describing, for example, legal 
consciousness as ‘the interplay between individuals and the law’.831  Silbey is 
critical of the individual focus, seeing it as weakening the power and potential of 
legal consciousness theory as an analytical tool, making the focus too 
                                                 
827 For example: Kennedy, I, (1979). What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital 
Medical School, London, Published in an amended form in Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in 
Medical Law and Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31. 
828 Ibid 
829 Silbey, SS (2005) After legal consciousness, Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci, 1, 323-368, p.333 
830 Engel, DM, (1998) ‘How Does Law Matter in the Constitution of Legal Consciousness?’ in Garth, BG, 
Sarat, A, (Eds) How Does Law Matter? Northwestern University Press, Illinois, p.111 
831 Fleury-Steiner, B, Nielsen, LB, (2006) The New Civil Rights Research, A Constitutive Approach, Ashgate 
Publishers Ltd, Oxford, p. 4 
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narrow.832 Silbey went as far as to say an individual focus made the purpose of 
continuing legal consciousness as a discipline questionable.833  Marshall834 
takes a different view, seeing the emphasis on the individual as allowing 
researchers to explain why wide variations in legal consciousness can occur in 
individuals who seem to be ‘similarly situated.’835  
 
Marshall’s argument does seem to have merit in the context of doctors in this 
study. Doctors who appear to be similarly situated, for example working as 
PICU consultants, seem to have very different legal consciousness. However, 
as was said earlier, the creation of legal consciousness is a complex process.  
All individuals are multi-dimensional, with cotemporaneous membership of 
several different groups.  A particular group is also likely to impact on the 
individuals within it differently, perhaps depending, to an extent, as to how 
strongly the individual identifies with that group.  To give an example, a doctor 
may identify strongly with colleagues, adopting their values and beliefs. Another 
doctor in the same group may reject those values and beliefs and so the group 
may help shape their legal consciousness very differently.  Because individuals 
are so multi-dimensional it is also very difficult to say with certainty which 
groups to which an individual belongs, contributed to the creation of an 
individual’s legal consciousness; nor indeed, which individuals within a group 
and which aspects of those individuals, contributed to a group legal 
consciousness. Presumably the answer is that all the groups and individuals 
contributed, but it is unknown to what extent.   
 
                                                 
832 Silbey, SS (2005) After legal consciousness, Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci, 1, 323-368, p.324 
833 Ibid 
834 Marshall, AM, Barclay, S (2003) In their own words: how ordinary people construct the legal world, 
Law & Social Inquiry, 28(3), 617-628 
835 Ibid, pp.263-264 
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There is also merit in Silbey’s argument that legal consciousness looses its 
point if it begins examining individuals rather than groups. The question, then, 
becomes why study individuals if they are all so different?  Can anything be 
learnt from studying the legal consciousness of an individual that can helpfully 
be more widely applied?  The answer seems to be that studying individuals as 
individuals does not add a great deal, but individuals’ legal consciousness need 
to be studied in the context of the group. This then gives a better understanding 
of the group’s legal consciousness, not least how powerful it is and also 
perhaps which characteristics of the individuals within it, helped establish it.  But 
perhaps, this debate is unimportant since, as Halliday et al suggests, ‘although 
individuals have attitudes, attitudes are not individual. Orientations towards 
legality are social rather than individual’.836 Both individual and group attitudes 
and consciousness, as well as the relationship between the two, are therefore 
important subjects of study. 
 
4. Choosing not to use the law & the impact of the unconscious on 
legal consciousness 
 
In addition to examining how people think about the law, understand it and how 
the law affects their everyday lives, legal consciousness837 is also the study of 
when choices are made not to use the law.838  Alongside this, it is concerned 
with how unconscious accepted ways of thinking about law affect people’s 
decisions.839  Indeed, Merry talks of legal consciousness as: ‘[t]he way people 
                                                 
836 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74, p. 69 
837 Nielsen, B, (2000) Situating Legal consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens About 
Law and Street Harassment Law and Society Review, p. 1058 
838 Fleury-Steiner, B, Nielsen, LB, (2006) The New Civil Rights Research, A Constitutive Approach, Ashgate 
Publishers Ltd, Oxford, p. 326 
839 Nielsen, B, (2000) Situating Legal consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens About 
Law and Street Harassment Law and Society Review, p. 1058 
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conceive of the ‘natural’ and normal way of doing things.’840 This is pertinent to 
this thesis in several ways.  First, this ‘avoiding the law’ aspect of legal 
conscience will be explored in the context of doctors resisting having a 
particular conception of best interests imposed upon them. Secondly, as was 
seen in chapter six, doctors sometimes choose to challenge others’ conceptions 
of a child’s best interests when they disagree, but not at other times.  Thirdly, 
the doctors discussed, as was seen in chapter six, their colleagues’ attitudes 
towards disabled children and their own perceptions of the impact these 
doctors’ attitudes have on their best interest decisions.  An accepted way of 
thinking amongst doctors, in this case about disabled children, seems to have a 
direct impact on how doctors formulate their best interest decisions.   
 
5. Law ‘on the books’ and law ‘in action’ 
 
Legal consciousness studies are also concerned with filling the gaps between 
the law as it appears in the statutes and court judgments (law on the books) and 
law as it impacts on ordinary people’s everyday lives, making legal 
consciousness theory part of the tradition in law and society scholarship of 
exploring the gap between ‘law on the books and law in action’.841 The question 
of the extent to which doctors are, or are not, making best interests decisions, 
as they are guided to do by their professional ethical guidance842 and the 
English High Court, is an important and repeated theme in this thesis. The 
subject matter of this thesis also helps exemplify why examining these gaps is 
important.  By examining how doctors in everyday practice make best interest 
decisions for disabled children, already in part two, this thesis has found gaps 
between what doctors are guided to do and what doctors are actually doing 
                                                 
840 Merry, SE (1990) Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness Among Working Class 
Americans, Chicago Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago, p.5 
841 Marshall, AM, Barclay, S (2003) In their own words: how ordinary people construct the legal world, 
Law & Social Inquiry, 28(3), 617-628 
842 Chapter four, para 3, pp.142-145 
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when they make best interest decisions. If no gaps had been found, the 
question asked by Kennedy (in summary whether doctors should be making 
these decisions)843 would still have remained, but seemed less problematic. 
This is because, if doctors were acting as guided by their professional bodies 
and case law, this suggests, some external oversight. Doctors are acting 
according to accepted, well considered norms.  However, as this thesis has 
found, by doctors’ own reports, some doctors are not doing so, but rather 
formulating their own conception of the law in this regard, this raise legitimate 
concerns.  It suggests that Kennedy’s concerns are justified, not just in theory, 
but also in practice.  It then becomes unclear how doctor’s decisions are 
regulated on a day-to-day basis. It raises the possibility that disabled children’s 
best interests may not be appropriately assessed. This, is turn, raises the 
possibility that disabled children may either receive medical treatment or have it 
withheld inappropriately.  The emotive nature of doctors’ decisions; the potential 
life or death of a child, brings into very sharp focus the importance of exploring 
the gaps between ‘law on the books’ and ‘law in action’, in a way that less 
emotive and more prosaic subjects perhaps do not. 
 
Another question legal consciousness scholars are keen to address is how, if 
there are consistent gaps between law on the books and law in action, law 
sustains its institutional power.844  Garcia-Villegas suggests that one of the 
ways this can happen is through the selective use of interventions.845  This is 
relevant to what doctors said at interview about choosing whether or not to 
challenge colleagues, formally or informally, if they are concerned that a child’s 
                                                 
843 Kennedy, I, (1979). What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, published in an amended form in Kennedy, I, ( 2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
844 Silbey, SS (2005) After legal consciousness, Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci, 1, 323-368, p. 323 
845 Garcia-Villegas, M (2003) Symbolic Power without violence? Critical comments on legal 
consciousness studies, International Journal of Semiotics of Law, 16(4), 363-393, p.390 
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best interests are not being properly addressed.846  It is also relevant to how 
judges chose or otherwise to intervene in doctors’ best interest decisions, a 
topic touched on briefly in this thesis847 and recommended for further study.848   
 
A legal consciousness approach suggests that law as found in the books, has 
less power than the perceptions of law created by those ordinary people who 
would invoke or violate it.849  It suggests further that the real impact and 
importance of law is found not solely in what the statute books and court 
judgments say, but in how ordinary people, (meaning in this thesis non-
lawyers), see and construct law.850 In the context of this thesis, this can be seen 
as the power of best interest decisions residing with the doctors.  However, the 
extent of this power will depend on how the individual doctors conceptualise 
best interest decisions.  For example, a doctor who takes a paternalistic 
approach, making the decision without consultation will have a tight grip on that 
power, whereas a doctor who consults widely will share that power.  
Relationships are important in the construction of legal consciousness and this 
can be seen vividly here.  The relationships a doctor has with their colleagues, 
the child, and parents will impact on the extent the doctor shares decision-
making.  Also, it seems the extent to which a doctor maintains power will be 
affected by the legal consciousness of those around him or her.  For example, a 
doctor will lose power if challenged by another doctor or parent, particularly if 
                                                 
846 Chapter six, para 7, pp.261-282 
847 Chapter two, para 3, p.37 
848 Chapter ten, para 5.1.4, pp.399-400 
849 Marshall, AM, Barclay, S (2003) In their own words: how ordinary people construct the legal world, 
Law & Social Inquiry, 28(3), 617-628, p.622 
850 Fleury-Steiner, B, Nielsen, LB, (2006) The New Civil Rights Research, A Constitutive Approach, Ashgate 
Publishers Ltd, Oxford 
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that challenge is a formal one, such as applying to court, where the power will 
be transferred to the court. 
 
Having established what legal consciousness theory is and why it is used in this 
thesis, consideration is now given to the categories of legal consciousness 
identified by some of its leading scholars. 
 
6. Categories of legal consciousness 
 
Legal consciousness scholars have identified various categories or schema of 
legal consciousness.   
  
Ewick851 and Silbey,852  two of the pre-eminent legal consciousness scholars, 
identified three categories or schema of legal consciousness.  They labelled 
them ‘before the law’;853 ‘with the law;’854 and ‘against the law.’855 They saw 
these schema, as together encompassing the fully range of conventional 
experiences of the law.856  The schema are not representations of what 
individuals think about the law,857 but are drawn on by individuals to create legal 
meaning.858 Each schema will now be considered. 
                                                 
851 Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1992) Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An Account of Legal 
Consciousness, New Eng. L. Rev, Vol. 26, at p. 731; Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1998) The Common Place of Law, 
Stories from everyday life, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & Ewick, P, Silbey. SS (1999) 
Common Knowledge and Ideological Critique, Law and Society Rev, 33, 1027 
852 Ibid and Silbey, SS (2005) After legal consciousness, Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci, 1, 323-368 
853 Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1998) The Common Place of Law, Stories from everyday life,  The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, p.74 
854 Ibid, p.129 
855 Ibid, p.184 
856 Ibid, p.248 
857 Ibid, p.247 
858 Ibid 
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6.1  ‘Before the Law’ 
Ewick and Silbey859 adopted this phrase from Franz Kafka’s novel ‘The Trial’:860  
‘Before the law stands a doorkeeper on guard…barring entry to the door’.861  
The Trial tells the story of Joseph K, a young banking official arrested and 
prosecuted by a remote, faceless authority. Neither Joseph nor the reader are 
ever made aware of Joseph’s alleged crime.  Ewick and Silbey identify a 
depiction of the law as remote, not just in terms of distance, but also in terms of 
power, being kept at a distance by a hierarchy of gatekeepers.862  
 
‘Before the law’ sees the law as taking place within set locations, for example a 
court room or lawyer’s office, rather, in contrast to other schema, as a system of 
ideas or persons.863  The law is distant, objective and impartial.864  The law has 
defined limits and boundaries; both in terms of who can take part and where the 
law takes place.  These are set by the law’s own rules and regulations.865  In 
this schema the law is not part of everyday life and only impacts on everyday 
life when things go wrong.’866  Ewick and Silbey see the law dehumanising.867 
The only way that the law is expressed by humans is through the actions of 
those employed within the law, such as judges or lawyers, or those acting in an 
                                                 
859 Ibid, p. 74 
860 Kafka, F, (2000) The Trial, Penguin Classics, London (first published 1925) 
861 Ewick,P, Silbey, SS, (1998) The Common Place of Law, Stories from everyday life,  The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 74 
862 Ibid 
863 Ibid, pp. 75-76 
864 Ibid, p. 76 
865 Ibid 
866 Ibid, p.77 
867 Ibid, p.78 
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official capacity such as jurors.868 Law here is depicted as housed in imposing 
and scary buildings such as courts or as enacted by oppressive bureaucratic 
agencies, with lawyers taking the dominant roles.869 Law is a place to which 
ordinary people have to be taken or visit. However, there are risks in going to 
law, as in doing so the individual in effect hands over their problem (and with it 
their power) to the lawyers870 to seek a solution871 As well as being a depiction 
of the law in the legal consciousness of some ordinary people, Ewick and Silbey 
report that often legal professionals express this schema of legal 
consciousness,872 which it seems is likely to reinforce this schema within the 
legal consciousness of ordinary people engaging with them, especially if the 
ordinary people look up to the lawyers as the experts in law.  This once again 
shows the importance of relationships in the construction of a legal 
consciousness.  This expression of legal consciousness is seen in doctors, if 
any, who see the law just in terms of litigation; as something that is potentially a 
threat to them both professionally and personally. 
 
6.2  ‘With the Law’ 
This conception of the law differs from ‘before the law’ both in terms ‘form and 
content as well as its location in social space’.873  In contrast to the distance 
between ordinary life and the law found in the ‘before the law’ conception, here 
                                                 
868 Ibid, p.78 
869 Ibid, p.158 
870 A parallel can be seen with Nils Christie’s description of the state stealing or taking over people’s 
conflicts to the extent that the people at the centre of the conflict are almost if not completely 
forgotten. See Christie, N (1977) Conflict as Property, The British Journal of Criminology, Vol 17, Issue 1, 
pp. 1-15 
871 Harding R (2006). ‘’Dogs are ‘registered’, People shouldn’t be’ Legal Consciousness and Lesbian and 
Gay Rights’, Social and Legal Studies, 15 (4),511-533 
872 Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1998) The Common Place of Law, Stories from everyday life,  The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, p.106 
873 Ibid, p.129 
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law is accessible, present in ordinary life.874 While ‘before the law’ is legality 
dehumanized875 ‘with the law’ can be empowering, helping people to achieve 
their aims.876  However, the law is not without constraints.  Holders of a ‘with the 
law’ legal consciousness understand that they are controlled by rules and 
regulations.877  For example, the law is more accessible to some than to others, 
not least because of the costs involved.  How well the law can be invoked can 
also depend on an individual’s level of knowledge and experience.878 
 
In this thesis, this conception of legal consciousness would perhaps be seen in 
doctors, if any, who have a good awareness of how best interests are 
conceptualised in their professional guidance, but are also aware of barriers - 
whether that be resources or an opposing opinion from another doctor - that 
could impact on the doctor’s ability to ensure a decision is made in what he or 
she believes to be the child’s best interests. 
 
Within this conception of legality, the law is a game which people either play or 
refrain from playing.  Ewick and Silbey describe the law as making tools, 
resources and specific language available.879 The best interests test could be 
seen as each of these. However, they stress that law is much more than this 
and it is wrong to see the law just as a tool or set of tools.880 For example, law 
within this schema is often used to communicate between actors.  Ewick and 
Silbey argue that referring to law as a tool overlooks that legality is about 
                                                 
874 Ibid, p.132 
875 Ibid, p.129 
876 Ibid, p.131 
877 Ibid 
878 Ibid, p.132 
879 Ibid 
880Ibid, p.133 
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relationships.  Talking about law as a tool fails to capture the interactive and 
social aspect of law.881 From what has already been said, it can be seen that 
this seems possibly to apply to best interest decisions.  The importance of 
relationships when making best interests was seen in chapter six.882 In chapter 
nine, it will be seen how these help shape a doctors’ legal consciousness.883 
 
Lawyers still play an import role in this conception of the law.  They are ‘the go 
betweens, the translators, initiators into the rules of the game’.884 Lawyers could 
help or hinder by creating obstacles.885 However, whereas in the ‘before the 
law’ schema the law was a place only for lawyers or those there for an official 
reason, ‘with the law’, non-lawyers are actively involved not just as legal parties 
but also recreating and challenging the law.886 This, in turn, can create 
challenges for the legal professionals, as they are no longer the only experts 
with access to the law.  
 
6.3  ‘Against the Law’ 
Within this conception, legality is described as a net, which traps ordinary, 
marginalised people, forcing them to struggle for freedom.887 A need for 
resistance to the law is dominant here.  Legality here is untrustworthy and to be 
avoided. Ewick and Silbey describes it as arbitrary, capricious and dangerous, a 
place of last resort.888 It lacks a moral compass and seems to embrace both 
                                                 
881 Ibid, p.134 
882 Chapter six, pp. 237-284 
883 Chapter nine, pp.347-380 
884 Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1998) The Common Place of Law, Stories from everyday life,  The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, p.153 
885 Ibid, p.15 
886 Ibid, p.164 
887 Ibid, p.184 
888 Ibid, p.194 
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violence and power.889 When the law cannot be avoided actors reluctantly 
submit themselves to it.890  
 
Ewick and Silbey’s description of ‘against the law’ has some similarities with 
their description of ‘before the law’, since both are bureaucratic, formal and 
remote. However, whereas law in ‘before the law’ is seen as grand and 
imposing, in ‘against the law,’ law is more menacing, unable to respond (in the 
actors’ eyes) to the sort of ordinary troubles that impact on their everyday 
lives.891 
 
Echoes of this schema, as will be seen in chapter nine,892 were found in the 
comments made by doctors in this study when asked directly about the law.  
Several doctors express a view that lawyers and the courts just don’t 
understand medicine and the complexities of best interest decision-making.  
One doctor expressed similar views about legislation enacted to protect 
disabled people from discrimination.  Some doctors expressed a sense of 
finding the law as a threat to them, but law was also, in their view, not nuanced 
enough to be reflect the complexities of their decisions or the realities of day-to-
day hospital life. 
 
7. Criticisms of Ewick and Silbey’s schema 
 
While being a dominant influence on legal consciousness scholarship, Ewick 
and Silbey’s schema has not been without its critics, most notably Mezey.893 In 
                                                 
889 Ibid 
890 Ibid, p.195 
891 Ibid, p.198 
892 Chapter nine, pp. 347-380 
893 Mezey, N (2001) Out of the ordinary: law, power, culture, and the commonplace, Law & Social 
Inquiry, 26(1), 145-167 
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her critique of Ewick and Silbey,894 Mezey questions where law is to be found in 
Ewick and Silbey’s conception of legal consciousness.895  Mezey criticizes 
Ewick and Silbey for failing to draw any clear distinction at all between law and 
society, to the extent that law as an entity seems to no longer exist.896 There is 
some merit in this criticism, particularly in Ewick and Silbey’s account of the 
‘with the law’ schema 897 where law is so much a part of ordinary life that it is 
difficult to identify what makes something law at all.  But perhaps that is the 
point, that law is part of every aspect of life; it is all embracing.  A doctor can be 
seen as entering into a series of relationships with patients, families and 
colleagues throughout a working day. A doctor can also be seen to be making a 
series of decisions throughout the day; which patients to see; which tests to do; 
which colleagues to refer to or consult with; what information to share, to name 
a few. Each of those decisions and interactions has the potential to create law. 
For example, if as been posited, the best interest test is a legal test, a doctor 
can be seen to create and recreate the test in his or her choice of, for example, 
who the doctor includes in the decision-making process; which factors the 
doctors considers relevant to the test and the weight the doctor puts both on 
each of those factors and also on the views of the others, if anyone, involved in 
the decision-making process.  This illustrates the important point that law is in 
essence about the regulation of relationships and good best interest decision-
making can be seen as a series of communications and dependant upon the 
relationships of those communicating.  Studying doctors situated as they seem 
to be when making best interest decisions, somewhere between non-lawyers 
and lawyers, helps to illustrate the connection between law as it is conceived by 
                                                 
894 Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1998) The Common Place of Law, Stories from everyday life, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago 
895 Mezey, N (2001) Out of the ordinary: law, power, culture, and the commonplace, Law & Social 
Inquiry, 26(1), 145-167, p.153 
896 Ibid 
897 Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1998) The Common Place of Law, Stories from everyday life, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, pp129-164 
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legal consciousness scholars, part of everyday life and relationships and law as 
it appears in the books898 and is taught to and practices by lawyers. 
 
8. Developing Ewick & Silbey’s schema 
 
Harding,899 Halliday & Morgan 900and Halliday, Kitzinger and Kitzinger 901 are 
UK-based legal consciousness scholars who have taken forward Ewick and 
Silbey’s work, adapting and developing legal consciousness theory.   Both 
Harding and Halliday et al, draw on Ewick and Silbey’s schema of ‘with’ and 
‘against’ the law.  In her study of the family lives of lesbians and gay men, 
Harding focuses on the concept of resistance within her participants’ legal 
consciousness.  She identifies three types of resistance to law; stabilising 
resistance;902 moderating resistance903 and fracturing resistance.904  Harding’s 
stabilising resistance involves individuals or groups challenging power, often the 
power of government, not through deliberate acts of challenge such as protest 
marches or perhaps legal challenges in the court, but by continuing to be 
themselves, despite this being outside the norm.905 Harding gives the example 
                                                 
898 Merry, SE (1990) Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness Among Working Class 
Americans, Chicago Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago 
899 Harding, R, (2010) Regulating Sexuality: Legal Consciousness in lesbian and gay lives, Routledge, 
Abingdon 
900 Halliday, S, Morgan, B (2013) I Fought the Law and the law Won? Legal Consciousness and the Critical 
Imagination, Current Legal Problems, vol. 66, pp.1-32 
901 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74 
902 Harding, R, (2010) Regulating Sexuality: Legal Consciousness in lesbian and gay lives, Routledge, 
Abingdon, p.12 
903 Ibid  
904 Ibid 
905 Ibid, p.46 
P a g e  | 309 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
of being gay and lesbian parents906 or binge drinking,907 acts outside the norm 
or challenging governmental guidance but not undertaken with the purpose of 
challenge. Those practising stabilising resistance, do so alongside those living 
within the norm, for example, heterosexual parents, the challenge or resistance 
comes from living differently from the norm.  Stabilising resistance illustrates 
that wherever there is an expected norm, those outside that norm are 
resistant.908 Harding sees stabilising resistance as the antithesis to what she 
describes as ‘disciplinary power relations’.909 In other words, individuals or 
groups resisting power by continuing to act as they wish to act, rather than 
feeling pressured to conform to the norm society is attempting to impose upon 
them. Harding draws parallels between stabilising resistance, and Ewick and 
Silbey’s ‘against the law’ schema.910  Harding argues that this form of resistance 
emphasises the relational nature of power. The norm she argues only needs to 
be enforced through disciplinary mechanisms because everyone does not 
automatically comply with the norm. Harding’s explanation of stabilising 
resistance is used to inform the analysis of what the doctors said about how 
they make their difficult decisions.  
 
Harding identifies two other forms of resistance, moderating and fracturing 
resistance as being particularly helpful at illustrating resistance in relation to 
sexuality,911 but that does not mean these forms of resistance could not 
potentially be applied to and illuminate other situations.  Moderating resistance, 
Harding explains is about openly challenging the status quo, not necessarily 
bringing about immediate change, although this could be the aim; but it 
                                                 
906 Ibid, p.45 




911 Ibid p. 13 
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highlights opposition to government or other power and in doing so shifting the 
debate.912  This form of resistance often involves public protest; Harding cites 
the 2003 marches against the invasion of Iraq in the UK or annual gay pride 
marches, as examples of this form of resistance.913  Harding identifies the 
defining element of fracturing resistance as being an act of resistance requiring 
immediate or almost immediate reaction by the government or power being 
challenged.914  Those resisting will be doing so publicly, as with moderating 
resistance, but the act may be violent, as in the 2005 Paris riots;915 but this will 
not necessarily be so.  Harding gives the example of 2004 mass lesbian and 
gay weddings in San Francisco as an example of non-violent fracturing 
resistance.916 In both Harding’s examples the state was forced to act quickly, in 
the former with the deployment of police and in the later with the actions of the 
mayor who had issues the marriage certificates being declared ultra vires by the 
court.917  Although the act of resistance and the government’s reaction to it 
causes a fracture in the relationship between the parties, Harding says the word 
fracture was chosen, as there is always the possibility of the fractured 
relationship to heal.918  The fact that the nature of the resistance are labelled by 
the nature of the response by the power holder to it, once again emphasises the 
relational nature of legal consciousness.   
 
Harding’s schema of resistance will be used as part of the analysis of doctors’ 
best interest decision-making.  Consideration will be given as to whether the 
                                                 
912 Ibid, pp.46-47 
913 Ibid 
914 Ibid, p.48 
915 Ibid 
916 Ibid 
917 Ibid, p. 48-49 
918 Ibid, p. 47 
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doctors seem to express resistance and if so, can that resistances be described 
as stabilising, moderating or fracturing.  This will help in an understanding of 
doctors’ legal consciousness by showing how and if doctors are resisting and 
also explore whether Harding’s three classifications can be applied to wider 
situations.  
 
Like Harding, Halliday et al acknowledge the influence Ewick and Silbey’s three 
schema had on their classifications of legal consciousness; namely ‘law as a 
sword’; ‘law as a shield’ and ‘law as a barrier’.919  In their study of the legal 
consciousness of relatives of adult patients with reduced consciousness, 
Halliday et al 920 connect both their ‘law as a shield’ and ‘law as a sword’ 
schema to Ewick and Silbeys’ ‘before the law’.921 Relatives interviewed see the 
power of law as a weapon (a sword) ‘of justice to counteract and call to account 
the failings of the medical system’922 which the authors situate within Ewick and 
Silbey’s ‘before the law’ schema.923 Halliday et al’s ‘shield’ metaphor also fits 
within the ‘before the law’ schema, as despite their frustrations at the slowness 
of the law, relatives respect its role as an impartial and powerful force, acting as 
a shield and ‘protecting society from reckless decision-making about the ending 
of lives’.924 As within the ‘before the law’ schema the law as a shield ‘deserves 
respect and compliance from deferential participants’.925 
 
                                                 
919 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74, p.69 
920 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74 
921 Ibid, p.70 
922 Ibid 
923 Ibid, p.71 
924 Ibid 
925 Ibid 
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Halliday et al also see their metaphor of ‘law as a sword’ fitting within Ewick and 
Silbeys’ ‘with the law’’ narrative.926  An example is given of one relative 
interviewed (Tracy) who is described as seeing law disconnected from justice 
and portrayed just as a resource that can be used for personal gain.   Halliday 
et al comment: 
‘In the midst of a harrowing and lengthy struggle with a powerful medical 
system, it is not hard to imagine such a narrative of legality being 
invoked’. 927 
 
Their schema of ‘law as a barrier,’ fits, Halliday et al suggests, into Ewick and 
Silbey’s ‘against the law’ schema, both having at their core struggle and 
resistance against the power of law.928 
 
Halliday et al developed legal consciousness theory from Ewick and Silbey’s 
schema by identifying a gap in their schema and adding a fourth dimension of 
legal consciousness, which they call ‘Collective Dissent’.929 Halliday et al 
characterise those who express ‘collective dissent’ as seeing state law as 
‘illegitimate and oppressive’ but being ‘resisted and subverted in [their] 
collective effort to alter the power structures that legality imposes’.930 They use 
this dimension of legal consciousness when describing participants in their 
study who have ended the life of their family member.  The family members 
have done this despite the act being unlawful because they believe they are 
acting in their loved one’s best interests, and see themselves as trying to 
escape the power of the law.931 Parallels can therefore be seen in the way in 
which Halliday et al and Harding both focus on resistance as they develop legal 
                                                 
926 Ibid, p. 72 
927 Ibid 
928 Ibid. p. 71 
929 Ibid, p.72 
930 Ibid, p. 70 
931 Ibid, p. 137 
P a g e  | 313 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
consciousness scholarship.  Echoes can be seen here with the Cuttini et al 
study,932 mentioned in chapter four,933of doctors’ neonatal decision-making 
across Europe.  In that study doctors seemed to collectively avoid or resist the 
law in their jurisdiction by making decisions based on factors such as the 
doctors’ religion, rather than the law.   
 
In their study, Halliday et al argued collective dissent also manifests as an act 
‘to change the power of law in this domain for the benefit of all those who may 
have suffered similarly’.934  Mention was made in chapter three935 of the 
participants in this study’s express hope that this thesis may bring their 
concerns about best interest decisions into the open.  This wish or indeed, even 
agreeing to participate in this research, could in the context of a closed 
profession, be perceived as an act of collective dissent on the part of the 
doctors involved if the doctors were shown to have similar motivations for taking 
part in this study.  Doctors’ resistance to law collectively and individually is a 
strong theme in the rest of this thesis. 
 
9. Parallels between Halliday et al’s study and this thesis 
 
Parallels between this study and Halliday et al’s936  can be discerned.  Both 
study the legal consciousness of groups who can be said to have power over 
another group whose legal consciousness would be exceptionally difficult to 
study.  Halliday et al study the legal consciousness of relatives of patients with 
                                                 
932 Cuttini, M., Nadai, M., Kaminski, M., Hansen, G. De Leeuw, R., Lenoir, S, Lenard, HG (2000) End-of-life 
decisions in neonatal intensive care: physicians' self-reported practices in seven European countries, The 
Lancet, 355(9221), 2112-2118 
933 Chapter four, para 4, p.146 
934 Ibid 
935 Chapter one, para 5.2, pp.17-18 
936 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74 
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reduced consciousness, rather than the legal consciousness of the patients.  
Here, doctors making the best interest decisions are studied rather than the 
disabled children. In both studies the patients’ severe cognitive impairment in 
most cases, and/or severe communication difficulties937  would make the study 
exceptionally difficult.  In both studies, while the primary actors, in Halliday et 
al’s study the relatives and in this study the doctors, are the main focus, the 
patients with reduced consciousness or disabled children are ever present, 
being those most affected by the primary actors’ legal consciousness. 
 
There are other parallels, too.  Both studies are concerned with best interest 
decision-making; both concern medics and their attitudes and behaviours 
towards exceptionally marginalized and vulnerable patients and their families.  
Both are concerned with the interplay between the courts and the medical 
profession.  Both studies have authors with personal as well as academic 
interests in the subject938 and the empirical research for both studies was 
conducted broadly at the same time.939 Although different laws apply to best 
interest decisions for disabled adults940 than to children, the data was collected 
during a similar time period, when societal and medical attitudes towards 
severely disabled individuals were the same. This thesis can also be seen as 
pushing beyond Halliday et al’s study by exploring the legal consciousness of 
doctors, who at times seem to be the elephant in the room in their study.   
 
                                                 
937 In the case of the adults who are conscious at all. 
938 Celia and Jenny Kitzinger’s sister Polly lives in a reduced consciousness state following a car accident. 
939 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74, p. 60 
940 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 applies to individuals from the age of 16, see s.2 (5) (b) in England and 
Wales s.64 (4). This requires all decisions for those who lack capacity to be made in their best interests 
s.4.  Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 applies to individuals from the age of 16 in Scotland see 
s.1 (6). Any intervention must benefit the individual concerned s.1 (2) 
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The similarities between the two studies make the schema developed by 
Halliday et al941 particularly helpful to this study, so are used here, with Ewick & 
Silbey’s942 and Harding’s943 to explore the legal consciousness of the doctors.  
Consideration will also be given as to whether existing schema are sufficient or 
whether the doctors seem to exhibit any expressions of legal consciousness not 
described in previous studies. 
 
10. Situating the doctors 
 
It was suggested at the beginning of this chapter that the situation of the actors 
in legal consciousness studies is important. Some consideration is therefore 
now given to where the doctors in this thesis are situated epistemologically. 
 
First, the doctors are situated firmly within a normative legal framework which 
can be found in their professional ethical guidance and the jurisprudence of the 
English court, as was explored earlier.  Doctors’ status as NHS employees and 
hence subject to the framework of rights pursuant to the HRA and UN human 
rights treaties is also significant here. 
 
Secondly, the doctors are also situated firmly in the culture of medicine; the 
culture of paediatrics and the culture of the NHS.  An understanding of  culture 
is therefore important to be able to analyse the doctors’ legal consciousness.  
Culture can be defined as:  
‘the framework of beliefs, expressive symbols, and values in terms of 
which individuals define their world, express their feelings, and make 
                                                 
941 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74 
942 Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1992) Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An Account of Legal 
Consciousness, New Eng. L. Rev, Vol. 26,at  p. 731; Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1998) The Common Place of Law, 
Stories from everyday life,  The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & Ewick, P, Silbey. SS (1999) 
Common Knowledge and Ideological Critique, Law and Society Rev, 33, 1027 
943 Harding, R, (2010) Regulating Sexuality: Legal Consciousness in lesbian and gay lives, Routledge, 
Abingdon 
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their judgments…it is the fabric of meaning in terms of which human 
beings interpret their experience and guide their actions.’944   
 
Culture within healthcare is a much-discussed phenomenon. Its importance in 
the context of doctors’ attitudes towards disabled patients was seen in chapter 
two.945  It featured prominently in high profile inquiries into when things have 
gone badly wrong within the NHS, most notably Bristol.946  It was deemed 
crucial in the events that led to the The Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust 
Public Inquiry,947 (‘Mid-Staffs) published after the timeline of chapter two.  The 
reports of these inquiries included a whole chapter each on culture, so 
significant was it deemed to be.  Both also, helpfully, defined culture in the 
context of the NHS and medical care.   
 
Bristol defined culture as ‘the attitudes assumptions and values of the NHS and 
its many professional groups’.948  It also identified the NHS historic status as a 
‘national icon’ as an ‘influence of great importance’ on NHS culture.949 Further, it 
recognised a cultural tendency for health professionals to ‘withdraw into a kind 
of professional bunker and view everything outside as a threat’.950 Perhaps of 
particular significance to this thesis, is the ‘co-existence of competing 
                                                 
944 Geertz, C, (1973) ‘The Interpretation of Cultures’, Basic Books, New York 
945 Chapter two, para 8, p.75-79 & para 10, p.82-91 
946 The Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry (2001), The Inquiry into the management of care of children 
receiving complex heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary, Final Report, Bristol Royal Infirmary 
Inquiry, chapter 22 
947 The Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (2013), Report of the Mid-Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, volume 3, HC898-111, The Stationery Office, London 
948 The Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry (2001), The Inquiry into the management of care of children 
receiving complex heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary, Final Report, Bristol Royal Infirmary 
Inquiry, chapter 22, para 1 
949 Ibid, para. 6 
950 Ibid 
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cultures’951 Bristol talks of competing nursing, medical and managerial cultures 
‘so distinct and internally close-knit that the word ‘tribe’ and ‘tribalism’952 is used, 
but these ‘tribes’ can be, as has already been seen, sub-divided, for example 
into paediatric sub-specialities or between hardliners and softliners.953 
 
The Mid-Staffs definition of culture, drawing from Vincent954  as ‘how we do 
things around here’, with ‘here’ being ‘anything from a small group or team, to a 
whole organisation, a profession or a health system’955 captures exactly the 
complexity of interrelating cultures, which contribute to the framework within 
which the doctors in this thesis are situated.   
 
The Mid-Staffs report quoting from Vincent,956identified organisational cultures 
as having key formal characteristics; (i) shared basic assumptions; (ii) 
discovery, creation or development of those assumptions by a defined group; 
(iii) group learning of how to cope with its problem of external adaptation and 
internal integration; (iv) identification of ways that have worked well enough to 
be considered valid and (v) teaching new members of the group the correct way 
to perceive, think and feel in relation to any problem.957 
 
                                                 
951 Ibid, para 9 
952 Ibid, para 6 
953 Chapter six, para 7.2.1, pp. 268-274 
954 Vincent, C, (2010), Patient Safety, 2nd Edition, BMJ Books 
955 The Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (2013), Report of the Mid-Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, volume 3, HC898-111, The Stationery Office, London, p.1358, para 
20.5 
956 Vincent C, (2010), Patient Safety, 2nd Edition, BMJ Books, p.272 
957 The Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry (2013), Report of the Mid-Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, volume 3, HC898-111, The Stationery Office, London, p.1357-8, 
para 20.5 
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The doctors in this study can therefore be seen to exist in a complex sea of 
professional cultures, some complimenting and others contradicting each other.  
However, those cultures do not exist in a vacuum.  The doctors will also bring a 
particular culture from their education, both their medical education and 
childhood education.  The doctors will also be operating in a multitude of 
additional cultures personal to them, their faith, their politics, their region and 
many other factors all of which contributes towards their individual or group 
legal consciousness.  The professional and personal data collected about the 
doctors and presented in chapter four, helped to give an indication of just some 
of the multiple factors that impact on each individual doctor, and on every group 
to which that doctor belongs; these help us to understand individual and group 
legal consciousness. 
 
11.  How legal consciousness theory helps in an understanding of 
paediatricians’ best interest decisions and how this thesis 
contributes to legal consciousness scholarship 
 
To conclude this chapter, how legal consciousness theory aids an 
understanding of paediatricians’ best interest decisions for disabled children, 
and what this thesis adds to legal consciousness scholarship, will now be 
summarised. 
 
11.1  How legal consciousness helps in an understanding of best 
interest decisions 
Legal consciousness is a particularly appropriate theoretical framework to apply 
to an examination of doctors’ best interest decision-making, because, as was 
seen earlier, legal consciousness can be both individual and a ‘collective 
phenomenon’.958   As has already been seen in part two, some of the doctors in 
this study reported acting individually, while others reported acting collectively. 
                                                 
958 Chapter seven, para 3, p.295 
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Moreover, the argument has long been made that medical training is a process 
of socializing a medical student into the world of medicine.959  Medicine is 
framed as being very much about learning through social interaction. 
Basnett’s960 work, as was seen,961 suggests that this transmission of attitudes in 
healthcare is particularly important in relation to the treatment and care of 
disabled adults.  
 
Legal consciousness theory is also adopted in this thesis because it so 
effectively shines a light on the unique situation of the doctors, acting in a quasi-
judicial way, but not being lawyers.  In essence, legal consciousness enables 
this thesis to test further Kennedy’s962 hypothesis and explore whether, as 
Kennedy claimed, doctors are making legal and ethical decisions they are not 
trained or competent to make.  It offers a new lens through which to study how 
the doctors construct best interest decisions for disabled children. 
 
Finally, the importance of relationships to best interest decision-making was 
seen in chapter six.963  Legal consciousness theory helps show the importance 
of relationships between doctors and others and how these relationships create 
and construct law.   
                                                 
959 See for example: Harter, LM, Kirby, EL (2004) Socializing medical students in an era of managed care: 
The ideological significance of standardized and virtual patients. Communication Studies, 55(1), 48-67;  
Jefferys, M, Elston, MA, (1989) The medical school as a social organization, Medical education, 23(3), 
242-251; Harter, LM, Krone, K J (2001) Exploring the emergent identities of future physicians: Toward an 
understanding of the ideological socialization of osteopathic medical students. Southern Journal of 
Communication, 67(1), 66-83; and Baszanger, I, (1985) Professional socialization and social control: From 
medical students to general practitioners, Social Science & Medicine, 20(2), 133-143 
960 Basnett, I, (2001)’ Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Towards and Decisions Affecting 
Disabled People’, in G.L. Albrecht, K.D. Seelman and M. Bury (eds), Handbook of Disability Studies, Sage 
Publications, London, pp.450-467 
961 Chapter two, para 10, pp.82-91 
962 Kennedy, I, (1979). What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, Published in an amended form in Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
963 Chapter six, para 7, pp.261-282 
P a g e  | 320 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
11.2  What this thesis adds to legal consciousness scholarship 
This thesis builds on existing legal consciousness scholarship by studying the 
legal consciousness of an elite group964 of non-lawyers taking legal and ethical 
decisions, and arguably acting in a quasi-judicial role. 
This unique status brings some important new insights to legal consciousness 
scholarship. First, the stark and extreme nature of the decisions the doctors are 
taking, namely decisions whether a child lives or dies, brings a new emphasis 
on the importance of knowing whether and how law is being created in these 
informal ways. As mentioned earlier, when law is created in this way, the normal 
checks and balances965 in place when law is formally created are not present, 
so it is important to know what is going on to ensure the rights of society’s 
vulnerable citizens are not overlooked. 
 
Secondly, the doctors’ situation also emphasizes the link between law as 
conceived by legal consciousness scholars and law as it appears ‘in the books’.  
This connection was perhaps less clear previously with scholars such as 
Mezey966 questioning how every day activities could be conceived in any way 
as law.  However, doctors best interest decisions are clearly part of doctors’ 
every day clinical activities, but can also be seen as legal in nature, making it 
easier to understand how discussions and interactions and other every day 
activities, or lack of them, can and do create law. 
 
A third contribution that this study makes to legal conscious scholarship is in the 
way that the doctors’ elite status brings focus to the fact that legal 
                                                 
964 Medical professionals are classified as being within class 1, the highest of eight classes in the UK 
National Office for statistics socio-economic classification 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-
method/classifications/current-standard-classifications/soc2010/soc2010-volume-3-ns-sec--rebased-on-
soc2010--user-manual/index.html, accessed 1 May 2017 
965 see for example Williams A, (1998) UK Government and Politics, Heinemann, London, p.9 
966 Mezey, N (2001) Out of the ordinary: law, power, culture, and the commonplace, Law & Social 
Inquiry, 26(1), 145-167 
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consciousness theory is about the participant’s perceptions of their situation, not 
the perceptions of those outside the group, which can be different.  It is 
therefore possible that a group of individuals who, to the outside world appears 
to be elite and confident, perceives itself as vulnerable. It is this self-perception 
which tells us something about their legal consciousness. 
 
A final contribution this thesis makes to legal consciousness theory is to 
propose an additional schema of legal consciousness, ‘law as kudos’, 
described by doctors in this study but not found in existing legal consciousness 
scholarship. This new schema and the reason for it is explained in chapter 
nine.967 In essence, however, it builds on existing schema suggested by Ewick 
and Silbey, Harding and Halliday et al, capturing a sense of law giving power 
and enhanced status to a non-lawyer but elite individuals or groups.   
 
This thesis now turns to explore the part played by law in the doctors’ decisions, 
through the lens of legal consciousness.  In chapter eight, data from the 
doctors’ surveys are drawn on and in chapter nine, from their interviews.  As will 
be explained, there are limits to how much an individual or group’s legal 
consciousness can be explored using survey data.  Accordingly, legal 
consciousness is used with a light touch in chapter eight, but in more depth in 
chapter nine.  Research question three is answered in both chapters eight and 
nine.  Research question four is also answered in both chapters, but for the 
reasons just explained, mainly in chapter nine. 
  
                                                 
967 Chapter nine, para 3.1, pp. 363-365 
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Chapter Eight  
What the doctors said (or did not say) about law, rights and ethics in their 
surveys  
 
1. Introduction  
 
This chapter explores and analyses, using legal consciousness theory, what 
doctors said in their surveys about law, rights and ethics. What they said in their 
interviews is explored in the next chapter.  The purpose of this exploration and 
analysis, is to gain a greater understanding of how, if at all, doctors draw on 
law, in their best interest decisions and what this reveals about doctors’ legal 
consciousness.  As was seen in chapter seven,968 what people don’t say and 
their accepted ways of doing things can also reveal important aspects of their 
legal consciousness.  Where relevant, what doctors did not say about law for 
example, if doctors did not mention a child’s rights or refer to best interests in 
circumstance where these concepts might be mentioned, will therefore also be 
examined. 
 
To help analyse what the doctors either said or did not say about law as was 
explained in the last chapter, legal consciousness schema developed by Ewick 
and Silbey,969 Harding970 and Halliday et al971 will be used.   
  
The doctors were asked questions in the survey specifically about law, rights 
and ethics.  These were asked in the second half of the survey after the doctors 
                                                 
968 Chapter seven, para 4, pp.297-298 
969 Ewick,P, Silbey, SS, (1998) The Common Place of Law, Stories from everyday life,  The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 74 
970 Harding, R, (2010) Regulating Sexuality: Legal Consciousness in lesbian and gay lives, Routledge, 
Abingdon 
971 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74 
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had answered questions about making difficult decisions.972 The placing of 
these questions at the end of the survey was deliberate, so that the doctors’ 
unprompted observations about law, as they reflected on their decision-making, 
could be captured in the first half of the survey.  Where appropriate, those 
observations will be drawn on in this chapter.  
 
Mention is made in this chapter of both law and ethics although it is law and the 
doctors’ legal consciousness which is the main focus of this study.  As will be 
seen, while the hardliner doctors tended to talk more about law, the softliner 
doctors tended to talk more about ethics.  Ethics was addressed in the survey in 
addition to law, because outside of this thesis, law and ethics are grouped 
together by the medical community, with no clear distinction being made.  The 
RCPCH, for example has an ethics and law committee.973  RCPCH 2015974  in 
essence, guides paediatricians that ethical best interest decisions mean 
following the law, with the jurisprudence of the English High Court being cited in 
the guidance.  
 
As was seen in chapter one,975 the term ethics is not, within this thesis, 
conceived within a traditional academic or disciplinary way, but rather through 
the lens of the doctors’ professional practice and guidance from the 
paediatrician’s professional bodies; most notably the RCPCH and 
GMC.  Neither the term ‘law’ nor ‘ethics’ were defined in the survey or the 
accompanying email sent to the doctors, but left for the doctors to define.  It was 
felt that how a doctor, for example, defined ‘law’ could give an important insight, 
                                                 
972 See Appendix 4, pp.427-433 
973 https://www.rcpch.ac.uk/what-we-do/ethics/ethics-and-law-resources/ethics-and-law-resource 
accessed 26 January 2018 
974 Larcher V, Craig F, Bhogal K, Wilkinson D, Brierley J, (2015) ‘Making decisions to limit treatment in 
life-limiting and life-threatening conditions in children: a framework for practice’, Archives of Disease in 
Childhood, 100, s1-s23 
975 Chapter one, para 2.5, p.6 
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into how the doctor understood law.  Did a doctor, for example, not mention law, 
or did he or she talk about law as a framework within which he or she worked; 
did the doctor seem to have a broad view of a spectrum of law relevant to 
disabled children’s healthcare, or did the doctor discuss law in terms of 
litigation, even just in terms of criminal litigation?   
 
It is recognised that from the short answers given in the survey, it is difficult to 
gain any real insights into doctors’ legal consciousness, but suggestions as to 
what it might be, taking the survey as a whole, might be gleaned.  For example, 
generally there is a sense that for most doctors, law only meant litigation, 
although a minority did talk about it more widely in terms of a framework within 
which they worked.  There are also some interesting apparent contradictions. 
For example, thirty doctors (90%) responded to an explicit question about 
whether they consciously consider a child’s rights stating they did. However, not 
a single doctor had listed the child’s rights as one of the main factors he or she 
considers when making difficult decisions, when asked to list these factors 
earlier in the survey.  The doctors did, as was seen in chapter four,976 list non-
clinical factors, such as whether a child attends school or is happy, and even 
legal factors977 but none expressly mentioned the child’s rights.  One possible 
reading of this contradiction is that doctors know they should consider the 
child’s rights and so say they do when prompted, but they do not consider it to 
be a ‘main factor’. It is perhaps not something at the forefront of their minds 
when thinking about difficult decisions and therefore not included in their 
responses to the earlier question.   Another possibility is that the doctors do 
consider the child’s rights, but use different language from ‘rights.’ However, 
when the doctors’ words are examined, it is difficult to find any that could be 
understood as meaning a child’s rights.  
  
                                                 
976 Chapter four, para 6.3, pp.137-179 
977 Chapter four, para 6.3 p.177 
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In chapter seven,978 it was seen how different aspects of an individual life, both 
professional and personal, contribute and interact to help construct an 
individual’s legal consciousness. But, as was also seen, this is a two-way 
process, with the group impacting on the individual’s legal consciousness and 
the individual impacting on the group’s.   
  
It is possible to imagine that a doctors’ legal consciousness will influence the 
extent to which a doctor is motivated to study law and that studying law will 
impact on a doctor’s legal consciousness.  With this in mind,, this chapter first 
explores the doctors’ training and education in law and ethics to see, as far as 
the limited data allows, whether there are indications that studying law has an 
impact on doctors’ best interest decision-making and legal consciousness and if 
so how?   This will also test Kennedy’s argument979 that doctors do not have the 
training and education in law and ethics needed, to make best interest 
decisions.  
 
Having considered what the doctors said about any training or education in law 
and ethics, the chapter will then turn to what the doctors said in their survey 
about specific legal issues.  An overview will be given of what the doctors said 
about seeking legal advice; the threat of litigation; and the importance of law 
and ethics to their decisions. It is important to include this overview of the 
doctors’ survey responses to capture a broader range of factors that frame and 
inform doctors’ decision making and, also to give some indication of the extent 
to which the views expressed by the doctors later interviewed, presented in the 
next chapter, are representative of the wider pool of doctors in this study.  
 
                                                 
978 Chapter seven, para 3, pp. 291-297 
979 Kennedy, I, (1979). What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, Published in an amended form in Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
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To help in an understanding of the impact, if any, of legal/ethical education, the 
doctors will be classed into three groups according to how much education and 
training a doctor has received in total, as a medical student and qualified doctor 
combined.  The three groups are (i) doctors who have received no training or 
education;980 (ii) doctors who have had minimal, for example, attended single 
events or describe their training in ways that suggest it was minimal and (iii) 
doctors who have had significant training or education.  This last group consists 
of doctors who have either, as under or postgraduates, followed complete 
courses in law and ethics.  These finding will then be mapped to data presented 
in chapter five,981 which explored the weight doctors put on prognosis; futility; 
quality of life and the child’s cognitive ability when making best interest 
decisions. The aim will be, using these factors as a snapshot, to see whether 
doctors who have received significant legal/ethical education approach best 
interest decisions the same or differently from doctors who have minimal or no 
education; and as far as possible, with the limited data available, to explore 
what these similarities and differences seem to be.  
  
As mentioned at the end of chapter seven, whilst existing legal consciousness 
schema will be adopted, for the analysis in this chapter of the survey data, only 
suggestions and hints of legal consciousness will be sought, recognizing that 
too little information is available in the survey to draw any firm conclusions 





                                                 
980 This means they have attended no courses, workshops, training events, CPD seminars, lectures, 
tutorials, talks, or similar and not undertaken any on-line or distance training or education. 
981 Kennedy, I, (1979). What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London, Published in an amended form in Kennedy, I, (2001) Treat Me Right, Essays in Medical Law and 
Ethics, OUP, Oxford, pp 19-31 
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2. Prevalence of training and education in law, rights and ethics  
 
Kennedy948 argued almost forty years ago that doctors were making decisions 
that were essentially legal and ethical decisions, while having no education or 
training in law or ethics.  Kennedy’s assertion that the doctors do not have the 
education and training to undertake this task, seems, for the doctors in this 
study, largely to be borne out.  Just nine doctors (27%) reported having had 
some education in law, rights or ethics while at medical school. (See figure 58) 
For all but two of these doctors (6%), this seems, by the doctors’ own accounts 
to have been minimal, for example, a single lecture.  Two doctors (6%) 
described following longer courses in what the doctors called ‘medical 
jurisprudence’. The remaining twenty-four doctors (73%) reported having had 
no training or education in law, rights or ethics whilst at medical school.  It is 
possible that with the passage of time some doctors may have forgotten 
whether they had any training or education in law or ethics.  It is noteworthy that 
the two doctors who report having the most education and training in law, rights 
and ethics, while at medical school trained in Europe982 and Scotland, not 
England, where the majority of doctors in this study were located.  
   
Figure 58: Legal and ethical education while at medical school  
  
                                                 








in medical school (24
doctors)
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The doctors were also asked about any training in law, rights and ethics they 
had undertaken since qualification, as figure 59 illustrates. Seventeen doctors 
(52%) reported that they had undertaken no training or education in law, rights 
or ethics since qualifying as a doctor.  
 
Figure 59:  Post-qualification legal and ethical training  
  
This suggests that sixteen doctors (48%) received no training at all, pre-or post-
qualification, in law, rights and ethics.  The remaining seventeen doctors (52%) 
described having undertaken some education.  This varied from three doctors 
(9%) who reported studying for a masters’ degree in medical law and one (6%) 
who followed what she described as ‘master level’ modules, to doctors who 
described their training and education in law as ‘minimal’.  It is perhaps 
noteworthy, here, that the doctors who were later interviewed, who had 
undertaken post-graduate studies in law and ethics, all said they had sought out 
training due to their interest in law and a sense that knowing more was 
important for their work.  No doctor was offered any training in law, rights or 
ethics as part of their compulsory or discretionary continuing professional 
education.   
  
It is noticeable that all nine doctors who had some training or education while at 
medical school, even if this was minimal, chose to undertake some further 
studies in law once qualified.  A possible explanation for this is that even limited 
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and awareness of the relevance of law and ethics to their work.  What is 
unknown from the limited data available, is why the doctors thought further 
education in law and ethics was important.  For example, it is possible, that 
doctors sought out legal or ethical education because they saw law as a 
‘sword’983 and felt the need to arm themselves, so to speak, to enable them to 
challenge decisions and to address a power imbalance where perhaps they 
perceive themselves as vulnerable.  Alternatively, it could be because the 
doctors saw law as a ‘shield’984 and sought either to protect themselves or their 
child patients, or indeed both. The doctors may have sought an understanding 
of due process, so that they can defer to the law, lifting the burden, to an extent, 
on them of having to make life or death decisions, in keeping with Ewick and 
Silbey’s ‘before the law schema’.985 
  
As seen above, when undergraduate and post graduate training and education 
is combined, sixteen doctors (49%) reported no education or training in law or 
ethics at all.  Nine doctors (27%) reported minimal and eight (24%) reported 
having had significant, for example, having followed a course in law and ethics 
at either under or post graduate stage of training.986 
  
                                                 
983 Halliday S, Kitzinger C, Kitzinger J, (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of chronic 
disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74, p.63-64 
984 Halliday S, Kitzinger C, Kitzinger J, (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of chronic 
disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74,p.65 
985 Ewick P, Silbey SS, (1992), Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An Account of Legal 
Consciousness, New England Law Review, vol 26 & Ewick P, Silbey SS, (1999), Common Knowledge and 
Ideological Critique,  Law and Society Rev, 33, 1027 
986 Although when explored further with doctors at interview it transpired that often these courses were 
limited to four or six week, one day a week courses, not a full masters course as doctors had suggested 
in their survey responses. 
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Figure 60:  Education in law and ethics doctors have received pre & post qualification 
  
  
This suggests that nearly 40 years on, Kennedy’s concern that doctors have no 
training in law, rights and ethics remains a concern.  It is important to remember 
that the doctors in this study were, all but one, consultants who qualified in 
various years between the 1960s until 1998.  The data does show that the 
1990s qualifiers received more legal and ethical education than doctors who 
qualified in earlier decades. Five 1990s qualifiers (71%) reported undertaking 
significant legal and ethical training (and none reporting no legal or ethical 
training) compared with two 1980s qualifiers (10%) and one 1970s qualifier 
(20%), as figure 61 illustrates.   However, what this study does find is that 
almost half the doctors who participated, doctors from across the UK and 
making best interests decisions day-to-day, have received no formal training or 
education at all in law and ethics.987   
  
What is also of interest, is the doctors’ confirmation they have not received 
training in rights. This is despite the UK government giving undertakings to the 
Committee of the UNCRC that professionals who work with children in the UK 
                                                 
987 The doctors interviewed all said they thought this was representative of paediatric consultants 
generally.  The consensus was that in most tertiary hospitals there was probably one, perhaps two PICU 
consultants who had some training and education in law and ethics and then the odd consultant here 
and there from other sub-specialisms who had a particular interest.  Training in rights was reported to 





training in law or ethics
(16 doctors)
Minimal education in
law and ethics (8
doctors)
Significant education in
law and ethics (9
doctors)
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receive training in UNCRC rights.988 Doctors may be aware of the rights of the 
children in their care in other ways than direct education or training, but without 
formal education and training, the quality and indeed, the accuracy of that 
training, is hard to assess.  The UNCRC is briefly referenced in RCPCH 2015:  
‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) 
applies to all children and young people under the age of 18 and was 
ratified by the UK in 1991. Whilst it cannot be directly applied in UK 
courts, ratification means that the UK government is bound to honour it 
and to make all laws, policy and practice applying to children compatible 
with it.’989 
  
However, this statement is only helpful if doctors firstly read it and secondly are 
aware of the rights that the UNCRC aims to uphold.  It is unclear how likely a 
doctor would be to read the UNCRC without further enlightenment of its 
relevance to best interest decision making.  
 
Figure 61: Education and training in law and ethic received by decade of qualification  
Presented as a percentage of doctors qualifying in each decade  




                                                 
988 UNCRC (2008) Committee on the Right of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State 
Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention, third and fourth periodic reports of States parties due in 2007 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN, Geneva, para 64 
989 Larcher  V, Craig F,  Bhogal K, Wilkinson D, Brierley J (2015) Making decisions to limit treatment in 
life-limiting and life-threatening conditions in children: a framework for practice, Archives of Disease in 
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3. Mapping whether doctors who have studied law and ethics 
approach best interest decisions the same or differently from 
doctors who have not.  
  
In chapter five,990 survey data showing how doctors used prognosis, futility, 
quality of life and cognitive ability in their difficult decisions for disabled children 
was presented and analysed.  Considerable variation was found between 
doctors as to how they understood these four factors, both with respect to the 
weight they put on them and also whether the doctor saw the factors as 
involving clinical or non-clinical issues.  If as argued in this thesis, the best 
interests test is a legal one, these findings are legally significant, as it suggests 
there is considerable inconsistency in the way the best interest test is applied, 
at least amongst the doctors from around the UK in this study.  The discussion 
about roster uncertainty in chapter six,991 adds weight to this concern.    
 
This chapter will now map the weight the doctors put on the four factors of 
prognosis, futility, quality of life and a child’s cognitive ability when making best 
interest decisions, to see whether there are any discernible differences in 
approach to best interest decision making between, in particular, doctors who 
have had no education in law and ethics and those who have had significant 
education.     
  
As presented in chapter five, four categories are used to classify the doctors 
according to the weight the doctor put on each of these four factors.  These are 
(i) doctors who saw the factor as an important one when making best interest 
decisions for disabled children; (ii) doctors who expressed unease at its use; (iii) 
doctors who had a mixed view, this included doctors who saw both positives 
and negatives in the use of the factor in best interest decisions, or saw it was 
                                                 
990 Chapter five, pp.181-236 
991 Chapter six, para 3.4, pp.243-244 
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helpful factor in some circumstances but not in others; and (iv) doctors who did 
not answer or whose answer could not be classified.  Each of the four factors is 
now considered in turn and analysed using the three levels of doctors’ legal 
education.                                                                                                              
   
3.1  Prognosis, weight and legal/ethical education  
All eight doctors (100%) who had studied a significant amount of law and ethics 
put considerable weight on a child’s prognosis, when making best interest 
decisions, describing it as the most important factor or one of the most 
important factors.  In contrast only five doctors (55%) who had received minimal 
legal/ethical training and seven doctors (44%) who had received no legal/ethical 
training did so.  For the remaining doctors with minimal legal/ethical training, 
one doctors (11%) expressed unease at the use of prognosis and three doctors 
(33%) expressed a mixed view.  
 
For the doctors with no legal training, two doctors (12.5%) expressed unease at 
the use of a child’s prognosis in a best interest decision, five doctors (31%) 
expressed a mixed view and the remaining two doctors (12.5%) did not answer 
the question or gave answers where their meaning was unclear.   
  
These results seem to suggest that, at least for doctors in this study, doctors 
who have studied law and ethics are more inclined to put weight on prognosis 
as a factor in their decisions than those who have had no 
legal/ethical education.  This of course does not mean that doctors do this 
because they have studied law, although that is a possibility.  It may be that 
whatever influences doctors to put weight on prognosis, also makes them more 
likely to study law.  Certainly, five doctors (62.5%) who had significant 
legal/ethical education were PICU consultants (50%) of the PICUs in the study) 
and as was seen in chapter five,992 seven PICU consultants (70%) in this study 
                                                 
992 Chapter five, para 3.4, p. 186 
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described prognosis as the most important or one of the most important factors 
in best interest decisions, compared with, for example, four neurologists 
(44%).  Only one neurologist (11%) and two Other doctors (14%) had 
undertaken significant legal/ethical studies. It is therefore possible that these 
findings can be explained by PICU consultants being both more inclined than 
neurologists and Other Doctors to study law and ethics and to put more weight 
on prognosis as a factor in their best interest decisions.  Dr 17 one of the PICU 
consultants interviewed talked at some length as to why she studied law and 
ethics when she became a PICU consultant, as will be seen in the next 
chapter.  
  
3.2   Futility, weight and legal/ethical education  
As was seen earlier in chapter five993 the use of futility in best interest decisions 
is controversial amongst paediatricians, with a lack of consensus as to its 
meaning and use.   This controversy is perhaps reflected in the more mixed 
results among doctors who have studied law and ethics, as to the weight to be 
put on futility, compared with prognosis. Four doctors (50%) who had studied a 
significant amount of law and ethics put considerable weight on futility when 
making best interest decisions, describing it as the most important factor or one 
of the most important factors.  This can be contrasted with the three doctors 
(33.3%) who had received minimal legal/ethical training and three doctors 
(19%) who had received no legal/ethical training who did so.  With this factor, 
seven doctors (44%) who had not studied law expressed unease at is use in 
best interest decisions, compared with two doctors (25%) who had studied 
significant amounts of law and three doctors (33.3%) who had studied minimum 
law.  Two doctors (25%) with significant education expressed a mixed view, as 
did four doctors (25%) with no legal/ethical education. No doctors with minimal 
training expressed a mixed view and the remaining doctors did not answer the 
question or expressed views that could not be classified.  
                                                 
993 Chapter five, para 4, pp. 198-207 
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The notable findings here are that doctors in this study who have had significant 
legal/ethical studies seem more inclined to use futility as a factor and those who 
have not studied law seem more inclined to express unease at its use.  Unlike 
with prognosis, however, there does not seem to be an obvious link with a 
doctor’s sub-specialism.  As was seen in chapter five,994 there was much less 
consensus between sub-specialisms as to whether futility should be 
used.  Indeed, if for example, the responses from doctors who have not studied 
law are examined in more detail, it is found that four neurologists (44%)995 had 
not studied law, but two (22%) expressed unease at the use of futility; one 
(11%) favoured its use as a factor and the fourth (11%) expressed a mixed 
viewpoint.  Likewise, for the five PICU consultants who had not studied law, 
three (30%)996 expressed unease at its use, but one (10%) favoured its use as a 
factor and one (10%) did not answer the question.  It is not possible to give an 
answer from the data available, why doctors in this study doctors who have 
studied significant law seem marginally more inclined to use futility as a factor, 
where as those who have not studied law seem more inclined to express 
concerns at it use.  However, one possible explanation is that, as was seen in 
chapters five,997 there seems to be some confusion amongst doctors as to what 
‘futility’ means.  It is possible that some doctors who have studied law and 
ethics simply feel more confident that they understand what the term means 
and so are happier to include it as a factor in their decision-making.  However, it 
might be expected that doctors who had studied significant law and ethics, 
might have become more aware of the controversial nature of futility and been 
less inclined, rather than more inclined to use it in their best interest 
decisions.  In short, it appears from the data that studying law may make a 
difference, but it is not clear why.  
                                                 
994 Chapter five, para 4.4, pp.201-202 
995 As a percentage of neurologists in this study 
996 As a percentage of PICU consultants in this study 
997 Chapter five, para 4.1, pp.198-199 
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3.3   Quality of life, weight and legal/ethical education  
Quality of life, as was seen in chapter five, is understood by the doctors in this 
study in different ways, with some, understanding it more as a clinical 
evaluation involving factors such as level of pain or the child’s state of health 
and others as more of a non-clinical evaluation considering, for example, 
whether a child is perceived to be happy or attends school.  
  
Similar numbers of doctors, five (62.5%) with significant legal/ethical education 
and six (66.6%) with minimum legal/ethical education put weight on quality of 
life as a factor, in their best interest decisions.  Slightly fewer, eight doctors 
(50%) who had no legal/ethical education put weight on it in their 
decisions.  There was more variation however, when the doctors who are 
uneasy about quality of life being used as a factor are examined.  One doctor 
(12.5%) with significant legal/ethical education reported unease at the use of 
quality of life as a factor, compared with three doctors (33.3%) with minimal 
education in law and two doctors (19%) with no legal/ethical education.   
  
In contrast with prognosis, but in keeping with futility, there does not seem to be 
any suggestion that these findings can be explained by the fact that PICU 
consultants are more likely to have significant legal/ethical education than 
doctors from other sub-specialisms in this study.  Looking at the data in more 
detail: of the doctors with significant legal/ethical education who put great 
weight on quality of life as a factor, three are PICU consultants, the least likely 
of the three sub-specialisms to favour the use of quality of life, with five PICU 
consultants (50%) doing so; one was a neurologist, the most likely sub-
specialism to favour the use of quality of life, with seven neurologists (67%) 
doing so and one was an Other Doctor, with five (57%) putting weight on quality 
of life as a factor. Indeed, the data here does not seem to suggest any obvious 
link between a doctor’s level of legal/ethical education and the weight he or she 
put on quality of life as a factor.  
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3.4   Cognitive ability, weight and legal/ethical education   
In contrast to quality of life as a factor, there are noticeable differences in the 
percentage of doctors who said they put weight on a child’s cognitive ability 
when making best interest decisions, depending on the extent of legal/ethical 
education received. Four doctors (50%) with significant legal/ethical education 
said they put weight on a child’s cognitive ability compared with two doctors 
(22%) (2) with minimal education and two doctors (12.5%) with no legal/ethical 
education.  However, no real difference can be seen between the percentage of 
doctors who expressed unease at the use of a child’s cognitive ability as a 
factor in best interest decisions, according to a doctor’s legal/ethical 
education.  Doctors with significant legal/ethical education, make up two (25%) 
and doctors with minimal legal/ethical education make up a further two (22%) of 
doctors who expressed unease at the use of a child’s cognitive ability as a 
factor in best interest decisions.  A similar number (2) but smaller percentage, 
(12.5%) of doctors with no legal/ethical education expressed similar 
unease.  Once again there is nothing in the data to suggest that these 
differences can be explained by the doctor’s sub-specialism, when these figures 
are considered alongside the percentage of doctors from each sub-specialism 
who either said they put weight on a child’s cognitive ability in their best interest 
decisions or expressed unease at doing so.   Doctors in this study who have 
significant legal/ethical education do seem to approach a child’s cognitive ability 
as a factor differently from those with no legal/ethical education when making 
best interests decisions.  What is unclear from the limited information available 
in a survey is why?  Also, it is acknowledged that the small number of doctors in 
this study means that it is not possible to claim that these findings are 
representative of the paediatric population as a whole.  
  
To summarise so far, almost half the doctors in this study (48%, 16 doctors) 
report having no formal training or education998 in law and ethics.  The nine 
                                                 
998 This means they have attended no courses, workshops, training events, CPD seminars, lectures, 
tutorials, talks, or similar and not undertaken any on-line or distance training or education. 
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doctors (27%), who have had significant training in law and ethics, five (55%) of 
whom were PICU consultants, do seem to use prognosis, futility and a 
child’s cognitive ability differently from doctors who had received no legal/ethical 
education when making best interest decisions. With each of these factors, 
doctors with legal/ethical education were more likely to say they put weight on 
those factors than doctors who had not received any legal/ethical 
education.  This difference was not seen for quality of life, as a factor, although 
doctors with minimal legal/ethical education did seem more likely to express 
unease at its use.  For prognosis, the difference may be explained by the 
doctors’ sub-specialism.  However, this does not seem to explain the difference 
for the other factors.  What is not clear from this data is whether the doctors with 
more legal/ethical education make their decisions more in keeping with how 
they are guided to make best interest decisions by their professional ethical 
guidance and the law –i.e. the jurisprudence of the English High Court.  This is 
however, considered in the next chapter when what the doctors said at 
interview about law is considered in detail.  
 
It does seem possible to conclude that doctors who have had significant 
legal/ethical training do approach best interest decisions differently. But what is 
not clear is whether this is because of the doctors’ legal/ethical training. It is 
possible that being exposed to concepts such as ‘best interests’ or ‘futility’ 
during training will make a difference.  However, as the doctors were not asked 
in the survey about the detail of any training, it is not known what the doctors’ 
training covered.  Despite this, it seems likely that the doctors do fall within 
different schema of legal consciousness, but there is insufficient data in a 
survey to determine how (and again, these numbers are small).  An issue also 
still to be addressed, is whether the doctors’ different approaches to best 
interest decision-making leads to different outcomes for the children at the 
centre of those decisions.  This is something discussed in the next chapter, as 
one of the themes picked up by doctors in their interviews.  
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Having mapped what the doctors said about how they made their decisions to 
the doctors’ training and education in law and ethics, this chapter will now turn 
to a brief overview of what doctors said about the law, rights and ethics in their 
survey responses.   
 
4. Perceptions of the law  
 
Doctors were asked for their perceptions of the relevance and influence of the 
law upon their difficult decisions for disabled children.  These answers were 
brief, often too brief to draw significant meaning.  However, some answers do 
give some insight, albeit small, into how the doctors view law in this context.   
 
None of the doctors mentioned the phrase ‘best interests’ or an obvious proxy 
when asked directly about law and ethics in the survey.  It will be recalled from 
chapter four,999 that four doctors (12%) did, however, list best interests or an 
obvious proxy, in their initial list of the factors they consider at the start of the 
survey. A further nine doctors (27%) also cited factors which are important 
elements of the best interest test.1000  For example, three cited the balancing of 
benefits and burdens of treatment and six cited consulting widely with other 
health professionals and the child’s parents.  For all these doctors, this perhaps 
suggests that, perhaps unsurprisingly for doctors, for them, best interests is a 
medical not legal determination.  However, the remaining twenty doctors 
(60.5%) made no reference at all to a child’s best interests or clear proxies in 
any part of their survey. 
Fourteen doctors (42%) wrote about the obligation on them not to break the law, 
several indicating in their answers that, provided they did not break it, the law 
had no relevance to their difficult decisions.  These doctors’ answers seem to 
suggest possibly fear or suspicion of the law, since law was only being 
                                                 
999 chapter four, para 4, pp. 178-179 
1000 As the test is set out in cases such as Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991]; 2 WLR 
140 
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mentioned in terms of litigation. This does seem to suggest a perception of the 
law as distant, intervening when things go wrong, often to punish, perhaps most 
in keeping with Halliday et al’s ‘law as a sword’ schema.1001  
  
Only two survey doctors (6%) (Drs. 2 & 29) described the law as much more 
than just a mechanism to resolve disputes, in one case drawing expressly and 
in the other implicitly, on the importance of not discriminating against disabled 
children.  Dr 2 (PICU) for example, wrote “Law supports the care of the disabled 
child and underwrites the same rights as all other children”.  Relating this back 
to the impact of training and education, Dr 2 had received no training or 
education in law and ethics and Dr 29 had received minimal training.  This 
suggests that these two doctors seem to have developed this broader 
understanding of the law in some other way.  Dr 29 did talk about how he 
developed an understanding of the importance of law at interview as is explored 
in the next chapter, talking particularly of developing an understanding of child’s 
rights while working under an eminent child psychoanalyst treating children with 
mental health problems.  
  
Perhaps the lack of nuance in the doctors’ answers is unsurprising given their 
brevity, but the answers do seem to suggest that the doctors in the survey saw 
law in very narrow terms.  As will be seen later in this chapter, twenty doctors 
(60.5%) reported having had discussions with their trust’s legal teams at some 
point in their career.  This seems to suggest that doctors see ‘law’ as impinging 
on their working lives, just not as part of the framework of their difficult 
decisions. which as was seen in chapter four, thirty-one of the doctors (94%) 
defined as end-of-life decisions whether to withhold or withdraw treatment. 
Indeed, five doctors (15%) described the law as having no relevance (Drs. 4 
(Other), 10 (Other) & 25 (Other) or little relevance (Drs. 30 (neurologist) & 28 
(PICU)) to their decisions for disabled children; suggesting an extremely narrow 
                                                 
1001 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74 
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interpretation of the law. Dr 25 (Other) had received minimal legal/ethical 
education, the other doctors had received none.  It is noticeable that all the 
doctors who described law as having no relevance to best interest decisions 
were from sub-specialisms other than PICU and neurology, again raising the 
question not answered here, as to whether the doctors’ sub-specialism is 
significant.  One Other Doctor, however, did reference the Disability 
Discrimination Act,1002 equality and diversity law, and the HRA1003 indicating a 
slightly broader perception of the law than other doctors. The doctor reported 
having received minimal legal/ethical education. The doctor is the parent of a 
disabled child, which may explain the doctor’s awareness of the particular 
legislation mentioned, although Parsons et al1004 found parents of disabled 
children did not necessarily have awareness of disability legislation.  The doctor 
can perhaps be seen as fitting more within Halliday et al’s “law as a shield” 
schema,1005 providing protection to disabled children.  
  
5. When do doctors turn to the law?  
 
To try and better understand how doctors conceptualise law when making best 
interest decisions, they were also asked in the survey, whether they ever sought 
legal advice when making difficult decisions and if they did in what 
circumstances?  
 
Twenty doctors (60.5%) said they had consulted with their hospital’s lawyers. 
The doctors cited a range of reasons, some unrelated to end-of-life decisions, 
                                                 
1002 Disability Discrimination Act 2005 c.13 
1003 Human Rights Act 1998 c 42 
1004 Parsons, S, Lewis A, Ellins, S, (2009) The views and experiences of parents of children with austic 
spectrum disorders about educational provision: comparisons with parents of children with other 
disabilities from an online survey, European Journal of Special Education Needs, vol.24, Issue 1, pp.37-58 
1005 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74 
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for example, child safeguarding. Writing specifically about best interest 
decision-making, thirteen doctors (39%) cited disagreements with a child’s 
family as the catalyst to them contacting their legal team.  It will be recalled from 
chapter four1006 that nineteen doctors (58%) cited disagreements with parents 
as the aspect of difficult decisions for disabled children they found most 
difficult.1007 Four doctors (12%) also mentioned disagreement between health 
professionals as a reason to contact their legal team. As was also seen in 
chapter four, twenty-six doctors (78%) reported disagreements with other 
doctors as to a disabled child’s best interests.1008 Suggesting doctors are more 
likely to frame disagreements with parents as to a child’s best interests, than 
with colleagues as ‘legal’.  
  
There are many reasons why a doctor could choose to contact their lawyers 
when they disagree as to a child’s best interests.  For example, the doctor could 
be seeking advice as to how best to ascertain a child’s best interests, protecting 
the child, perhaps showing a ‘law as a shield’ legal consciousness.  This could 
also be seen as falling within Ewick and Silbey’s schema of ‘before the law’ 
seeing law as the arbiter of disagreements.1009 Alternatively a doctor could be 
seeking advice as to whether a proposed course of action is lawful, to 
safeguard and protect themselves from the law, perhaps seeing law more as a 
power to be feared, in keeping with a ‘law as a sword’ legal consciousness.   
  
Dr 13 (Other) did expand a little on her reasons for contacting lawyers, again 
perhaps expressing a ‘before the law’ legal consciousness:  
                                                 
1006 Chapter four, para 5.4, p.171-172 
1007 Ibid 
1008 Ibid 
1009 Ewick P, Silbey SS, (1992), ‘Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An Account of Legal 
Consciousness’, New England Law Review, vol 26 & Ewick P, Silbey SS, (1999), ‘Common Knowledge and 
Ideological Critique’, Law and Society Rev, 33, 1027 
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“When decisions appear to (or could potentially become) controversial 
or where it is not clear that a decision would be lawful. Where there is 
disagreement about best interests between clinicians or with families”  
  
Dr 5 (Other) wrote he would refer to his legal team  
“When there is disagreement between staff and parents or when 
potential murder case.” 
 
 His answer is ambiguous, it is unclear whether he is meaning a potential 
murder unrelated to the child’s healthcare (for example a child presenting at 
hospital with suspicious injuries) or a potential ‘murder’ by healthcare staff and a 
fear on the part of Dr 5 that he or a colleague may be charged with murder.  If 
this is the case, this could be read as Dr 5 seeing ‘law as a sword’, which is 
threatening him or his colleagues, or it could also be read as Dr 5 seeing ‘law as 
a shield’ and seeking its and his legal team’s protection.   
  
The survey data suggest that PICU consultants seem more likely to consult with 
their Trust’s legal team, with eight PICU consultants (80%) in this study 
indicating they do. This is perhaps not surprising, as PICU consultants are most 
likely to be involved in decisions as whether to withdraw or withhold treatment. 
Moreover, as has been seen in chapter four,1010 PICU consultants reported 
disagreements with parents more commonly than other sub-specialities, which 
was the most common reason given for contacting a legal team.   
  
Five neurologists (55%) also said they contacted their lawyers.  Four Other 
Doctors (29%) - the oncologist, metabolic specialist and both endocrine 
consultants in this study - all reported that they did not contact their legal 
teams.   
 
Having significant legal/ethical education does not seem to influence whether a 
doctor contacts his or her legal team. Indeed, the same percentage, 62.5% of 
                                                 
1010 Ibid 
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doctors who had significant legal/ethical education (3 doctors) and had no 
legal/ethical education (10 doctors), reported contacting their legal team for 
advice. However, it is acknowledged that the small numbers in this study, may 
be impacting on these percentages. 
  
To summarise what can be concluded about doctors who contact their legal 
team: disagreements seem to be the main reason contact made. However, it is 
unclear whether doctors are doing so defensively, fearing litigation, seeing law 
as a sword, or looking to protect themselves, seeing it as a shield. Alternatively, 
the doctors may be wanting advice as to how to ascertain a child’s best 
interests, still seeing law as a shield, but this time seeking to protect the 
child.   It is of course possible, that doctors are contacting their legal teams for a 
combination of reasons.  
   
6. Conclusions  
 
The survey responses of the thirty-three doctors in this study seem to suggest 
that for almost half the doctors (48%), Kennedy was correct in his assertion that 
doctors do not have training in law and ethics.  
  
Doctors who have received training in law and ethics do seem to conceptualise 
their best interest decisions for disabled children differently from doctors who 
have no legal/ethical training, but whether this is because to this training, is 
unclear.  It is also not possible to make a judgment as to whether doctors with 
legal/ethical education are ‘better’ at making best interest decisions.  
  
Law for the majority of doctors in this study was seen solely in terms of 
litigation, i.e. as a threat, or law as a ‘sword’ within Halliday et al’s 
schema.  Doctors who have studied law also seem possibly to fear law – or at 
least be aware of law and its impact – more so than doctors who have not, but 
again there is insufficient data to explain why.  It is also possible that the 
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doctors chose to study law, in part, because they feared or felt vulnerable to 
law’s power. 
 
Having explored what the doctors’ survey’s tell us about how the doctors 
conceptualise law in relation to their difficult decisions for disabled children, the 
next chapter now turns to an analysis of the semi-structured interviews with 
doctors, looking at what these reveal about the part, if any, played by law and 
ethics in doctors’ best interest decisions and the doctors’ legal consciousness.  
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Chapter Nine 
What the doctors said (or did not say) about law, rights and ethics in their 
interviews  
 
1. Introduction  
This chapter continues from the last, by exploring what the nine doctors who 
were interviewed said, and did not say, about law and ethics in their interviews. 
As was discussed in chapter three,1011 the interviews with the doctors were 
semi-structured, allowing each doctor the freedom to discuss the aspects of his 
or her best interest decisions-making for severely disabled children that was 
perceived to be the most important.  Allowing doctors this freedom helped 
reveal their legal consciousness, by showing how the doctor constructed and 
understood best interest decision-making.   
 
At the start of chapter six,1012 it was seen that the doctors choose to talk about 
different aspects of their decision-making and at different length.  While some 
doctors talked at great length about law and ethics others talked more about 
other aspects of decision making. This led to a diversity in the amount of data 
collected from each doctor. This is reflected in the extent to which each doctor 
is discussed in this chapter.    
  
There was considerable variation in the content, tone and language used by the 
doctors in their interviews. However, while there was considerable variation 
between the nine doctors, there were commonalities in the tone and language 
amongst the hardliners and also amongst the softliners, as defined in chapter 
six.1013 For this reason, when analysing what the doctors said in their interviews, 
the hardliner and softliner classifications will be used. As a reminder, the 
                                                 
1011 Chapter three, para 5, p.109 
1012 Chapter six, para 1, p.237 
1013 Chapter six, paras. 7.2.1-7.2.2, pp.268-271 
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terminology being used refers to the way a doctor approaches best interest 
decisions, for disabled children.  As explained in chapter six,1014 softliners are 
usually, but not always, doctors who work with the child long term, whereas the 
hardliners tend to be acute specialists called in to treat a child in a crisis.  The 
two camps of doctors tended to use different language. The softliner tended to 
stress the more positive aspects and the hardliners tended to stress the more 
negative aspects, when talking potential treatment for a disabled child. 
Softliners tended to make decisions based on an individual child and consult 
with others to decide a child’s best interests. Hardliners were more likely to use 
heuristics to guide their decisions and make decisions without wider 
consultation. For example, hardliners said they would, as a matter of practice, 
exclude a cognitively impaired child from PICU. 
  
Dr 17 described herself as a hardliner, and so has been classified here as such. 
The rest of the doctors have been classified based on an overall assessment of 
their interview and survey responses.  This is based on an analysis of the 
language used and how the doctors described making their best interest 
decisions for disabled children.  As was discussed in chapter six, the distinction 
between hardliner and softliner doctors is not binary, but rather a spectrum.  For 
example, Dr 17 was on the hard end of the hardliner doctors, although even she 
at times made comments, which could be labelled softliner in tone. In contrast 
Dr 24 was on the soft end of the hardliners, expressing views that could put her 
into both camps, but on balance put her just in the hardliner camp.  It is 
acknowledged that, apart from Dr 17, the categorisation of doctors as hardliners 
or softliners is based on the subjective assessment of the researcher.  The 
classification of each doctor interviewed is shown in table 62 below, with five of 
the nine doctors classified as softliners and four as hardliners. Each doctor’s 
level of legal education is also shown.   
  
                                                 
1014 Ibid  
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It was noted in chapter five1015 that PICU consultants and doctors who only saw 
children acutely, so did not have the opportunity to form long-term relationships 
with the child and his or her family, were more likely, but not exclusively, to be 
hardliners.  In contrast neurologists and doctors who saw a child routinely, often 
over many years were more likely to be softliners. Doctors, however, also bring 
a complex mix of personal and private characteristics to their decisions, not just 
their sub-specialism and the experience that brings. This means doctors from all 
three sub-specialisms, PICU doctors, neurologists and Other Doctors are found 
within both softliner and hardliner classifications.  As can also be seen from 
table 62, the level of a doctor’s legal education does not seem to influence 
whether a doctor is a hardliner or softliner, with doctors with no, minimal and 
significant legal education found in both camps. Indeed, there was an almost 
equal spread of doctors within each level of legal education in each camp, 
amongst the doctors interviewed.  For these doctors, whether a doctor was a 
softliner or a hardliner did not seem to influence whether a doctor contacts his 
or her legal team, with three hardliners and three softliners saying they did do.  
 
Figure 62: Interviewed doctors’ legal education and whether the doctor’s responses appear to 
show a hardliner or softliner approach  






1  Neuro  none  yes  soft  
7  Neuro  none  no  hard  
10  Other (oncology)  none  no  soft  
14  Other 
(respiratory)  
none  yes  hard  
17  PICU  significant  yes  hard  
18  PICU  significant  yes  soft  
24  Neuro  minimal  yes  hard  
29  Neuro  minimal  yes  soft  
32  Other  
(Palliative care)  
none  no  soft  
                                                 
1015 Chapter five, para 2, p.183 
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Clear differences between the hardliner doctors and the softliner doctors were 
found in their interview discussions. An analysis of the interview transcripts 
shows that the hardliner doctors used what can be described loosely as legal 
language - words such as law, best interests, judges and court - far more 
frequently than the softliner doctors.  For example, ‘court’ is mentioned a total of 
forty-five times in the interview transcripts, but forty of those times were by the 
hardliner doctors. Similarly, ‘best interests’ were mentioned fifteen times in the 
doctors’ discussions, with ten of the references to ‘best interests’ being made by 
hardliners. In contrast, the softliners tended to talk about decision-making for 
disabled children, much more in terms of the relationships between the various 
parties, seeing, it seems, best interest decision making much more, as series of 
discussions than a legal process. This also comes across in the vocabulary 
used. For example, the word ‘relationship’ was used fifteen times in total, but all 
but one use of the word was by a softliner doctor. Indeed, Dr 14 the hardliner 
doctor who did use the word ‘relationship,’ did so when talking about 
relationships between doctors and parents breaking down.  In contrast, 
softliners tended to talk about good relationships as key to good best interest 
decision-making.  The word ‘discussion’ was also used sixty-nine times in the 
transcripts, but softliners used it more frequently, with forty-four of these 
references being made by softliners. It is noteworthy also that Dr 17 made 
fifteen of the twenty-five hardliner references to discussion, with ten of those 
references being to discussions that had not taken place about end-of-life care, 
but which in Dr 17’s view should have occurred. Throughout their interviews the 
tone of the hardliners is noticeably negative, when compared with the 
discussions by softliners.  Hardliners talked much more frequently about 
reasons why a disabled child should not have treatment, in contrast to the 
softliners who tended to emphasise more the positive aspects of a disabled 
child’s life, such as a child’s loving relationship with family members or 
engagement at school.  
  
The differences in language was also seen when in interviews, the doctors 
picked up the theme of conflict between doctors, particularly with PICU 
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consultants. For example, Drs 7 & 24 - both hardliner doctors - used legal 
terminology such as discrimination and prejudice, whereas the softliner doctors 
raised similar concerns, but did not use legal terminology. For example, Drs 10 
and 32- both softliner doctors - talked instead of the PICU consultant’s 
behaviour being ethically unacceptable.    
  
The hardliner doctors also referred, without prompting, to legal cases in their 
discussions more frequently than the softliners. Hardliners made five mentions 
of legal cases compared with just two by softliners, and even then, the context 
in which softliners referred to legal cases seemed to be different from the 
context in which they were mentioned by hardliners.   Both Drs.7 and 14 
(hardliners) cited the criminal trial of Dr Leonard Arthur,1016 discussed in chapter 
two. Drs 17 and 7 both mentioned, Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland [1993].1017 Dr 
17, a hardliner, also cited the case of A NHS Trust v MB [2006],1018 while Dr 10, 
a softliner, did mention An NHS Trust v SR [2012]1019a case involving Neon 
Roberts, a child with a brain tumour whose mother did not wish him to have 
radiotherapy. However, the context in which Dr 10 mentioned this case was 
qualitatively different from the context in which the hardliner doctors cited legal 
cases. The hardliners, as will be seen, cited cases in the context of discussing 
law as a negative influence and their own sense of vulnerability before the law. 
In contrast, Dr 10, an oncologist, cited the Neon Roberts case when discussing 
disagreements with families, seeming to see law as way of resolving that 
disagreement, saying he would have applied to the court in similar 
circumstances.  A fear of or anxiety about the law was also seen in the hardliner 
doctors’ responses when specifically asked whether cases involving disabled 
children impacted on their practice. Drs. 24, 14 and 7, all hardliner doctors, said 
                                                 
1016 R v Arthur[1981] 12 BMLR 1, heard before Farquharson J, 3-5th November, 1981 
1017 Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789 House of Lords 
1018 A NHS Trust v MB [2006], EWHC 507 (Fam) 
1019 An NHS Trust v SR [2012] EWHC 3842 (Fam) 
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that their reaction to such cases (and, they added, in their view it would be the 
reaction of most doctors) or when hearing of any legal cases which might be 
relevant to their area of medicine, was to think “there but for the grace of God 
go I.”   In contrast, three of the five softliner doctors said they were not aware of 
the legal cases.  In addition to Dr 10’s awareness of the Roberts case, Dr 29 
was aware of the litigation relating to David Glass,1020 (discussed in chapter 
two)1021 but, as shall be seen, rather than expressing a sense of fear for the 
doctors involved, was critical of the doctors’ treatment of David and said the 
doctors should have applied to court so that the court could determine what was 
in David’s best interests. 
  
As was discussed in chapter six,1022 there also seem to be other qualitative 
differences in the language used by the hardliners and softliners. This is 
especially noticeable in the language used when talking about the children at 
the centre of their decisions and their families. As was seen, the hardliners 
seemed more likely to speak about the child, or parents, using dismissive 
language, for example, referring to disabled children as a group as ‘no hopers’ 
or describing parents as “selfish” or “pathological”. In contrast, the softliners 
used more positive language, often expressing compassion. For example, 
softliner Dr 32 talked about disabled children “participating in relationships” and 
both Dr 1, also a softliner and Dr 32 talked about the children’s lives having 
“value”.    
  
An analysis of the interview transcripts suggest that best interest decisions are 
conceptualised differently by the hardliner and the softliner doctors, as this 
chapter will go on to explore in more detail. The interviews with the softliner 
                                                 
1020 Glass, R (On the application of) v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust [1999] EWCA Civ 1914; Glass, R 
(On the application of) v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust [1999] EWHC Admin 343; Glass v UK 
[2003]ECHR Admissibility Decision no. 61827/00 
1021 Chapter two, para 7, pp. 61-75 
1022 Chapter six, para 7.2.2 , pp.269-271 
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doctors will first be analysed, followed by the interviews with the hardliners, to 
ascertain the role of law, rights and ethics, if any, in their best interest decisions 
and what the doctors reveal about their legal consciousness. The difference in 
the amount the softliner and hardliner doctors talk about law is reflected in the 
way the rest of this chapter is presented. More space is given to an analysis of 
what was said by the hardliner doctors, with each doctor being individually 
analysed. In contrast, less space and less individual analysis is given to the 
softliner doctors, instead the softliners are analysed thematically.  This is 
because the softliners said much less than hardliners directly about law. 
Therefore, for softliners, it is largely what they did not say about law which is of 
interest, and this first discussed.  
  
2. Softliners  
 
As was mentioned at the start of this chapter, the tone and content of the five 
softliners doctors’ interviews was qualitatively different from the interviews with 
the four hardliners. The softliners talked much less about law as it is in the 
books and tended not, in contrast to the hardliner doctors, to use legal language 
or refer to legislation or case law.  
 
2.1  Perceptions of law 
 When the softliners did talk about legal cases, as will be seen, this was also 
qualitatively different from the hardliners’ discussions of the legal cases.  Like 
hardliners, softliners seemed to see the court as a distant place of last resort, to 
which one went, or was taken, in keeping with Ewick and Silbey’s schema of 
‘before the law’.1023  However, in contrast to the hardliners, for the softliners, 
once there, the court seemed to be seen as a helpful place where difficult 
decisions could be solved, not a threatening place to be feared.  It is interesting 
                                                 
1023 Ewick P, Silbey SS, (1992), ‘Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An Account of Legal 
Consciousness’, New England Law Review, vol 26 & Ewick P, Silbey SS, (1999), ‘Common Knowledge and 
Ideological Critique’, Law and Society Rev, 33, 1027 
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to note that this seems to fit, as discussed below, with hardliner Dr 14’s actual 
experience of court, rather than his and other hardliners’ discussions of their 
perceptions of the court.  Moreover, when softliners talked about going to court 
there was much more of a sense that the beneficiary of any legal action was the 
child, with the aim of any court hearing being to provide a shield for the child by 
determining his or her child’s best interests. This seems to contrast with the 
hardliners’ conception of the court as a place to be feared, but also a place of 
protection, a shield for the doctor, rather than the child.   
  
2.2 Conceptualising and constructing best interests 
Although the softliners do not use terminology such as best interests and do not 
reference the law in the same way as the hardliners, the way in which the 
softliners discuss and describe their best interest decision-making for severely 
disabled children does, as was identified in chapter six,1024 seem to be much 
closer to the normative conception of how best interest decisions should be 
made according to the doctors’ professional guidance and stream of cases 
which followed on from Re B (A Minor) [1981]1025 discussed in chapter 
two.1026  The softliners described how they make best interest decisions in a 
way that fits within the normative conception of best interests as one of 
consulting widely, looking at the individual child’s best interests and their wider 
welfare as well as medical needs.  In part, this seems to be because softliners 
are more likely to be the doctors with long term relationships with families, 
described in five.1027 However, the distinction between softliner and hardliner 
doctors is more nuanced than this.  As is seen in figure 62 above, Dr 18 a 
softliner doctor is a PICU consultant who sees children just acutely and Dr 7 
and Dr 24 are both hard liner doctors, (albeit at the softer end of hardliners) but 
                                                 
1024 Chapter six, pp.237-284 
1025 Re B (A Minor) (Wardship, Medical Treatment) [1981], WLR 1421, CA, August 1981,  
1026 Chapter two, para 7.2.2-7.2.3, pp.269-273 
1027 Chapter five, para 2, p.183 
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neurologists, who have long-term relationships with patients.  It seems that, as 
with a doctors’ legal consciousness, many factors interact to create a softliner or 
hardliner persona.  
  
Relationships do seem to be of central importance to soft liner doctors.  Dr 1, for 
example talked about the need for discussion between all parties, he talked 
about the importance of maintaining good relationships with a child’s parents 
and stressed the importance of involving nurses, (who he said will often know a 
child better than a doctor), in discussions.  Dr 10 described making difficult 
decisions in similar terms, putting strong emphasis on the importance of 
discussion and consultation. Like Dr 1 he stressed the importance of involving 
the child’s parents, where possible the child and also the nursing team in 
discussions.  A common theme amongst all the doctors, as was seen in chapter 
six,1028 was disagreements between doctors as to a child’s best interests, 
especially between PICU consultants and non-PICU doctors.  As was seen, 
while some doctors talked of ‘keeping quiet’ (most noticeably hardliner Dr 14), 
other doctors, (most noticeably softliners such as Drs 1, and 10) talked of 
discussion and involving more people in the decision as a way of resolving this 
conflict.  Indeed, Dr 10 said he would get a ‘third, fourth, fifth opinion, if 
necessary’, until consensus is reached. Dr 10 did, as has been mentioned, said 
he would apply to court ‘as a last resort’ citing the case of An NHS Trust v SR 
[2012]1029 as the sort of circumstances where he would feel this 
necessary.  However, as mentioned, Dr 10’s motivation seemed qualitatively 
different from that of the hardliners who had talked about court applications.  Dr 
10’s motivation seemed to be to ensure the child’s best interests are followed, 
rather than to provide the doctor with a legal shield, as the hardliners seem to 
                                                 
1028 Chapter six, para 7, pp.261-276 
1029 An NHS Trust v SR [2012] EWHC 3842 (Fam) 
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suggest they are doing. He seems to be using the law as a shield for the child, 
within Halliday et al’s schema.1030 
 
Dr 32, Dr 1 and Dr 29 as well as hardliner doctors, Dr 24 and Dr 14 were all 
critical of PICU consultants’ treatment of disabled children and all attributed the 
behaviour of PICU consultants they criticised as being due to PICU consultants’ 
lack of experience of the lives of disabled children, suggesting the importance of 
the relationship between the PICU consultants and the children and their 
families in the construction of best interest decisions.  
  
 Dr 18 also attributed the behaviour she criticised in her PICU colleagues to the 
culture of her hospital, or at least its PICU department. Dr 18 attribute her 
different values from those of her colleagues to having, unlike many of her 
colleagues, worked in a range of PICU departments within a range of cultures:  
“I think some of the problems with some of my colleagues is that they 
have only trained here, they only see ICU as practiced here and they 
haven’t seen how it can be practiced elsewhere.” 
  
The importance of culture on the development of an individual or groups’ legal 
consciousness was discussed in chapter seven.1031  It is possible to see how Dr 
18, who had worked in several hospitals, including overseas, had developed a 
different conception of best interest decisions from that of her colleagues, some 
of whom had spent their whole career in one hospital.  
 
Both Dr 18 and Dr 32, like the other softliner doctors, but perhaps even more 
so, stressed the importance of good communication between doctors for good 
best interest decision-making.  Dr 18 talked about the need to involve the whole 
multi-disciplinary team saying “there is quite a lot to balance and you have to 
consider other people’s views”.  In particular Dr 18 stressed the importance of 
                                                 
1030 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74 
1031 Chapter seven, para 3, p. 295 
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neurologists being involved when best interest decisions are being made for 
severely disabled children.  Both doctors stressed the importance of including 
the child in decisions where possible and of parents being fully involved.  Dr 18 
described parents’ views as “a major influence” on her best interest decisions.  
  
Both doctors also stressed the importance of good communication between 
doctors and families. Dr 32 talked of problems arising when doctors avoided 
communicating with families, especially when they avoided discussing end-of -
life planning for children with life limiting and life threatening conditions, some 
thing described as a common problem. He spoke of the importance of an 
advanced care plan .1032 Although Dr 17, a hardliner, also spoke of the 
importance of advance care plans, once again there was a qualitative difference 
in their discussions.  While Dr 17 talked about the plans as being important to 
protect doctors, providing doctors with a shield, Dr 32 talked about advanced 
care plans being important to provide a shield for the child, ensuring that a child 
received treatment when it was in his or her best interests, but also did not 
receive treatment when this route was in the child’s best interests.  
  
Mention was made earlier of the qualitative difference in the way the hardliners 
and softliner doctors spoke about the children. The softliner doctors but 
particularly Drs 18 and 32 seemed to construct best interests as 
communication, dialogue between the parties who know the child and the child 
themselves where possible, emphasising the relational nature of legal 
consciousness. The importance of valuing the child was particularly noticeable 
with Dr 32. He spoke about the value he believed severely disabled children 
bring not just to their families, but also to health professionals and to society in 
general.  He spoke of their ‘preciousness’.  
 
 
                                                 
1032 Advanced care plans for children are not legally binding 
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 2.3  Role of Ethics 
Dr 10 mentioned consulting with his clinical ethics committees.  He described 
the experience a very helpful one, assisting him to resolve his practical ethical 
dilemma.  This, as will be seen below, contrasts with hardliner Dr 14’s negative 
experience of clinical ethics committees. What is unclear from Dr 14 and Dr 10’s 
accounts is whether it was the clinical ethics committees at their respective 
hospitals that were different - for example, one taking a more practical and the 
other a more theoretical approach - or whether it was the way the two doctors 
construct the information they are given which was different. Dr 10 certainly 
seemed to embrace ethics, talking of it as being ‘built into us’ as doctors.  
 
Softliner, Dr 1 also mentioned ethics, but described his experience of it as 
disappointing. He described himself as self-taught, but echoed the concerns, as 
shall be seen, Dr 14 voiced when talking about ethics committees. Dr 1 said he 
looked to ethics to provide him with some firm principles for his decision-
making, but did not find this by reading about different branches of ethics. This 
perhaps suggests Dr 1 was seeking but failing to find a framework to support 
his best interest decisions ethically.  It may also suggest a resistance to 
applying ethical principles, similar to the resistance that will be seen with the 
hardliner doctors.  
  
2.4  Role of lawyers 
Dr 10 was the only softliner who spoke about lawyers and again the context in 
which he did so was qualitatively different from the discussions about lawyers 
with the hardliner doctors discussed later in this chapter. Dr 10 sought out the 
company of lawyers.  He spoke of an annual meeting in his region of senior 
paediatricians, judges, barristers and solicitors who specialise in paediatric 
medical law to discuss legal and ethical issues.  He spoke positively about the 
meeting, and of how he believed it helped doctors and lawyers to better 
understand each other’s points of view.  Talking of the senior lawyers he did, 
however, say “we thought they would be hot on the legal stuff, but they are not 
[laughs].” While Dr 10’s enthusiasm for the meeting seems to suggest a ‘with 
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the law’ legal consciousness, with the senior lawyers being accessible, at least 
to elite senior paediatric consultants, his comments do raise the question of 
whether in his jokey dismissal of senior lawyers’ expertise in the law, Dr 10 was 
also exhibiting some resistance to the law. 
 
2.5   Law resolving disagreements 
The softliners, however, seemed far less resistant to law than the hardliners. 
For example, while still seeing the court as a place of last resort, the softliners 
also saw the court as place where disputes can be resolved. This was a 
construction of legality suggested by Dr 10 when he raised the case involving 
Neon Robert, An NHS Trust v SR [2012]1033 as discussed at the start of this 
chapter.  There was no sense in Dr 10’s interview, in contrast to that of the 
hardliner doctors, that a best interest application to the court was not in any way 
either a threat to a doctor or undertaken with the view to providing the doctor 
with a shield.  He spoke about the case as being about protecting the child’s 
best interests, much more of a ‘with the law’ legal consciousness, or ‘law as a 
shield’, that would protect the child’s best interests, rather than those of the 
doctor.    
  
Dr 29, another softliner doctor, seemed to construct legality in a similar way. He 
discussed the David Glass litigation,1034 discussed at length in chapter two1035 
but did so only after being asked about the influence, if any, of legal cases on 
his practice. This contrasted with the hardliners who cited legal cases without 
being prompted.  Dr 29 questioned the behaviour of the doctors treating David 
Glass, in particular criticising them for giving David diamorphine and for not 
applying to court for a determination of David’s best interests.  Once again, it 
                                                 
1033 An NHS Trust v SR [2012] EWHC 3842 (Fam) 
1034 Glass, R (on the application of) v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust [1999] EWCA Civ 1914; Glass, R (on 
the application of) v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust [1999] EWHC Admin 343 
1035 Chapter two, para 7, pp. 61-75 
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seems a softliner saw the law as a shield to protect the child, and expressed a 
‘with the law’ legal consciousness, in contrast to the fear of and hostility to the 
law seen with the hardliner doctors.  
 
 2.6  Not mentioning the law 
Until prompted, Drs 18 and 32 did not mention the law, the courts or any legal 
cases at all. Both discussed issues that could be framed as legal, but even 
when prompted, both chose instead to frame the issues they discussed as 
ethical.  Both spoke in detail about what they clearly perceived to be PICU 
consultants’ discriminatory behaviour towards disabled children, but neither 
used legal terms such as ‘discrimination’.  Dr 32 framed the PICU consultant’s 
behaviour as being unethical.  Dr 18 did not expressly label her fellow PICU 
consultant’s behaviour, but did attributed it to them being misinformed, largely 
she believed because they lacked knowledge of disabled children’s lives and 
experience outside their immediate working environment.  When asked about 
the role of law, she said this is something “that is more likely between the 
parents and the doctors”, again suggesting a perception of law as limited to 
litigation, in keeping with Ewick and Silbey’s ‘before the law’ schema.1036 
  
To summarise: in contrast to the hardliners discussed below, the way softliner 
doctors approach best interest decisions suggests law is very much in the 
background.  It is distant, but when needed it is helpful. It is a shield to protect 
the child, to ensure the child’s best interests are met.  Ethics are more 
prominent in softliner doctor’s construction of best interests, with doctors who 
do not seem in the softliner’s view to value disabled children and their families, 
being seen as behaving unethically.  
 
                                                 
1036 Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1992) Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An Account of Legal 
Consciousness, New Eng. L. Rev, Vol. 26, & Ewick, P, Silbey. SS (1999) Common Knowledge and 
Ideological Critique, Law and Society Rev, 33, 1027 
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There is far less resistance to law as, it is found in the books, from the 
softliners.  Law is not generally seen as a threat, indeed, unless it is needed to 
resolve a disagreement as to a child’s best interests, it is not seen as 
particularly relevant.   
 
Best interest decisions are much more part of the stuff of everyday life for 
softliner doctors, about good communication and good relationships.  For them, 
best interest decision-making seems to be about conversations and discussions 
with a broad range of actors.  It does not seem to be primarily a clinical or a 
legal decision, but more a human interaction.  
 
3.     .Hardliners  
 
Four doctors classified as hardliners were interviewed.  As was mentioned 
earlier, Dr 17 seems to be on the hard end of the hardliners. Dr 24 was at the 
soft end of the hardliners, Dr 14 and Dr 7 were between the two. The doctors 
have not been classified as hardliners or softliners according to how much they 
spoke about law, but analysis of the doctors’ interviews does seem to suggest 
that the more hardline a doctor was, the more he or she talked about the law in 
their interview.  As was just shown, the softliners tended to talk much more 
about relationships and communications.  It was also seen in chapter six1037 
that the hardliners seemed to use heuristics to guide their decisions, whereas 
the softliners tended to make their decisions based much more on the 
circumstances of the individual child. This does raise the possibility that the 
hardliners talk so much about the law because they are more drawn to clear 
rules than the softliners. However, a detailed analysis of the hardliners’ 
discussions shows considerable ambivalence towards the law.  Each of the 
hardliner doctors will now be discussed in turn.  
 
    
                                                 
1037 Chapter six, para 4.2, p.249 
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 3.1  Dr 17  
Dr 17 perhaps illustrates this ambivalence the best.  She talked about the law a 
great deal in her interview.  She spoke fast, with noticeable passion, in long 
bursts, at times hardly pausing for breath.  She spoke about her education in 
law, as well as in ethics. She spoke about the eminence of her course tutor, and 
gave details of her studies. She spoke with pride of teaching junior doctors 
about the law and being viewed by colleagues as a legal expert. During the 
discussion Dr 17 was very keen to display her knowledge, seeming at times to 
revert to a teaching mode, explaining in great detail her understanding of legal 
and ethical concepts. Her discussion expressed a strong sense of pride in her 
legal and ethical knowledge.  She was very confident and certain, although 
several of the statements of fact she made about legal cases or particular 
statutes were confused, for example confusing the ECHR1038 and the 
HRA.1039  She spoke about being able to influence junior doctors’ and other’s 
best interest decisions, using her legal knowledge. Dr 17 also said she believed 
training in law and ethics should be, just as life support training is, compulsory 
for all PICU consultants. As well as describing herself as a hardliner, she also 
described herself as an “outlier” both in her approach to best interest decisions 
for disabled children and for her interest in law and ethics.  She said “the 
average intensivist does not think about it [law and ethics] much”.     
  
Her remarks suggested that law and ethics were central to Dr 17’s conception 
of best interest decisions. She spoke of choosing to study law and ethics to 
provide her with a framework to make these decisions. She said   
“I was making some really tough decisions and I was making them in a 
medical framework, but not in a legal or ethical framework. People 
[senior medical colleagues] told me what was right but they didn’t give 
me the framework and I kinda of realised that there was a framework and 
I needed to learn more about it.”  
                                                 
1038 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention of Human Rights0, as amended, 1950 
1039 Human Rights Act 1998 c. 42 
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Dr 17 conveyed a sense of the power of law in her discussions. Her legal 
consciousness here seems to fit within Ewick and Silbey’s ‘with the law’ 
schema,1040 empowering and helping Dr 17 to achieve her aims.  There is no 
sign of resistance here. There are perhaps also elements of Halliday el al’s ‘law 
as a sword’ schema1041, but the way Dr 17 talks about the law here seems 
slightly different from that.  There was a strong sense in Dr 17’s remarks of the 
personal and professional power law gave her.  She spoke of how her legal and 
ethical knowledge empowered her to reason with parents and colleagues, how 
it gave her a position of authority and power within her hospital Trust, 
suggesting her perceived expertise in the law, made her an ultra-elite within her 
Trust. She also spoke of the intellectual stimulation she gained from studying 
and debating about law.    
  
Perhaps because their studies have been of marginalised groups, this is not a 
legal consciousness schema really found in Ewick and Silbey’s or Halliday et 
al’s schema and certainly not in Harding’s three types of resistance 
schema.1042  Although Ewick and Silbey’s ‘with the law’ and Halliday et al’s law 
as a ‘sword’ are in part about the law empowering their study participants, that 
empowerment seems to be limited to the context of the problem they are 
facing.  Ewick and Silbey’s ‘before the law’ schema constructs law as powerful, 
but again differently from what seems to be the case here. ‘Before the law’ 
casts law as powerful, but distant and fear inspiring. With Dr 17’s legal 
consciousness, there seems to be a sense of her embracing the law and being 
empowered by it both personally and professionally.  She seems to gain ‘kudos’ 
from her perceived expertise, enhanced status and admiration from colleagues. 
                                                 
1040 Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1992) Conformity, Contestation and Resistance: An Account of Legal 
Consciousness, New Eng. L. Rev, Vol. 26, & Ewick, P, Silbey. SS (1999) Common Knowledge and 
Ideological Critique, Law and Society Rev, 33, 1027 
1041 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74 
1042 Harding, R, (2010) Regulating Sexuality: Legal Consciousness in lesbian and gay lives, Routledge, 
Abingdon 
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She suggests in her discussion that law also gives her power over colleagues, 
junior doctors, patients and families.  ‘Law as kudos’ is therefore suggested 
as an additional schema of legal consciousness, to supplement Halliday 
et al’s schema of ‘law as a sword’; ‘law as a shield’; ‘law as a barrier’ and 
‘collective dissent’.   
  
It is anticipated that this schema will be found most often among elites, who 
have easier access to legal education and who are already in positions of 
respect and power.  It seems possible to imagine that while studying law and 
ethics may provide individuals from marginalised groups with a sense of 
personal empowerment, outside of legal professions, it seems they will be less 
likely to be allowed to use their knowledge of the law to enhance their 
professional status in the way Dr 17 seems to suggest she has done.  As was 
discussed right at the start of this thesis,1043 Basnett1044explains how doctors 
can be perceived as experts in everything to do with disabled people’s lives, 
even when there may be others, including in some circumstances the disabled 
person themselves, who have far more expertise about the topic under 
discussion.  There is a sense from Dr 17 that she, and her colleagues, have 
attributed to her significant expertise in law after she completed a relatively 
short and limited course of study.1045   This is also another example of the 
relational nature of legal consciousness.  Dr 17 is empowered by law because 
her colleagues allow her to be so empowered and seem, from Dr 17’s account, 
to provide no resistance to this empowerment. It is also relational as Dr 17 
suggests she is an expert in law, in relation to her colleagues, though she would 
perhaps not be viewed as such by lawyers.  
                                                 
1043 Chapter one,  para 1, p. 1 
1044 Basnett, I, (2001)’ Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Towards and Decisions Affecting 
Disabled People’, in G.L. Albrecht, K.D. Seelman and M. Bury (eds), Handbook of Disability Studies, Sage 
Publications, London, pp.450-467, p.452 
1045 Dr 17 gave details of the course she studied, but details are not given in this thesis as to do so may 
make Dr 17 identifiable to colleagues. 
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Dr 17 is the only doctor interviewed who seemed to clearly express this legal 
consciousness, but other doctors interviewed, both hardliners and softliners, 
talked about medical colleagues, usually like Dr 17 also PICU consultants, who 
from the doctors’ descriptions seem to possibly express this legal 
consciousness. Of course, those doctors would have to be interviewed to 
properly explore their legal consciousness, as it is how those individuals 
conceptualise the law that is important in legal consciousness studies.  As was 
seen in the last chapter, the PICU consultants in this study did seem more likely 
to study law and ethics, which perhaps explains why, as a sub-specialism, they 
seem potentially more likely than other doctors to exhibit ‘law as kudos’ legal 
consciousness.   
  
Dr 17’s ‘law as kudos’ legal consciousness is, however, just part of the picture. 
Like other hardliners, Dr 17 expressed ambivalence towards the law.  While half 
of her discussion was about the power she personally and professionally gains 
from law, the other half of her discussion, in stark contrast, conveyed a strong 
fear of law.  Dr 17 talked of her fear of being struck off by the GMC and losing 
her livelihood if she acted in what she believed to be a child’s best interests. 
She also talked of her fear of being challenged in court by a colleague or parent 
who took ‘a different view from her’ as to the child’s best interests.  At first sight 
it is perhaps hard to reconcile Dr 17’s law of kudos legal consciousness with the 
fear of and resistance to the law she seems to express.  However, it seems 
possible that Dr 17 has developed the former to protect herself from the later. 
  
Dr 17 spoke very passionately, even angrily about the case of A NHS trust v MB 
[2006] 1046a case with which she said she was familiar as it involved a doctor 
she knew well.  Dr 17 was highly critical of the judgment that MB, an infant with 
                                                 
1046 A NHS trust v MB [2006], EWHC 507 (Fam) 
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spinal muscular atrophy type 1, (a severe degenerative condition, usually fatal 
within infancy), should continue to be ventilated. Dr 17 interpreted the case as 
placing upon her an unwelcome obligation to advise other parents of the 
possibility of ventilation for their child. She said:-  
 “[T]his has been driven as much by society as it has been by medicine, 
perhaps some of the time we have not been paternalistic, but there is 
self preservation there. If I’m paternalistic and someone challenges me, 
I’m going to end up struck off, I’ve got to earn a living and I’ve got to 
balance my feeling that I should do the right thing for the child versus 
can I go to court pick a fight here, loose my reputation’” 
 
From her comments, Dr 17 seems to view the law here as a threat, forcing 
doctors to act against their better judgment out of fear of losing their reputation 
and livelihood.    
  
Dr 17’s strong fear and indeed anger was clear in the passionate way she 
discussed these concerns. While the anxiety that Dr 17 feels is clearly real, the 
extent to which this fear is well founded, however, does perhaps need further 
examination. Dr 17, as was seen, expressed anxiety at the prospect of losing 
her registration if she acted in what she believed to be the child’s best interests, 
if this contravened in her words, society’s expectations as to a child’s best 
interests. The GMC, the body whose statutory purpose is ‘to protect, promote 
and maintain the health and safety of the public by ensuring proper standards in 
the practice of medicine’,1047 would be the body who would investigate and 
bring any action against Dr 17. Doctors risk sanction if they fail to comply with 
the GMC’s guidance ‘Good Medical Practice.’1048  There is nothing in the GMC 
guidance to suggest that a doctor would be sanctioned for acting in what the 
                                                 
1047 GMC, (2014), Letter to Public Petition Committee of the Scottish Parliament, 
gmc.u..org/GMC_reponse_to_the_consultation_on_the_Scottish_Parliament_Public_Petition_Committ
ee_58721416.pdf accessed 30 September 2017 
1048 GMC (2013) ‘Good Medical Practice’, GMG, http://www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/, last accessed 30 
September 2017 
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doctor believed to be a child’s best interests, indeed, that is what doctors are 
guided to do.1049 
  
Moreover, if someone other than a doctors’ employer complained there seems 
to be little likelihood that the GMC would investigate.  The GMC’s annual 
statistics1050 report that 80% of complaints about doctors received from 
members of the public in 2015 were closed with no investigation being 
conducted. The statistics do not deal expressly with complaints about best 
interest decision making. However, such a complaint would seem to fall under 
the GMC 2015 heading of ‘Clinical competence and communication and respect 
for patients allegations’1051Of these complaints the GMC report for 2015:  
‘92% of investigations involving clinical competence from members of the 
public resulted in no sanction or warning. Moreover, only a very small 
percentage of clinical competence investigations resulted in a sanction or 
a warning; 71% from other doctors and employers and 76% from all 
others resulted in no sanction or warning’1052 
  
The GMC’s statistics suggest that the anxiety Dr 17 expressed about being 
sanctioned if she “acted in a child’s best interests’” against society’s wishes is 
perhaps disproportionate to any real risk, even if someone were to complain. 
This, however, illustrates, how it is the individual or group’s perceptions that are 
important in the construction of legal consciousness.  Dr 17 perceives herself to 
be at risk of sanction from the GMC or a court if she acts in what she believes to 
be in the child’s best interests and it is this fear, which helps construct both Dr 
17’s best interest decisions and her legal consciousness.  
                                                 
1049 GMC, (2014), Good Medical Practice, 0-18 Years Guidance, GMC, para 8, last accessed 30 September 
2017 
1050 GMC (2015) ‘The state of medical education and practice in the UK: 2015’,GMC, Chapter 2, p.70, 
http://www.gmc-uk.org/Chapter_2_SOMEP_2015.pdf_63501223.pdf  last accessed 30 September 2017 
1051 Ibid, p.66 
1052 GMC, (2015) ‘The state of medical education and practice in the UK: 2015’,GMC, Chapter 2, p.70 last 
accessed 30 September 2017 
P a g e  | 368 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
 Dr 17 suggests that she sees her assessment of a child’s best interests to be in 
conflict with a societal norm of the child’s best interests. This is also revealing 
with regard to Dr 17’s legal consciousness. Dr 17 also talked about the 
heuristics she used, such as allowing a child with cerebral palsy just one 
admission to PICU or not admitting a physically impaired child who is unable to 
perform a particular physical task, to PICU.  She also spoke about, as seen, 
being both a ‘hardliner’ and an ‘outlier’. There is a strong sense here of Dr 17 
expressing the stabilising resistance Harding found in her study 
participants.  Harding described stabilising resistance, as being always present 
when power relations exists.1053 She describes how participants do not directly 
challenge the law or norms around them but live their lives in ways which 
challenge these norms.1054  
 
Dr 17 suggests her treatment of disabled child patients is out of step with that of 
her colleagues and she believes, society, but she challenges these norms by 
withholding and withdrawing treatment from disabled children in circumstances 
she suggests most (but not all) of her colleagues would provide treatment.  Dr 
17 resists what she perceives as pressure from society to treat disabled 
children in a way she does not believe to be in those children’s best 
interests.  However, while resisting what she sees as the norm, Dr 17 also 
expresses her strong sense of vulnerability before the law, talking as she does 
of her fear of being taking to court and losing her livelihood and reputation.  In 
these parts of her interview, Dr 17 seems to convey much more of an ‘against 
the law’ legal consciousness within Ewick and Silbey’s schema or ‘law as a 
sword’ within Halliday et al’s; depicting law as distance, something to be feared 
and dangerous.    
  
                                                 
1053 Harding R, (2010), Regulating Sexuality: Legal Consciousness in lesbian and gay lives, Routledge, 
Abingdon p 45 
1054 Ibid, p.46 
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This legal consciousness seems most intense for Dr 17 when she cited the 
case of  A NHS trust v MB [2006].1055 Her anger, especially towards the judge 
Justice Holman, was palpable. She described the judge as being out of touch 
with the realities of clinical practice. This sense of judges, indeed, the law 
generally, as being out of touch with the realities of clinical practice was 
conveyed by other hardliner doctors (but not by softliners), as was a legal 
consciousness of resistance, as will now be discussed.  
  
3.2  Dr 14  
Dr 14, expressed a strong sense of the law being out of touch with the realities 
of best interest decision-making.  Discussing the role of the court in best interest 
decisions, he said:  
“I think judges ordering doctors to do something I would refuse, even if it 
were in contempt, because I don’t think it is right that judges should order 
doctors to do things, if they do not believe [they] are right. I think judges 
of course have a huge amount of insight and wisdom, but I don’t think 
they know what it is like at the coal face making medical decisions.”   
  
The strength of Dr 14’s resistance to the law can be seen in his statement that 
he would sooner be held in contempt of court than comply with a court order 
with which he disagreed.    
  
There are, again, strong echoes here of the resistance shown by Harding’s 
participants.1056 However, assuming Dr 14 were to carry through with his claim 
that he would risk sanction for contempt of court, his resistances seems to be 
closer to Harding’s ‘fracturing resistance’ rather than the stabilising resistance, 
Dr 17 seems to express.  Harding describes fracturing resistance, it will be 
recalled, as acts of resistance requiring an immediate response from the 
                                                 
1055 A NHS Trust v MB [2006], EWHC 507 (Fam) 
1056 Harding, R, (2010) Regulating Sexuality: Legal Consciousness in lesbian and gay lives, Routledge, 
Abingdon 
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government.1057 It is assumed the judge would feel compelled to act if a doctor 
acted in deliberate contravention of a court order. Dr 14’s resistance may not, 
however, be as forceful as it at first appears; earlier in his interview Dr 14 said 
he agreed with the well-established legal principle that a judge will not interfere 
with a doctor’s clinical autonomy,1058 so seems aware that it is unlikely that a 
judge would order him to do something contrary to his clinical judgment. Indeed, 
it does seem that it would only be a situation similar to the case of Re MB 
1059where Holman J, refused to grant an order allowing doctors to withdraw 
MB’s existing life support, that the potential for a doctor to resist a court order 
with regard to a child’s best interests would arise.  A doctor refusing to comply 
with such an order would certainly be expressing fracturing resistance and 
potentially, it seems, be risking a charge of murder.  Whether Dr 14’s resistance 
went this far is unclear from his remarks.  As was seen in chapter six1060, he 
expressed the view that best interest decisions are in his words a matter of 
‘roulette’, dependent much more on characteristics pertinent to the doctor than 
anything to do with the child.  As will be recalled, he said that even twelve 
different respiratory consultants are likely to come to twelve different opinions 
about the same child.  It does then seem perhaps surprising that he expressed 
such a strong view that a doctors’ opinion should not be subject to challenge by 
the law, when he acknowledges that doctors’ opinions vary widely and that they 
were based more on a doctor’s values than a child’s best interests. Like Dr 17, 
Dr 14’s seems to express an ‘against the law’ legal consciousness within Ewick 
and Silbey’s schema and to fit within Halliday et al’s ‘law as a sword’ schema, 
constructing law as being alien, distance and threatening.   
  
                                                 
1057 Harding R, (2010), Regulating Sexuality: Legal Consciousness in lesbian and gay lives, Routledge, 
Abingdon p. 48 
1058 Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment [1991] [1991] Fam. 33; [1991] 2 W.L.R. 140; per Lord 
Donaldson 
1059 A NHS Trust v MB [2006], EWHC 507 (Fam) 
1060 Chapter six, para 6, p. 256 
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Also like Dr 17, Dr 14 seems to embrace more than one legal consciousness 
when making best interest decisions, suggesting ambivalence towards the law. 
As has been seen, Dr 14 expressed resistance to law’s power, constructing law 
as a threat to doctors, something to be avoided.  However, contradictorily, Dr 14 
also said that his own experience of the courts had been positive. He explained 
how dealing with a medical case it is very easy for all the parties including the 
doctors to become “blinkered” but a case being considered by the court could 
be helpful in resolving this.  He described his own experience in court saying 
the doctors and the child’s parents had found the whole process very 
helpful.  He said it was an opportunity for all the evidence to be explored in full 
by “protagonists not directly involved’” and to hear evidence from people at the 
cutting edge in the field.  He also said it enabled him to understand things from 
the parents’ perspective, and that he thought the parents had found the process 
helpful for similar reasons.    
  
This conveys a different legal consciousness on Dr 14’s part, more in keeping 
with Ewick and Silbey’s ‘with the law’, enabling the doctors to achieve their 
aims, or Halliday’s et al’s ‘law as a shield’ schema, and like the relatives in 
Halliday et al’s study, Dr 14 here shows respect for law’s role as an impartial 
and powerful force.  The power of law here is still seen, but in contrast to 
elsewhere in Dr 14’s discussions, it is an impartial not hostile power.  
  
In chapter seven, the way in which an individual or group’s experiences all 
contribute towards the construction of a legal consciousness was discussed,1015 
and this is apparent here. Dr 17 and Dr 14’s relational legal consciousness can 
be seen to be constructed in part by their personal experiences.  Dr 17 resisted 
law and constructed it as alien, and hostile threat based, as described with 
respect to her colleagues’ experience in A NHS trust v MB [2006],1061 where the 
judge had ruled in keeping with the family’s and not the doctors’ view of the 
child’s best interests.  Dr 17’s personal connection with the case, knowing one 
                                                 
1061 A NHS Trust v MB [2006], EWHC 507 (Fam) 
P a g e  | 372 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
of the doctors involved, seems to have increased the impact of the case on the 
development of her legal consciousness.  Dr 14’s legal consciousness likewise 
constructs law as hostile and threatening when he imagines a judge ruling 
against him. However, when a judge agreed with his view as to a child’s best 
wishes, as the judge did in an actual case, Dr 14 constructs the law as a 
positive force.  This is important, because if doctors conceive of law negatively 
then it seems likely they will avoid the law. However, if doctors conceive of law 
as being potentially positive, it seems more likely that doctors will apply to court 
for a disabled child’s best interests to be determined, when there is 
disagreement as to what is in an individual child’s best interests, potential 
protecting that child’s legal rights. 
  
Dr 14 was also one of two hardliners who mentioned the criminal trial of Dr 
Arthur1062 for the manslaughter of a baby with Downs syndrome, discussed in 
chapter two.1063  Dr 14 had not studied any law or ethics. He would have been 
at the start of his medical career at the time of the trial, (so at the older age 
range of doctors in this study) which may explain why the case made such an 
impression. 
 
Dr 14 also talked about referring cases to his hospital’s clinical ethics committee 
but said he had not found the experience helpful. He complained that the 
clinical ethics committee dealt with abstract philosophical ethics but did not 
address the everyday ethics of the problems before them.  There were echoes 
in what he said about the clinical ethics committee with the resistance he and 
other hardliners had shown to judges and the courts. Both are criticised by 
hardliners for being out of touch with the realities of clinical practice. This 
                                                 
1062 R v Arthur [1981] 12 BMLR 1, heard before Farquharson J, 3-5th November, 1981 
1063 Chapter two, para 2, pp. 36-43 
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echoes the disappointment in the power of ethics expressed earlier by softliner 
Dr 11064 Dr 14 went on to say:  
“so in a sense it almost seems to me, that as it stands right now, that we 
go through a process just to say we have been through the process 
when the case comes further down the line. If one was in court for 
instance and we had a clinical ethics committee and had not been to it, 
you know, it would look pretty odd.”  
 
Dr 14 suggests he refers cases to primarily to avoid criticism from the court, 
rather than to ascertain a child’s best interests, suggesting again that the law 
and the courts are seen as a threat to doctors, in keeping with Ewick and 
Silbey’s ‘Before the Law’ schema. 
 
3.3    Dr 7  
 
Dr 7 like Dr 14 also mentioned the trial of Dr Arthur. Like Dr 14, Dr 7 had not 
studied any law or ethics and also like Dr 7 he had been at the start of his 
medical career at the time of the trial.  Dr 7, however, mentioned the case in the 
context of expressing his relief that doctors no longer behave in the way Dr 
Arthur did.  Dr 7 said he believed the case was:  
 “the start of a number of actions taken and then that led to the sort of 
situation, where if you wanted to withdraw care and the family did not 
agree you could go to law and the judge could rule that it was not 
unlawful to withdraw care.”   
  
This suggested a construction of legal consciousness as ‘law as a shield’, within 
Halliday et al’s schema.  Dr 7 however, was describing, in his view, other 
doctors. He rejected this construction of the law for himself, saying:   
“‘but I have never been involved in that level of thinking. The law is too 
clumsy to deal with complex human emotion here. You have to take 
people with you and settle it that way I think.  Or they take you with them 
indeed”    
  
There are echoes here of Dr 17’s and Dr 14’s resistance to the law and in 
particular to judges, as lacking the ability to understand the complexities of day-
                                                 
1064 Chapter nine, para. 2.3 p.358 
P a g e  | 374 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
to-day clinical practice and decision-making.  But Dr 7 is further to the soft end 
of the hardliners than those two doctors and expresses himself differently, 
talking about the law being “too clumsy to deal with the complexity of human 
emotions.” This comes across perhaps as less defensive than Drs 17 and 14 
and, as was seen, closer to the softliners construction of best interest decisions 
as being concerned with relationships and good communication.  
  
Dr 7 did convey a sense that applying to court was an admission of failure on 
the part of a doctor, like other hardliners resisting the law and constructing it as 
a place of last resort, in keeping with Ewick and Silbey’s ‘before the law’ 
schema and Halliday et al’s ‘law as a sword schema’. Dr 7 seems to resist the 
law as he seems to constructs this as a failure to maintain good relationships, 
putting him very close to the softliner construction of best interests. But Dr 7 
depicts the law as a place best avoided, not part of a framework within which he 
works and lives.  
  
3.4  Dr 24  
Resistance to the law was also seen from Dr 24, the final hardliner, albeit also 
at the soft end of the hardliner spectrum. Speaking of the relevance of law to 
her best interest decisions, Dr 24 said:   
“It is kind of the last port of call when you are desperate really, when you 
are genuinely very, very stuck the law, the court is the place where it is 
legally decided and for us as professionals. It is a bit defensive but if you 
have taken it to the court and the court has decided it takes the 
responsibility off you.  You know, nobody is going to come along and 
charge you with manslaughter or murder the next day, because of the 
decision you took, because the court is the final point, so for some of us 
it is a kind of protection and it is good to know if we are really struggling it 
can be there I think, but I think it would generally be so much better if we 
did not have to go there” 
  
Like the other hardliners Dr 24’s legal consciousness constructs law as a distant 
place, somewhere that doctors have to go to, not part of her everyday life but as 
she describes it, “a place of last resort,” in keeping with Ewick and Silbey’s 
‘before the law’ schema.  But law is seen here by Dr 24 as a place  doctors turn 
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to defensively for protection, in keeping with Halliday et al’s, depiction of law as 
a shield, protecting the doctors from law’s harsher sanctions – a murder or 
manslaughter charge.  Although Dr 24 said it would be better not to go to court, 
rather than resisting the law like the other hardliners, she seems to see it as 
providing doctors with protection.  
  
It is noteworthy that Dr 24 talks of applying to court to provide protection for 
doctors, rather than a best interests application being to protect the child by 
determining his or her best interests. This echoes what Dr 14 said earlier when 
talking about clinical ethics committees.1065 
  
Although Dr 24 did not seem to express resistance when talking about 
applications to court, she did exhibit resistance to the disability and child rights 
legislation introduced during the years of her practice and discussed in chapter 
two.1066  Just as the other hardliners suggested judges and the courts could not 
deal with the complexity of best interests decisions for disabled children, Dr 14 
said the same about this legislation, especially disability anti-discrimination 
legislation and training for doctors.1067 As was seen in chapter six,1068 Dr 24 
criticised junior consultants who she believed were overly influenced by this 
legislation, saying that training made them, in her view, too willing to treat 
disabled children. Dr 24 said younger consultants put too much weight on their 
disability awareness training, to the detriment of best interests.    
  
Many contradictions can be seen in the way the hardliners construct legality and 
this is perhaps another of them.  Dr 24 is both highly critical of PICU consultants 
                                                 
1065 Ibid 
1066 Chapter two, pp. 23-94 
1067 Chapter six, para 7.1.3, pp.267-268 
1068 Ibid 
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for discriminating against disabled children and critical of junior consultants for 
being influenced by anti-discrimination training and legislation. This is an 
example of roster uncertainty discussed in chapter six.1069 It seems both a 
doctors’ awareness of legislation and the doctors’ values in relation to that 
legislation play a part in how doctors construct their best interest decisions and 
their legal consciousness.  There is certainly a sense with Dr 24 and other 
doctors in this study such as Dr 14, that they seem to construct legality in such 
a way that law, as it appears in the books, is something they will follow if they 
agree with it, but resist if they do not agree with it.  This is perhaps another way 
in which a doctors’ elite status plays a part in a doctors’ construction of legality, 
with a doctor’s elite status giving him or her more power to choose whether to 
follow law than ordinary citizens, because of the authority given to doctors to 
decide for disabled patients as Basnett identified.1070 This is something that is 
addressed more in the final concluding chapter of this thesis where the courts’ 
deference to doctors is considered for further research.  
  
To summarise: what can be concluded about hardliners’ use of law in their best 
interest decisions. The hardliners seem to show ambivalence towards the law. 
At times, as was seen particularly with Dr 17, but also with the other hardliners, 
they embrace the law, looking to it to provide them with protection.  Sometimes, 
perhaps emphasising the ambivalent nature of hardliners’ relationship with the 
law, that sought after protection, is often from the law itself.  Dr 17 and from 
participants accounts, other doctors, especially PICU consulants, seems to 
show an embodiment of legal consciousness not reported by legal 
consciousness scholars. This may because this is an embodiment of legal 
consciousness that requires elite status.  This is a legal conscious of law 
                                                 
1069 Chapter six, para 6, pp.256-261 
1070 Basnett, I, (2001)’ Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes Towards and Decisions Affecting 
Disabled People’, in G.L. Albrecht, K.D. Seelman and M. Bury (eds), Handbook of Disability Studies, Sage 
Publications, London, pp.450-467, p.452 
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providing personal and professional empowerment.  As was seen, this legal 
consciousness has been labelled ‘law as kudos’.  
 
At other times, hardliners resist the law, there is a strong sense of fear of the 
law in their discussions. The hardliner doctors’ feelings of vulnerability came 
across very strongly in their discussions, illustrating, as was discussed in 
chapter four,1025 that elites do not necessarily perceive themselves to be elite 
and it is their own perceptions of themselves which constructs their legal 
consciousness.   As was seen with Dr 17 it is possible that on occasions this 
fear is misplaced due to an incomplete understanding of the law.    
  
The law seems to overshadow hardliners’ best interest decisions. Law as it is in 
the books seems to be at the forefront of hardliner doctors’ minds when they 
make best interest decisions for disabled children.  
 
While law is ever present, it seems, however, that it does not provide the 
doctors with a structure and guidance as how to make their decisions, but rather 
it seems to stimulate fear and resistance.  It was noticeable, as was discussed, 
that hardliner doctors tended to talk about the law in relation to themselves and 
the impact on themselves rather than in relation to the children they are treating. 
This echoes what doctors said about using guidance in their survey responses, 
where, doctors reported either not using guidance at all, or using it to justify 
their decisions, rather than to guide them. Dr 14 who had direct personal 
experience of a best interest applications to court, did however, report the 
experience to be a positive one, despite his own strongly expressed fear of, and 
resistance to, the law.  
  
The lack of reference to ethics by hardliners was noticeable.  As was seen both 
Dr 14 and Dr 17 did talk about ethics in the context of referring cases to ethics 
committees or in Dr 17’s case sitting on ethics committees.  As with law, ethics 
seems to be conceived as a process: the process of taking a case to an ethics 
committee, rather than a framework for practice or intellectual exercise.    
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 This chapter now turn briefly to rights and their absence from doctors’ 
discussions. 
  
5. Rights  
 
Before concluding this chapter, mention must be made of rights, because thirty 
doctors (91%) said in their survey response that they actively considered a 
child’s rights when making a difficult decision for disabled children.  However, 
rights were only raised three times by doctors in their interviews, always by 
hardliner doctors.  Dr 17 said she taught junior doctors about the Human Rights 
Act and that the right to life is not absolute. If as she seemed to suggest, her 
teaching of rights is limited to this one concept, it does seem that possibly Dr 17 
is again using ‘law as a shield’ selectively teaching the junior doctors just about 
rights from a doctor’s protection perspective, not from the child’s.   
 
Dr 14 criticised the courts for taking what he described as a “right to life” 
approach to best interest decisions.  Dr 24 did say, when asked about the 
relevance of rights to her best interest decisions “we have to be mindful of a 
child’s rights, nobody should be wanting to override the rights of the child” But 
as was noted earlier, Dr 24 was highly critical of her junior consultant 
colleagues for, in her view, putting too much weight on disabled children’s 
equality rights.  
  
Although 91% of the doctors said in response to the survey question that the 
child’s rights are a factor doctors they consciously consider when making 
difficult decisions in for disabled children, there was nothing in the doctors 
interview discussions, or as was seen in the last chapter in their survey 
responses, to support this. It is possible that the doctors were aware when they 
answered the question that they would be expected to put weight on the child’s 
rights, but it is not at the forefront of their mind when making best interest 
decisions.  
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6. Conclusions  
 
To conclude, hardliner and softliner doctors seem to construct best interest 
decisions differently. The hardliner doctors seem to take a much more legalistic 
approach, where the law seems ever present, but at the same time they are 
much more ambivalent about the law, embracing it when it provides them with a 
shield, but being resistant to and fearful of the law at other times.  There are 
signs of both stabilising resistance and fracturing resistance as described by 
Harding.1071 The doctors’ elite status seems potentially to empower the doctors 
to resist the law in circumstances when ordinary people would not be able to do 
so. As such, Dr 17 comments appear to suggest a new schema of legal 
consciousness to compliment Halliday et al’s four schema, that is, a schema of 
‘law as kudos’, which it is also anticipated is usually only found among elites.  
  
In contrast, for the softliner doctors best interest decisions are about human 
interactions, discussions, good communication and relationships.  Best interest 
decisions are constructed as being part of everyday life.  There are also 
elements of ‘law as a shield’, but when there is recourse to law as it is on the 
books, this is for the benefit of the child not the doctors.  Law is then seen as a 
solution, and not a threat.  
  
There does seem to be a suggestion of collective dissent from doctors to any 
law with which they do not agree, but as was seen, the doctors seem to vary in 
their reasons for resisting the law. Again, it seems likely that their elite status 
empowers them in this collective dissent.  
  
 It was said in chapter four1072 that for the purpose of this study the best interest 
test is constructed as a legal test, rather than a medical one. It might then be 
                                                 
1071 Harding R, (2010), Regulating Sexuality: Legal Consciousness in lesbian and gay lives, Routledge, 
Abingdon p. 48 
1072Chapter seven, para 2, p.290 
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expected that the hardliners who seem to take a much more legalistic approach 
than the softliners, would be found to be making best interest decisions much 
more in keeping with the norms established by the doctors’ professional 
guidance and case law.  However, an examination of the what the doctors said 
or do not say about law, rights and ethics, through the lens of legal 
consciousness scholarship finds that it is the softliner doctors’ approach of wide 
ranging discussion and maintaining good relationships with all parties, that is 
much more in keeping with those norms as presented in doctors’ professional 
guidance and case law, than the more legalistic approach of the hardliners.  
  
There is no indication that studying law and ethics either hinders or assists best 
interest decisions making, although there is a strong suggestion that fear of the 
law hinders good best interest decision making.  The next and final chapter of 
this thesis will draw together what has been learnt in the whole of this thesis 
about how doctors make best interest decisions for disabled children and what 
part if any the law, rights and ethics play in those decisions. It will consider the 
limitations of this thesis and consider what recommendations can be made from 
this study’s findings.   
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Chapter Ten   
 
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
1. Introduction 
This final chapter begins by summarising the findings in respect of each of the 
four research questions, namely: 
(i) Which decisions do UK paediatricians find particularly difficult when 
working with disabled children and what makes those decisions 
particularly difficult?  
(ii) What factors do UK paediatricians take into consideration when making 
difficult decisions for disabled children, and what weight do they put on 
those factors? 
(iii) What formal education in law, rights and ethics have the doctors received 
and to what extent, if any, can we discern how this education impacts on 
their difficult decisions for disabled children? 
(iv) How do UK paediatricians construct and understand the law, rights    
and ethics, when making their difficult decisions? 
 
This chapter then briefly draws overall conclusions, including considering this 
study’s limitations. The chapter and the thesis conclude with recommendations 
for further research and potential changes in the law and practice, in relation to 
best interest decision-making for the UK’s severely disabled children. 
 
2. Summary of research question findings 
 
2.1 Research question one 
 
Almost all doctors in this study (94%) identified decisions whether to withhold or 
withdraw treatment in potentially life and death situations, as the most difficult 
ones they faced when working with severely disabled children with complex 
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health problems.1073 (The two other doctors identified situations specific to their 
sub-specialisms).1074  This finding is what I anticipated, based both on pilot 
discussions with three consultant paediatricians1075 and my prior personal and 
professional experience in the field.1076 However, the survey, as seen in chapter 
three,1077 was worded in such a way that  doctors were asked about ‘difficult 
decisions’. This was to allow for doctors to suggest decisions other than end-of-
life best interest decisions, as the difficult ones they face when treating disabled 
children with serious health problems1078  
 
The doctors reported that communication with parents and uncertainty made 
these decisions particularly difficult.1079  The doctors also identified 
disagreements between doctors as a major challenge for them when involved in 
end-of-life decisions for disabled children.1080  Indeed, while 58% of doctors 
reported experiencing disagreements with parents as to a child’s best interests, 
78% of doctors reported experiencing disagreements with medical colleagues.  
Disagreements with doctors was also the main topic the nine interviewed 
doctors chose to discuss.1081 That paediatricians routinely disagree strongly as 
to a disabled child’s best interests is perhaps a new finding, at least outside of 
                                                 
1073 Chapter four, para 5.1, p.168 
1074 Ibid 
1075 Chapter three, para 4, pp. 108-109 
1076 Chapter one, paras 5.2 -5.3, pp. 12-21 
1077 Chapter three, para 3, p.106 
1078 If the majority or a significant minority of doctors had reported a different type of difficult decision, 
the focus of this thesis would have shifted to examine those decisions. 
1079 Chapter four, para 5.4, pp. 171-172 
1080 Chapter six, para 7, pp. 261-275 
1081 Ibid 
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the paediatric community.  This might be masked by high profile disagreements 
between parents and doctors that get into the public domain and media 
spotlight, when cases concerning children such as David Glass,1082 discussed 
in this thesis1083 or the more recent cases of Ashya King1084 and Charlie 
Gard1085 illustrate.  Doctors are however, understandably reluctant to refer 
colleagues to court when they disagree with their assessment of a child’s best 
interests, keeping disagreements between doctors behind the closed walls of 
the hospital and out of the public domain.  Indeed, doctors in this study 
suggested that, at times, doctors are even reluctant to voice their concerns or 
offer an alternative interpretation of a child’s best interests to colleagues. This is 
even in circumstances where failure to do so will, in the doctor’s view, result in 
the inappropriate withholding or withdrawal of treatment and the inevitable 
death of the child.1086 As was seen, the doctors describe a culture of not 
wanting to ‘rock the boat’.1087     
 
Three classes of uncertainty were identified and classified in this study, namely: 
(i) prognostic and diagnostic uncertainty1088 (an uncertainty as to a child’s 
condition or future); (ii) moral uncertainty1089 (anxiety felt by doctors arising from 
the decision-making process and their part in it); and (iii) roster uncertainty (an 
                                                 
1082 Glass, R (On the application of) v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust [1999] EWCA Civ 1914; Glass, R 
(On the application of) v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust [1999] EWHC Admin 343; Glass v UK [2003] 
ECHR Admissibility Decision no. 61827/00 
1083 Chapter two, para 7, pp. 61-75 
1084 Re Ashya King [2014] EWHC 2964 
1085 Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates [2017] EWCA Civ 410 
1086 Chapter six, para 7.1.1. pp.262-264 
1087 Ibid 
1088 Chapter six, para 4, pp. 244-251 
1089 Chapter six, para 5, pp. 251-256 
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uncertainty in the outcome for a patient, depending on the values of the 
doctor).1090 While examined as three separate categories of uncertainty, the 
findings of this study suggest that the three are closely linked. Doctors’ views as 
to a child’s prognosis/diagnosis, particularly when these are value laden, seem 
to contribute both to the moral uncertainty the doctors describe and to the roster 
uncertainty identified. 
 
2.2 Research question two 
This study found a lack of consensus between the doctors as to the factors that 
should be included when making, what was framed in the study survey as 
difficult decisions for disabled children, (but quickly identified by the doctors as 
best interest decisions), and the weight to be put on those factors.1091  It also 
found a lack of consensus as to the people to be included in the decision-
making process, ranging from doctors unilaterally taking decisions without 
consultation, to doctors consulting widely including with a multi-disciplinary team 
of professionals and non-health professionals, the child’s parents and where 
possible the child. This included doctors who saw the child’s parents as the 
ultimate decision-maker.1092 
 
The doctors drew on a wide-range of factors in their best interest decisions 
including clinical factors, such as the trajectory of the child’s illness and the 
child’s pain, and non-clinical factors, such as whether the child was happy or 
attended school.1093  A doctor’s personal and professional characteristics, 
including their sub-specialism, duration of practice, any personal experience of 
disability and religious faith all seemed to potentially impact on the weight a 
doctor put on the key factors of prognosis, futility, quality of life and a child’s 
                                                 
1090 Chapter six, para 6, pp. 256-261 
1091 Chapter five, pp.181-236 
1092 Chapter six, para 7.3.2, p. 277 
1093 Chapter four, figure 25, p.178 
P a g e  | 385 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
cognitive ability. However, the way in which personal and professional 
characteristics potentially impacted was variable, with some characteristics 
seeming to affect the weight doctors put on some factors but not others.1094  
Some patterns seemed to emerge, but there were exceptions to these. For 
example, there seemed to be similarities between the weight put on certain 
factors by neurologists (doctors with the most professional experience of 
disabled children) and by doctors who were parents of a disabled child (the 
doctors with the most personal experience of disabled children). In contrast, 
similarities were not seen between PICU consultants and parent doctors.1095  
This may help explain the finding that PICU consultants were more likely to 
report disagreements with parents (generally) than neurologists.1096 It seems 
that there is possibly more agreement between neurologists and parents, than 
between PICU consultants and parents, as to the factors considered when 
making best interest decisions for a disabled child and the weight to put on 
those factors. 
 
The findings from this research also suggest that doctors who qualified in the 
1990s seemed to approach best interest decisions in several respects 
differently from doctors who qualified earlier.  The data suggest that the ‘hidden 
curriculum’1097 is perhaps not as influential on younger consultants’ best interest 
decisions for disabled children, as the literature on this phenomenon might 
otherwise suggest. 
 
Although the doctors in this study seemed to take a very individualistic 
approach when making their decisions, two camps of doctors were identified: 
                                                 
1094 Chapter five, pp.181-236 
1095 Ibid 
1096 Chapter six, para 7.3.1, p.276 
1097 Chapter three, para 2.2, pp.100-101 
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the hardliners and the softliners.1098 The hardliners took a very ‘rules’ based 
approach to their decisions, for example, a rule that a cognitively impaired child 
should not have intensive care. They drew on heuristics and seemed to apply 
blanket rules, applying these with little or no wider consultation.1099  They 
tended to stress the burdens of any treatments and the negative aspects of a 
disabled child’s life. Hardliners tended not to have prior knowledge of a patient 
and to be called in to care for the child in a medical crisis.1100  In contrast, the 
softliners saw the decision-making process much more as a series of 
discussions that were dependent upon good communication between a wide 
circle of medical and non-medical parties.  They tended to have longer-term 
relationships with the child, to stress the positive benefits of treatment and of a 
disabled child’s life, such as the child’s enjoyment of school or loving 
relationship with other family members.1101 
 
The different approaches of hardliners and softliners was seen to have the 
potential for optimum best interest decision-making, in keeping with doctor’s 
professional guidance. Potentially doctors from either camp could contribute to 
the best interest decision, highlighting the benefits and burdens of treatment, to 
draw up a ‘best interests balance sheet’ in keeping with the jurisprudence of the 
English High Court.1102  However, doctors suggested that, at least for the 
hardliners, this balancing exercise does not always happen, not least because 
of the reluctance of doctors to challenge colleagues if they did not agree with 
their assessment of a child’s best interests.1103 This suggested that the two 
                                                 
1098 Chapter six, para 7.2, pp. 268-273 
1099 Chapter six, para 4.2, p.249 
1100 Chapter six, para 7.2, pp. 268-273 
1101 Ibid 
1102 See for example An NHS Trust v MB [2006], EWHC 507 (Fam), where Holman J made the ‘best 
interest balance sheet’ in that case available in his judgment. 
1103 Chapter six, para 7, pp. 261-275 
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sides of the best interests balance sheet do not necessarily get considered, 
even when relevant information is available.   
 
This finding is particularly relevant to this thesis in the light of its focus on 
disabled children, moving away from the usual focus on infants in the literature 
and ‘case law.1104  Key to this thesis is the argument that there is an important 
difference when making best interest decisions for children, when compared to 
infants, in the amount of information available to doctors about the child. It was 
argued that whereas for infants, doctors are forced by circumstances to make 
assumptions based on their and colleagues experience of other infants as to, 
for example, a particular infant’s quality of life or cognitive ability, this can be 
avoided for older children. This information will be known and documented by a 
range of parties.1105  This study found, however, that the hardliner doctors 
seemed to continue to make assumptions about a disabled child, as they do for 
infants, rather than drawing on available known information about a child from a 
variety of sources, including medical colleagues. Moreover, the research found 
that doctors who do have this information are often reluctant to share it with 
other doctors, for fear of ‘rocking the boat’. The net result is that there is 
evidence of a possible tendency not to undertake a wide-ranging exploration of 
a child’s best interests.1106   
 
2.3 Research question three 
The doctors in this study, as was seen in chapter four,1107 included thirty-three 
paediatricians, all but one of whom were senior paediatric consultants working 
around the UK. Ten of the doctors were PICU consultants, nine were 
neurologists, and the remaining doctors were from a range of paediatric sub-
                                                 
1104 Chapter One, para 2.2, p. 3 
1105 Chapter five, para 5.3, pp.210-213 
1106 Chapter six, para 7, pp. 261-275 
1107 Chapter four, para 4, pp. 145-147 
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specialties.  The doctors ranged from one doctor who qualified in the 1960s to a 
doctor (the specialist registrar) who qualified in 1998. The majority of  doctors 
(20/33) qualified in the 1980s.1108 This study found that five 1990 qualifiers 
(71% ) received significant 1109legal and ethical education and that none of this 
cohort reported having had no legal or ethical education.  However, only two 
1980s (10%) and one 1970s (20%) qualifiers were found to have had significant 
legal or ethical education.1110 Two 1970s (40%) and fourteen 1980s qualifiers 
(70%) were found to have had no legal or ethical education at all.1111 
 
However, perhaps most significantly, especially in the context of the Kennedy 
debate1112 and particularly the question he posed as to whether doctors are 
making ethical and legal decisions without the training and education to do so, 
this study found that almost half the doctors (48%) the majority of whom are 
routinely involved in the treatment of severely disabled children, including 
making end-of-life best interests decisions - have had no formal training or 
education at all in law, and ethics.1113   
 
This thesis also tested the claim made by the UK government to the UNCRC 
Committee1114 that all professionals working with children in the UK receive 
training in children’s rights. The finding that 48% of doctors in this study 
receiving no education or training at all in rights suggests that the government’s 
                                                 
1108 Chapter four, para 4.5, pp. 157-158 
1109 Chapter eight, para 2, pp. 328-332 
1110 Chapter eight, para 2, p.331 
1111 Ibid 
1112 Chapter two, para 2, pp. 25-34 
1113 Chapter eight, para 2, pp. 328-332 
1114 Chapter eight, para 2, pp. 331-332 
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claim is at best, an exaggeration. The seniority of the doctors is significant here: 
first, because they are the very doctors taking decisions which have life or death 
implications for disabled children; and secondly, the doctors have all been 
employed within the NHS for many years, most for several decades, so the 
opportunity to receive training should have presumably presented itself if, as the 
UK government suggest, such training is the ‘norm’ for all professionals working 
with children. 
 
The thesis also mapped the doctors’ legal and ethical education and training to 
their decision-making to see if there was any suggestion that doctors who had 
significant education and training approached best interest decisions differently 
from those who did not.  The research findings reveal the picture to be unclear.  
The data from the doctors’ surveys suggested that doctors who had received 
significant legal/ethical education potentially approached some aspects of best 
interest decisions differently from doctors with less or no legal/ethical education. 
For example, doctors with significant legal/ethical education were found to put 
more weight on prognosis as a factor in their decisions than other doctors; they 
were also found to be more inclined to put weight on both futility and a child’s 
cognitive ability. They were, however, less inclined to put weight on a child’s 
quality of life.1115 
 
Although these differences were found, it was unclear from the data whether the 
doctors who had more legal/ethical education approached these factors 
differently from their colleagues because of their legal/ethical education or for 
other, unrelated, reasons. 
 
Moreover, the differences in approach by doctors with different levels of legal 
education found in relation to individual factors within a best interest decision, 
namely prognosis, futility, quality of life and cognitive ability, were not found 
                                                 
1115 Chapter eight, para 3.3, pp. 337-338 
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when doctors discussed their best interest decisions as a whole, at interview. 
This study found no difference in legal/ethical education between the softliner 
and the hardliner doctors who seem to approach best interest decisions very 
differently. Indeed, similar numbers of doctors with significant, minimal and no 
legal/ethical education were found within the softliner and hardliner camps.1116  
In other words, a difference in approach was more likely to be found between 
softliner and hardliner doctors than according to level of legal and ethical 
education undertaken. 
 
2.4 Research question four 
It is in answering this final research question that legal consciousness theory 
comes to the fore.  Drawing firm conclusions about a doctors’ legal 
consciousness from the survey data is difficult due to the lack of depth and 
detail in the doctors’ survey responses.  However, there are suggestions in 
those responses, from fourteen of the doctors (42%),1117 that they depicted law 
as a distant place, that it becomes relevant when things go wrong, and often to 
punish ‘wrong’ decisions. The survey responses suggest that for these doctors, 
law is about litigation, sometimes just criminal litigation, and not part of the 
fabric or framework of doctors’ everyday lives and decisions. They seem, from 
the limited available data, to understand law in very narrow terms: that is, ‘law 
as sword’ within Halliday et al’s legal consciousness schema.1118   
Although doctors’ professional guidance1119 tells them to ensure all decisions for 
children are made in a child’s ‘best interests’, twenty of the doctors (60.5%) 
made no direct and clear references to ‘best interests’ or any statements that 
                                                 
1116 Chapter nine,  figure 62, p. 349 
1117 Chapter eight, para 4, p. 341 
1118 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74; 
Halliday, S, Morgan, B (2013) I Fought the Law and the law Won? Legal Consciousness and the Critical 
Imagination, Current Legal Problems, vol. 66, pp.1-32 
1119 Chapter four, figure 11, p.144 
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could at first sight, be read as a proxy for best interests, in their survey 
responses.1120  Four doctors (12%) used the term ‘best interests’ or an obvious 
proxy and a further nine doctors (27%) cited factors, which are important 
elements of the best interest test.1121  For example, balancing of benefits and 
burdens of treatment or consulting widely. It is noteworthy that all these 
references were made in the first half of the survey and none in response to 
questions concerning law and ethics. This suggests the doctors, who use the 
term best interests, see it as something other than a legal test, presumably as a 
medical one.  
 
The research did, however, find that the doctors are possibly using other 
factors, particularly quality of life, as a proxy for ‘best interests’. The doctors 
defined quality of life to include a wide range of clinical and non-clinical factors, 
including wide welfare factors, such as the child’s happiness, schooling and 
family life.1122 This is in keeping with the jurisprudence of the English High 
Court, which makes clear that a child’s best interests should be considered 
widely to include these wider welfare factors.1123  
 
The semi-structured interview discussions allowed for much greater analysis of 
the legal consciousness of the nine doctors interviewed for this study. The 
research found that the doctors conceptualise best interests in two broad ways.  
Two ‘camps’ of doctors were identified, the hardliners and the softliners. These 
two camps are important in furthering an understanding of both how best 
interest decisions are made day-to-day in the real world and how different 
doctors conceptualise best interest decisions.  
                                                 
1120 Chapter four, para 6.4, pp. 178-179 
1121 As the test is set out in cases such as Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991]; 2 WLR 
140 
1122 Chapter five, figure 41, p.213 
1123 Chapter two, pp. 23-94 
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The hardliners seem to take an almost deontological approach, that is, to 
conceptualise best interest decision-making as being about following a series of 
heuristics or rules, albeit ones the doctors have created for themselves.  For 
example, the rule seemingly shared generally amongst the hardliners, that 
cognitively impaired children should not have intensive care treatment.1124  The 
softliners, in contrast, seemed to conceptualise best interest decisions as being 
about relationships between the various parties and good communication.  They 
did not see law as being particularly relevant to their day-to-day decisions. This 
study did not, however, find the law completely absent from the softliners’ 
understanding of best interest decision-making.  As was seen,1125 law was seen 
to have a place within the softliners’ conceptualisation of law, in protecting a 
child, acting as a ‘shield’ within Halliday et al’s legal consciousness schema,1126   
 
An important part of the claim to originality in this thesis relates to the fact that 
the research found not only the two camps of doctors in the hardliners and the 
softliners, but also a schema of legal consciousness which has not been 
previously described by legal consciousness scholars. This schema was most 
obviously seen in hardliners’ conceptualisation of the law.   
 
Doctors who embrace this legal consciousness, seem to gain power and status, 
especially among colleagues for their apparent legal expertise.  This new legal 
consciousness draws on this sense of enhanced status and builds on the 
                                                 
1124 Chapter six, paras 7.1.1-7.1.2, pp. 262-266 
1125 Chapter nine, para 4, pp. 347-380 
1126 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74; Halliday, S, Morgan, B (2013) I 
Fought the Law and the law Won? Legal Consciousness and the Critical Imagination, Current Legal 
Problems, vol. 66, pp.1-32 
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schema identified by Ewick and Silbey,1127 Harding1128 and Halliday et al.1129  I 
have labelled this as ‘law as kudos’, in light of the kudos holders of this schema 
seem to feel.  It is argued that it is at least in part the doctor’s elite status that 
enables them to gain status or kudos from the law in this way. 1130  This schema 
emphasizes the relational nature of legal consciousness, as how colleagues 
and others respond to a doctor and his or her legal ‘expertise’ plays an 
important part in creating this schema. 
 
Having briefly summarised the research findings, the next section draws some 
overall conclusions from this study; it then turns to this study’s limitations, 
before ending with some recommendations. 
 
3. Overall Conclusions 
 
This study finds doctors seem to approach best interest decisions in two distinct 
ways.  Doctors who tend to have long term relationships with a child and family 
(the softliners) seem to conceptualise best interest decision-making as a series 
of conversations with a wide spectrum of actors. Their approach seems to be 
child focused, considering the best interests of each individual child. Other 
doctors (hardliners) who tend to be called in to care for a child in a medical 
crisis and tend not to have a prior relationship with the child, seem to draw on 
heuristics to guide them as to when a disabled child should or should receive 
                                                 
1127 Ewick P, Silbey SS, (1999), ‘Common Knowledge and Ideological Critique’, Law and Society Rev, 33, 
1027; Ewick, P, Silbey, SS, (1998) The Common Place of Law, Stories from everyday life, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago 
1128 Harding R, (2010), Regulating Sexuality: Legal Consciousness in lesbian and gay lives, Routledge, 
Abingdon  
1129 Halliday, S, Kitzinger, C, Kitzinger, J (2015) Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of 
chronic disorders of consciousness, Legal Studies, vol. 35, No. 1, pp.55-74; 
Halliday, S, Morgan, B (2013) I Fought the Law and the law Won? Legal Consciousness and the Critical 
Imagination, Current Legal Problems, vol. 66, pp.1-32 
1130 Chapter nine, para 3.1, p. 364 
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treatment.  No doubt in part due to the fact that they are acting in a medical 
crisis, the doctors in this study suggest these hardliner doctors, tend make 
decisions based on a ‘type’ of child, rather than on an individual.  However, this 
study also found that the softliner doctors can be reluctant to share with 
hardliner doctors their more detailed knowledge of an individual child.  The 
softliner doctors in this study and indeed some of the hardliners at the softliner 
end of the spectrum of positions,1131  suggested that they routinely find 
themselves faced with a choice between prioritising a disabled child’s best 
interests or prioritising the autonomy of a medical colleague’s clinical judgment.  
The doctors suggest that when faced with this choice there can be a tendency, 
due to an ingrained culture of respect for colleague’s clinical judgments and a 
wish to ‘not rock the boat’, that doctors will prioritise their colleague’s judgment 
over a child’s best interests.1132   
 
The hardliner doctors seem to be very aware of the law when making their best 
interest decisions, although it was found that this was often awareness of the 
possible legal implications of their actions for them as doctors, rather than an 
awareness of the law as it relates to the child.1133  The softliners in contrast do 
not, other than in extreme circumstances, seem to conceive of the law as 
relevant when making their day-to-day best interests decisions for disabled 
children.1134  What is particularly interesting about these two approaches is that 
it is the softliners with their relational and communicative approach to best 
interest decisions, who seem to be aligning their best interest decisions most 
closely with their professional guidance. and the jurisprudence of the English 
High Court.  In contrast, the hardliners who take what could be labelled as a 
                                                 
1131 Chapter six, para 7, pp. 261-275 
1132 Ibid 
1133 Chapter nine, para 3, pp. 361-378 
1134 Chapter nine, para 2, pp. 353-361 
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much more legalistic approach, seem be further from making decisions in the 
way their guidance suggests they should do.   
 
The finding that some doctors are not making best interest decisions in the way 
they are guided to do, raises the question whether there are enough checks and 
balances to protect severely disabled children when doctors are making these 
decisions.  If doctors are following professional guidance, which in turns follows 
the jurisprudence of the English High Court, there can be some confidence that 
checks and balances are in place.  However, this study has found that some 
doctors do not consult as widely, or consider an individual child’s best interests 
in as much detail as they perhaps should.  
 
As has been discussed, this study found that doctors seem to use proxies for 
best interests. It was found1135 that doctors define the factors they use when 
making best interest decisions very broadly, so that, for example, even factors 
such as prognosis can be defined to include broad non-clinical as well as 
clinical factors. Quality of life was particularly found to be used in this way.1136  It 
could be argued that defining factors broadly is a positive thing and in keeping 
with the jurisprudence of the English High Court judgments that: 
‘[b]est interests are not confined to best medical interests but embrace 
medical, social, emotional and welfare issues’.1137  
 
However, this study found that a distinction could be drawn between softliners 
and hardliners in this regard.  The softliners draw on wider ‘social, emotional 
and welfare issues’ by seeking information on these from, for example, a child’s 
teacher, social worker or parents. The hardliners seem to make assumptions 
about non-clinical aspects of a child’s life, such as, assuming a disabled child 
                                                 
1135 Chapter five, para 7, p. 236 
1136 Chapter five, para 5, pp. 207-226 
1137 Re OT [2009] EWHC 633 (Fam , para 98 
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does not attend school or cannot interact with his or her family.1138 It has been 
argued in this thesis that doctors can be seen to be acting in a quasi-judicial 
way.1139  The difference between the softliners and hardliners here make this 
point an important one.  It is argued that it is appropriate for a decision-maker 
such as a judge to make decisions based on evidence the decision maker has 
gathered, but perhaps not to make decisions based on his or her own 
assumptions and presumptions. 
 
This study has also identified a possible conflict here in the two lenses used in 
part two of this thesis to explore the doctors’ best interest decisions. There does 
seem to be a conflict with the legal norm that best interest decisions should be 
wide-ranging and Kennedy’s1140 concern that doctors should not make 
decisions on these wide-ranging issues. The only way to resolve this conflict is 
to recognise the quasi-judicial nature of best interest decision-making. A 
recommendation is made as how this might be addressed below.1141 
 
Exploring doctors best interest decisions through a legal consciousness lens 
also vividly illustrates how non-legal actors construct law in their every-day 







                                                 
1138 Chapter six, para 7.2.3, p. 272 
1139 Chapter five para 5.8, p. 225 
1140 Kennedy, I, (1979) What is a Medical Decision? Astor Lecture, Middlesex Hospital Medical School, 
London 
1141 Chapter 10, para 5.2.1, p.400 
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4. Study limitations 
 
Several limitations were identified at the start of this study and were listed in 
chapter three.1142 Further additional limitations have been identified during the 
research and analysis process, as follows: 
 
4.1 This study found that doctors who qualified in the 1990s, in general terms, 
seem to approach best interest decisions for disabled children differently from 
doctors who qualified in earlier decades.  The research does not include any 
doctors who qualified after 1998, which would have allowed an assessment to 
be made as to whether this shift has continued. A larger pool of more recently-
qualified doctors may have also made it possible to identify the reason for the 
apparent shift. 
 
4.2 The three consultants who advised on the survey during the pilot had all 
advised taking a cautious approach when asking doctors about quality of life 
and futility.  With hindsight, it seems these consultants may have been too 
cautious because the doctors in this study showed no reluctance to share their 
views.  The three consultants were all neurologists, chosen to advise on the 
study because of their expertise in the care and treatment of disabled children.  
At that time, I was not aware, as was found during the study, that paediatricians 
from different sub-specialisms can conceptualise factors such as quality of life 
differently. I may have received different advice on discussing these factors, if 
the three paediatricians consulted had been from different, rather than the 
same, sub-specialism. Questions probing more deeply on futility and quality of 
life, could have potentially been included in the survey. 
 
4.3  Due to the advice received from the advising consultants I also took a 
cautious approach in the early interviews, not probing the doctors too deeply.  
                                                 
1142 Chapter three, para 16, pp.133-135 
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However, it became clear as the interviews progressed that the doctors had no 
concerns about discussing their and their colleagues best interest decision-
making or being probed by me to give more detail. The later interviews 
therefore provided more data, depth and detail which was missing from the 
earlier interviews. 
 
4.4  As was seen in chapter four,1143 an unexpectedly high number of 
doctors1144 with a personal experience of disability, including being parents of a 
disabled child were drawn to this study.  This limited the study in two ways, 
firstly, the doctors reflections are likely to be atypical of paediatricians generally, 
as it seems likely that a doctor’s personal experience of disability will impact on 
how a doctor treats a disabled child and that child’s family. Indeed, the relevant 
doctors in this study confirmed they believed this to be the case. Secondly, it is 
a characteristic which is likely to make a doctor easily identifiable to colleagues. 
This meant this important characteristic could not be fully explored in this study, 
as it would have risked identifying the doctors involved. 
 
Having briefly outlined the overall conclusions and additional limitations of this 
study, this chapter and the thesis now concludes with recommendations for 
further research and for potential changes in the law and practice when best 




 5.1  Research recommendations 
Having completed this study, merit is seen in the following further research: 
 
                                                 
1143 Chapter four, para 4.9, pp.163-165 
1144 18% of the doctors in this survey reported being a parent of a disabled child.   
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5.1.1  A study exploring the same issues as this study with doctors who 
qualified since 2000 is recommended. This would hopefully be able to show 
whether the potential changes in the way doctors approach best interest 
decisions found in the doctors who qualified in the 1990s have continued.  
 
5.1.2  This study only explored the role of doctors in best interest decisions for 
disabled children.  Further studies exploring the role and experiences of nurses, 
parents and when possible the children, with those parties, is recommended.  
This has the potential to provide new insights into how best interest decisions 
are made and particularly how actively involved wider parties feel themselves to 
be. 
 
5.1.3  Both hardliner and softliner doctors in this small study suggested that 
there may be barriers to cognitively impaired children (or children believed by 
the doctor to be cognitively impaired) accessing PICU treatment in some 
circumstances. Some of the doctors in this study suggested they think PICU 
treatment should have sometimes have been given in circumstances when it 
was withheld.  A research study, such as a confidential inquiry by the National 
Confidential Inquiry into Patient Outcome and Death (NCEPOD), into this issue 
is recommended. In keeping with other NCEPOD inquiries, the research could 
identify the prevalence of this practice, if wider than the experience of the small 
number of doctors in this study, and identify whether this is a wider problem 
which needs addressing. If this is found, NCEPOD could then make appropriate 
recommendations. 
5.1.4  This study touched on, but did not explore in any detail, the question of 
whether the courts can be too deferential to doctors by failing to lift the veil and 
unpack doctors’ best interest decisions for disabled children.  A particular 
question for a new study could perhaps be how the courts balance the two legal 
principles of the paramountcy of a child’s best interests and the autonomy of a 
doctors’ clinical judgment. This study has found that doctors can put a lot of 
weight on non-clinical factors when deciding for disabled children, which 
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perhaps throws new light on earlier decisions where judges have chosen not to 
question a doctors’ clinical judgment.1145   
5.1.5  Some doctors in this study suggested a reluctant to provide information 
they know about a child, which may be relevant to a best interest decision being 
made by a medical colleague.  Research is recommended as to whether there 
is any merit in a duty of candour being introduced to encourage doctors to share 
information they have about patients with each other.  This could parallel the 
duty of candour introduced in 20141146 requiring health professionals to share 
information with patients and families.   The research could explore whether the 
duty is needed, if it is, the best form for it and the likelihood of it improving 
information sharing between health professionals. 
 
5.2 Recommendations for changes in the law and practice. 
5.2.1  Mediation  
Francis J, suggested in his final judgment in GOSH v Gard 1147 that third party 
assistance, perhaps mediation, is needed to ensure that a child’s best interests 
are fully explored when disagreements arise.  He was talking about 
disagreements between parents and doctors, whereas the focus here is 
disagreements between doctors.  
 
The reluctance of doctors to even voice their disagreement with colleagues’ 
about best interest decisions may still be a barrier to mediation. However, if best 
interest meetings chaired by a suitably qualified neutral party were to become 
routine, doctors (and indeed other interested parties such as parents and 
nurses) may feel more empowered to share their views and expertise. It is 
recommended that the chair should not be a doctor, to move away from an 
                                                 
1145 Chapter five, pp.181-236 
1146 Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014: Regulation 20 
1147 Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates & Gard [2017] EWHC 972 (Fam); para 130 
P a g e  | 401 
 
PhD The University of Edinburgh 2018 
assumption that best interest decisions are solely medical decisions and 
towards an universal premise, support by the law, that they are wide-ranging 
decisions that include clinical factors. However, in light of the resistance some 
doctors in this study showed towards external interference in their decision-
making,1148 it might prove difficult to convince some doctors to take part in 
mediation. Nonetheless, it is envisaged that best interest mediation meetings 
chaired by a suitably qualified chair may help address several of the challenges 
to optimum best interest decision-making the doctors in this study identified. 
 
5.2.2  Early exposure of medical students to disabled children 
This and the final recommendation relates to doctors training, rather than to law 
or practice. The softliner doctors repeatedly raised concerns that their hardliner 
colleagues did not understand severely disabled children or their lives.1149  To 
help address this issue, it is recommended that medical students and junior 
doctors routinely have placements, (for example at a nursery or school for 
children with special needs) so that doctors in training who will later be treating 
disabled children get to know disabled children when they are well.  Another 
advantage of such a placement is that it would encourage doctors in training to 
engage with other professional groups, in this case education staff, and 
recognise their knowledge and expertise.  This would hopefully encourage 
doctors to draw on wider expertise later in their careers. 
 
5.2.3  Disability Matters training  
The RCPCH, together with the Department of Health and a consortium of child 
disability voluntary organisations have produced a virtual training platform 
‘Disability Matters’.1150  Produced jointly by health, third sector professional, 
                                                 
1148 Chapter nine, para 3, pp. 361-378 
1149 Chapter six, para 7, pp.261-282 
1150 Disability Matters web platform, https://www.disabilitymatters.org.uk/ last accessed 30 January 
2018 
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parents of disabled children and disabled children, it provides comprehensive 
training on all aspects of child disability, including many of the issues raised by 
doctors in this thesis.  Its aims to improve professionals,’ especially health 
professions understanding of disabled children’s lives.  Health trusts and other 
bodies use it to train staff. It is recommended that Disability Matters becomes 
part of every paediatrician’s, including consultants, continuing professional 
development.  
 
I would like to conclude this thesis by thanking all the doctors involved for being 
so generous with their time and reflections.  Without you, this study would not 
have been possible. 
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Appendix 3 
Letter to potential survey participants 
 Dear Dr  X 
 
I am a PhD researcher at Edinburgh University undertaking research 
into difficult medical decision making for disabled children in the 
UK.  As part of that research I have produced, in consultation with my 
academic supervisors and with consultant paediatric specialists and 
nurses here in Scotland, an on-line surveys for doctors  
asking about difficult medical decision making concerning 
disabled children.  I am interested to learn how doctors  
make difficult medical decisions involving disabled children and what 
factors influence these decisions.  The surveys are intended for 
doctors working with children in the UK. 
 
I wish to canvass the views and experience of doctors from a number of 
paediatric specialities and would be extremely interested in your 
views as an experienced paediatric specialist.  The surveys have been 
given ethical clearance by Edinburgh University and the South East 
Scotland Research Ethics Service which reviewed the surveys for the 
NHS, has informed me that this project "does not need NHS ethical 
review under the terms of the Governance Arrangements for Research 
Ethics Committees in the UK." 
 
The paediatric consultants and nurses with whom I have consulted in developing 
the survey felt that the questions raised are important ones, so I 
very much hope you will be able to complete the survey.  Please also 
feel free to forward details of the surveys to medical  
colleagues.  I would also be interested in the views of Registrars and 
junior doctors, as well as the views of consultants, so please feel 
free to forward details of the survey to junior colleagues as well as 
to fellow consultants. 
 
If you wish to know more about my PhD, you can read this at 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/research/students/133.aspx 
 
I am also very happy to answer any questions you may have. 
 




Sincere thanks for taking the time to read this email and for any for 
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Difficult Medical Decision Making for the UK's Disabled Children  
Page 1: Welcome 
Welcome to the Difficult Decision Making for the UK's Disabled Children Survey. This survey 
aims to collect data for use in a PhD study examining difficult medical decision making for the 
UK's disabled children. 
You can choose to give your name or you can choose to complete this survey anonymously. 
The primary purpose of this study is to ascertain how doctors make difficult medical decisions 
for disabled children in reality and what influences those decisions. 
In answering this survey, you are asked to reflect on your own experience of difficult medical 
decision making for disabled children. 
For the purpose of this study the term "disabled children" is used to describe children with 
chronic health conditions and physical and sometimes sensory and cognitive impairments. 
These children will often have some level of neurological impairment, will often be described as 
having "life limiting" conditions, although they will not necessarily be terminally ill. 
THE RESEARCHER WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS IN PERSON 
WITH A SAMPLE OF PARTICIPANTS FROM THIS STUDY THE ISSUES RAISED IN THIS 
SURVEY. IF YOU WOULD BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH THE RESEARCHER TO DISCUSS 
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THIS SURVEY IN GREATER DETAIL, PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR 
NAME AND CONTACT DETAILS WHERE INDICATED IN THE BODY OF THE SURVEY. 
YOUR NAME AND CONTACT DETAILS WILL BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL, WILL NOT BE 
PUBLISHED AND WILL ONLY BE ACCESSIBLE TO THE RESEARCHER. 
The survey can be saved part way through and takes around 45 minutes to complete. 
THIS SURVEY HAS ETHICAL APPROVAL FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH AND 
HAS BEEN APPROVED AS NOT NEEDING "NHS ETHICAL REVIEW UNDER THE TERMS 
OF THE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS FOR RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEES IN THE 
UK" BY THE SOUTH EAST SCOTLAND RESEARCH ETHICS SERVICE. 
NOTE that once you have clicked on the CONTINUE button at the bottom of each page you can 
not return to review or amend that page 
The researcher can be contacted by email at [email provided] 
    
Data Protection 
All data collected in this survey will be held securely. Participants’ names and place of work will 
not be published. 
Participants will be referred to in all published data by a code and reference may be made to a 
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participant's specialism, sex and NHS region (for example Doc001 a female neurologist from 
London or Doc 002 a male respiratory specialist from Wales). 
Aggregate data may be retained to benchmark future surveys. 
Participants may remain anonymous, but do please provide your name and contact details if 
you are willing to assist further with this research project, or if you would like to receive a 
summary of the research findings. 




1.  Surname Name 
 
You can choose to remain anonymous and complete this survey. However, if you would be 
willing to participate further in this research or would like to receive a summary of the study 
findings, please provide your full name and contact details. Your name and contact details will 
be kept confidential and will NOT be used other than to contact you to arrange further 
discussion or to send you details of the study findings. 
 
2.  First Name 
 
3. Contact email address 
 
4. Postal Address 
 
5. Contact telephone number 
 





7.Would you like to receive a summary report of the findings of this research once the research 




8. Current specialism 
 
          Please select 
Community Paediatrics/ Endocrinology/ General Paediatrics/ Intensive Care/ Neurology/ 
Respiratory Medicine/. Other 
           If you selected Other, please specify: 
 
9. Why did you choose to specialise in this area of medicine? 
 
Training and Current Post 
 
The following section asks you questions about your training and current position. 
 
10. Current Post 
 
11. Number of years in current post 
 
12. Professional Qualifications 
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13. At which university/universities did you undertake medical training? 
 
14.In which year did you qualify as a doctor? 
 
15. Of which professional bodies are you a member? 
 
For example, Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health; British Paediatric Neurology 
Association; The Intensive Care Society etc 
 
16. In which NHS regions have you worked? 
Eastern/London/North & Yorkshire/North West/Northern Ireland/Scotland/South East/South 
West/Trent/Wales/West Midlands/Other 
 
If you selected Other, please specify: 
 
17. What impact, if any, do you think your training had on the way you now approach difficult 
medical decisions for disabled children? 
 
18. What impact, if any, do you think colleagues you have worked with in the past or currently 
work with have had on the way you approach difficult decision making for disabled children? 
 
Child Dependant Factors 
This section asks you about the child dependant factors you consider when making difficult 
medical decisions concerning disabled children. 
 
Throughout this study the child or children under consideration are disabled children with 
chronic health conditions, with physical and sometimes sensory and cognitive impairments. The 
children under consideration will often have some level of neurological impairment; will often be 
described as having "life limiting" conditions, although they will not necessarily be terminally ill. 
 
19. What sort of difficult decisions do you find yourself making when dealing with disabled 
children? 
 
20.What aspect of these decisions do you find most difficult? 
 
21. What are the main factors which you consider when making these decisions? 
 
22. Do you have a written framework for making these decisions? 
      Please select 
             
              YES/NO 
 
23.If yes, who created the framework? 
 
For example, is the framework one you have produced yourself; was it produced by you with 
colleagues; is it a standard framework used throughout your institution; is it a framework 
produced by a professional body such as a Royal College or is it a framework used 
internationally? There may be other possibilities. 
 
24. What part does a child's medical prognosis play? 
 
25.What factors do you consider when making a medical prognosis for an individual child with 
disabilities?  
 
26.What factors make a medical prognosis harder or easier? 
 
27. How confident do you feel that you are able to make an accurate prognosis for an individual 
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child with disabilities? 
 
very confident/confident/moderately confident/somewhat lacking in confidence/not at all 
confident 
 
28. What part does futility play in difficult medical decisions for disabled children? 
 
29. What impact does a child's quality of life have on these decisions? 
 
30.If you assess a child's quality of life, what factors do you feel are relevant to this 
assessment? 
 
31.What part does a child's cognitive ability play in these assessments? 
 
32.If you make such an assessment, how do you make an assessment of a disabled child's 
level of cognitive ability? 
 
33.If you make assessments of disabled children's cognitive ability, how confident do you feel 
that you are able to make an accurate assessment of an individual disabled child's cognitive 
ability? 
 
very confident/confident/moderately confident/somewhat lacking in confidence/not at all 
confidence/assessment not made 
 
34.With whom do you consult when making difficult medical decisions about an individual 
disabled child? 
 
35.Do you ever find you have a difference of opinion with collegues when making difficult 




36. If you do ever have a difference of opinion with collegues, how do you reach a resolution? 
 
37.How relevant are a child's personal circumstances and home environment when making 
these sorts of decisions? 
 
38.What is the role of the medics in these types of difficult medical decisions? 
 
39.What is the role of the nursing team in this type of difficult medical decisions? 
 
40.What is the role of the parents or the child's primary care giver(s) in these types of 
decisions? 
 
41.What is the role of the child in these types of difficult medical decisions? 
 
Please use the box below to add any further comments or observations you may have about 
your experience of making difficult medical decisions concerning disabled children. 
 
The Law, Rights and Ethics 
 
42.What influence does the law have on your medical decision making for disabled children? 
 
43.What training (if any) did you receive in medical law, pre-qualification? 
 
44. What training (if any) did you receive in medical law post qualification? 
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45. Do you ever consult with your health authority lawyers? 
           
           YES/NO 
46. If yes, in what sort circumstances? 
 
47. If you ever do consult with your health authority lawyers, how helpful do you find the advice 
they give you? 
 
not at all helpful/somewhat unhelpful/moderately helpful/helpful/very helpful 
 
48.The UK is said to be becoming a more and more litigious country, have you noticed this 
impacting on your practise and if so how? 
 
49. Have you ever acted as an expert witness? 
 
             Please select 
           YES/NO 
 
50. If yes, in what type of cases? 
 
51. If yes, has this had an impact on your own practise, and if so how? 
 
52. What relevance (if any) do you think the law has in the context of these types of difficult 
medical decisions? 
 
53. What training (if any) did you receive in human rights pre-qualification? 
 
54. What training (if any) did you receive in human rights Post qualification? 
 
55. Are a child's human rights a factor you consciously consider when making difficult medical 
decisions for a disabled child? 
 
              Please select 
           
              YES/NO 
               
56. What relevance (if any) do you think human rights have in the context of these types of 
difficult medical decisions? 
 
57. What training (if any) did you receive in ethics, pre-qualification? 
 
58. Post qualification 
 
59.What relevance (if any) do you think ethics have in the context of these types of difficult 
medical decisions for disabled children? 
 
60. Where would you turn to for support if you were looking for ethical guidance? 
 
61.Are there any areas of law, rights or ethics where you would welcome training and if yes, 
what are these? 
 
Please use the box below to add any comments or observations you may have concerning the 
law, rights and ethics in the context of your experience of making difficult medical decisions for 
disabled children 
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Resources 
 
62. How, if at all, does the availability of resources impact on your difficult medical decisions for 
disabled children? 
 
63. What influence, if any, do you have on the allocation of resources for disabled children 
under your care? 
 
64. What role, if any, does your hospital management play in these sorts of difficult medical 
decisions for disabled children? 
 
65. Please use the box below to add any comments or observations you may have regarding 
resources in the context of your experience of difficult medical decision making for disabled 
children. 
 
More information about you 
This section asks for more information about you. The questions in this section are all optional, 
but it would be much appreciated if this information could be provided. The data collected in this 
section will NOT be attributed to individuals. 
 
66. Have you ever lived outside of the UK for a period of more than 1 year? 
 
No/Yes, I have lived abroad as a child below the age of five years old/Yes, I have lived abroad 
as a child between the ages of five and ten years old/Yes, I have lived abroad as a child over 
the age of 10 years old/Yes, I have lived abroad as an adult for between one and three 
years/Yes, I have lived abroad as an adult for more than three years/Yes, I completed part or all 
of my medical training abroad/Yes, I have worked as a qualified doctor outside of the UK 
 
67. If you have answered yes to the last question, please name the country/ies where you have 
lived. 
 




or multiple ethnic origin/Other 
 
If you selected Other, please specify: 
 
69. How old are you? 
              Please select 
 
Under 18 years/Between 18- 25 years/Between 26-34 years/Between 35-44  
years/Between 45-54 years/Between 55-64 years/Between 65-74 year/75 years or over 
 
70. Are you a parent? 
Yes/No 
 
71. If yes, what impact, if any, did becoming a parent have on your decision making in these 
types of circumstances? 
 
72. Do you have any personal experience of living with disability? 
No personal experience/I have a disability myself/I have experience of parenting a 
disabled child/I had a disabled sibling as a child/I have or have had a close relative 
(other than a son or daughter) with a disability/Other 
 
If you selected Other, please specify: 
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73. If you have personal experience of living with disability, what impact, if any, do you think this 
experience has on your difficult medical decision making for disabled children? 
 
74. Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion or faith? 
              Please select 
           
              No/Christian-Protestant/Christian- Roman Catholic/Christian-Other/Buddist 
              Hindu/Jewish/Muslim/Sikh/Other 
 
If you selected Other, please specify: 
 
75. As a child, were you brought up in a particular religion or faith? 
              Please select 
 
              No/Christian-Protestant/Christian-Roman Catholic/Christian-Other/Buddist 
              Hindu/Jewish/Muslim/Sikh/Other 
               
If you selected Other, please specify: 
 
76. If you now have or were brought up as a child in a particular religion or faith, what impact, if 
any, do you think this has on your difficult decision making for disabled children? 
 
77. What changes would you make to the way difficult medical decisions are made for disabled 
children in the UK? 
 
78. Please use the box below to add any comments or observations you may have about your 
experience of making difficult medical decisions for disabled children or about this survey or 
research. 
 
Thank you for your valuable time and for completing this survey. 
 
Consent Notice 
The data supplied by you for this survey will be used as part of PhD research examining difficult 
medical decision making for the UK's disabled children. 
This survey has ethical approval from the University of Edinburgh an has been approved as not 
needing "NHS ethical review under the terms of the governance arrangements for research 
ethics committees in the UK" by the South East Scotland Research Ethics Service. 
All raw data collected will be kept securely and accessed only by the researcher. 
Your name and place of work will be kept confidential, although reference may be made in any 
published work arising from this survey to your job title and the NHS region in which you work. 
 
Any personal information, such as religious beliefs, ethnic origin or personal experience of 
disability will not be attributed to any individual participant. 
 
CLICKING ON THE CONTINUE BUTTON INDICATES YOUR CONSENT TO BE A 
PARTICIPANT IN THIS SURVEY. 
Finish 
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Appendix 5 
 
Letter to interviewees 
 
Dear Dr X 
 
Difficult Medical Decision Making for the UK's Disabled Children  
Thank you for agreeing to meet with me/speak with me by telephone at 
[                        ] 
 to discuss your survey responses and difficult decision making for disabled children in more 
detail. 
I shall [detail of arrangements for meeting or telephone conversation]. 
As you will recall the primary purpose of my PhD study is to ascertain how doctors make difficult 
medical decisions for disabled children in reality and what influences those decisions. 
 
You will also recall for the purpose of this study the term "disabled children" is used to describe 
children with chronic health conditions and physical and sometimes sensory and cognitive 
impairments. These children will often have some level of neurological impairment, will often be 
described as having "life limiting" conditions, although they will not necessarily be terminally ill. 
 
Your name and contact details will be kept confidential.  Your participation in this research will 
be kept confidential and all original data will be stored securely and will only be accessible by 
me.  Every attempt will be made not to identify you in my thesis or in any subsequent 
publications.  Information you provide will not be published in such a way that you would be 
readily identifiable. However, due to the close nature of the paediatric profession there is the 
possibility that a colleague may be able to identify you from information provided.  
 
With your consent our discussion will be recorded using a recording App on a mini iPad.  I am 
happy to provide you with a copy of the transcript of our discussion once it has been 
transcribed. 
 
This research has ethical approval from the University of Edinburgh and has been approved as 
not needing ‘NHS ethical review under the terms of governance arrangements for research 
ethics committees in the UK’ by the South East Scotland Research Ethics Service. 
 
When we meet/speak, I will remain you of this information and also ask for your consent to 
make the digital audio recording. 
 
You will be free to withdraw from this research at any time. 
 
Thank you for being generous with your time. 
 
I look forward to meeting/ speaking with you. 
 
Kind regards 
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Questions and question areas to address.  
There are three groups of questions 
(1) questions to all doctors; 
(2) questions tailored dependent on doctor’s survey responses; and 
(3) questions about law, rights and ethics. 
Doctors will be encouraged to reflect freely and ‘dictate’ largely the areas to be discussed, 
so all questions will only be used if necessary and as prompts. 
Preliminaries 
 Thanking them for their time 
 Consent and confidentiality 
 Outlining research 
 
Questions to all doctors 
 
I would like you now to reflect on how you make clinical decisions. 
These are some of the areas I am interested to know more about: 
 
1. What are types of difficult medical decisions you are called upon to make? 
2. What differences are there, if any, in the way you approach these decisions if the child 
in questions is significantly disabled? 
3. What resources do you draw on when making difficult decisions? 
 Prompts –  
 colleagues 
 medical/non-medical 
 child’s family 
 the child 
 guidance 
 ethics committees 
 law/rights 
4. What would make these kind of decisions easier 
 Prompts 
 Resources 
 More professional bodies could do eg RCPCH/GMC 
 Training /education 
 Colleagues 
5. A study [give brief detail] reported in the Lancet found that doctors across Europe were 
greatly influenced by their faith when making clinical decisions, what is your experience 
in this regard? 
6. Do you think there is any difference between the way male and female doctors 
approach difficult medical decisions? 
7. Aaron and Schwartz American researchers who did a study in the 1980s in the UK, 
found that British doctors “British physicians often appear to rationalize or at least 
redefine, medical standards so that he can deal more comfortably with resource 
constraints”.   They reported 
“Thus it is clear that not all British doctors believe they are providing all potential 
beneficial care to their patients.  Many realize, according to one consultant, that they 
are acting as society’s agent in rationing care”.    
 Does this chime with your experience?   
 How does it manifest itself in day to day practice.  
 What impact, if any do you think it has on the care of disabled children or 
children with more complex health needs? 
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Then go on to ask whether they have experienced disabled children not getting care, eg 
ITU; ventilation; antibiotics. 
 
Questions specific to doctor’s circumstances 
 
1. Question on specialism – whether the doctor thinks doctors from different specialisms 
approach difficult decisions differently? If yes, how, why doctors think this is? 
2. Question on different hospitals or different departments – whether there are work place 
cultures that developed and what influences this is it does happen, is it a “key player” ie 
influential senior doctor who sets tone of department or hospital. 
3. Question to doctors who are parents as to whether and if so how being a parent 
changed their approach 
4. Question to doctors who are parents of disabled child whether this changed their 
approach. Do they find their approach differs from other doctors. 
5. Question to doctors who have worked abroad on difference seen, particularly with 
regard to care and treatment of children with significant disability. 
 
 Questions on law, rights and ethics 
1. Taylor question to individual doctor about their own education and training in these 
areas, e.g. ask those who have had significant training and education, why and what 
difference if any it has made. Those who have not, why not and whether they think 
more training in law, rights and ethics would help. 
2. Questions about relevance of law, rights and ethics to doctor’s work and doctor’s 
understanding of these disciplines in relation to their work. 
3. How aware are doctors of case law? 
 e.g. are they aware of cases such as Glass/Wyatt/ or some of the less “high 
profile cases”? 
 How if at all do cases feed into their practice? 
 What is their perception of the courts approach? ( may say they don’t have one) 
 
4. Question about use of professional guidance using RCPCH guidance on withdrawing 
and withholding care as example – exploring doctors’ awareness and use of guidance? 
E.g.  
 Are they aware of it? (Only two mentioned it in survey) 
 How do they keep up to date with new guidance, what about junior colleagues? 
 Do doctors discuss it with colleagues either in theory or in practice in real life 
case situations? 
 What do they think of this kind of guidance? 
5. Question about dealing with conflict disagreement, with colleagues and with families. 
How it is dealt with; whether there are better ways it could be addressed. 
6. Question of any suggestions/ recommendations doctors have to improve care for 
disabled children from perspective of doctor, child & family. 
 
 
 
END 
 
 
 
 
 
 
